

CIULIUS CÆSAR PERPETUAL DICTATOR.

MDCCLV



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THE

COMMENTARIES

OF

CÆSAR,

TRANSLATED into ENGLISH.

To which is prefixed a

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

The ROMAN ART of WAR.

By WILLIAM DUNCAN,
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen.

In Two VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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ROYALHIGHNESS

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SIR, Ver

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are informed of the Motives which determined him in all his Enterprises, of the various Difficulties he had to encounter, and of the Steps by which in the end he was enabled to surmount all Opposition. In a word, Prudence in Counsel, Courage and Intrepidity in the Field, a calm Presence of Mind in the midst of Dangers, and an amazing Dexterity in sudden and unforeseen Emergencies, are here exemplified in the Conduct of a Leader, whom all succeeding Ages have agreed to regard as the most finished Pattern of military Merit.

It is the Observation of one of the wisest of the Roman Historians, "that "War is in a peculiar manner the Pro"vince of a Prince; and that though
"civil Accomplishments are by no means "to be neglected, yet to the Person of
the Sovereign more immediately belongs the Merit and Praise of being
a great General." And indeed as it is among the principal Duties of a King, to protect his Subjects from foreign Invafions,

fions, to baffle the Attempts of ambitious and aspiring Tyrants, and to guard against the Incroachments of powerful Neighbours, nothing can be more evident, than that a due Institution in the Art of War ought to be considered as an essential Part of the Education of a Prince.

Some perhaps may be of opinion, that the Maxims of the present Age, which forbid Kings to appear in Person at the head of Armies, and injoin them rather to delegate their Power to others, render military Talents less necessary in the Rulers of Nations. But the this be in reality a very wife Policy, and excellently calculated to prevent those unjust Wars, which have no other Foundation but the personal Ambition and Glory of Princes, yet does it by no means dispense with the Obligation of applying to the Study of Arms. The due modelling of the Army, the introducing a proper Discipline among the Troops, and the Disposal of military Preferments, are intirely in the Breast of the Sovereign, who would be but ill qualified for the Exercise of so great a Trust,

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if

if wholly unacquainted with martial Af-It is likewise well known, that in dangerous domestic Seditions, to which all States are at times liable, nothing tends more to confirm the well-affected in their Duty, and to check the Machinations of the Factious, than when a King every way qualified to command, appears in Person at the head of his Troops. In general Confederacies too, where many Nations unite to oppose some threatening overgrown Power, it is often impossible to reconcile their various Interests, and preserve the Unanimity necessary to give Force and Vigour to their Operations, unless some Prince of distinguished Reputation, and eminent Quality in the League, charge himself with the Conduct of the War, and employ his whole Authority to prevent those Competitions, Jealoufies and mutual Animofities, which are every moment ready to break out in an Army composed of so many separate and divided Bodies.

HENCE it is that Valour and the military Virtues have always been confidered

as Objects highly worthy the Pursuit of a Prince; nor do they ever fail to meet with their due Share of Applause, unless where they degenerate into that hurtful Ambition, that immoderate Thirst of Conquest, which prompts Men rather to be the Destroyers than to be the Protectors of Nations. As the Commentaries of Cæsar furnish the best Lessons and Precepts of War, fo the Example and Hiftory of the same Cæsar demonstrate, that the greatest Talents, when not directed to laudable Ends, are utterly infufficient, either for present Security, or future Fame. Tho' his Abilities as a General and a Statefman were never perhaps equalled before or fince; yet as he employed them, not to promote the Welfare, but to disturb the Peace of Society; not to defend, but to overturn the Liberties of his Country; he could neither escape the Hatred of the Age in which he lived, nor the Reproaches of Posterity. We find him often in Distress, and sometimes in Despair, ready to fly his Country, threatened with being tried and condemned as a public Criminal; and at last, after a restless Life, full of

of Anxiety and Care, cut off by a violent and untimely Death, just as he had established his Tyranny, tho' with it he could not establish his own Happiness. Had he employed his Authority and Address to preserve public Liberty; had he, for this glorious End, exerted his Industry and admirable Talents; how amiable must he have appeared, in what Security might he have lived, and with what Veneration would he have been regarded by all future Ages?

Your Royal Highness is born to govern a People, who have at all times diffinguished themselves by their Love of Liberty; a People always obedient to just Laws, but impatient under Oppression, and infinitely jealous of their Privileges. Tacitus speaking of them sisteen hundred Years ago says, "that they chear-"fully complied with the Levies of Men, "with the Imposition of Tribute, and "with all the necessary Demands "of Government, provided they re-"ceived no illegal Treatment or In-"fults from their Governors; for those "they

"they acknowledge any other Subjection "to the Romans, than what confifted in "an Obedience to just Laws, not the "Submission of Slaves." Such was the Character of the British People at that time, such has been their Character in all Ages, and such it remains to this Day. Princes who observed the Laws always found them peaceable Subjects, and ready to comply with their just Demands: but when Infringements were made upon the public Liberty, they grew uneasy and discontented, and the Sovereign, by grasping at too much, frequently lost all.

INDEED it appears in our History, that the Design of assuming an Authority independent of the Laws, was never entertained by any of the best and ablest of our Princes; who always esteemed it more glorious to rule over a free People, than to command a Nation of Slaves. Among many remarkable Examples of this, that of the ever memorable Henry the Fifth seems in a particular manner deserving of Notice. He was a wise and valiant Prince,

who scorned to incroach upon the Liberties of the Subjects, and abhorred the uninstifiable Arts by which they had been impaired. He esteemed their Courage, Strength, and Love, to be his greatest Advantage, Riches, and Glory; and readily joined with them to extinguish the mischievous Abuses that had been introduced by some of his Predecessors. He aimed at making good his Claim to the Crown of France, which he knew was only to be effected by the Bravery of a free and well-fatisfied People. Slaves will always be Cowards, and, when they dare declare themselves, Enemies to their Master: by bringing his Subjects into that Condition, he must infallibly have ruined his own Designs, and made them unfit to fight either for him or for themselves. He defired not only that his People should be free during his Time, but that his Succeffors should not be able to deprive them of so valuable a Bleffing. He knew that he did not reign for himself but for his People, and regarding their Safety as the fupreme Law of Government, always paffed with the utmost Chearfulness such Laws

Laws as were presented to him in behalf of public Liberty. The Event was such as might be expected. Never Prince was better obeyed and served by his Subjects, more successful and formidable abroad, more beloved at home, or more sincerely lamented after his Death. In sine, History no where surnishes a more persect Pattern of a wise, valiant, and virtuous King.

IT has been the good Fortune of these Nations for some time past to be bleft with a feries of fuch Princes. The excellent Principles of Government adopted by King William at the Revolution, have been steddily adhered to by his Successors of your illustrious House. Nor has the Security of domestic Freedom alone employed their Attention. Like that glorious Monarch they have exerted their utmost Influence to preserve the Independency of the other States of Europe, and by a Conduct fo truly noble merited the greatest of all Titles, that of being The Patrons of Public Liberty, and The Friends of Mankind.

Your

DEDICATION. medity, and the intire Love of your Sub-

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS is now at an Age when Examples of this kind make the deepest Impression; and the early good Dispositions You discover, joined to the excellent Institution under which You have the Happiness to be formed, give the justest reason to believe, that they will not fail of having their due effect. The Public beholds with Pleasure the Seeds of your many ripening Virtues, and charmed with the Prospect of the Advantages to be reaped from their Maturity, feems to address You in the Words of Æneas to his Son Ascanius, a young Prince of great Expectation, in whose Person were centered the Hopes of a whole People.

---- Te, Animo repetentem Exempla tuorum, Et Pater Æneas, et Avunculus excitet Hector.

THAT You may improve daily in every laudable and useful Quality, and that when by the Appointment of Providence You are called to the Exercise of the Government, You may long fway the British Scepter with uninterrupted Prof-

perity, and the intire Love of your Subjects, is the fincere and ardent Prayer Age when Examples of this kind or, to the deepelt Impression; and the early good Dispositions You of Acles joined to the excellent Inflication under which You have the Happinels to be formed, give Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's most bumble not fail of having their due effect. The Public beholds with Pleafure the Seeds of most dutiful, and asm moy ed with the Profpect of the Advantages to be reaped from their Maturity, feems most obedient Servant, to his Son Ascanius, a young Prince of great Expediation, in whose Person were centered the Hopes of a whole People.

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HE following Translation of Cæsar's Commentaries was done from the celebrated Edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson in 1712. All possible Care has been taken to render it exact, and to preferve the Distinctness and Perspicuity of Expression for which the Original is so justly famous. The Reader will perceive, that the very turn and manner of Cæsar has been copied with the utmost Attention; and tho' the Success may not always answer Expectation, yet Candor will induce him to make great Allowances, when he confiders the inimitable Beauty of the Latin, and the Difficulty of expressing ancient Manners and Transactions in modern Language.

It was at first intended to accompany the Translation with Notes, explaining what was difficult and obscure in the Roman Art of War. But as a few loose scattered Remarks would have contributed little towards giving the Reader

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Reader a distinct Idea of what was necessary to be known on this Head, there is substituted in their place a Discourse concerning the military Customs of the Ancients, in which all that is curious and most interesting relating to these Matters is fully and copiously explained. Besides the ancient Authors; Rollin, Folard, Orrery, Feuquiere, Machiavel, Montefquieu, and several other Moderns have been confulted, and all fuch Paffages felected, as tended to throw Light upon this Branch of the Roman Antiquities. As the Author, by his Situation in Life, is necessarily a Stranger to the practical Part of War, he pretends not to offer any thing of his own upon the Subject. If he has collected with Care from the Writers before-mentioned, and disposed the Materials they furnish in such a manner, as sufficiently to display the Proficiency and Improvements of the Ancients in military Knowledge, he has compassed all he intended, and the Reader will have no cause to complain.

THE ancient Names of Places are retained in the Translation, as well to avoid giving too modern

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Practice, as because they are sufficiently familiar to an English Ear, being constantly made use of by all Historians who treat of those Times in our Language. But as the following Work may perhaps fall into the Hands of Persons little acquainted with ancient Geography, and who would therefore be at a loss in comparing Casar's Descriptions with the present Face of the Country, the Reader will find at the End of the Book a large geographical Index, in which the ancient Names of Places, as near as can be discovered with any Certainty, are explained by the modern.

It may be just proper to mention, that befides the Seven Books of the Gallic War, and the Three of the Civil, written by Cæsar himfelf, the Supplements of A. Hirtius Pansa are likewise inserted in the following Translation, consisting of one additional Book to the Gallic War, and three Books of the Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars.

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Vol. I.

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CHAP. L

Of the Undertaking and Declaration of War:

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Original, role by degrees to be Sovereigns of the World. If we
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ROMAN ART of WAR.

CHAP. I.

Of the Undertaking and Declaration of War.

I. HE Romans, from small Beginings and an almost contemptible Original, rose by degrees to be Sovereigns of the World. If we enquire into the Causes of this, we shall find, that nothing so much contributed to it, as the excellence of their military Discipline. War is a Profession of the greatest Importance to Society. The Security of our Lives, Liberties, Properties, and indeed of all that is dear

CHAP and valuable among Men, depends in a man-I. ner entirely on it. Good and wholfom Laws may establish Peace and Unity within, and if executed with vigour, will prevent the Inroads of Vice and Corruption; but are by no means sufficient to screen a State from powerful Neighbours, or secure it against the Affaults of the Ambitious and Afpiring. Hence in the most peaceful Times, it has ever been esteemed a maxim of found Policy, to cultivate the Science of Arms with the fame Application, as when we are threatened with War and Invafions. For however little we may ourselves be disposed to disturb the Tranquillity of the Nations around us, yet the Experience of all Ages makes it abundantly evident, that the most powerful and prevailing Argument to keep those quiet, from whom we have reason to apprehend any danger, is by letting them fee that we are prepared to receive them, and capable of making them repent of their Rashness, should they unjustly seek a pretence of falling upon us. In all wife States therefore, the Profession of a Soldier has ever been held in honour: nor do we read any Part of ancient History with greater pleasure, than that by which we learn, how free Nations have defended themselves against the Attempts of incroaching Tyrants, and when roused to a thorough exertion of their Strength, overthrown in the end that very Power, which once threatened to crush them. It is not indeed

deed to be denied, that the military Virtues of aC H A P. free People, have not always been confined to Self-defence, and the avenging themselves of their Enemies. Ambition, and a Consciousness of Superiority, have sometimes prompted even these to aspire at universal Dominion. This is remarkably exemplified in the History of the Roman Commonwealth, from whose Constitution, and Love of Liberty, one would naturally expect a very different Spirit. Who more likely to become the great Patrons and Defenders of the common Rights and Privileges of Mankind, than a People, whose prevailing Passion was an Abhorrence of Slavery; and who in a long feries of Struggles with the Nations around them, were never weary of fighting in defence of that Liberty, which is the Eirthright and Inheritance of every reasonable Creature? And yet we find, that no fooner were they fecure of their own Freedom, than a thirst of Rule took possession of their Minds, and they forcibly imposed that Yoke upon others, which they had disdained to submit to themselves. The Superiority of their military Discipline enabled them by degrees to accomplish this unjust Design. Trained up in a continued Succession of Wars, and equally attentive to their own Victories and Defeats, they were daily improving themselves in the Art of Conquest, and attained at length to so great a mastery in it, that no Nation was able to withstand their Attacks. It cannot therefore a 3

CHAP but be an agreeable, as well as useful Inquiry, to trace out the military Customs of a People, so renowned for their Knowledge in the Art of War. And as it is my Design, to present the Publick with a new Translation of the Commentaries of Cæsar, who was confessedly the greatest General Rome ever produced, I imagine a Discourse of this nature may be not improperly presixed to that Work.

II. LET us then take a view of the Conduct of the Romans, from their first engaging in a War, through all the different Branches of its Management, until they at last bring it to a happy Period. This will naturally lead us to confider the Ceremonies attending the Declaration of War; the Manner of levying Troops, and forming a Roman Army; the Precautions used in Marches and Encampments; their Order of Battle, Conduct in Sieges, and the Machines and other Contrivances made use of in the Attack and Defence of Places. Under these several Heads may be comprehended every thing that is material and important upon this Subject. It is not however my Defign, to enter into Grammatical Niceties, or a minute Detail of particular Criticisms, but only to give a general Idea of the military Customs of the Romans, intermixed with fuch Remarks, as may ferve to lay open the Wisdom and Policy of their first Contrivance, and show their natural Tendency

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Tendency to that Superiority and universal CHAP.

Dominion, which they at length procured the Commonwealth.

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III. THE Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War were instituted by Numa Pompilius, the fecond King of Rome. Romulus, the Founder of that Colony, was, during the whole course of his Reign, engaged in perpetual Contests with his Neigh-The Necessity he was under, at his first setting out, of procuring Wives for his Subjects by the Rape of the Sabine Virgins, exasperated all the Nations round about, and begot no small Jealously of the new Colony, which seemed to be founded on maxims of Violence and Injustice. We are not therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a Series of Wars, which continued almost without intermission to the end of his Life. Thus the Romans, who were originally in great measure a Band of Fugitives and Outlaws, improving their natural Fierceness by having their Arms constantly in their Hands, gradually grew to be a brave and warlike People. Numa, who succeeded Romulus, being a Prince of a pacific Temper, fet himself to check this martial Ardor, and form them to Religion, and a Respect for the Gods. In order to stifle that impetuous defire of War, which he found fo prevalent among them, he established certain Ceremonies, which were always to precede the commencing of Hostilities,

Tendency

CHAP and committed them to the care of a College of Heralds, called Feciales. The Chief or Head of this Society had the Name of Pater Patratus: and it was his peculiar Office, to make Peace, or denounce War. Livy, indeed, feems to confider him as a temporary Minister: for, in his Account of the Treaty concluded with the Albans, before the triple Combat of the Horatii and Curiatii, he makes one of the Feciales choose a Pater Patratus, on purpose to perform that Ceremony. But as I have no defign to enter into a Controverfy of this nature, little important in itself, and not easy to be decided, I shall content myfelf with observing, that the Officer here mentioned, whether constant or temporary, was one who had a Father and Son both alive. Hence this Title of Pater Patratus, which may be interpreted to imply a more perfect kind of Father, as they feem to have imagined him to be, whose own Father was still living, after he himself had been a Father for some time. Such an one, it was believed, would be an equitable and moderate Judge in Affairs of this kind, and not over forward to plunge his Country into a War, in which fo many Lives that must be dear to him, would unavoidably be exposed to hazard.

> IV. And indeed the Ceremonies themfelves, as instituted by Numa, seem peculiarly calculated to render the Romans cautious and circumspect,

circumspect, in a Matter of so great Im-CHAP. portance. For before they entered upon a. War with any State, the College of Heralds were to commission the Pater Patratus, to go and demand satisfaction in the name of the Roman People. Accordingly this Officer, clothed in the Habit of his Order, fet forward for the Enemy's Country; and entering the Frontiers, proclaimed aloud the cause of his Arrival, calling all the Gods to witness that he came to demand satisfaction, and imprecate the Divine Vengeance on himfelf and Country, if he faid any thing contrary to Truth. When he came to the chief City of the Enemy, he again repeated the fame Declaration, adding fresh Oaths and Imprecations, and withal defired fatisfaction. If his Demands were granted, he returned immediately to Rome, and all Thoughts of War were laid afide. But if they required time to consider, he gave them ten Days, and then came again to hear their Resolution. This he did, in some Cases, three times: but if after thirty Days, nothing was done towards an Accommodation, he called Gods and Men to witness the Refusal, and expresly denounced, that the Romans would now think themselves sufficiently authorised, to take fuch Measures as the Case required, in order to do themselves justice. Upon his return to Rome, he repaired to the Senate, attended by the whole College of Heralds; and having there made a report of his Embassy, declared

CHAP declared the legality of the War. The Af
fair was then debated among the Fathers:
and if the majority of Voices were for War,
the same Officer was sent back to the Enemy's Frontiers, where in presence of at least
three Persons he pronounced the usual Declaration, throwing a Spear at the same time
into their Territories, in Token of defiance.

V. THESE Institutions continued long in force at Rome, even during the times of the Commonwealth; and it must be owned, were admirably well contrived to answer Numa's great Design, of habituating the Romans to Peace, and blunting the edge of their martial Fury. For as a certain space of Time was necessarily to intervene, between the Injury received and the commencing of Hostilities; this left room for Reason and Reflection, and gave them an Opportunity of weighing maturely all the Consequences of the Step they were about to take. The Imprecations too to be denounced by the Herald against himfelf and Country, if he advanced any thing contrary to Truth, would naturally make them very cautious in their Demands, and extremely attentive to the Equity and Justice of them. Add to all this, the great probability of adjusting Matters amicably, and obtaining a reasonable Satisfaction, which cannot by any means be expected, where the Parties fly immediately to Arms, and by mutual Acts of Hostility exasperate one another. One

One would think, that a State under the CHAP. check of fo many Restraints against Oppres fion, could not eafily break out into violent or unjust Wars. Accordingly we find, not only the ancient Historians, but even many modern Writers of Name and Reputation, extolling the Moderation and Difinterestedness of the Romans; their Faith in Treaties; steddy Adherence to their Allies; and care to have Equity on their fide in all their Undertakings. It is however, methinks, a fufficiently obvious Reflection, that a People, who by degrees accomplished the Conquest of the Universe, and forced all Nations to submit to their Dominion, must in many Instances have been the Aggressors. For altho' in the first beginnings of their State, they were perhaps often unjustly attacked by their Neighbours, out of Envy and Jealoufy; yet it is certain, that their Power at last became so very formidable, that no Nation was willing to enter the Lists with them. We find them notwithstanding still pushing on their Conquests, still engaged in new Wars, and extending the Limits of their Empire. Now both Reason and Experience tell us, that in a Controversy between States of unequal Strength, the weaker will fubmit to many Infults and Hardships, rather than draw upon themselves a War, which they foresee must end in the subversion of their Liberties. And indeed if we examine narrowly into the Conduct of the Romans, we shall find, that their Reputation.

CHAP. Reputation of Justice is owing rather to an exact Observance of certain outward Forms, and the Partiality of their Historians, than any steddy Adherence to the Principles of Equity. For as their Power and Dominion increased, and they became conscious of their Superiority, they readily gave way to the Dictates of Ambition, and were never at a loss in contriving some ground of Quarrel with those Nations, whom in their Plan of univerfal Conquest, they had resolved to bring next under subjection. But as all their Attempts of this kind were preceded by Complaints of Injuries received, pretended Grievances, and formal Declarations of War; this gave a colour of Justice to their Undertakings, and effectually deceived the People; who, convinced that they had Equity on their fide, followed their Generals with an affured Confidence, imagining themselves under the immediate Protection of the Gods. Add to this, that the Historians, partly misled by the same Notions, partly thro' a national and almost unavoidable Partiality, have vied with one another in extolling the Equity and Moderation of the Romans, and varnishing over fuch parts of their Behaviour, as feemed most liable to exception. The Merit of these Writers, and the Veneration paid them by fucceeding Ages, have given a kind of Sanction and Authority to their Opinions. It looks like Presumption to contradict Authors of so established a Reputation: and being accustomed we are easily led to believe, that we cannot do better than blindly give into their Sentiments. It is only upon this Principle I am able to excuse some late Writers of great Name, who in treating of the Roman Commonwealth, have not scrupled to adopt the Prejudices of the ancient Historians, and represent that People as Patterns of Equity and Justice in all their Proceedings.

VI. As nothing is of greater importance in History, than to form a right Judgment of Events and their Causes, and penetrate into the real Character of States and Nations, I shall take some pains to set this Matter in a true Light; and to that end shall lay before the Reader a short view of the Transactions between the Romans and Carthaginians. It is well known, that these last were characterized by the Romans, as a faithless and perfidious People, regardless of Oaths, and whom no Ties or Treaties could bind. They even went fo far as to make Punick Faith ferve only as another Expression for Insincerity. Who would imagine, after fuch a representation of Things, that in all the Punick Wars the Romans were the Aggressors; and that, in the two last especially, they forced the Carthagimians into them by the most flagrant Acts of Injustice? But let Truth and an impartial Account of Facts determine. The occasion of the first Punick War was as follows. A Body CHAP. Body of Campanian Soldiers, known in History by the Name of Mamertines, and who had served under Agathocles Tyrant of Syracuse, upon the Death of that Prince retired to Meffina: where being received as Friends, they treacherously massacred one part of the Inhabitants, expelled the rest, and seizing upon the Lands, Houses, and even Wives of those unfortunate Men, remained fole Masters of that important City. Some time after this, the People of Rhegium, to screen themselves from the Infults of the Carthaginians, whose Fleets appeared frequently off their Coast, applied to the Roman Senate for a Garrison. A Legion of four thousand Men raised in Campania, and commanded by Decius Jubellius, was appointed to that Service. At first they behaved fuitably to the Intention of those who employed them: but at length, tempted by the Wealth of the Place, emboldened by the example of the Mamertines, and strength, ened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel Part towards the Rhegians, which the other had acted towards the People of Messina.

VII. As these two Cities were parted only by the narrow Strait which separates Italy from Sicily, and were not insensible of the Odium they had brought upon themselves by their Treachery, they entered into a strict Confederacy mutually to support each other in their Usurpations. This Alliance subsisted

for

for some time. But at length the Romans, CHAP. having difengaged themselves from the many, Wars in which they were intangled, turned their Thoughts towards the Punishment of their perfidious Legion. Rhegium was invefted, and after an obstinate Resistance, taken by Assault. All that remained alive of the Garrison, amounting to about three hundred, were carried to Rome, beaten with Rods, and then publickly beheaded in the Forum. The Destruction of this confederate City produced a mighty change in the Affairs of the Mamertines. While aided by their Friends at Rhegium, they had not only lived fearless of Danger, but had often made Inroads into the Territories of the Carthaginians and Syracufans, putting many of their Towns and Villages under Contribution. The Case was now greatly altered: for being attacked by Hiero Prætor of Syracuse, they were overthrown in Battle, and their Army almost totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible a Blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend Meshna; and differing in Opinion about what Measures to pursue, one Party furrendered the Citadel to the Carthaginians, whilst another sent Ambassadors to implore the Protection of the Romans.

VIII. THE Affair was debated in the Senate; where being considered in all its Lights, it gave no small perplexity to the Fathers. On the one hand they thought it dishonourable,

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CHAP. able, and altogether unworthy of the Roman Virtue, to undertake the defence of Traitors, whose Perfidy was exactly the same with that of the Rhegians, which they had lately punished with so exemplary a Severity. But then again it was of the utmost Consequence to stop the Progress of the Carthaginians; who, not fatisfied with their Conquests in Africa and Spain, had also made themselves Masters of Sardinia, and the adjacent Isles on the Coast of Italy; and would certainly get all Sicily into their hands, if they should be fuffered to possess themselves of Messina. From thence, into Italy, the Paffage was very short; and it was in some measure to invite an Enemy to come over, to leave him that Entrance open. These Reasons, tho' strong, could not prevail with the Senate to declare in favour of the Mamertines; and accordingly Motives of Honour and Justice prevailed over those of Interest and Policy. But the People were not fo scrupulous. In an Assembly held on this Subject, it was resolved that the Mamertines should be affisted; and Appius Claudius, one of the Confuls, was ordered to conduct an Army into Sicily for that purpose. Appius, to learn the true state, of Things, went over in person to Messina, and conducted himself so happily, as by some means to persuade the Carthaginian Officer to evacuate the Citadel. This fo highly offended the People of Carthage, that they condemned their Officer to be crucified as a Traitor and a Coward. At the same time they CHAPinvested the Place by Sea and Land, and entering into an Alliance with Hiero the new
King of Syracuse, were joined by his Troops.
Mean-while Appius, having by an artful Stratagem, eluded the Vigilance of the Carthaginian Admiral, crossed the Strait with all his
Forces, and attacking the Syracusans and Carthaginians one after another, compelled them
to abandon the Siege.

IX. Such was the beginning of the first Punick War, in which I think it evidently appears, that the Romans were the Aggreffors. For they undertook the defence of a traiterous and perfidious fet of Men, against a People with whom they were in Alliance and Amity. I deny not that Reasons of State, and the Maxims of Policy, plead strongly in their Behalf on this Occasion. It was certainly not their Interest, to suffer the Carthaginians to become too powerful, or get intire possession of an Island that lay so contiguous to Italy. But if we examine their Conduct by the Rules of strict Justice, it will be found no easy matter to vindicate it. And in fact we have seen, that the Senate absolutely declared against aiding the Mamertines, as inconfistent with Honour, and the Dignity of the Roman Name. Whether they acted fincerely upon this Occasion, or only to save Appearances, is not my business to determine. enough that the thing itself serves to justify VOL. I. the

the Rebellian in Araca entenared to recover;

CHAP the Carthaginians, and exempt them from the I. Charge of having been the first Aggressors in this War. Nor indeed do the Roman Writers throw the Blame of it upon them, but generally allow, that Jealousy, and an apprehension of each other's growing Power, embroiled the two States upon the present Occafion.

X. But let us now pass to the second Punick War. Here it is that the Charge of Infincerity feems to lie heaviest against the Carthaginians. The Romans exasperated by the Losses they received, gave a free vent to their Hatred, and spared no Endeavours to blacken their Adversaries, and lay the whole Blame of the War upon them. And indeed they have contrived to give a specious Colour to this Accusation, by representing the taking of Saguntum as the cause of the Quarrel. For to confider only the first appearance of this Step; Hannibal, contrary, as they pretend, to the express tenor of Treaties, and without any formal Declaration of War, falls upon a City in alliance with the Romans. But as Polybius has very judiciously observed, the taking of Saguntum is to be looked upon as the beginning, not the cause of the War: and if we trace Matters to their fource, we shall find that the Carthaginians were provoked to this Step, by a feries of the most unjustifiable Injuries on the fide of the Romans. Soon after the conclusion of the Peace of Sicily, the . deedl Mercenaries

Mercenaries who had ferved in the Armies CHAP. of Carthage revolting, brought that State to the very brink of Destruction. The Sardinians taking advantage of these Troubles, shook off the Carthaginian Yoke, and expelled all their Garrisons out of the Island. Things continued for some time in this fituation, 'till' at length the Carthaginians, having quelled the Rebellion in Africa, prepared to recover possession of Sardinia. The Romans, who during all the foregoing Troubles of Carthage had behaved with great Justice and Moderation, now feeing that People like to regain their former Strength, pretended a jealoufy of the new Preparations, and declared War against them. The Carthaginians, unable at that time to enter the Lists with so powerful an Adversary, were forced to submit to a fecond Treaty, by which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans, and obliged themselves to an additional Payment of twelve hundred Talents.

XI. This Injustice of the Romans may be considered as the first and principal Cause of the second Punick War. For Hamilear sirnamed Barcha, highly exasperated on account of a Treaty, which Necessity alone had compelled the Carthaginians to submit to, resolved to break with Rome the first savourable Opportunity; and accordingly directed all his Views to the success of that Enterprise. How deeply he resented the Injury of which we be 2

CHAP. speak, appears by his making Hannibal swear upon the Altar at the age of nine Years, that he would ever be an irreconcileable Enemy to the Romans. During his command in Spain, he brought the greatest part of that Country under the power of the Carthaginitans: but falling in Battle before he had compleated the Conquest of it, Afdrabal his Sonin-law fucceeded him, and continued the War with success. This alarmed the Romans, who thinking it a necessary piece of Policy to check the growing Power of a rival State, obliged Afdrubat to enter into a new Treaty, in which it was stipulated, that he should attempt no Conquest beyond the Iberus. How this may appear to others, I cannot fay, but Home it carries the Idea of a fresh Infult. as the Romans hereby claimed a manifest superiority over the Carthaginians, and affumed the power of fetting! Bounds to their Empire: a Point wuson which they were always fo very nice themselves, that no Excuse can be offered for their difregarding it in their Conenter into a Derardo others. a other enter because the taking of Soguntum ought

All. Hannibal fucceeded Afdrubal in the command of the Army; and having in a very fhort time compleated the reduction of Spain, began to think seriously of avenging the many Wrongs done his Country by the Romans. To that end he contrived a pretence of Quarrel with the Saguntiness that by attacking their City, he might give occasion to a Rupture and serious of the saguntiness of the saguntin

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between the two States. For though Sagun- CHAP. tum lay on this fide the Iberus, and there fore was within the Plan of Conquest permitted to the Carthaginians by the Romans; yet these last, as if repenting of the Concession they had made to their Adversaries, concluded an alliance with the Saguntines foon after the figning of the Treaty with Afdrubal. Now as by an Article of that Treaty, neither State was to make War upon the Allies of the other, the Romans pretended that Saguntum, though on this fide the Iberus, could not be attacked without violating the Reace. On the other hand the Carthaginians maintained, that the very Alliance with the Saguntimes was a violation of the Treaty, as being no other than a mean Artifice to wrest the power of making War upon the Saguntines out of their hands, after it had been expresly conceded to them by that Article, which permitted the Conquest of all the Nations of Spain on this fide the Iberus. I think it needless to enter into a Discussion of this nice point, because the taking of Saguntum ought to be confidered rather as the beginning of the Quarrel, than the Cause of the War. The Carthaginians were determined upon Hostilities: and it appears by the above deduction, that the Romans, by a continued series of Infults and Provocations, had given them but too just ground to come to that Extremity. Polybius himself, a great admirer of the Ramans, and who endeavours on all occasions

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CHAP. to represent their Conduct in the mostfavourable Light, though he blames the Attempt upon Saguntum as an infraction of the Treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge thus much. " It would be a great mistake, says that judicious Historian, to confider the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the real Cause of the second Punick War. It was the bee ginning, but not the cause of it. The " regret of the Carthaginians for the loss of " Sicily; the Violence and Injustice of the " Romans, in seizing Sardinia, and imposing " a new Tribute; and lastly, the Success of " the Carthaginian Armies in Spain, which infpired that State with Courage, and alarmed their Adversaries: these were the real Causes of the Rupture. If we consider only the Siege of Saguntum, we cannot avoid " throwing the whole blame upon the Carthaginians, whose attack of that City was a manifest Violation of the Treaty with Afdrubal. For though the Saguntines were not in alliance with Rome at the time of the conclusion of that Treaty, it is evident the Romans did not thereby divest them-" felves of the Liberty of making new Alliances. " In this view of things, therefore, the Carthaginians would be altogether inexcusable.

But if we go back to the Times when " Sardinia was forcibly feized, and a new "Tribute imposed, it must be confessed, adds " the Historian, that the Conduct of the Ro-" mansin thefe two points cannot be justified." XIII.

XIII. Thus we see that Polybius throws CHAP. the whole blame of the fecond Punick War upon the Romans; and I believe every thinking Man will be of the same Opinion: which ought to make us cautious of giving too easy Credit to the Representations of their Historians, when they charge their Enemies with Infidelity and Breach of Faith, and beflow such magnificent Elogiums of Justice and Moderation upon their own Commonwealth. For allowing the Carthaginians to have been the first in breaking the Peace, it may with reason be asked, whether the notorious Injustice of the Romans previously committed, did not justify them in no longer observing a Treaty concluded in all the Forms; and whether it was not a legitimate Reason for entering into a War. I cannot however but observe, that Polybius seems to be a little too severe in his Censure of the Carthaginians for attacking Saguntum. It will furely admit of debate, whether the Article relating to the Allies of both States could be extended any farther than to the Alliance actually subfifting at the time of the figning of the Treaty, If we extend it to all Alliances whatfoever, either made or to be made; this feems mutually to invest them with a Power of prohibiting each other from engaging in any War: because either of them contracting an Alliance with that People against whom War was intended, rendered them thereby b 4 facred

XXIV

CHAP. facred and inviolable. But allowing the Reflection of Polybius to be just, that the two States by that Treaty did not absolutely divest themselves of the Liberty of making new Alliances; it feems yet pretty evident that the Romans did fo, in respect of all the Nations lying on this fide the Iberus. For by giving up to the Carthaginians the entire Conquest of those Countries, they plainly bound themselves not to come under any Engagements in confift. ent with that Article. The Alliance therefore with the Saguntines, as it tended to divest the Carthaginians of a Power expresly conceded to them by the Treaty, ought to be confidered as a direct Violation of it: and the Romans might with equal justice have contracted Amity with all the other Nations of Spain yet unsubdued, and thereby utterly deprived the Carthaginians of the Power of making War in that Country, who are finished

XIV. But it is now time to take a view of the Causes that gave rise to the third Punick War; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly manifest, that the Romans proceeded without the least appearance of Justice. Among the Conditions of the Peace granted by Scipio to the Carthaginians, there was one which imported, that they should not make War without the consent of the Romans. Masinisa, King of Numidia, taking advantage of this Article, made daily Incroachments upon their Territories, and dispossessed them

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of feveral Towns and Diffricts. He was CHAP. himself in great favour with the Romans, on account of the many Services he had done them in the fecond Punick War: and being no Stranger to their Hatred and Jealoufy of the Carthaginians, imagined they would not be displeased at his Attempts to weaken the Power of a Rival-State. The Event shewed that he was not mistaken in his Judgment. The Carthaginians not daring to do themselves justice, applied to the Romans for Redress. But all their Solicitations were to no purpose. Commissioners indeed set out for Africa, to examine the Pretentions of the two Parties. and bring Matters to an iffue. Thefe finding Mafiniffa already possessed of the Territories in question, chose rather to leave the Affair undecided, than either oblige the King to abandon his Conquests, or declare expresty against the Carthaginians. The fame Conduct was observed in two following Deputations: whence it was generally believed, that the Commissioners acted in a manner by Order of the Senate, and had received private Instructions to favour Mafinifla, who by this Delay had an Opportunity of establishing simfelf in his Usurpations. Some to the Carthagiains, there was one

XV. IT was upon occasion of the last of these Deputations, that the elder Cato, who was one of the Commissioners, observing the slourishing Condition of Carthage, and its great Power and Riches, notwithstanding the many

XXVI A DISCOURSE CONCERNING CHAP many Losses it had fustained, could not help confidering it as a very dangerous Rival to his Country. Accordingly at his return, he declared in the Senate, that Rome could never be fafe, fo long as Carthage should subfift. Nay fo deeply had this Apprehension rooted itself in his Mind, that in order to keep alive in his Countrymen a sense of their danger, he never spoke upon publick Affairs, but he

always concluded his opinion with this Sentence, Carthage must be destroy'd. And indeed the Romans, naturally averse to that City, and mindful of the many Calamities they had fuffered from it, were easily perfuaded to come into this Defign. Nor was it long before an Opportunity offered itself. The Car-

the continual Incroachments of Mafinissa, and seeing no hopes of Redress from the Senate, had recourse to Arms. A Battle was fought, in which they were defeated, their Camp

thaginians exasperated to the last degree by

taken, and their whole Army cut to pieces. The Romans resolving to take advantage of this Blow, and of the Pretence furnished by

the Quarrel with Masinissa, declared War in form. All the Endeavours of the Carthaginians to mollify them were without effect.

They even made an absolute surrender of their City and Territories; and in obedience to the Orders of the Senate, fent three hun-

dred of their principal Nobility as Hostages, and delivered up, without Fraud, all their Arms. But these Acts of Submission were

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and rendering them incapable of Refistance.

For the Romans still peremptorily demanding, that they should abandon their City, and give it up to be demolished, compelled them at last to arm in their own Defence.

XVI. I thought it necessary to be thus particular in my Account of the Wars between these two States, because they best ferve to show what Credit is due to the pompous Accounts we meet with in Historians, of the Sincerity and inviolable Justice of the Romans. For here, if any where, we may expect to find Samples of that Equity and Moderation. Here we may look for a Conduct altogether clear and void of Reproach. It is certain that the Romans always valued themselves in a particular manner, upon their good Faith, and exact observance of Treaties with the Carthaginians. This evidently appears by the advantageous Testimony Cafar gives of his Conntrymen in this respect, in that famous Speech of his in Saluft, upon occasion of the Conspiracy of Catiline. Bellis Punicis omnibus, cum sæpe Carthaginienses, & in Pace, & per Inducias, multa nefanda Facinora fecissent; nunquam ipsi per occasionem talia fecere: magis quod se dignum foret, quam quod in illis 'fure fieri posset, quærebant." " Altho' in all the Punick Wars, the Cartha-" ginians, both in Peace, and during Truces, were guilty of many Abuses and Violations

xxviii

CHAP." of their Engagements; the Romans, how " inviting foever the Opportunity might be, " could yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate " the like usage. They were more atten-" tive to their own Glory, than to the Revenge " they might have justly taken on fuch per-" fidious Enemies." We find likewise a great many Reflections to the fame purpose sprinkled up and down the Writings of Cicero: from all which it is easy to judge, how irreproachable they thought their Conduct on this head, and what a Pattern of Iustice and Moderation. But if notwithstanding all these favourable Representations, it still appears so very liable to Exception; how much less can it be justified with regard to other States? And, indeed, was I to enter into a particular Detail, I could eafily evince, that it was no other than a continued train of Infults and Provocations, defignedly calculated to exasperate such States as were most obnoxious, and force them to have recourse to Arms. It will doubtless appear wonderful to the Reader, how amidst such a series of oppressive Conduct, the Romans still found means to preferve, in some measure, the Re-

Forms. They never failed to contrive fome ground of Complaint against those Nations they intended to attack; to send Deputies to

demand satisfaction; and to make formal

putation of Justice and Equity. But this, as we have before intimated, was chiefly ow-

Declaration

Declaration of War by a Herald, previous to CHAP. the commencing of Hostilities. It must indeed be owned, that it required no small Art and Policy, so to involve and intangle themselves with all the Nations of the then known World, that they could at pleasure find some specious Pretence of Quarrel, when their Interest required them to break with any State. This gave a Colour of Justice to all their Undertakings, inspired their Armies with Assurance and Confidence, inviolably attached to them their old Friends, and procured them new Allies at pleasure. And as it seems to have been one of their Master-strokes in Politicks, and the principal Engine by which they pushed on their Conquests, it may not be amis to give the Reader some little Infight into their artful Conduct in this respect, that he may the better comprehend the Motives and Tenthat it was no other than a continuit for yoneb Infults and Provocations, del

XVII. ALTHO' I cannot bring myself to think, with fome modern Writers of pretended Depth and Penetration, that Numa Pompilius had a political view, in the feveral religious Regulations he established at Rome; yet I am ready enough to allow, that many of his Institutions were afterwards, by the prudent Management of the Senate, converted into Maxims of State, and rendered very ferviceable in the administration of the Government. Of this Nature particularly were the Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War. gnidton tattaction; sad to make formal

Declaration

CHAP. Nothing is of greater consequence to an am-I. bitious Republick, which aims at universal Dominion, and a gradual Subjection of all' Nations, than to prevent fuch a general Confederacy against her, as might not only put a stop to her Conquests, but even threaten her in her turn with Destruction. This the Senate effected by their fingular Address and Conduct, in the feveral Wars in which they were engaged. For they always found means to colour them over with fuch a specious pretence of Justice, as gave no Umbrage to the neighbouring States, nor begot any Jealoufy of a Power, which seemed to have nothing in view but the redreffing of its own Wrongs, or those of other Nations in alliance with it. That strong bent towards Religion, and the Worship of the Gods, which Numa introduced among the People, and which the Senate carefully cherished for many Generations, helped greatly to forward this Persuafion. Men were not apt to distrust a religious Republick, where Virtue was held in honour, and Vice of every kind discountenanced. Let me add, that in the early Ages of the State, this was more than mere Pretence. They were really distinguished by their Probity, by a fleddy adherence to Justice, and a faithful observance of Treaties. Most of their Wars were defensive, or undertaken for the fake of their Allies. And though in after-times, in proportion as their Bower increased, they gave way to the Dictates

lous in their Conduct: yet as they never departed from those outward Observances, by which the appearance of Justice is maintained; and took care to signalize themselves from time to time, by such particular Internaces of Moderation, as could not fail to make a deep Impression; their Reputation for Equity and good Faith continued still the same.

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XVIII. OBSERVE, I befeech you, the different Sentiments entertained of the Romans and Carthaginians, at the time of the Rupture between the two States. The Romans, tho' they had gradually subjected all the Nations of Italy, and raifed themselves to a very formidable Pitch of Greatness, were yet for far from being confidered as an ambitious Republick, against which it was necessary for other States to be upon their guard, that the fame of their Virtue and Justice seems at this time to have been at the highest; infomuch that foreign Nations, instead of dreading their Power, courted their Alliance and Amity. It was otherwise with the Carthaginians. They had been less careful to conceal their Ambition, or cover their Breach of Treaties under a pretence of Injuries. Hence their Defigns became suspected, all their Actions were viewed in the worst Light, and the general Prejudice against them was so strong, that every thing laid to their Charge by their Enemies aping!

XXXII

it happened, that though in the Interval between the first and second Punick Wars, the Romans acted without the least regard to Justice and the Faith of Treaties, yet very little notice was taken of the Complaints of the Carthaginians: and when in consequence of repeated Insults and Provocations, they were at last obliged to have recourse to Arms; the whole blame of the War, though so manifestly slowing from the injurious Behaviour of the Romans, was nevertheless charged upon the Persidy of the Carthaginians.

XIX. AFTER the entire Conquest of Italy, and the Reduction of the greatest Part of Sicily in the first Punick War, it required a more refined Policy in the Romans, to extend the Limits of their Empire, and at the same time keep up the Reputation of their Integrity. They were not immediately furrounded with those Nations, which it was their Interest to attack; and therefore could not easily provoke them to fuch Acts of Hostility, as might justify a Declaration of War. And should they upon slight Pretences transport an Army out of their own Territories, to fall upon a distant Prince, the design of Conquest would be visible, and beget a general alarm. Besides, their Power was become so very formidable, that foreign States did not care to contend with them, and therefore industrioufly avoided giving them any just ground of Complaint.

Complaint. In this Situation they took upon CHAP. themselves the Title of Patrons and Protectors I. of all Nations, and by contracting Alliances with weaker States, found means to fall upon the stronger at pleasure, without seeming themselves to have any particular Interest in the Quarrel. It was upon this Principle that they attached themselves to the Saguntines and Ætolians, which afterwards furnished them with fuch a plaufible colour for the Carthaginian and Macedonian Wars. To know the full Reach and Value of this Policy, we need only reflect, that though the fecond Punick War was unexceptionably just on the Part of the Carthaginians; yet the Romans, by diverting the attention of the Publick from the Usurpation of Sardinia, and the fixing it upon the Fate of Saguntum, threw the whole odium of that War upon their Adversaries, whilst themselves were considered as a humane generous People, actuated meerly by a Concern for their Allies.

XX. And here it is particularly deferving of our notice, that amongst the many Wars in which they were engaged, after the conclusion of that with *Hannibal*, we hardly meet with any that can be deemed personal. It was always, at least in appearance, to support the Cause of some of their Allies, or prevent their being crushed by a powerful Neighbour. One would be apt to think, that they had it not so much in view to aggranton.

CHAP dize themselves, as to prevent the Growth of any dangerous Power, from which weaker States might be exposed to suffer. Upon the conclusion of the first Macedonian War, they proclaimed Liberty to all the States of Greece. This Action, so magnificent in appearance, was in reality a refined Stroke of Policy. The Greeks were a warlike People, well difciplined, and capable of bringing great Armies into the Field. Had they suspected the Romans of a Design upon their Liberties, and united in their own defence, they must have been invincible. But this feeming Grant of Freedom effectually lulled them asleep, and by the artful Conduct of the Romans, gave birth to infinite Divisions among them; which ending commonly in an Appeal to Rome, furnished the Senate with frequent Opportunities of taking part in their Quarrels. Thus they infenfibly grew to be Rulers and Dictators over them, and by flow imperceptible Steps accomplished their Subjection.

XXI. THEIR Ambassadors to foreign Princes, and such as had not yet felt the weight of their Power, commonly delivered themselves in such a haughty magisterial way, as could not fail to draw upon them some Indignity or ill Treatment, and thereby surnish a sure Pretence of War, when the Interest of the Commonwealth rendered such a Step necessary. If a People at any time had given them Umbrage, and afterwards repenting of their Rash-

ness, surrendered up the principal Offenders; CHAP. they would often refuse to punish them, choosing rather to consider the whole Nation as guilty, and referve to themselves an useful When they faw two Nations Vengeance. engag'd in War, although they were not in alliance, nor had any Contest with either of them, they would nevertheless appear upon the Stage of Action, and affected always to fide with the weakest. It was an ancient Custom, says Dionysius of Halycarnassus, for the Romans to grant Succour to all who came to implore it. If Princes of the same Blood were at variance for the Crown, they feldom failed to make themselves Parties in the Difpute; and if one of them was a Minor, declared in his favour, proclaiming themselves his Guardians in quality of Protectors of the World. When Subjects oppressed and tyrannifed over by their Sovereigns, were provoked to renounce their Allegiance, they immediately indulged them the Title of Ally, declaring themselves the professed Enemies of Tyranny and lawless Power.

XXII. THESE were the Arts and Policies, by which the Romans so intangled themselves with all Nations, that they could with pleafure engage in a War with any State, and colour it over with such an appearance of Justice, as not only prevented any general Confederacy against them, but even warmly engaged their Allies in the support of their c 2

HVXXX

XXXVI A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP, Usurpations. Nor were they less politick in the choice of their Wars, and in the manner of conducting and bringing them to a period. For as their Power was very formidable, and they had contrived to draw many Nations over to their Interest: whatever State took up Arms against them, found it impossible to make any long Resistance, and was in the end forced to accept of fuch Conditions of Peace as they thought fit to propose. For this reason War was seldom declared against them, but themselves always made it, at a Season, with a People, and in such manner as best suited their Interest. If they were opposed by several Enemies at the same time, they granted a Truce to the weakest, who thought themselves happy in obtaining it, confidering it as a great Advantage, that their Ruin was at least suspended. They never engaged in far-distant Wars, till they had first made an Alliance with fome Power contiguous to the Enemy they invaded, who might unite his Troops to the Army they fent: and as this was never confiderable with regard to Numbers, they always had another in that Province which lay nearest the Enemy, and a third, in Rome, ever ready to march at a Minute's warning. In this manner they hazarded but a small part of their Forces at once, and found it easy to repair any Loss they might fustain, whilst their Enciny was often ruined by a fingle Battle. It was this Confideration that inspired Hannibal with the Refolution

Resolution of attacking them in Italy itself, CHAP. the Center of their Dominions. He was fenfible that a Blow struck there, must effectually weaken them; whereas diftant Defeats, fo long as the Capital remained unmolested, and was at liberty to fend a fresh Supply of Troops to recruit the Army, were properly speaking little other than so many Lessons of Prudence to their Generals, who foon found themselves in a condition to renew the War, with greater Forces, and more Circumspection. Accordingly we find, that when the same Hannibal afterwards offered his Service to Antiochus, in his intended War against the Romans, there was no Principle he inculcated more earnestly, than the Necessity of fending an Army into Italy, and cutting them off from those continual Resources, by which in any other method of Attack they found them-Ruin was at least furbend slight was at least furbend.

XXIII. But nothing gives us a greater idea of the Address and Policy of this People, than the manner in which they terminated their Wars, when they had at last brought them to the point they desired. They sent the Garrisons out of the Strong-holds; had the Horses and Elephants delivered up to them; and if their Enemies were powerful at Sea, obliged them to burn their Ships, and sometimes remove higher up in the Country. If the Prince they had overcome was possessed of numerous Armies, and surrounded with the country of the prince they had overcome was possessed of numerous Armies, and surrounded with the country.

Refolution

CHAP warlike Nations, one of the Articles of the I. Treaty was, that he should not make War with any of the Allies of the Romans, but fubmit his Differences to Arbitration. as they never refused their Alliance to any People who bordered on a powerful Prince, this Condition inserted in a Treaty of Peace, cut him off from all Opportunities of making War, or employing his Troops, and thereby deprived him of a military Power for the time to come. Nay they even bereaved their very Allies of this Force. The instant any Contest broke out amongst them, they sent Ambaffadors who obliged them to conclude a Peace. It was in this manner they terminated the Wars between Attalus and Prusas; and whoever is in the least acquainted with their History, must be sensible, that they all along adhered strictly to this Policy. The Result was, that they alone were possessed of warlike and veteran Armies, whilst those of other Nations degenerated into a raw unpractifed Rabble. When any State composed too formidable a Body from its Situation or Union, they never failed to divide it. The Republick of Achaia was formed by an Affociation of free Cities. The Senate declared, that every City should be governed by its own Laws, independent on the general Authority. Macedonia was furrounded with inaccessible Mountains. The Senate divided it into four Parts; declared those free; prohibited them every kind of Alliance among themselves by Marriage;

Marriage; carried off all the Nobles into Haly, CHAP and by that means reduced this Power to nothing.

XXIV. THESE Customs of the Romans were not certain particular Incidents which happened by chance; but fo many invariable Principles, from which in a long Course of Years they never deviated. The Maxims they put in practice against the greatest Monarchs, were exactly the same with those they had employed in their infant State, against the little Cities which stood round them. They made Eumenes and Masinissa contribute to the Subjection of Philip and Antiochus, as they had before employed the Latines and Hernici, to fubdue the Volscians and the Tufcans. They obliged the Carthaginians and the Kings of Afia to furrender their Fleets to them, in like manner as they had forced the Citizens of Antium to give up their little Veffels. And indeed it is furprifing to confider, that during the course of that long and mighty Prosperity which attended the Roman Arms, and in which it is fo usual for Mankind to forget themselves, the Senate continued to act all along with the fame depth of Judgment, and the same steddy Views to the publick Interest. They were not dazzled by their good Fortune, nor moved to precipitate their Enterprises before the proper Season. Observe, I entreat you, the Wisdom and Policy of their Conduct. After the Defeat of Antiochus, they C 4

CHAP they were possessed of Africa, Alian and Greece, without having a fingle City in those Countries, that could be called immediately They feemed to conquer with their own. no other view but to bestow. But then they obtained fo complete a Sovereignty, that whenever they engaged in War with any Prince, they oppressed him, as it were, with the weight of the whole Universe. The time proper for feizing upon the conquered Countries was not yet come. Had the Romans kept the Cities they took from Philip, the Greeks would have feen at once into their Defigns. Had they, after the fecond Punick War, or that with Antiochus, possessed themselves of Lands in Africa and in Aha, they could never have preserved Conquests so slightly established. It was the Interest of the Senate to wait till all Nations were accustomed to obey as free and as confederate, and to let them blend and lose themfelves infenfibly in the Roman Commonwealth, before they should attempt reducing them to the Condition of Subjects. After overcoming a Nation, they contented themselves with weakening it, and imposing such Conditions as confumed it infenfibly. If it recovered, they depreffed it still more, and it became subject without a possibility of dating the Æra of its Subjection. This was indeed a flow way of conquering, but founded in the deepest Policy. Rome, by a steddy Adherence to these Maxims, gradually increased in Strength; and having at length

length got the better of all Opposition, se CHAP.
curely took possession of the Sovereignty of II.
the Universe, the black and admin the Universe.

they obtain in Good H Dovereignty,

Of the manner of levying Troops, and forming a Roman Army.

I. THE Levies, during the times of the Commonwealth, to which Period we chiefly confine ourselves, were commonly made by the Confuls. Every Year they iffued out an Edict, commanding all who had reached the military Age, to appear in the Field of Mars, or in the Capitol. Two Legions composed a consular Army: and as there were two Confuls, it was usual to raise four Legions yearly. The Age for serving in the Army was from feventeen to forty-five. None but Citizens were admited: and all of that Rank within the Age prescribed by Law, were obliged to be present on the Day prefixed, under pain of a Fine. To fail in this respect was long criminal during the Commonwealth. The People being affembled, the Confuls began by nominating the military Tribunes, twenty-four in Number, fix to every Legion. Of these fourteen were chofen out of the Body of the Knights, and the rest from among the People. The first were required to have ferved at least five Years, and

CHAP the others ten. They were divided to the II. four Legions in this manner. Of the four-teen youngest Tribunes, four were assigned to the first Legion, three to the second, four to the third, and three to the last. Of the ten eldest, two to the first and third Legions, and three to the second and last.

II. THE four and twenty Tribunes thus chosen and appointed, every Tribe was called out by Lot, and ordered to divide into its proper Centuries. Four Men, as much alike in all circumstances as could be found, being presented out of the Century on whom the Lot fell; the Tribunes of the first Legion chose one, then the Tribunes of the second another; the Tribunes of the third Legion a third, and the remaining Person fell to the Tribunes of the fourth. After this four more were drawn out. And now the right of choosing first belonged to the Tribunes of the second Legion: in the next four to the Tribunes of the third Legion: then to the Tribunes of the fourth Legion: and fo continually, those always choosing last in every turn, who chose first the time before. From this manner of choosing the Soldiers one by one, the several large Bodies into which they were formed, obtained the Name of Legions, from the Latin Word legere, to choose; and the Levy itself was called Delectus, Choice. No Soldier was admitted under the height of five Roman Feet and ten Inches, except in an extreme want of

of Troops, which would not allow of choof-CHAP. ing. It is observed, that the Men of the II. first Cohorts of each Legion were not under fix Feet high, which amounts to five Feet ten Inches of our measure, the Roman Foot making eleven Inches and fix hundred and four decimal Parts of an Inch English.

III. THE Horse were chosen out of the Body of the Equites, into which Order, after the institution of the Census by Servius Tullius, all were admitted who were worth four hundred Sestertia. They had a Horse and Ring given them at the publick Charge, and formed a third and middle Order between the Senate and the People. They are known in History under the Name of Roman Knights, and were obliged to appear on horseback, as often as the State had occasion for their Service. Thus there was always a fufficient Number of Cavalry in readiness, and it belonged to the Cenfors to review them, and furnish what was necessary to complete the Legions. It is indeed hard to conceive, that all the Roman Horse in the Army should be Knights; and therefore many learned Men are of opinion, that after the Siege of Veii, there were two forts of Cavalry in the Roman Armies: one, whom the Publick supplied with Horses, and who were faid to serve Equo publico: the other, who furnished themselves, and served Equo privato. The former they allow to have been of the Order of Knights, the latter not.

CHAP. But Gravius has abundantly demonstrated by All the Course of History, that from the beginning of the Roman State, till the time of Marius, no other Horse entered the Legions but the true and proper Knights, except in the midft of publick Confusion, when Order and Discipline were neglected. After that Period, the military Affairs being new modelled, the Knights thought not fit to expose themselves abroad in the Legions, as they had formerly done, but generally kept at home to enjoy their Estates, and to have a hand in the Tranfactions of the City, leaving their Places in the Army to be supplied by foreign Horse. Or if they ever made Campaigns themselves, they held some Post of Honour and Command. Hence under the Emperors, a Man might be a Knight, and have the Honour of a publick Horse, without ever engaging in the publick Caufe, or fo much as touching Arms: which Confideration made fome Princes lay afide the Cuftom of allowing the Knights a Horfe, and leave them only the gold Ring to diftinguish their Order, as Pliny the elder affirms to have been done in his that among the Creeks the military Oatsemit

IV. WHEN the Levies were compleated, the Tribunes of every Legion obliged the Soldiers one by one to take the military Oath. The Form in this case was, to choose out a Soldier, who repeated the Oath aloud. By this Oath he engaged to hazard his Life

accounted inteparable from the

for the Commonwealth, to obey his General, CHAP. and not to quit the Army without Leave, In pronouncing it he held up his right Hand, raifing the Thumb of it upright; after which all the Soldiers of each Legion declared that they fwore the fame thing, but without repeating the Form. This was not a mere Ceremony, but a very folemn Act of Religion, and fo effential to the military State, that no Man was deemed a Soldier, nor allowed to strike or kill an Enemy, if he had not taken the customary Oath. We have a remarkable Example of this in the Behaviour of Cato the Cenfor. A Legion, in which the Son of that illustrious Senator ferved, being difmiffed by the Conful who commanded in Macedonia, young Cato chose to continue with the Army. His Father thereupon wrote immediately to the Conful, to defire if he thought fit to fuffer his Son to remain in the Service, that he would make him take a new Oath, because being discharged from the former, he had no longer any right to join in Battle against the Enemy. We find likewise, that among the Greeks the military Oath was accounted inseparable from the State of a Soldier. And Xenophon, in his History of Cyrus the Great, informs us, that that Prince exceedingly applauded the Action of an Officer, who having raifed his Arm to flrike an Enemy, upon hearing the Retreat founded, Stopt short, regarding that Signal, as an order to proceed no farther.

V.

Source &

CHAP V. AFTER adminia V. AFTER administring the military Oaths II. the next care of the Tribunes was, to form the Troops into Legions. The exact Number of Soldiers in fuch a Battalion was not always the same. Romulus fixed it at three thousand Foot, and three hundred Horse. It afterwards role to four, five, and fix thousand. Under the Confuls it was commonly four thousand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horse. This was the Number in the time of Polybius, and here I shall fix it. In order thoroughly to comprehend the Nature of the Legion, so famous in History, we must begin with observing, that the whole Infantry of which it was composed, was divided into four Orders, the Velites, Hastati, Principes, and Triarii. The Velites were young, active Soldiers, and formed the light-armed Troops of the Roman Commonwealth. They had their Name à volando, or à velocitate, from their Swiftness and Expedition. They were not divided into Companies, nor had any fixed Post assigned them in a Day of Battle, but hovered in loose order before the Army, or were disposed among the Cavalry and heavyarmed Troops, as occasion required. The Hastati were so called, because they used in ancient times to fight with Spears, which were afterwards laid afide as incommodious. These were taken out the next in Age to the Velites, and formed the first Line in a Day of Battle. The Principes were generally Men

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

Men of middle Age, in the prime and vigour CHAP. of Life, whence probably they took their Name. Their Post in an Engagement was the second Line. The Triarii were old Soldiers of distinguished Valour, who had served long, and acquired great Experience. They had their Name from their Post in the Field of Battle, forming the third Line or Reserve. They are likewise sometimes called Pilani, from their Weapon the Pilum.

VI. THESE feveral Divisions formed twelve hundred Men apiece in the three first Orders. and fix hundred in the last, amounting in all to four thousand two hundred, the intire Infantry of a Legion. Each Body, the Velite's excepted, was subdivided into ten Parts of Maniples, confifting of an hundred and twenty in the Hastati and Principes, and of fixty in the Triarii. Every Maniple made two Centuries or Companies. Anciently, and at its first Institution by Romulus, the Century had an hundred Men, from which it took its Name. But afterwards, it confifted only of fixty in the Hastati and Principes, and of thirty in the Triarii. Three Maniples, one of the Hastati, another of the Principes, and a third of the Triarii, composed a Cohort. Every Legion, therefore, confifted of ten Cohorts, besides the twelve hundred Velites, who, as we have already observed, were not divided into distinct Companies. The Number of Legions kept on foot was different, according to the different ExiYear, and divided between the two Confuls.

But in case of Necessity, the Number was augmented, and we sometimes meet with eighteen in Livy.

VII. We have observed that every Maniple was divided into two Centuries or Companies. Over each of these presided an Officer called a Centurion. To determine the Point of Priority between them, they were created at two different Elections. Those of the first Election, as the most honourable, alway took the Precedency of their Fellows, and therefore commanded the right hand Orders, as the others did the left. He who commanded the first Century of the first Maniple of the Triarii, called also Pilani, was the most confiderable of all the Centurions, and had a Place in the Council of War with the Conful and principal Officers. He bore the Name of Primipilus, or Primipili Centurio; and was called likewise Primipilus prior, to distinguish him from the Centurion who commanded the fecond Century of the same Maniple who had the Title of Primipilus posterior. This Distinction of prior and posterior had place also in all the other Maniples. The Centurion who commanded the first Century of the fecond Maniple of the Triarii, was called fecundi Pili Centurio; and fo on to the tenth, who was called decimi Pili Centurio. The same order was observed among the Hastati and

Principes was called primus Princeps, or primi.

Principis Centurio. The second, secundar Princeps, &c. and so on to the last. So like wise among the Hastati, primus Hastatus, or primi Hastati Centurio, secundus Hastatus, &c. through all the different Orders. As it belonged to the military Tribunes to appoint the Centurions, so these last chose Vexillarii or Ensigns, two to every Maniple. They had likewise Officers under them called Succenturiones or Optiones, and who were in the nature of our Lieutenants. Polybius mentions them under the Name of Tergiductors, their Post being in the Rear of the Company.

VIII. THE Cavalry required to a Logion, was three hundred. They were divided into ten Turma, or Troops, thirty to a Troop. Every Troop confifted of three Decuria, on Bodies of ten Men. Over each of these was a Captain, called Decurio, He that was first elected commanded the whole Troop, and had the Title of Prafectus. The Decurions had every one his Optio, or Deputy, under him, who in like manner as in the Foot, were called Tergiductors. These Squadrons often occur in Hiftory under the Name of Ala, because they always formed the Wings of the Legion. At the time the Romans, warred against the leffer Nations of Italy, their Horse was incomparably superior to that of their Enemies, for which Reason they were famedrder was obferted among the Hollerit

CHAP composed of none but the most considerable among the Citizens, being, as we have observed, felected wholly out of the Order of the Knights. When they alighted, no Infantry was more formidable, and they very often turned the Scale of Victory. It must be owned, however, that their Cavalry were but few in proportion to their Foot; and though they ferved well enough for their Italian Wars, yet they became fully fensible of this Inconvenience when they had to do with Hannibal. It was chiefly by the Superiority of his Cavalry, and his manner of using it, that he gained so many Victories over them. Accordingly they applied themselves seriously to the improvement of this Part of their Strength, not only by intermixing Platoons of Foot with their Cavalry, and training them particularly to that Service, but likewife by taking foreign Horse into their pay, Numidians, Gauls, and Germans.

IX. Besides the Troops already mentioned, there were always in the Roman Armies a Number of Soldiers of a more eminent degree, known by the Title of Evocati. They were such as had served out the legal time, and been distinguished by particular Marks of Favour, as a Reward of their Valour. It was usual for the Consuls, especially in important Wars, to invite a great Number of these into the Service, by circular Letters dispatched for that purpose. The Reputation of a General

General was what chiefly induced them to CHAP. grant their attendance, and therefore it was confidered as a particular mark of Honour. In the Field they usually guarded the chief Standard, being excused from all the military Drudgery of standing on the Watch, labouring in the Works, or other fervile Employments. They had likewise the privilege of using the Vitis or Rod, which was the badge of the Centurion's Office, and indeed were in all respects rather superior to the Cen-General of an established Reputation, and who had long distinguished himself in the fervice of his Country, was appointed to the management of a difficult War, to fee great Numbers of these flock to his Standard, and offer themselves anew to Dangers and Fa-tigues, in hopes of gaining fresh Laurels un-der the auspices of a Commander, who had often in their youth led them to Honour and Victory. Thus it happened to Paulus Æmilius, when he was charged with the Conduct of the Macedonian War. And thus also to the younger Scipio Africanus, when after a feries of Difgraces before Numantia, the Romans cast their Eyes upon him, as alone capable of restoring the Reputation of their Arms.

X. Bur to return to the Legions. The Officers next in dignity to the Centurions were the military Tribunes, of whom we have already given some account. They owed

CHAP. owed their Name and Institution to Romulus, who having divided the whole Body of the Citizens into three Tribes, appointed an Officer over each, with the Title of Tribune. The Number afterwards increased to fix in every Legion. During the Infancy of the Commonwealth they were nominated by the Confuls; and afterwards, partly by the Confuls, partly by the People. Their Bufiness was to decide all Controversies in the Army; to give the Word to the Watch; to fee that the Soldiers observed Discipline, obeyed Orders, and did their Duty; and to take care of the Works and Camp. None could attain this Dignity, who had not ferved in the Army five Years; and of the twenty-four that were annually chosen, ten at least must have served ten Years. Care was also taken to distribute them in fuch manner, that in each Legion the most experienced were united with those who were younger, in order to instruct and form them for commanding. By this means the Legions were always provided with able Officers, which could not fail of having an excellent Effect upon the Troops, as it naturally tended to inspire them with Valour, and beget an Esteem and Confidence in their Commanders. During the Campaign, which lafted fix Months, they commanded the Legion by turns, two at a time, for two Months together. The order in which they were to command was decided by Lot. left Wings, "And because they

humerous

OHAP owed their Name and Infliction to Romain XI. THE Troops we have hitherto been CHAP. describing, may properly be termed the natural Forces of the Republick, as confifting wholly of her own Citizens. They were indeed the original Armies of Rome, and all along constituted her main Strength. But this political Commonwealth, when the began to extend her Dominion over Italy, instead of reducing the vanquished Nations to Slavery, indulged them the Title of Allies, and the free enjoyment of their own Laws, upon Condition of supplying her in her Wars with a certain proportion of Men. These were called the allied Troops, and as to Number, were equal to the natural Forces in Foot, and double in Horse. The manner of levying them was thus. The Confuls, while they were employed in compleating the Legions at Rome, gave notice to the allied States what Number of Forces they would have occasion for, and appointed a time and place of Rendezyous. The States accordingly convened their Men, and choosing out the defired Number, gave them an Oath, and affigned them a Commander in Chief, and a Paymaster-general. When they arrived in the Camp, they were divided into two great Bodies, termed Ala, or Cornua, from their position in the Army. For the Romans always reserved the Center to themselves, placing the Confederates, half on the right, and half on the left Wings. And because they were more d 3 numerous

CHAP numerous than the natural Forces, Care was II. taken farther to separate them, by selecting a third part of the Horse, and a fifth of the Foot, and posting them near the Consul's Person, under the Name of Extraordinarii. It is not certainly known how the smaller Bodies of the Confederate Forces were commanded. Most probably the Romans marshalled them according to their own Discipline, and affigned them Officers of the same nature with those of the Legions. This feems to follow from the manner in which they fought, it appearing evidently by the Course of History, that both as to their Arms, and order of Battle, they differed in nothing from the Troops of the Republick. We are affured, however, that the two Ala, or great Divisions of the Allies, had each a Præfect appointed them by the Roman Conful, who governed in the fame manner as the legionary Tribunes. In after-times, all the States of Italy were admitted to share the Freedom of the City, and their Forces incorporated with those of the Republick. From this Period, therefore, the Name of the Allies ceafed, and in their stead the auxiliary Troops were procured. These were sent by foreign States and Princes, at the Defire of the Roman Senate. or Generals, and were allowed a fet Pay from the Republick; whereas the Allies received no Confideration for their Service, but a Di-Aribution of Corn.

XII.

CHA Phamerous than the natural Forces, Care was XII. Over these Armies of the Roman CHAP. People, the two Coufuls prefided, who were II. the standing Generals of the Republick. They were created yearly, and in the Field possessed an unlimited Authority; the Senate referving to themselves only the Power of making Peace, and decreeing War, unless upon extraordinary Occasions. The annual Change of Generals was doubtless in some Cases an Obstacle to the Advancement of Affairs: but the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, by continuing the same Man longer in the Command of all the Forces of the State, obliged them to overlook this inconvenience, from the apprehension of a much greater. The Necessity of Affairs, the Distance of Places, and other Reasons, reduced the Romans at length to continue their Generals in the Command, for feveral Years together, under the Name of Proconfuls or Proprætors. And as these Generals had often a great Extent of Country to defend, and were obliged to employ different Bodies of Troops in different Places, they found it necessary to have Officers under them, of a more extensive Authority than the military Tribunes. This gave rife to the Institution of the Legati, who commanded in chief under the General, and managed all Affairs by his Permission. We find them sometimes at the head of one d 4 Legion

CHAP. Legion, sometimes of three or four, and sometimes of only part of a Legion. Their Office was accounted very honourable, infomuch that the greatest Men of the State, and even fuch as had been Confuls and Dictators, did not disdain to accept of it. The great Fabius, as is well known, was his Son's Lieutenant; and Scipio Africanus served in the same Capacity under the Conful his Brother, The Number was according to the General's pleafure, on whom alone the Choice depended: and it appears, that they commanded under him, and received his Orders, as Lieutenant-Generals in our Armies serve under the Generalissimo. In the absence of the Consul or Proconful, they had the honour of using the Fasces, and were intrusted with the same Charge as the Officer whom they represent-Party of Reman Forces was without a fib

XIII. HAVING thus sufficiently explained how the Armies of the Roman People were formed, and the different Degrees of Rank and military Service that prevailed in them; it is time to consider a little more particularly wherein their Strength consisted, and to what they were indebted for that Superiority, which rendered them victorious over the Troops of all other Nations. The first thing that offers itself to our Observation here is, the Nature and Form of the Legion; whose contrivance was so admirable, that Vegetius thinks

thinks nothing less than a God could inspire CHAP. the Idea of it. The Soldiers of which it was II. composed, were armed with Weapons of a heavier and stronger kind than those of other Nations, as we shall have occasion to show more at large in the next Chapter. But because some things must be done in War, which a heavy Body is not able to execute, it was therefore made to include within itself a Band of light Forces, which might iffue from it in order to provoke the Enemy to Battle, or draw back into it in case of Necesfity. It was likewise strengthened with Cavalry, and with Spearmen and Slingers, to purfue those who fled, and compleat the Victory. The Troops were all of different experience and standing in the Service, and so mixed together in the Cohorts, that no Party of Roman Forces was without a fufficient Number of Veterans, to give Life and Vigour to its Operations. The Number of Men in a Legion seems likewise to have been the effect of a wife Policy. For these amounting to four thousand five hundred, formed a confiderable Body of Troops, animated by one and the fame Spirit, and who from their mutual Relation among themselves, would take a near Interest in each others Prefervation. They were in effect Men of the same Regiment, and had all that Zeal and Concern for one another, which is usual among those lesser Divisions of our Troops. XIV.

CHAP.

XIV. THE Marquis de Feuquiere in his Memoirs observes, that the Regiments of which modern Armies confift, are not fufficiently strong in the Number of Men. He thinks it might do well to form them of feveral Battalions: because such a Multitude of different Bodies, without any immediate Tie among themselves, seems directly contrary to that Union and Subordination, which conftitutes the great beauty of military Discipline. It is certain that Troops always exert themfelves more, in behalf of those of the same Regiment, than where the Party for which they are engaged belongs to a different Divifion. This the Romans were fully fenfible of, and had an Eye to it particularly in the Constitution of their Legion. It was doubtless of great Advantage to them in a Day of Battle, that their Lines were made up of a few large Bodies, linked together by the strongest military Ties, and nearly interested in each others Preservation. Nor did the Number of Men in these Bodies render them unwieldy or unmanageable: because being judiciously difposed into Cohorts, they could be commanded with the same ease, and were no less nimble in their Operations, than if they had formed fo many independent Battalions. And here it is worthy of notice, that in drawing up the Army, the Troops were so disposed, as tended wonderfully to their mutual Support and Encouragement. For as the Romans commonly fought

fought in three Lines, fo in every one of those CHAP. Lines, the Soldiers were always so posted, as, to be fustained by others of the same Legion. This was owing to the manner of forming the Lines, not by intire Legions, but by the different military Orders that composed the Legions. The Hastati were placed in the first Line, the Principes in the second, and the Triarii in the third. By this means the Hastati of every Legion were supported by the Principes of the same Legion, and these again by the Triarii. What Spirit and Confidence this must add to the Troops, and how effectually it would tend to preserve them from Slaughter, when any particular Line was broken, will be evident upon the least Reflection. It is found by experience, that Soldiers never fight better, nor exert a greater share of Courage, than when they know themselves to be well supported; and if at last they are obliged to give way, yet still the Retreat is managed with less Terror and Confusion. The Romans. in case of a Repulse, retired through the Intervals of the Lines behind them: and thefe confisting of Men of the same Legion, advanced immediately to their Relief, and doubtless would do every thing in their Power to preserve their Fellows. This kept up the Spirits of those that fled, prevented their throwing away their Arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew the Charge. their mutualcoupport and the

ment. For as the Komuns Comming

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CHAP. I XV. THERE was also another Advantage
11. in the Constitution of the Legion, arising from

in the Constitution of the Legion, arising from the feveral military Orders of which it was composed, with their Division into Maniples and Companies. For these being very numerous, and differing in point of Rank and Superiority, opened a large Field for Preferment, and thereby excited an incredible Ardor and Emulation among the Troops. A private Soldier, after passing through the different military Orders, came to be a Centurion among the Hastati; and rising from one Maniple to another, was at length promoted into the Rank of the Principes. Thence by a like Gradation he reached the Order of the Triarii, and in time attained the Dignity of Primipilus. Nor was he even obliged to ftop here. For as military Merit was every thing at Rome, it seldom failed to raise those who possessed it in any eminent Degree, to the first Dignities of the State. The manner too in which Promotions were made, feems wonderfully calculated for the advancement of true Bravery. Every higher order of Officers created those next below them, and so in train continually, through all the different Steps of the Service. As therefore the Pertfons on whom the Choice depended, had the best Opportunities of knowing the Merit of the feveral Competitors, and were likely to be determined by that alone, in a matter that to nearly concerned their own Honour and Safety; their

Safety; it is natural to suppose, that every CHAP. one would endeavour to recommend himself This by fuch Qualifications, as rendered him truly worthy of the Place to which he affired. This progressive Choice of Officers, which established so just a Subordination in the Army, and gave a great ascendant to the principal Commanders, contributed more than any thing to the Perfection of military Discipline. It is worth while to observe how gradually the Romans proceeded herein. The People or State elected the two Confuls. The Confuls chose the military Tribunes: the military Tribunes the Centurions: and the Centurions their Vexillarii and Tergiductors. This method opened the fairest Prospect to Valous and tended to beget that Spirit among the Troops, which is of all others the happiest that can be raifed in an Army, an Emulation to furpass each other in deserving Honours. 18.

XVI. What we have hitherto said regards chiefly the Form and Structure of the Legion. Let us now consider the Quality of the Troops of which it was composed. None but Citizens were admitted into this Body; and of all these the Tribunes had their Choice, from seventeen to forty-sive Years of Age. We are to observe, however, that it was not every Citizen whom they judged worthy of this Honour. By the Institution of the Census, the whole Roman People were divided into distinct Classes, founded on a valuation of their

CHAP: their Estates. Those of the fixth and lowest Class, confifting of the poorer Citizens, useful only by flocking the Commonwealth with Children, were not allowed to serve in the Army. The Romans were for having Soldiers, whose real Interest in the Preservation of the State, would prompt them to act with Zeal in its Defence. They had every one their portion of Land, and for the most part lived in the Country, to improve and cultivate it with their own Hands. Thus accustomed to the Toils of Husbandry; to endure Sun, Rain, and Hail; to handle heavy Instruments, dig

Trenches, and carry Burdens; when they entered the Service they only changed their Arms and Tools, and came with Bodies inured to Labour, and feasoned to all the Fatigues of the Field. Besides, as War was the proper Profession of this People, and what they were all obliged to engage in, as foon as they reached the Age for bearing Arms, military Exercifes made an effential part of their Education. They were trained up in them from their In-

fancy, and had a space of Ground within the City, called the Campus Martius, where, as if actually in the Field, they formed themfelves to all the Branches of the Service.

ter their Fatigues they plunged into the Tiber, to accustom themselves to swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat.

the Romans were never obliged, on any fudden Emergency, to commit the Honour or Safety of the State to a raw undisciplined Mul-

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titude.

titude. They had always a fufficient Num-CHAP. ber of Men in readiness, trained and habituated to War, for the forming and recruiting their Armies, and all and The Rondon were New Year

XVII. In reading the History of ancient Commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancying, that we peruse the Annals of a set of Men, altogether different from ourselves: The prodigious Fortune to which the Romans attained, feems incredible to us. We are amazed to see that Republick, from an obfoure inconfiderable Village, rifing infenfibly to Power, extending her Dominion over Italy, and at last rendering herself Mistress of the Universe: to behold her Citizens, even those of weight and authority in the Administration; serving as private Men in her Armies: and to find that Soldiers, who in our Days are the Dregs of every Nation, were in that Commonwealth made up of the very same People; who at home, in times of Peace, created Magistrates, enacted Laws, and obliged the Senate itself to submit to their Decisions. Nor is it less a matter of wonder when we confider the number and greatness of her Armies It is evident by experience with respect to modern times, that a European Prince who has a Million of Subjects, cannot, without de-Aroying himself, keep up and maintain above ten thousand Men. But when we look into the Affairs of ancient States, especially those of Sparta, Athens, and Rome, the case ap-Slugia.

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that this proportion between the Soldiers and the rest of the People, which is now as one to an hundred, could not in them be less than as one to eight. Rome was yet confined within very narrow Bounds, when the Latins having resused to succour her with the Troops which had been stipulated, ten Legions were presently raised in the City only. And if we examine the Histories of Athens and Sparta, we shall there meet with Instances no less surprising, of powerful and numerous Armies, when compared with the Extent of their Territories.

XVIII. To account in some measure for so wonderful a Revolution in the course of human Affairs, it behoves us to call to mind, that the Founders of ancient Commonwealths had taken care to make an equal Distribution of Lands, and that the feveral Portions were allotted to Individuals, upon Condition of ferving the State in her Wars. This Circumstance alone raised a Nation to Power, gave Strength to its Armies, and made it a wellregulated Society. By this it became equally the Interest of every Member of the Commonwealth, and that a very great Interest too, to exert himself in defence of his Country. Romulus, after affigning one Part of the Roman Territory to the Expences of religious Worship, and another to the uses of the State, divided the remainder into thirty Portions, to answer

answer to the thirty Curiæ. Under the Com-CHAP. monwealth, in proportion as the publick Domain increased, it was the constant practice of the Senate for feveral Ages, to allot part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens, and share it equally among them. This was what at first enabled Rome to foar above its humble Condition; and the People were strongly fensible of it even in their corrupted State. We find them constantly struggling for an Agrarian Law, and contriving means to check the Artifices of those who endeavoured to elude it. The avowed Patrons of Liberty confidered this Law as the main Bulwark of the State, and were ever founding in the Ears of the Senate, the Mifchiefs to which they exposed themselves by the violation of it. Tell me, would Tiberius Gracchus fay to the Nobles, which is the most valuable Character, that of a Citizen, or of a perpetual Slave? Who is most useful, a Soldier, or a Man entirely unfit for War? Will you, merely for the fake of enjoying a few more Acres of Land than your Fellowcitizens, quite lay afide the hopes of conquering the rest of the World, or be exposed to fee yourselves dispossessed by the Enemy of those very Lands which you refuse us?

XIX. And in fact we find, that in proportion as the Romans deviated from this great and original Principle of Government, Affairs began to wear the very fame face, under Vol. I. e which

times.

CHAP. which they appear in our Days. The Avarice of some, and the lavish Profuseness of others, occasioned the Lands to become the Property of a few. Immediately Arts were introduced, to supply the reciprocal Wants of the rich and poor; by which means but very few Soldiers or Citizens were to be feen. For the Revenues of the Lands, that had before been employed to support the latter, were now wholly bestowed on Slaves and Artificers, who administered to the Luxury of the new Proprietors. But it was impossible that People of this cast should be good Soldiers, they being cowardly and abject, already corrupted by the Luxury of Cities, and often by the very Art they professed. Besides, as they might reap the fruits of their Industry in every Clime, and could not properly call any Country their own, they had no fufficient Tie to bind them to its Defence. Nor was this Revolution peculiar to the Republick of Rome. Sparta before her had experienced the like viciffitude. Lycurgus left no less than thirty thoufand Citizens behind him, who in the time of Agis and Cleomenes, were reduced to seven hundred, scarce an eighth Part of whom was possessed of Lands. The rest were no more than a cowardly Populace. These two Kings undertook to revive the ancient Laws on this occasion, and from that time Lacedæmonia recovered its former Power, and again became formidable to all the States of Greece. Tiberius and Caius Gracekus equally succeeded m

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in their Design of reforming the Roman Com-CHAP. monwealth, the loss of Liberty, and all the Miseries consequent upon it, might have been prevented. But their untimely fate discouraging others from engaging in the same Cause, Rome soon after, instead of being defended by, became a Prey to her own Legions. Nor ought we to wonder, if Men who had no Property in the State, and might hope more from its Overthrow than Preservation, were easily induced to conspire its Ruin.

XX. But the equal Distribution of Lands, was not that alone, which gave Strength to the Armies of Rome. There were other Circumstances peculiar to the Times and Constitution of that Republick, which contributed not a little to its Grandeur. The Trade of a Soldier was not then, as in our Days, a Slavery for Life, attended with infinite Fatigue, and scarce any Profit. As the Art of exactly fortifying Places was little known, and less practifed; national Quarrels were decided by Battle, and one gained often put an end to the War. Hence the Service was properly speaking little other than so many Summer Campaigns. The Armies were renewed yearly, and for feveral Ages never kept the Field during the Winter. A Battle was commonly attended with the Conquest of an entire Province or Kingdom; and the Pillage got in over-running the Enemy's Country, was often not only sufficient to enrich the Conquerors, but sometimes e 2

CHAP.times even served to aggrandise their Posterity. At the close of the Campaign, the Soldiers were dismissed, every one to his own home, to look after his domestick Affairs, and cultivate his Inheritance. Thus there were many Inducements to a military Life: the short Duration of the Service: the Profpect of Wealth and Affluence, to which it often conducted: the Necessity of defending their own Poffessions: and the Hope of acquiring new ones from the Enemy. For, as we have already observed, it was the constant Practice of the Senate for several Ages, to affign part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens; either dividing it among those who had no Patrimony of their own, or granting an additional Allowance to fuch whose Inheritance was but scanty. In our times the condition of a Soldier is very different. National Quarrels are not now decided by Battles, but most commonly by Sieges, which spins out the War to an immoderate length, and occasions an infinite loss of Men. Towns are feldom taken by Storm, or abandoned to be plundered, but given up by Capitulation, and the Inhabitants left in the quiet Possession of their Properties. A Country exposed to Pillage redeems itself by Contributions, no Part of which comes into the Hands of the private Men, whose Pay at the same time is so small, that the meanest Occupation yields a far greater Income. Thus the Miseries of Hunger, Heat, and Cold, which

which are inseparable from a military Life, CHAP the certainty of Blows, and the uncertainty of Plunder, renders the usual Parts of War full of Sufferings and Dangers, and of little or no Profit to the Soldiers.

XXI. INDEED in the latter times of the Commonwealth, War began to partake of those Inconveniencies, with which it is attended in the present Age. But then the Encouragements they had to face the Dangers of the Service, and the high Honours to which it paved the way, made all Difficulties vanish and disappear. For as the Romans devoted themselves entirely to the Profession of Arms, and confidered it as the only Study worthy their Care, they omitted no methods to recommend and place it in Esteem. Innumerable Rewards and Distinctions were invented, fuited to the different Stations of Men, and the feveral kinds of Valour in which they might render themselves conspicuous. Magiftracies and Dignities were almost always conferred, according to the Reputation of the Candidate for Bravery in War. And at the fame time that military Merit never failed to promote the Person in whom it was lodged, no one was capable of civil Employment in the Commonwealth, who had not served in the Army at least ten Years. We are not therefore to wonder, that amidft so many Incentives, which rendered the Life of a Soldier not only honourable, but in some measure necessary,

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CHAP. necessary, Multitudes flocked to the Service. and strove with Emulation to be admitted into the Legions. Interest and Ambition are the two ruling Principles of human Life; and as both conspired to urge the Romans to War, it was easy for them to find Armies, and to increase and multiply them at pleasure. in our Days, none of those motives operate upon the Minds of Men. The Condition of a common Soldier is of all others the most despicable: and even with regard to Officers of the first Rank, long Service is so far from being a Recommendation to State-Preferment, that they are on that very account, in the Judgment of many, the less fit for civil Employments.

> XXII. But what chiefly contributed to the Strength and Greatness of the Roman Armies, was the Custom established by Romulus, of incorporating the vanquished Nations, and admitting them to the Privileges of Citizens, Without this it would have been impossible for Rome, to raise herself to that height of Grandeur, to which in time she attained. The Spirit of her Citizens, the Bravery of her Troops, and the admirable Discipline of her Armies, might have enabled her to subject the Nations around her, and extend her Sway over a confiderable Part of Italy: but in proportion as she advanced in Conquest, she would have become fensible of her own Weakness; and the difficulty of maintaining herself

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in her new Territories, when they grew large CHAP. enough to employ the whole natural Forces of the Commonwealth, would have either made her drop all Thoughts of farther Empire, or forced her to have recourse to mercenary Troops, which have always in the end proved the ruin of those States, who were imprudent enough to venture upon fo dangerous an expedient. This is remarkably exemplified in the History of Athens, Sparta, and Carthage. The two first of these Cities acquired confiderable Dominion and Authority in Greece, and for some time maintained themselves in the Possession of that Power, to which their Valour and Abilities in War had raised them. But as the Number of Citizens in either State feldom exceeded thirty thousand, and they were unacquainted with the Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, it was impossible for them to enlarge their Territories in any extensive Degree. For great Conquests require great Armies to maintain them, which Cities so constituted as Athens and Sparta, were not able to furnish. Accordingly we find, that when Ambition prompted them to Undertakings beyond their Strength, they were fo far from being able to increase their Dominions, that their very Conquests proved their Ruin, and they funk under the weight of their own Greatness. For the Countries they had brought under Subjection, not confidering themselves as Parts of the State, but rather as Tributaof shaking off the Yoke; and therefore seldom failed to revolt, when they saw them engaged in any difficult War. By this means they were not only deprived of a considerable Part of the Revenues, at a time when they stood most in need of Money and Supplies; but obliged likewise to divide their Forces: which was a great Check upon their Designs, and in the end so weakened them, that they were no longer able to maintain themselves in that Grandeur and Reputation they had acquired.

XXIII. THE case of Carthage was indeed fomewhat different. That Commonwealth, by its Riches and Commerce, was able to fet great Armies on foot, and make extensive Conquests. But as the Genius of the Citizens was turned more to Traffick than War, and as they never admitted the conquered Nations to the Privileges of natural Subjects, they were under a Necessity of employing mercenary Troops, both for enlarging their Territories, and holding the vanquished Countries in Obedience. Hence the many Shocks and Convulsions to which that State was liable. For as her Armies had no other Tie to the Republick, but that of their Pay, they were eafily induced to throw off their Allegiance, when any more advantageous Prospect offered itself. Their Revoltmore than once brought Carthage to the very brink of Destruction. Instead of contributing

contributing to fecure the Tranquillity of the CHAP. tributary Countries, they often spirited them up. to Rebellion; and, which is indeed a necessary Confequence of employing mercenary Troops, upon any fudden reverse of Fortune, they were ever ready to abandon the Service. Thus the Carthaginians, though absolute Masters at Sea, possessed of immense Territories, and able to set on foot numerous Armies, were in reality rather a rich than a powerful Republick. They were successful indeed for a time against a Number of barbarous States and Nations, without Discipline or Experience in War: but when they came to enter the Lists with a brave and a military People, their Undertakings almost always miscarred. Witness their many Attempts upon Syracuse; the Extremity to which they were reduced by Agathocles; and the eafe with which they were in a manner totally driven out of Sicily by Pyrrbus. Indeed in their first and second War with the Romans, they make a very confiderable figure in History, whether we regard the greatness of their Victories, or the strength of their Armies. But the merit of that feems rather owing to the Abilities of their Generals, than to the intrinfick Power of the Commonwealth itself. Accordingly, in the third Punick War, when they had neither a Hamilcar nor a Hannibal at the head of their Troops, they in a very short time fell a Prey to their Enemies.

XXIV. Bur now the Romans, by the ad-CHAP. mirable Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, avoided all the Inconveniences to which the above-mention'd Cities were liable. and built their greatness upon a sure Foundaation. The Forces of the State increased with their Territories, infomuch that it is amazing to confider, in how short a time from fmall beginnings, they rose to an incredible multitude of Citizens. The conquered Provinces were so far from being an Incumbrance upon them, by exhausting their Strength in Guards and Garrisons, that, on the contrary, they became real Parts of the Commonwealth. and contributed greatly to her Power, by augmenting her Revenues, and adding to the Number of her Subjects. Thus in proportion as Rome grew in greatness, and stood in need of mighty Armies to support the weight of her Enterprises, she found within herself an inexhaustible Stock of Men and Riches, and without having recourse to mercenary Troops, could furnish more than sufficient to answer all the Demands of the State. Polybius, when he comes to speak of the War with the Italick Gauls, takes occasion to describe the mighty Preparations made by the Romans, to oppose that formidable Enemy. We there find, that the Forces of the Commonwealth at that time, amounted to about feven hundred thousand Foot, and seventy thousand Horse. Compare this Account with the Histories of

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Athens and Sparta, and it will foon appear, CHAP what a disadvantage these two States lay under, for want of fuch an Institution as that of Romulus. For as they never admitted the vanquished Nations to the right of Citizens, but always reduced them to the Condition of Tributaries, the multitude of their Conquests ferved only to enlarge their Territories, without adding to the number of their natural Subjects. Hence even in the most flourishing Period of their greatness, they could seldom bring into the Field above thirty thousand Men. Rome on the other hand, by a contrary Policy, increased daily in the multitude of her Citizens, and in time was enabled to furnish out Armies, adequate to the Conquest of the Universe. Number of her Subjects. Thus in proportion

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Of the Arms and Discipline of the Romans.

I. I T is generally allowed among the Writers upon the Art of War, that as in many other things, so particularly in their Arms, the Romans excelled all other Nations. I shall not here confine myself to the usual Distinction into offensive and defensive, but rather

CHAP rather describe them according to the several military Orders of which the Legions were composed. By the Velites we are to understand all the light-armed Troops of the Commonwealth, of whatever Rank and Denomination. They were equipped with Bows, Slings, Javelins, a Spanish Sword, a Buckler, and a Helmet. The Bow is of very remote Antiquity, and has been used by almost all Nations. Crete in particular was famous for its excellent Archers. It does not feem to have been much regarded by the Romans in the earliest times of the Republick, and when it was afterwards introduced, was confined chiefly to the auxiliary Troops. We find however, in the Description of Battles, frequent mention made of the Sagittarii; and it appears, that they fometimes contributed not a little to the Victory. The Sling was also an Instrument of War much used by many Nations. The Baleareans especially, who inhabited the Islands now called Majorga and Minorca, are beyond all others celebrated for their Expertness at this Weapon. They were so attentive in exercising their Youth in the use of it, that they did not give them their Food in a Morning till they hit a Mark. These Baleareans were much employed in the Armies of the Carthaginians and Romans, and greatly contributed to the gaining of Victories. Livy mentions some Cities of Achaia, particularly Egium, Patræ, and Dymæ, whose Inhabitants were still more dexterous

dexterous at the Sling than the Baleareans. CHAP. They threw Stones farther, and with greater Force and Certainty, never failing to hit what Part of the Face they pleased. Their Slings discharged Stones with so much Force, that neither Buckler nor Head-piece could refift their Impetuofity. Instead of Stones, they fometimes charged the Sling with Balls of Lead, which it carried much farther, and with greater Impetuofity. The Javelin, or Hasta, was the proper missive Weapon of the Velites. It was a kind of Dart not unlike an Arrow, the Wood of which was generally three Foot long, and one Inch thick. The Point was four Inches long, and tapered to fo fine an end, that it bent at the first Stroke in fuch a manner, as to be useless to the Enemy. Every Man carried feven of them to Battle. The Spanish Sword was for a close Encounter. The Romans judged this Weapon the fittest for execution, as having both Edge and Point. It was short, of excellent temper, and in shape not unlike a Turkish Scimetar, only sharper at the Point. Livy tells us, that though it was principally intended for stabbing, it would yet ferve likewise to cut off Arms, Legs, and Heads at a Blow. The Buckler, or Parma, was of a round form, about three Foot in Diameter, and made of Wood covered with Leather. The Helmet, called Galea, or Galerus, was a light Cask for the Head, generally made of the Skin of some wild Beast, to appear the more terrible.

CHAP. II. THE Arms of the Haftati, Prinicpes, and Triarii, were in a great measure the same; for which reason we shall not divide them in our Description, but speak of them all together. Those most deserving our Notice are the Sword, the Scutum, the Pilum, the Galea; and the Lorica. The Sword was the same as that of the Velites, and therefore requires not any particular Description here. It was usual with the Romans to wear it on the right fide, that they might be the more at liberty to manage their Shields. In ancient Monuments however we fometimes meet with it on the left. The Scutum was a Buckler of Wood, oblong, and bending inward like a half Cylinder. Its Parts were joined together with little Plates of Iron, and the whole was covered with a Bull's Hide. An Iron Ring went round it without, to keep off Blows; and another within, to hinder it from taking any Damage by lying on the Ground. In the middle was an Iron Boss, or Umbo, jutting out, very ferviceable to glance off Stones and Darts, and fometimes to prefs violently upon the Enemy, and drive all before them. It appears that these Bucklers were large enough to cover

almost the whole Body. Polybius makes them four Foot long, and two and a half broad. And in Livy we meet with Soldiers who stood on the Guard, sometimes sleeping with their Head laid on their Shield, having fixed the other Part of it on the Earth. Some make

the Scutum the same with the Chypeus: but CHAP, this is evidently a mistake; since in the Institution of the Census by Servius Tullius, we find the Chypeus given to those of the sirst Class, and the Scutum to those of the second. In sact, the Scutum was long and square, and came at last to be the only Shield of the heavy-armed Troops. The Chypeus was of a smaller size, and quite round, belonging more properly to other Nations, though for some time used by the Romans.

III. THE Pilum was a missive Weapon, which, in a Charge, they darted at the Enemy. It was commonly four square, but sometimes round; composed of a Piece of Wood about three Cubits long, and a Slip of Iron of the fame length, hooked and jagged at the end. They took abundance of care in joining the two Parts together, and did it fo artificially, that it would fooner break in the Iron itself, than in the Joint. Every Man had two of these Pila, which they discharged at the Enemy before they came to close Fight. When they had neither time nor room they threw it upon the Ground, and charged the Enemy Sword in Hand. Marius, in the Cimbrian War, contrived these Pila after a new Fashion. For whereas before, the Head was fastened to the Wood with two Iron Pins; he fuffered one of them to remain as it was, and pulling out the other, put a weak wooden Peg in bits Place. By this means, when it stuck in the Enemy's

CHAP. Enemy's Shield it did not stand outright as III. formerly: but the wooden Peg breaking, the Javelin hung down, and sticking fast by its crooked Point, drew after it the Shield. Next to the Pilum we mentioned the Galea. This was a Head-piece, or Morrion, coming down to the Shoulders. It was either of Iron or Brass, open before, and leaving the Face uncovered. Some of them were fo contrived, that they might be let down, on occasion, to cover the Face. Upon the top was the Crista, or Crest, in adorning of which the Soldiers took great In the time of Polybius they wore Plumes of Feathers, dyed of various Colours, to render them beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies. The Officers in particular were extremely curious and splendid in their Crests, which were usually worked in Gold and Silver, and fo contrived as to represent Animals of various kinds, Lions, Leopards, Tigers, and Griffins. If we might speak of those of foreign Commanders, the Crest of King Pyrrhus, as very singular, would deferve our notice. It was made, according to Plutarch's Description, of two Goats Horns. Alexander the great, as he is represented on ancient Medals, wore a Crest of the same Nature.

IV. We come now to the Lorica, which was a defensive Armour for the Body, as the Galea was for the Head and Neck. In our Language it is called the Cuirass, and was generally

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generally made of Leather, covered with CHAP Plates of Iron in the form of Scales, or Iron. III. Rings twifted within one another in the form of Chains. These are what we call Coats of Mail, in Latin, Lorica Hamis conserta, or Hamata. Sometimes the Cuirass confisted of Thongs, with which the Soldier was girt from the Armpits to the Waste, and whence probably it took the Name of Lorica, from Lorum, a Thong or Strap of Leather. We find likewise that it was oftentimes a fort of Linen Caffock, made with many Folds, which refisted, or very much broke the Force of Blows. Among the Greeks this Piece of Armour had the Name of Thorax, and was made either of Iron or Brass, in two Pieces which were fastened upon the Sides by Buckles. Alexander left the Cuirass only the two Pieces which covered the Breast, that the fear of being wounded on the Back, which had no defence, might prevent the Soldiers from fly-Some of these Cuirasses were of so hard a Metal, as to be absolutely proof against Weapons. Zoilus, an excellent Artist in this way, offered two of them to Demetrius Poliocertes. To show the excellency of them, he caused a Dart to be discharged from a Catapulta, at the distance of only twenty-fix Paces; which though it struck the Cuirass with the utmost Violence, yet made no Impression, and scarce left the least Mark behind it. After all it must be owned, that the Thorax of the Greeks was much less capable VOL. I.

CHAP of Motion, Agility, and Force; whereas the III. Girts of Leather, successively covering each other, left the Roman Soldier entire Liberty of Action; and fitting him like a Vest, defended him against Darts. The poorer Soldiers, who were rated under a thousand Drachms, instead of the Lorica, wore a Pectorale, or Breast-Plate of thin Brass, about twelve Inches square: and this, with what has been already described, and Greaves and Gantlets upon their Legs and Arms, which were common likewise to the rest, rendered them compleatly armed.

V. WHAT we have hitherto faid regards only the Foot. It is now time to speak of the Cavalry, who at first were but very indifferently armed, either for Offence or Defence. used only a round Shield, with a Helmet on their Head, and a couple of Javelins in their Hand, great part of the Body being left without defence. But as foon as they found the many inconveniences to which they were hereby exposed, they began to arm themselves like the Grecian Horse, or much in the manner of their own Foot, only their Shield was a little shorter and squarer, and their Lance or Javelin thicker, with spikes at each end, that if one miscarried, the other might be ferviceable. It is remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly able to comprehend, that amongst the Ancients, the Horse had neither Stirrups nor Saddle. Education, Exercise, and

and Habit, had accustomed them not to want CHAP. those aids, and even not to perceive that there. III. was any occasion for them. There were fome Horsemen, such as the Numidians, who did not know fo much as the use of Bridles to guide their Horses: and who, notwithstanding, by their Voice only, or the use of the Heel or Spur, made them advance, fall back, stop, turn to the right or left; in a word, perform all the Evolutions of the best disciplined Cavalry. Sometimes, having two Horses, they leaped from one to the other even in the heat of Battle, to ease the first when fatigued. These Numidians, as well as the Parthians, were never more terrible than when they feemed to fly thro' Fear and Cowardice. For then, facing suddenly about, they discharged their Darts or Arrows upon the Enemy, and often put them to flight with great flaughter. The Romans were more than once furprised by these unexpected Attacks, and on fome occasions suffered considerably. But they at last found out a method of fecuring themselves, by holding their Targets over their Heads, and forming what Historians call the Testudo. It was to this Invention that Marc Antony owed the preservation of his Army, when miscarrying in his Expedition against the Parthians, he found himself obliged to retreat into Syria before a great Body of their Horse.

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CHAP. VI. THESE were the Arms with which the III. Romans conquered the World: and I believe it will be readily owned, that they were admirably well calculated both for defending themselves, and offending their Enemies. Polybius, in more Places than one, gives them the advantage in this respect over all other Nations, and expresly affirms, that the many Victories they obtained over the Gauls, was owing entirely to the superiority of their Arms. It is true, the cutting Swords of that People terrified them greatly at first, and was the cause of a fatal Overthrow. But they foon learnt from Experience, what a contemptible Weapon that was, when employed in close fight, against Troops substantially armed for defence. For the Gauls, to give force and vigour to their Blows, were obliged to avoid too near an approach to the Enemy, that they might have room to wield their Swords. Their first Ranks therefore only could do excution, because the Romans knowing their fafety to lie in close fight, advanced continually under cover of their Shields, and crouded upon them in fuch manner, that they left them not sufficient space for the free use of their Weapons. It is besides observed, that the Swords of the Gauls were of fo ill a temper, as after two or three strokes to stand bent in their Hands, and thereby become wholly useless to them, if they had not time to straighten them on the Ground with their Foot. This was not to be expected in the heat

heat of fight, against an Enemy that pressed CHAP. hard; fo that the Romans closing in with them, stabbed them in the Face and Breast with their pointed Swords, and made terrible flaughter. The Chevalier Folard is aftonished, that under all these Disadvantages, his Countrymen should obtain so many Victories over the Romans. He can hardly forbear fancying, that had they fo far improved by their Defeats, as to change the fashion of their Weapons, and arm themselves after the manner of their Adverfaries, we should not have heard so much of the boasted Exploits and Conquests of that People. Be that as it will, it is certain the Gauls wanted neither Bravery nor military Conduct, and if we except the fingle Article of their Arms, shewed themselves on many occasions no way inferior to the Romans.

VII. But let us now compare their Arms with those of the Greeks. Here, it must be owned, the Advantage does not appear fo manifest. Many are rather of opinion, that the Greeks excelled the Romans in this respect. The Earl of Orrery particularly, in his Treatise of the Art of War, wonders much that the Romans, who borrowed most of their Weapons whether offensive or defensive from the Greeks, did not also follow their example in furnishing some of their Infantry with long Pikes, which he observes are the best offensive Arms, either to charge or defend, and of excellent use against Horse. It is well known f 3 that

CHAP that the Macedonian Phalanx, to which Philip III. and Alexander were indebted for most of their

Victories, fought always with this Weapon. One would therefore be apt to think, that an Experience so much in its favour, could not have failed of recommending it powerfully to the Romans. And yet it is certain, that after making tryal of it for some time, they laid it aside as incommodious, ordering the Hastati, who at first were equipped with it, and thence took their Name, to arm themselves after the fashion of the rest of the legionary Foot. This could not arise from any scrupulous attachment to their own Customs, or dislike of foreign Manners; because no People were ever less tenacious in this respect, or shewed a greater readiness to adopt the Institutions of other Nations, when they faw any real Benefit likely to accrue from them. The principal Reason seems to have been, that they found the use of the Weapon incompatible with that of the Shield. For as it necessarily required to be managed with both Hands, those who fought with it were obliged to lay afide the Buckler; which piece of Armour appeared to the Romans of greater consequence than the Pike, because this last was in some meafure supplied by the Sword and Javelin. we might judge of things by the Event, the Romans reasoned very justly on this occasion; fince without the affistance of the Pike, they not only gained greater and more numerous Victories than the Macedonian Phalanx, but

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even beat that very Phalanx itself, so formi-CHAP. dable by the use of this Weapon. As this is a very curious and interesting Subject, and capable of furnishing many useful Resections in relation to the ancient Art of War, it will not, I believe, be disagreeable to the Reader, if we enlarge a little upon it.

VIII. THE Macedonian Phalanx was a Body of fixteen thousand Men, armed with Pikes four and twenty foot long, which Historians describe under the Name of Sarissa. Corps was generally divided into ten Battalions, each confifting of fixteen hundred Men, an hundred in front, and fixteen deep. To form some idea of their strength and order of Battle, we need only reflect upon what passed a few Centuries ago in Europe, when Italy was a continual Theatre of War, by reafon of the different Pretensions of France, Spain, and the Emperor. The Battalions of Switzerland were then in great Reputation, and generally looked upon as the best Infantry in the World, chiefly on account of the many Victories they had gained by the Pike. They were forced at first to have recourse to this Weapon, in order to fecure themselves against the Ambition of the German Princes, who were daily making Attempts upon their Liberty. For these Princes being rich, and able to bring into the Field a numerous Cavalry, the Switzers, whose whole Strength on the contrary lay in their Foot, faw themfelves. f 4

CHAP. selves under a necessity of contriving Arms, that might defend them against the Enemy's Horse. None appeared so proper for this purpose as the Pike; and so successful were they, by the Perfection they attained to in the use of it, and their admirable Orders and Discipline, that with fifteen or twenty thousand Foot, they would often venture to attack a vast Body of Horse, and generally came off victorious. From that time the Pike became famous, and was introduced into all the Armies of Europe. We find that they usually had one half of their Infantry Shot, and the other half Pikes; and it is particularly deferving of our notice, that for feveral Ages, the chief Dependence of the General in a Day of Battle seems to have been upon the Pikes. By degrees the Musket began to prevail over the Pike; yet gained ground fo very flowly, that it is not much above half a Century, fince we find one third of the Infantry still Pikes.

IX. But the the Pike was found to be of admirable fervice in Engagements with Horse, Experience constantly made it appear, that it was by no means sufficient against a resolute and well-armed Infantry. For as this Weapon required to be managed with both Hands, and therefore necessarily excluded the use of the Target, those who carried it were left altogether without defence, if in the course of an Engagement, the Enemy should chance to

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get within their Pikes. Hence the Generals CHAP. who were acquainted with this Weakness in the Swiss Battalions, and could bring their Troops to press the Charge vigorously, seldom failed of defeating them with great flaughter. We have a remarkable Example of it in the case of Count Carmignola, General to Philip Viconti Duke of Milan. That brave Officer being fent against a Body of eighteen thousand Switzers, with only fix thousand Horse, and a few Foot, advanced boldly to the Encounter: but tho' the Attack was resolute and well conducted, he was repulfed with confiderable loss. Carmignola quickly perceived the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horse. As he was a Man of determined Courage, and rather roused than dispirited by the Check he had lately received, he foon rallied his Men, and led them on again to the Charge. When he came within a certain distance, he ordered his Cavalry to difmount; and engaging the Switzers imartly in that Posture, put them all to the rout, and most of them to the Sword. Only three thousand were left, who finding themselves past remedy, threw down their Arms. It will be proper to take notice on this Occasion, that the Cavalry led by Carmignola were all Men at Arms, and therefore compleatly provided both for Offence and Defence. Now fuch a Body of Troops was well enough able to deal with the Switzers, if they but once got close up with them, and came to use their Swords.

CHAP. Swords. For then the Enemy being without defensive Arms, and deriving no affiftance from their Pikes, whose very length rendered them unferviceable, were exposed to unavoidable flaughter. Confidering therefore the Advantages and Difadvantages on both fides, it will appear, that they who have no defenfive Arms are without Remedy, if the Enemy charges but home, and passes their Pikes. This cannot miss to happen in an Engagement with resolute Troops: because Battles always advancing, and the Parties on each fide pressing on perpetually, they must of neceffity come so near at last, as to reach one another with their Swords; and the' some few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down by the Pikes, yet those that are behind still pressing on, are sufficient to carry the Victory.

X. From these Reasons it will be easy to conceive, why Carmignola overcame with so great a slaughter of the Switzers, and so little of his own Army. Nor is this Example singular in its kind. We meet with many others in History, all tending to demonstrate, that an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers, have great advantages over the Pike. When Gonsalvo was besieged in Barletta by the French, a detachment of Spanish Foot was sent out of Sicily, and landed in the Kingdom of Naples, with Orders to march to his Relief. Monsieur d'Aubigny had notice of their Approach,

proach, and went to meet them with his Men CHAP. at Arms, and a Body of about four thousand Switzers. These last press'd upon them with their Pikes, and at first put them into some disorder; but the Spaniards, by the help of their Bucklers, and the agility of their Bodies, having at length got under the Pikes of the Switzers, and so near as that they could come at them with their Swords, defeated them with great flaughter, and very little loss on their own fide. Every one knows what terrible havock was made of the Switzers at the Battle of Ravenna, and all upon the same account, the Spanish Foot having got to them with their Swords: nay, it is certain they must have been all cut to pieces, had they not been happily rescued by the French Horse: and yet the Spaniards, drawing themselves into close order, bravely fustained the Assaults of the Cavalry, and retired without loss. It appears therefore, that tho' the Pike be excellent against Horse, it is yet insufficient in an Encounter with Foot; whereas an Army judicioully armed for Offence and Defence, at the fame time that it can very well deal with Cavalry, is likewise an overmatch for a Body of Pikes.

XI. And hence it was that the Macedonian Phalanx, which feems to have been just fuch an order of Battle as the Battalions of Switzerland, experienced likewise the same Fate, when it came to encounter the warlike xcii

CHAP, and well-armed Troops of the Romans. Historians ascribe the defeat of it to several Causes: the advantageous disposition of the Roman Troops, who fought in separate Bodies, yet fo drawn up, that they could unite and join upon occasion: the artful Conduct of the Generals, in drawing it into rugged and uneven Places, where it could not preferve itself entire, but became disjointed and broken: the opportunity this gave of charging it in the openings and void spaces, whereby it was totally difunited, and being attacked in front and rear, fell an easy Prey to its Enemies. These things doubtless contributed in part to the Overthrow of which we speak: but the principal defect of the Phalanx lay in its disadvantageous Armour and order of Battle. In reality, the Pikes of the two first Ranks only were ferviceable in an Engagement: those of the rest scarce availed any thing. The Men of the third Rank could not see what passed in the front, nor had any command of their long Pikes, which were intangled and locked up between the Files, without a possibility of moving them to the right or left. Hence the Romans found no great difficulty in furmounting an Obstacle, formidable indeed in appearance, but at bottom very trifling. They had only to gain upon the Pikes of the two first Ranks, that they might join the Enemy, and fight hand to hand. This they were enabled to do by the help of their large Bucklers, with which they

they bore up the Pikes of the Macedonians, CHAP. and forcing their way under, reached them. with their Swords. All refistance was then at an end. The Phalanx, unprovided for defence, and rather embarraffed than aided by their Pikes, could no longer stand the furious Charge of the Romans, who made dreadful havock with their pointed Swords. We find at the Battle of Pydna, where Paulus Æmilius gained so compleat a Victory over Perseus, that no less than twenty thousand Macedonians were flain, with the loss of only a hundred Men on the fide of the Romans. fo exactly with what we have above related of the Switzers, that it is impossible not to ascribe it to the same Cause, namely, the infufficiency of the Pike, when opposed to an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers.

XII. WE come now to speak of the military Discipline of the Romans, to which, no less than to their Arms, they were indebted for their many Victories and Conquests. If we compare this with other Nations, we do not find that they surpassed the Gauls in Number or Boldness, the Germans in Stature, the Spaniards in Strength of Body, the Africans in Stratagem, or the Greeks in Learning and the Arts of civil Life. Nay it is evident from History, that they were inferior in all these Respects. But as to what regards the use and exercise of Arms, the choice of Soldiers, and the training them up in all the Duties of War;

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CHAP here indeed lay their chief Excellence, and III. by this they were enabled to baffle all the Advantages of their Enemies, whether derived from Nature or Education. We have already observed, that none were admitted into the Legions 'till they had reached their feventeenth Year. But tho' this was the age for entering the Service, it was not that when they began to learn. For as War was the darling Study of the Romans, they habituated their Youth to it from their Infancy, and carefully instructed them in all its Branches, having fet apart the Field of Mars for this purpose, which was a kind of military School within the City. We are not however to imagine, that they looked upon this early Institution as fufficient, or were less affiduous in exercifing their Men, after they were admitted into the Service. They knew that constant Practice alone makes Troops expert, and brings them to the habit of applying their Knowledge with readiness upon all occasions. Hence not only among the young Soldiers, but even among those of oldest standing in the Army, the military Exercises were continued without intermission. These Exercises had a threefold Tendency: to inure the Men to Labour, and render them robust and active: to instruct them in the use of their Arms: and laftly, to teach them the necessary Evolutions, and how to preserve their Ranks and Orders, in Marches, Battles, and Incampments.

XIII. As to the first, the Romans took great CHAP. pains to form their Youth to be nimble in running, active to leap, strong to throw the Bar and to wrestle, which are all necessary Qualifications in a Soldier. For running and nimbleness fits them to get possession of a Place before the Enemy, to fall upon them on a fudden in their Quarters, and to purfue them with more execution in a Rout. Activity enables them with greater ease to avoid Blows, leap a Ditch, or climb a Bank. And Strength makes them carry their Arms better, firike better, and endure the Shock better. Swimming was likewise considered as an essential part of a military Education. Armies are not fure of Bridges wherever they come, nor are Boats always to be had; fo that if Men cannot fwim, they will necessarily be deprived of feveral Conveniences, and lose many fair Opportunitias of Action. One principal Reafon why the Romans made choice of the Campus Martius to exercise their Youth in was, its nearness to the Tiber, into which they plunged after their Fatigues, to accustom themselves to Swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat. But of all their Exercises of this kind, none was purfued with greater attention, than the inuring the Troops to the military Pace; that is, to walk twenty miles, and fometimes four and twenty, in five Hours. This habituated the Soldiers to a certain stated and regular Progress in their Marches, taught them to keep close together, and prevented their

CHAP their exposing themselves scattered and difperfed to the Enemy. They were obliged likewise on these Occasions, to carry Burdens of threescore Pound weight, which not only accustomed them to bear Fatigue, but was found ferviceable in many other respects: For whether it might be necessary in an Expedition to take along with them feveral Days Provisions, or to carry a certain quantity of Water thro' a defart and fandy Country, or to provide a number of Stakes for the Execution of any particular Enterprize; against all these Exigencies they had prepared themfelves by the Practice of which we speak: and hence great Dangers were many times avoided, and great Victories many times obtained.

> XIV. THE fecond Particular we mentioned in the Roman Exercises was, the instructing the Men in the use of their Arms. Here also we meet with many Proofs of the Industry and Sagacity of that People. They fet up a great Post about fix Foot high, suitable to the stature of a Man, and fastened it so strongly, that no Blows might be able to batter or shake it. This the Soldiers were wont to affail with all the Instruments of War, as if it had been indeed a real Enemy. Sometimes they would aim their Blows at the Head, fometimes strike it on the Face, then on the Sides, Legs, before and behind, now retreating, and then advancing again; during all which

which they were taught to proceed with foCHAP. much Caution, that in directing their Weapon against their Adversary, they should not mean-while lay themseves open to Wounds. By this Contrivance they learnt how to place their Blows aright, and became dexterous and nimble, both at defending themselves, and offending their Enemies. They were instructed rather to thrust than to cut with their Swords: because Thrusts are more mortal, harder to be defended, and he that makes them is not so easily discovered, and is readier to double his Thrust than his Blow. must not here forget, that in these Exercises they made use of Helmets, Shields, and Swords, double the weight of common Weapons. This made them ready and alert in Battle, which they found fo far from being attended with any unforeseen Incumbrances, that it was rather an ease from the fatigue of ordinary Duty. Nor let any one wonder, that the Romans were fo extremely attentive to these little things, fince according to the manner of fighting then used, in which the Troops encountered hand to hand, every small Advantage was of great Importance. They were besides sensible, that Experience in this kind makes Men bold and courageous; for no one fears to do that which he thinks he understands. A Soldier who had often made trial of himself in these imaginary Combats, grew impatient to come to action in good earnest, that he might the better Vol. I. judge

Opportunity of putting that in practice, which he had so well learnt in Theory. Hence Battles were not what they dreaded, but what they desired: and Generals often found it more difficult to restrain their Men from fighting, and check the Ardor of their Courage, where Prudence obliged them to decline the Onset; than to prevail upon them to face the Enemy, when they judged it necessary to come to an Engagement.

XV. But it is not sufficient to inure Men to Labour, to make them strong, swift, and expert at the use of their Weapons: they must learn likewise to keep their Ranks well, to obey Orders, and follow the Directions and Signals of their Commanders. This was the third Branch of the Roman Exercises, about which they were no less folicitous, than about the other two. I shall not here enter into a minute Detail of the common Evolutions, the opening and closing of the Files, doubling their Ranks, turning to the right and left, Marchings, Wheelings, &c. because they differed but a little from the Practice of the present Age. Their manner of forming too in order of Battle, their Conduct in an Attack or Repulse, with the general dispofition of their Marches, will come in more properly under other Heads of this Discourse. Let it suffice for the present to observe, that they exercised their Men without intermission

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in all these different Branches of the Service, C HA P. and by the force of constant Habit, brought, them to that degree of Expertness, that they could practife without Hurry and Confusion in the heat of Fight, what they had been fo thoroughly trained to in the Field. Above all it was their particular Care, to accustom the Troops to rally and recover their Order readily when broken. To this end, besides distinguishing the several Companies by peculiar Enfigns, every Man had his fixed and invariable Post in the Battalion, and was taught by long Practice, to know in a manner habitually, the number of his File, his Place in that File, his right and left-hand Man where he belonged to the front Rank, and both these and his File-Leader where he belonged to the other Ranks. Nay fo very curious were the Romans in this Point, that to imprint these things the deeper upon the Minds of the Soldiers, they caused them to be engraven in great Characters upon their Helmets and Bucklers.

XVI. Nor were they less careful in training up the Cavalry, whom they taught particularly to ride well, and sit fast when they came to a Charge. To this end they had Horses of Wood upon which they were exercised, vaulting upon them, sometimes with their Arms, and sometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any assistance; so that upon a Signal from their Captain they were

CHAP immediately on horse-back, and upon another Signal as foon upon the Ground. As they fought in Squadrons, like the Cavalry of our time, their Evolutions were much the same with those in use at present, allowing only the difference of Armour; and among the Horse, as well as the Foot, were carried on without intermission. Indeed there is nothing more admirable in the whole Roman Discipline, than the continual Exercise to which the Troops were kept, either within or without the Camp; infomuch that they were never idle, and had scarce any respite from Duty. The new raised Soldiers performed their Exercifes regularly twice a Day, and the old ones once: for it was not, in the Opinion of this People, length of Service that constituted warlike and veteran Troops, but the uninterrupted Habit and Practice of Arms; nor did they consider an unexercised Soldier, after what number of Campaigns you will, as any other than a Novice in the Profession. Accordingly they were constant and indefatigable in training their Men to all the different Operations of the Field. They obliged them to make hafty Marches of a confiderable length, laden with their Arms and feveral Palifades, and that often in steep and craggy Countries. They habituated them always to keep their Ranks. even in the midst of Disorder and Confusion, and never to lose fight of their Standards. They made them charge each other in mock Battles, of which the Officers, Generals, and even

even the Consul himself were Witnesses, and in CHAP, which they thought it for their Glory to share in person. When they had no Enemy in the Field, the Troops were employed in considerable Works, as well to keep them in Exercise, as for the publick Utility. Such in particular were the Highways, called for that reason Viæ militares, which still subsist, and are the fruits of that wise and salutary Custom.

XVII. How much the Romans relied upon this manner of training and employing their Troops, appears evidently from the Conduct of their Senate and Generals, during a courfe of several Ages. For in all their Difficulties and Straits, this was that to which they had immediate recourse, as their furest Refuge, and the only means by which they could hope to extricate themselves. Did they think themfelves exposed to any Danger, or were they desirous to repair some Loss? It was a constant Practice among them, to invigorate and give new Life to their military Discipline. Are they engaged in a War with the Latines, a People no less martial than themselves? Manlius reflects upon the best Method of strengthening the Command in the Field, and puts to death his own Son, for conquering without his Orders. Are they defeated before Numantia? Scipio Æmilianus immediately removes the feveral Blandishments which had enervated them. Have the Roman Legions passed under the Yoke in Numidia? Metellus

CHAP wipes away the Ignominy, the Instant he has III. obliged them to refume their ancient Institutions. Marius, that he may be enabled to vanquish the Cimbri and the Teutones, begins by diverting the course of Rivers: and Sylla employs in fuch hard Labour his Soldiers, who were terrified at the War which was carrying on against Mithridates, that they sue for Battle, to put an end to their Hardships. Publius Nafica made the Romans build a Fleet of Ships at a time when they had no occasion for such a Force. In a word, Industry, Diligence, and a Perseverance in all kind of military Toils, was the very Characteristick of this People: they dreaded Idleness more than an Enemy.

> XVIII. THESE Men thus inured were generally healthy and vigorous. We do not find by Historians, that the Roman Armies, which waged War in so great a variety of Climates, fell often a prey to Diseases; whereas in the present Age, we daily see Armies, without once engaging, perish and melt away, if I may use the Expression, in a single Campaign. Nor can I forbear taking notice, that the Dexterity and Address the Soldiers attained, by means of their continual Exercises, served not only to render them skilful and active in the Duties of the Field, but inspired them likewife with Boldness and Intrepidity. In the Battles fought in our Age, every fingle Soldier has very little Security and Confidence,

except

except in the Multitude: but among the Romans, CHAP every Individual, more robust and of greater Experience in War, as well as more inured to the Fatigues of it than his Enemy, relied upon himself only. He was naturally endued with Courage, or in other Words, with that Virtue which a fensibility of our own Strength inspires. To the same admirable Discipline too were they indebted, for a certain Haughtiness and Opinion of Superiority, which made them rank themselves above the Troops of all other Nations, and despise the fervice of any foreign Prince or State, compared with that of their own Country. Defertions are very common among us for this Reason, because the Soldiers are the dregs of every Nation, and not one of them possesses, or thinks himself possessed of a certain Advantage, which renders his Condition preferable to that of his Adversaries. But among the Romans they were less frequent; it being fcarce possible that Soldiers, raised from among a People naturally fo imperious and aspiring, and so sure of commanding over others, should demean themselves to such a degree as to cease to be Romans. We may likewise observe, as a necessary Consequence of their being so carefully trained, that 'twas next to impossible in a Battle, how unfortunate soever, but some Troops must rally in one Part or other of it, or the Enemy be defeated in some quarter of the Field; either of which was often fufficient to secure the Victory. And indeed we 399023

the Romans happened to be overpowered in the beginning, whether by numbers or the fierceness of the Onset, they seldom failed at last to wrest the Victory out of the Enemy's hands.

XIX. THERE are still many other Particulars that might be mentioned to the advantage of the Roman Discipline: their frict Regulations with regard to all the different Branches of the Service: their admirable Policy in making Motives of Honour and Shame operate strongly upon the Troops: their steddy adherence to the received Maxims of War, so as never on any occasion to abate of the rigor of military Severity, where the Soldiers were found to have neglected their Duty, abandoned their Post, thrown away their Arms, or furrendered themselves to the Enemy. History abounds with Examples of his kind. As their Armies were for the most part but small, the Commander had a better Opportunity of knowing the feveral Individuals, and could more eafily perceive the various Faults and Misdemeanors committed by the Soldiery, against which care was taken to provide immediately. Nor were they fo tenacious of their own Customs, as not to pay a due attention to those of other Nations, which they adopted without hesitation, whereever they appeared attended with any real Benefit. In their War with Pyrrbus, they improved

improved themselves in the knowledge of CHAP. Posts and Incampments: in that with Hanni- III. bal they learnt the true use of Cavalry, and how to apply Address and Stratagem in the conduct of a Campaign. If any Nation boafted, either from Nature or its Institution, any peculiar Advantage, the Romans immediately made use of it. They employed their utmost Endeavours to procure Horses from Numidia, Bowmen from Crete, Slingers from the Balearean Isles, and Ships from the Rhodians: fo that it may with justice be said of them, that no Nation in the World ever prepered for War with so much Wisdom, and carried it on with fo much Intrepidity. dhe 'abboth rieds of War, to as never on any occamon to aba

XX. Thus have we endeavoured to give fome account of the Arms and Discipline of the Romans, and to point out their excellency over those of other Nations. How much they were indebted to them for their Grandeur and Successes, appears evidently from this: that fo long as their Armies adhered strictly to these primitive Institutions, they were invincible; but in proportion as they deviated from them, became like other Men. When they began to look upon their Armour as too weighty and cumbersome, and their Discipline as attended with too many Restraints, and of course to relax in these two important Articles, they gradually funk to a level with the Troops of their Enemies, and at last so totally degenerated, that we find not

CHAP in their Behaviour the least traces of their original Bravery. I know it is a Maxim of long standing, that Money is the Sinews of War. How far this may fuit the Constitution of the present Age, I will not pretend to say; but it feems by no means to agree with Antiquity. I am fure the whole current of History is against it. Had this been the case, Cyrus could never have prevailed against Cræsus, nor the Greeks against the Persians, nor the Romans against the Carthaginians. It is true Money is requisite for the carrying on of a War, but not principally and in the first place. Good Soldiers and good Discipline are of infinitely greater avail. Where these are, it it will be easy to find Money; but Money is not always sufficient to procure them. not the Romans done more in their Wars with their Iron than their Gold, the Treasures of the whole World would not have been sufficient for them, confidering their great Enterprizes abroad, and their no less Difficulties at home. But having good and well disciplined Troops, they were never in want of Money; for those who were afraid of their Armies, strove with Emulation to supply them. Nay it is remarkable, that their most celebrated Victories, and those which required the greatest exertion of Strength, were gained during the period of their Poverty. was then that they subdued the Samnites, forced Pyrrhus to quit Italy, and cut in pieces the mighty Armies of the Carthaginians.

thaginians. After they became possessed CHAP of the Treasures of the Universe, they had III. for the most part only weak and effeminate Nations to deal with, and were fo far from increasing in real Power, that by the concurrent Testimony of all Historians, they are to be confidered from that time as upon the decline. Livy, in that famous Question relating to the Greeks and Romans, where he endeayours to determine what would have been the Event, had Alexander the Great turned his Arms against Italy, observes that in War there are three things fundamentally necessary; good Soldiers, good Officers, and good Fortune: and then arguing whether Alexander or the Romans were more confiderable in these three Points, concludes without the least mention of Money. It is well known that the Spartans, so long as they adhered to their primitive Institutions and Poverty, were the most powerful People of all Greece, and never proved unsuccessful in their Wars, till they became possessed of great Riches and Revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was by the Bravery of their Troops, the Advantage of their Arms, and the Excellence of their Discipline, that the Romans rendered themselves victorious over all Nations: and accordingly we find, that when they ceased to have the superiority in these, the Revenues of the whole World were not fufficient to defend them.

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Of the Spirit and Bravery of the Roman Troops.

I. A LTHO' military Discipline, and the continual Exercise of Arms, naturally conduce to make a People bold, daring, and intrepid; yet there is fomething so peculiar in the Spirit and Character of the Romans, that I flatter myself it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to offer a few Reflections on this Subject, and give him fome infight in to those Institutions and Maxims of Conduct, which chiefly contributed to exalt their Courage, and animate their Bravery. Two things here naturally present themselves to our consideration. First, the admirable Principles upon which the Commonwealth was founded. Secondly, the Succession of great Men that for several Ages prevailed in it, and who fupported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to these Principles. Among the Principles of the Roman Polity, none feems to have taken deeper root, than the fear of the Gods, and a veneration for Religion. This perhaps, at first fight, may not be thought so immediately otack fell, chancing to be flain. Quintlins Cin

to concern a martial People: but if we exa-CHAP. mine the effect of it upon their Armies, and IV. the many valuable Purpofes it was made to ferve in War, we shall have reason to conclude, that of all their Institutions, not one contributed more to the Grandeur of the State. For hence in particular it was, that the military Oath was held fo facred among the Troops, and became an inviolable bond of Fidelity and Subjection. The Soldiers, however displeased and enraged, did not dare to quit their Generals, fo long as this Tie was supposed to remain in force; nay fo very tender and fcrupulous were they, that even in their greatest Impatience to be discharged, they would yet never admit of any Interpretation, that carried in it the least strain or appearance of Deceit. We have a remarkable Example of this, in their Behaviour to Quinctius Cincinnatus, after the defeat of Appius Herdonius. That Sabine had feized the Capitol with four thousand Men. The Danger was imminent, and required speedy redress: but the Tribunes, who were then pushing the Terentian Law; in order to force the Senate to a compliance, opposed the Levies. The People however, partly by Promises, partly by remonstrating the danger of the City, were at length prevailed upon to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Confuls; and marching against Herdonius, foon recovered possession of the Capitol. Publius Valerius, to whom the charge of the Attack fell, chancing to be flain, Quinctius Cincinnatus

CHAP.cinnatus was immediately chosen in his room; IV. who to keep the Troops employed, and leave them no room to think of their Law Terentilla, ordered them out upon an Expedition against the Volsci, alledging, that the Oath they had taken to the late Consul obliged them to follow him. The Tribunes, to evade the Engagement, pretended that the Oath bound them only to the person of Valerius, and so was buried with him in his Tomb. But the People, more fincere and plain-hearted, could not resolve to shelter themselves under so frivolous a Distinction, and therefore prepared every Man to take Arms, tho' very unwillingly. Nondum (fays Livy) bæc, quæ nunc tenet seculum, negligentia Deum venerat, nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, & leges aptas faciebat. " That neglect of the "Gods, which fo much dishonours the prefent Age, was not known in those Days, " nor had Men learnt the pernicious Art " of interpreting the Laws of Religion ac-" cording to their own Purpofes."

II. I could produce many Instances of the like nature, all tending to shew, how serviceable Religion was, to the governing of Armies, the uniting of the People, and the keeping them in due subjection to their Officers and Magistrates: insomuch that should it fall into dispute, whether Rome was more indebted to Romulus or Numa, I am clearly of Opinion that Numa would have the preference.

ference. For where Religion is once fixed, CHAP. military Discipline may be easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline is not brought in without great difficulty; and never can be carried to perfection. If we enquire into the nature of the Religion professed by the Romans, we find that it ran much upon the Answers of Oracles, Divinations, Soothfaying, Sacrifices, and innumerable other Ceremonies, that argue more of Superstition, than any just knowledge of the Deity. But absurd as this Religion may appear, it had nevertheless a wonderful Influence upon the Minds of Men, and was often made use of with fuccess, to inspire Courage in Battles and Dangers. It is well known that all their military Expeditions were preceded by the Auguries and Auspices; and according to the Omens that offered on these Occasions, did the People judge of the issue. Hence their wifest and best Generals, by a strict Regard to these Observances, and accommodating the Ceremonies of Religion to their own Defigns, generally found means to give a favourable turn to the Omens; which greatly contributed to exalt the Courage of their Troops, and made them face the Enemy with Confidence. On the contrary, it is observed, that where the usual Forms were neglected, and Generals affected to act in Contempt of the Auspices, they feldom succeeded in their Designs. This may well enough be accounted for, without allowing any real Influence to these Ceremonies,

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CHAP or supposing that the flight and chirping of IV. Birds could in the least affect future Events. Nothing in truth can be more trifling, than the pretended Presages of which we speak : but as they were firmly believed by the bulk of the Army; where at any time they appeared unfavourable, it could not fail of casting a great damp upon the Spirits of the Soldiers. And yet this does not feem to me to have been the principal cause of those Miscarriages, that were usually observed to follow a neglect of the Auspices. The Ignorance and Incapacity of the Generals will much better account for them; nor need we a stronger Proof of this Incapacity, than the Contempt with which they affected to treat Religion. War is necessarily attended with fo much Uncertainty, and requires such a multitude of different Attentions, that a prudent General will be far from neglecting any Advantages, which he fees may be drawn from the established Prejudices of those under his command: much less will he turn these very Prejudices to his own hurt, by an ill-judged Contempt: and the General who is fo indifcreet as to act in this manner, plainly discovers himself unfit for the conduct of any great Enterprize. I know it is afferted by some, that Religion checks the natural Fierceness and Obstinacy of Men, and renders them poor-spirited and abject: but whoever talks in this manner, shews himself little conversant in the History of Mankind. Confider the Romans in the best times

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Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell, the French in the Age of Henry the fourth, the United Provinces in that of Philip the second, and the Suedes under Gustavus Vasa, and then tell me, whether the most flourishing and formidable periods of Nations, be not those when a Spirit of Religion has strongly taken possession of the Minds of the People.

III. NEXT to a veneration for Religion, love of their Country was the prevailing Characteristick of the Romans. This Virtue naturally rouses Men to great Designs, and begets Vigour and Perseverance in the execution of them; and as it had taken a deeper root among the People of whom we fpeak, than in any other Nation mentioned in History, no wonder we here meet with fo many Inftances of Magnanimity, publick Spirit, Fortitude, and all the Virtues that tend to form a race of Heroes. It is certain that the Constitution of the Roman Commonwealth was peculiarly fitted to nourish this Spirit. The People had many Ties and Obligations to the State, many endearing Connections to infpire the love of it. They chose the Senators by whose Counsels the Republick was governed, the Magistrates by whom Justice was administered, and the Generals who conducted and terminated their Wars; fo that the publick Successes were in a manner their own Work. Hence the Principle of which we VOL. I. fpeak

CHAP. speak became so strong in them, that they IV. were ready to facrifice every other Confideration to it, whether of Interest or Ambition. No Hazards, no Sufferings appeared great, where their Country stood in need of their Affistance. We find even in the Disputes between the different Orders of the State, where the Passions of Men are wont most strongly to be engaged, and where particular Animolities are but too apt to get the better of Reason, that the Consideration of the publick Safety was always fufficient to calm their Resentments, and bring them to Temper and Moderation. How violent foever the Contest might be, however much the Parties appeared exasperated against one another, they were yet fure to unite, when any Danger from without threatened the Commonwealth. This is evident thro' the whole course of the Roman History, and requires not to be illustrated by particular Examples. I shall therefore only add, that a Principle fo powerful and univerfally diffused, as it could not fail of having many desirable Effects upon the People, so did it in a particular manner tend to render them brave and resolute: for Courage being of indispensible necessity to the defence of our Country, wherever the love of that predominates, there we are fure to find the other likewise.

> IV. Bur if the Romans are remarkable for the love they bore their Country, they are

no less so when we consider how passionately CHAP. fond they were of Liberty. This Spirit subfifted from the very foundation of the State. Tho' Rome was at first governed by Kings, these Kings were far from being absolute: for besides the Authority enjoyed by the Senate, the People too had a confiderable share in the Administration; since to their Affemblies were committed the creation of Magistrates, the enacting of Laws, and the resolving upon Peace or War. Indeed under Tarquin the Proud, the Government degenerated into a real Tyranny: but this, instead of extinguishing, served only to rouse the love of Liberty; and the Behaviour of Brutus, who put his own Sons to death, for attempting to restore the royal Authority, made so strong an Impression upon the Minds of the People, that they henceforward confidered Slavery as the greatest of Evils, and bent all their Thoughts to the preserving and enlarging the Freedom they had acquired. I need not here fay, how much Liberty tends to ennoble the Mind, and how necessary it is to the Prosperity and Greatness of a State. It is well known that Athens, so long as it continued under the Tyranny of Pifistratus and his Descendents, made scarce any figure in Greece; and whereas foon after their Expulsion, it rose to so astonishing a pitch of Grandeur, as not only to baffile all the Efforts of the Persians, but even to render itself formidable to that mighty Empire. And if we look h 2

CHAP into the History of the Roman Commonwealth, we find, that in proportion as Liberty increased, and the People got from under the dominion of the Nobles, they became inspired with a more elevated Courage, a more unwearied Fortitude, and pushed their Conquests with greater rapidity. Nay in the very infancy of their Freedom, when Tarquin was endeavouring to recover his loft Authority, they gave manifest indications of that Spirit, for which they are so justly admired by succeeding Ages. It is upon this Occasion that we read of the aftonishing Valour of Horatius Cocles, the intrepid Firmness of Scavola, and the masculine Boldness of Clelia; infomuch that Porsenna King of the Clusians, who had undertaken the reinstating of Tarquin, admiring their Bravery, would not any longer disturb them in the enjoyment of a Liberty, to which their Merit gave them so just a title, and which he found them so resolutely bent to defend.

V. And here I cannot but observe, that this passionate desire of Freedom gave rise to a peculiar Circumstance in the Roman Constitution, which the seemingly inconsistent with the Prosperity of the State, was yet in reality one of the principal causes of its Grandeur, as it more than any thing contributed to exalt the Character of the People, and produce among them the most finished Models in every Species of Merit. What I mean is, those

those continual Diffentions between the Nobles C HA P. and Commons, of which we meet with fo IV. frequent mention in the early Ages of the Commonwealth. Two Bodies at Rome divided the whole Authority: the Senate and the People. A mutual Jealoufy, founded on the one fide upon a defire of governing, on the other upon that of keeping themselves free and independent, raised between them Contentions and Quarrels, which ended not but with the Republick itself. These Contests, tho' attended with many Inconveniences, procured notwithstanding a considerable Advantage to the State, in forming a number of Perfons of distinguished Merit, and perpetuating a fuccession of them in the Commonwealth. The Patricians, who were obstinately bent to keep to themselves alone the Commands, the Honours, the Magistracies; as they could not obtain them but by the Suffrages of the Plebeians, were obliged to use their utmost Endeavours to prove themselves worthy by superior Qualities, by real and repeated Services, by illustrious Actions, of which their Adversaries themselves were Witnesses, and to which they could not refuse their Esteem and Applause. This necessity of depending on the Judgment of the People for admission to Posts, obliged the young Patricians to acquire all the Merit capable of gaining the Suffrages of Judges, who examined them rigoroully, and were not inclined to have a remiss Indulgence for the Candidates, as well out of love to the h 3 Honour

CHAP. Honour and Welfare of the State, as out of an hereditary Jealousy of the Patrician Order. The Plebeians on their fide, in aspiring to the highest Dignities of the State, were forced to prepare themselves so as to convince their Brethren, that they had all the Qualities necessary to fill them with Honour. Proofs were to be given of a diftinguished Valour, of a wife and prudent Conduct, of a Capacity to discharge all the Functions of Government, and to pass with Reputation thro' the feveral Offices, which led by degrees to the highest. It was needful to have not only the military Virtues, and Ability to conduct an Army; but the Talent of haranguing the Senate and People, of reporting the great Affairs of State, of answering foreign Ambaffadors, and entering with them into the nicest and most important Negotiations. By all these Obligations, imposed by Ambition on the Plebeians, to qualify them for the Posts to which they aspired, they were under necessity of making proof of an accomplished Merit, at least equal to that of the Patricians.

VI. THESE were some of the Advantages arising from the sharp Contests between the Senate and People, from whence resulted a lively Emulation between the two Orders, and a happy Necessity of displaying Talents, which perhaps by a continual Concord and Peace would have lain dormant and fruitless: just as, if I may use the Comparison, from a Steel

a Steel struck with a Flint, Sparks of Fire fly CHAP. out, which without that Violence would re-, main for ever concealed. This is not all. It was by means of these Contests that the publick Liberty was improved and fettled, without which the Commonwealth would never have become great and flourishing. By the Revolution which expelled Tarquin the Proud, the Commons of Rome were delivered from a The Patri-Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. cians still held them under subjection: and tho' while their Fears of Tarquin's return were alive and strong, they behaved with great Lenity and Moderation, yet no fooner were they informed of that Prince's death, than the weight of Oppression was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the People as ever. The Valerian Law, to permit Appeals from the Sentence of the Magistrates to the People affembled, was not sufficient to protect the Plebeians from Injustice and Cruelty. They found it necessary to have Magistrates of their own Body, to screen them from the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a confent to the establishment of the Tribunitian power. The institution of the Comitia Tributa, and the practice of bringing into Judgment, before those Assemblies, the most exalted of the Nobles, upon Accufations of Treason against the People, was another Bulwark against the overflowings of Ambition. The publication of the Laws of the twelve Tables, gave some Check to the abuse

CHAP abuse of that Prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole Judges in civil Causes: and on many other Occasions we find, that the Commons, urged by Oppression to Fury, exerted their natural Strength in such manner as proclaimed them sovereign Masters of the Administration, and gradually extended their Privileges.

VII. But the Commonwealth of Rome was never truly a free State, 'till after the publication of the Licinian Laws, those Laws which, in their Consequences, made Merit alone the ordinary Scale whereby to ascend to the highest Offices; and which, by admitting the Plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their Blood, delivered them from that fervile subjection to the wealthy Nobles, in which their Indigence had fo long detained them. From this Period, the Roman People, when they made Laws, or elected Magistrates for the execution of them, were generally speaking free from all undue Influence; not overawed, as before, by the Rich and the Great, nor constrained by any Force, but that of Reason and natural Justice, in the most absolute subjection to which is the most perfect Freedom. No Citizen, who had shewed superior Talents and Virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his Birth, from the Dignities of the State: and lence proceeded an Emulation among the Individuals to furpass each other in deserving Honours. 4

Honours. Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, CHAP. when vanquished by the Plebeians, they had, IV. given ground with an angry Reluctance, and retired fighting, fo they afterwards, from time to time, shewed a strong Disposition to renew the War, in order to regain their unrighteous Sovereignty: but their Efforts were faint and ineffectual: and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there enfued domestic Peace and Union, and an established Liberty. Union at home gave new strength to the State; and Liberty feems to have inspired the People with a nobler Spirit, a more exalted Courage, and a greater Ardor to enlarge the Bounds of their Empire. For whereas before, during the space of four hundred Years, they had not pushed their Conquests beyond a few Leagues round the City; we find that from this period, in the course of seventy Years, they by a series of Victories made themselves masters of all Italy. And the destitute of naval Strength and naval Skill, their next Enterprise was against a rival Republick beyond the Continent; a Republick that with greater Riches, and more ample Territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute Dominion of the Sea. The Boldness of the Undertaking, and the amazing Constancy with which they supported it, in spite of the most terrible Adversities, are not to be paralleled in the History of any other Nation: but the Roman Legions were, at that time, Legions of free Citizens, whose predominant Passion was Glory,

IV. facing every Danger, and furmounting every Difficulty, to preferve their Liberty, and extend their Empire.

VIII. THE love of Glory is indeed a natural Confequence of Liberty, and if to this we join that remarkable difregard of Wealth, which prevailed for fo many Ages among this People, we shall have reason to conclude, that these likewise contributed not a little, towards forming in them that firm and intrepid Bravery, which makes a distinguishing part of their Character. For the love of Glory pushes Men on to great Actions, and a difregard of Wealth prevents their being biased by mean fordid Views, or shaken by the low Considerations of Self-Interest. It is certain that Glory was the main Spring of all those noble and illustrious Undertakings, which have rendered the Romans so famous. By this Motive, the Republick, after Liberty prevailed, made an incredible progress in a short time. The frequent Examples of Patriotism, and of an inviolable attachment to the publick Good, of which Rome was witness in those critical times, and which the rewarded in fo eminent a manner, kindled not only in the Patricians, but likewise among the Plebeians, that noble Fire of Emulation and Glory, which dares all things, and influenced all along the whole Nation. Greedy of Praise, they reckoned Money as nothing, and valued it only

to disperse it. They were content with mo-CHAP. derate Fortunes, says Salust, but desired IV. Glory without measure. Accordingly we find, that for four hundred Years after the building of Rome, the City was in very great Poverty: and of this the probable Cause seems to be, that Poverty was no impediment to Prefer-.. ment. Virtue was the only thing required in the election of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the Person, or Family be ever so poor, he was fure to be advanced. Quinctius Cincinnatus was taken from the Plough, and raifed to the Office of Dictator, tho' his Estate did not exceed four Acres of Land. Fabricius and Attilius Regulus are likewise Examples of this kind; and indeed the Roman History every where abounds with them. 32 10 2001187 Glory was the main Spring of

IX. The Thirst of Glory usually produces that of Dominion. It appears noble to be Masters, to command others, to compose Laws, to be feared and obeyed. This Passion, natural to Mankind, was more strong and active in the Romans, than in any other People. One would think, at seeing the air of Authority that they very early assume, that they already believed themselves destined to become one day Lords of the Universe. Nay it appears from many Indications in their History, that this Notion subsisted from the Foundation of the State. The Answers and Interpretations of the Augurs frequently glanced this way.

CHAP. A Head was found in digging for the Foundations of the Capitol. This was given out to imply the eternity of their Empire, and that the City to which that Temple belonged, was to become the head of the Universe. We see likewise in the Speech of Coriolanus to the Deputies of the Senate, upon occasion of his investing Rome with an Army of Volscians, that the Conceit of universal Dominion not only strongly prevailed in his time, but was carefully cherished among the People. Nor was it without reason that the Senate contrived to raise and propagate this Persuasion, as it tended wonderfully to exalt the Courage of the Citizens, and not only animated them in the pursuit of Conquest, but kept them firm and steddy under the severest Strokes of Adversity. Thus at the same time that Poverty and a difregard of Wealth rendered them modest, the love of Glory and Dominion inspired them with Magnanimity. When put into Command, and placed at the head of Armies, Kings appeared but little before them; nor was any Danger, Difficulty, or Opposition able to difmay them: but when their Commissions expired, and they returned to a private Station; none fo frugal, none fo humble, none fo laborious, fo obedient to the Magistrates, or respectful to their Superiors as they; infomuch that one would think it impossible the same Minds should be capable of such strange Alterations.

X. From these distinguishing Characte-CHAP. risticks of the Roman People, it will be easy, to perceive, how Courage and a fense of Honour came to be fo prevalent in their. Armies. And here I cannot but observe, that the military Rewards were wonderfully calculated to promote this Spirit; fince without being confiderable for their intrinsick Value, they were yet extremely coveted by the Troops, because Glory, so precious to that warlike People, was annexed to them. A very small Crown of Gold, and generally a Crown of Laurel or Oak-Leaves, became inestimable to the Soldiers, who knew not any Marks more excellent than those of Virtue, nor any Distinction more noble, than that which flows from glorious Actions. These Monuments of Renown were to them real Patents of Nobility, and descended to their Posterity as a precious Inheritance. They were befides fure Titles to rife to Places of Honour and Advantage, which were granted only to Merit, and not procured by Intrigue and Cabal. We have already had occasion to take notice of the large Field there lay for promotion in the Roman Armies, and that fuch as distinguished themselves by their Valour had reason to hope for every thing. What an agreeable prospect for an inferior Officer, to behold at a distance the chief Dignities of the State and Army, as fo many Rewards to which he could aspire.

CHAP. XI. And indeed if any thing be capable IV. of inspiring Men with Bravery and a martial Ardor; to pass thro' a succession of different Honours, and to be entitled to a number of military Rewards, which were all confidered as fo many standing Monuments of Renown, feems to bid fairest for it. I cannot better represent the Effect this had upon the Troops, than by the following Relation, from which the Reader may form fome Idea of what a Roman Soldier was. When the War against Perseus, the last King of Macedonia, was refolved upon at Rome; amongst the other Meafures taken for the fuccess of it, the Senate decreed, that the Conful charged with that Expedition, should raise as many Centurions and veteran Soldiers as he pleased, out of those who did not exceed fifty Years of Age. Twenty-three Centurions, who had been Primipili, refused to take Arms, unless the same Rank was granted them, which they had in preceding Campaigns. As it was impossible to gratify them all, and they perfifted obstinately in their refusal, the Affair was brought before the People. After Popilius, who had been Consul two Years before, had pleaded the Cause of the Centurions, and the Consul his own, one of the Centurions, who had appealed to the People, having obtained permission to speak, expressed himself to this effect.

XII. " I am called Spurius Ligustinus, of the Crustumine Tribe, descended from the "Sabines."

" Sabines. My Father left me a small FieldCHAP. " and Cottage, where I was born, brought "IV." up, and now live. As foon as I was at age " to marry, he gave me his Brother's Daugh-" ter to Wife. She brought me no Portion, " but Liberty, Chastity, and a Fruitfulness " fufficient for the richest Houses. " have fix Sons, and two Daughters, both " married. Of my Sons four have taken the " Robe of Manhood, the other two are still "Infants. I began to bear Arms in the Con-" fulfhip of P. Sulpicius and C. Aurelius, and " ferved two Years as a private Soldier in the " Army fent into Macedonia against King " Philip. The third Year T. Quintius Flami-" ninus, to reward me for my Services, made " made me Captain of a Century in the " tenth Maniple of the Hastati. I served " afterwards as a Volunteer in Spain under " Cato; and that General, who is so excel-" lent a Judge of Merit, made me first Cen-" turion of the first Maniple of the Hastati. " In the War against the Ætolians and King " Antiochus, I rose to the same Rank amongst " the Principes. I afterwards made several " Campaigns, and in a very few Years have " been four times Primipilus: I have been " four and thirty times rewarded by the Ge-" nerals, have received fix Civic Crowns, " have ferved two and twenty Campaigns, and am above fifty Years old. Tho' I had " not completed the number of Years re-" quired by the Law, and my Age did not " discharge

CHAP." discharge me, substituting four of my " Children in my place, I should deserve to " be exempt from the necessity of serving. " But by all I have faid, I only intend to " shew the justice of my Cause. For the " rest, as long as those who levy the Troops " shall judge me capable of bearing Arms, I " shall not refuse the Service. The Tribunes " may rank me as they please, that is their "Business: mine is to act, that none be " ranked above me for Valour; as all the Ge-" nerals under whom I have had the honour " to ferve, and all my Comrades can witness " for me, I have hitherto never failed to do. " For you, Centurions, notwithstanding your " Appeal; as even during your Youth you " have never done any thing contrary to the " Authority of the Magistrates and Senate, " in my Opinion, it would become your Age, " to shew yourselves submissive to the Senate " and Confuls, and to think every Station ho-" nourable, that gives you opportunity to " ferve the Republick."

XIII. It is easy to discern in this Speech, the Spirit and Magnanimity of a true Roman; and particularly a certain Boldness and Confidence, derived from a sense of his many Services, and the Rewards and Honours with which they had been attended. And if this be so conspicuous in the inferior Officers, what may we not expect in those of a more eminent degree? If Civic and Mural Crowns, Collars.

Collars, Chains, Bracelets, and fuch like, were CHAP. fufficient to rouse these Sentiments of Heroism among the lower Order of Troops, what would not the prospect of a Triumph effect in the Mind of the General? This Honour was granted only to Dictators, Confuls, and Prætors. After the General had diftributed a part of the Spoils to the Soldiers, and performed some other Ceremonies, the Proceffion began, and entered the City thro' the Triumphal Port, to ascend to the Capitol. At the head of it were the players upon mufical Instruments, who made the Air resound with their Harmony. They were followed by the Beafts that were to be facrificed, adorned with Fillets, and Flowers, many of them having their Horns gilt. After them came the whole Booty, and all the Spoils, either displayed upon Carriages, or born upon the Shoulders of young Men in magnificent Habits. The Names of the Nations conquered were written in great Characters, and the Cities that had been taken represented. Sometimes they added to the Pomp extraordinary Animals, brought from the Countries subjected, as Bears, Panthers, Lions, and Elephants. But what most attracted the Attention and Curiofity of the Spectators, were the illustrious Captives, who walked in Chains before the Victor's Chariot: great Officers of State, Generals of Armies, Princes, Kings, with their Wives and Children. The Conful followed upon a magnificent Chariot, drawn by four VOL. I. Horses,

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CHAP. Horfes, and robed with the august Habit of Triumph, his Head incircled with a Crown of Laurel, holding also a Branch of the same Tree in his Hand, and fometimes accompanied with his young Children fitting by him. Behind the Chariot marched the whole Army, the Cavalry first, then the Infantry. the Soldiers were crowned with Laurel, and those who had received particular Crowns, and other Marks of Honour, did not fail to thew them on fo great a Solemnity. They emulated each other in celebrating the Praifes of their General, and fometimes threw in Expressions, sufficiently offensive, of Raillery and Satire against him, which savoured of the military Freedom; but the Joy of the Ceremony entirely blunted their Edge, and abated their Bitterness. When the Procession arrived at the Capitol, the Conful immediately upon his entering the Temple, made this very remarkable Prayer to the God. " with Gratitude and with Joy, I return you " thanks, O most good and most great Ju-" piter, and you Queen Juno, and all the " other Gods, the Guardians and Inhabitants " of this Citadel, that to this Day and Hour wyou have vouchfafed by my Hands, to pre-" ferve and guide the Roman Republick haper pily. Continue always, I implore you, to " preserve, guide, protect, and favour it in " all things." This Prayer was followed by facrificing the Victims, and a magnificent Feaft, given in the Capitol, fometimes by the Publick,

Publick, and fometimes by the Person him-CHAP. felf who triumphed. It must be allowed, that this was a glorious Day for a General of an Army; and it is not furprifing that all poffible Endeavours should be used to deserve so grateful a Distinction, and so splendid an Honour. Rome had not any thing more majestick and magnificent than this pompous Ceremony, which seemed to raise the Person in favour of whom it was granted, above the Condition of Mortals.

XIV. THE Romans, in War, knew how to make use of Punishments, as well as Rewards. The steddiness of a Dictator with respect to his General of Horse, who could not be faved from death but by the Intreaties and urgent Prayers of all the People: the inexorable Severity of the Conful Manlius to his own Son, whom he unmercifully put to Death, tho' victorious, for fighting contrary to his Orders: these Examples made a terrible Impression of Fear upon the People, which became for ever the firm Bond of military Discipline. Wherefore never was it observed in any Nation so inviolably as among the Romans, nor did any thing contribute fo much to render them victorious over all their Enemies. How should they have been otherwife than victorious with Troops formed as we have feen, and above all guided in their Operations by Principles the most proper to make Conquerors? One of which was, not

CHAP to know any other end of War but Victory, and for its fake to furmount by an indefatigable Perseverance, all the Obstacles and all the Dangers by which it can be retarded. The greatest Misfortunes, the most desperate Losses, were incapable of daunting their Courage, or making them accept a base and dishonourable Peace. To grant nothing by compulsion, was a fundamental Law of the Roman Policy, from which the Senate never departed; and in the most melancholy Junctures, weak Counfels, inflead of prevailing, were not so much as heard. As far back as Coriolanus, the Senate declared, that no Agreement could be made with the Volsci, so long as they remained on the Roman Territory. They proceeded in the same manner with Pyrrbus. After the bloody Battle of Canna, wherein above fifty thousand of the Romans lay dead on the Field, it was resolved no Proposal of Peace should be listened to. The Conful Varro, who had been the Occasion of the Defeat, was received at Rome as if he had been victorious, because in so great a Missortune he had not despaired of the Roman Affairs. Thus, instead of disheartening the People by an unseasonable Instance of Severity, these generous Senators taught them by their Example, to bear up against ill Fortune, and affume in Advertity the Haughtiness with which others are inspired by Prosperity. XV.

seed to the needity of placing all

their Hopes in the Abdictes of a fingle Period, For this quick surveillation of Authority, by

XV. ONE thing indeed has been gene-CHAP. rally confidered, as tending greatly to obstruct the Conquests of the Roman People: I mean the too limited space of the Consulship, which often afforded not the General time to finish a War he had begun, a good part of the Year being fometimes spent in Preparations. This Inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as far as possible, by prolonging the Command to the General as Proconful, and fometimes continuing him in the Confulship itself. But this was practifed sparingly in the wifer Ages of the Republick; the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, making the frequent change of General appear necessary to the fafety of the State. If the Generals had been long continued at the head of the Armies, they might have been able to usurp all the Authority, and become masters of the Government, as happened under Cæfar in the latter end of the Commonwealth. We are likewife to call to mind, that these annual Commands were well enough fuited to the earlier times of Rome, when Wars feldom lasted above one Campaign; and though perhaps they might not be without their Inconveniences afterwards, yet they had this one manifest Advantage attending them, that thereby a number of great Generals was formed in the State, and the Romans were not often reduced to the necessity of placing all their Hopes in the Abilities of a fingle Person. For this quick circulation of Authority, by railing

CHAP raising many in their turns to the highest IV. Offices of the Republick, excited an incredible Emulation among Individuals, to qualify themselves for the conduct of Armies; and at the same time furnished them with frequent Opportunities of acquiring Experience in supreme Command, which is one of the most requisite Accomplishments in a great General.

XVI. Thus every thing at Rome led to great Conquests: the Constitution of the Government; the admirable political Principles on which it was founded; the nature of the Troops; the ability of the Generals; and above all, the steddiness of the Senate, in an attachment to the ancient Maxims of the State. This last Particular leads me to the second thing I mentioned, as the cause of that noble Spirit which we fo much admire in the Roman Armies, namely the fuccession of great Men that for feveral Ages prevailed in the Commonwealth, and who supported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to the fundamental Principles of the Constitution. Happy is the State that is bleffed with this Privilege! and it was the good Fortune of the Romans to enjoy it in a fupreme degree. It were endless to recount all the Names that History furnishes on this Subject. I shall therefore content myself with mentioning only two; Manlius Torquatus, and Valerius Corvinus; the one famed for his rivorbu A do moindadaio antip Severity,

Severity, the other for his Clemency. Man-CHAPlius commanded with Rigor, excused his Sol- IV. diers from no Labour, and never remitted any Punishment. Valerius, on the other fide, used them with as much Gentleness and Familiarity. Manlius, to support the Vigour of military Discipline, executed his own Son. Valerius acted upon Principles fo different, that he is faid never to have offended any Man. Yet in this great diversity of Conduct, the Effects were the same, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves. For none of their Soldiers ever declined fighting, none of them rebelled, none so much as disputed their Orders, tho' the Discipline of Manlius was so severe, that afterwards all excessive and arbitrary Commands were from him called Manliana Imperia. If Manlius be confidered as he is represented by Historians, we find him to have been very valiant, pious to his Father and Country, and submissive to his Superiors. This appears by his defence of his Father, at the hazard of his own Life, against a Tribune who accused him; by his readiness to offer himself to fingle Combat with a Gaul, where he thought the Honour of his Country concerned; and by his first applying to the Conful for Leave, before he would accept the Challenge. Now when a Man of this Constitution arrives at Command, he defires that all Men may be as punctual as himself; and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded,

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CHAP commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; this being a certain Rule, that where great Things are commanded, strict Obedience must be exacted; in which Case Mildness and Gentleness will not always prevail. But where a Man has not this Greatness and Magnificence of Mind, he is by no means to command extraordinary Things, and may therefore fafely exercise the Virtue of Clemency, with which ordinary Punishments are compatible enough, because they are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs of the Place. Manlius then was a severe Man, and kept up the Roman Discipline exactly; prompted first by his own nature, and then by a strong defire to have that obeyed, which his own Inclination had conftrained him to command. Valerius Corvinus, on the other hand, might exercise his Gentleness without Inconvenience, because he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the Customs of the Romans at that time. For, as those Customs were good, and not very troublesome to observe, he was seldom necesfitated to punish Offenders, because there were but few of that fort; and where they were, their Punishment was imputed to the Laws, and not to his Cruelty. Hence Valerius had an Opportunity by his Gentleness, to gain both Affection and Authority in the Army; which was the Cause, that the Soldiers being equally obedient to the one as the other, tho' their Tempers and Discipline were fo

very different, they could yet do the same CHAP. things, and their Actions have the same effects. I shall only add, that could a State be so happy, as to have always Persons succeeding one another within a reasonable time, who however different in Inclination and Temper, would yet by their Examples renew the Laws, restrain Vice, and remove every thing that tended to its Ruin or Corruption, that State must be immortal.

Successes of the Romans, to the excellent Principles of their Constitution, and the great Men by whom these Principles were supported, I do no more than follow the Opinion of their own Writers upon this Subject. Salust tells us, "that after much Reading and Re-"flexion, upon the Causes of the Growth and Grandeur of the Romans, he found reason to conclude, that the distinguished Virtue of a few Citizens had effected all that mighty run of Prosperity." Cicero too, in his Reslexion upon that Verse of the Poet Ennius,

Moribus antiquis res stat Romana, virisque,

makes the same Observation. "It is, fays he, "the union of these two Advantages, which has produced all the Grandeur of Rome: on the one hand, the good Manners, the wise political Principles established from "the

CHAP." the beginning: on the other, a succession IV. " of great Men formed upon these Principles, and employed by a State in the ad-" ministration of Affairs. Before our times, "that happy Union was always the fame, " and these two Advantages ever existed to-" gether; otherwise a Republick so power-" ful and extensive as ours could not have " subfifted so long with Honour, nor so con-" stantly kept up its Reputation amongst all " Nations." I omit the Complaints Cicero fubjoins to the degeneracy of the Age in which he lived, and of the total decay of ancient Manners. Every one knows, that these soon after occasioned the ruin of the Republick. Mean-while it may not be improper to observe, that these two Advantages were not only the chief Causes of the Roman Greatness, but likewise produced that slow and gradual increase of Power, so necessary to lay a solid Foundation of Strength, and support the weight of their many and extensive Conquests.

XVIII. For there never was an Empire, either more flourishing, or more extensive than the Roman. From the Euphrates and Tanais to Hercules's Pillars, and the Atlantick Ocean, all the Lands, and all the Seas, were under their Obedience. It is astonishing to consider, that the Nations which at present make Kingdoms so considerable, all Gaul, all Spain, almost the whole Island of Great-Britain, Illyria to the Danube, Germany to the Elbe, Africa

Africa to the frightful and impassable Desarts, CHAP. Greece, Thrace, Syria, Egypt, all the King- IV. doms of Aha Minor, and those between the Euxine and Caspian Seas, with many others, became Roman Provinces, almost all before the end of the Republick. I have often wondered to observe in Historians a certain Affectation of ascribing the Successes of the Romans to Fortune, as if that, rather than Valour and Wisdom, had been the Occasion of their Prosperity. To me it evidently appears, thro' the whole course of their History, that the unufual pitch of Grandeur to which they arrived, was the necessary result of the Talents and Accomplishments of which they were possessed, whether they are considered with regard to moral Virtues, or to a political Government, or to martial Merit and the Art of War. For, as Livy observes in the Preface to his History, there never was a Republick more religious, or more abounding in good Examples, or where Avarice and Luxury gained ground fo late, or where Simplicity and Poverty were fo much and fo long held in honour. All the Debates and Transactions of the Senate, shew to a Demonstration, how. much wisdom of Counsel, love of the Publick, steddiness to the Maxims of the State, Lenity and Moderation with regard to the conquered Nations, prevailed in that august Affembly. Courage, Boldness, Intrepidity in the midst of the greatest Dangers, an invincible Patience in the hardest Labours, an inexorable

CHAP.orable Firmness to maintain the military Dis-IV. cipline in its utmost Rigor, a settled Resolution to conquer or die, a greatness of Soul, and a Constancy proof against all Misfortunes, have at all times constituted the Character of the Romans, and rendered them in the end victorious over all other Nations. Cyrus and Alexander, it is true, founded great Empires: but the Qualities proper for the execution of fuch a Defign, being confined to the persons of these two illustrious Conquerors, and not inherited by their Descendants; the Grandeur to which they gave a beginning, did not support itself long with any Reputation. It was very different with the Romans. Their Empire was not founded, nor raifed to the state of Grandeur it attained, by the rare Endowments, or rapid Conquests of a fingle Person. The Roman People themselves, the Body of the State, formed that Empire by flow degrees, and at feveral times. The great Men that helped, each in their time, to establish, enlarge, and preserve it, had all different Characters, tho' in the main they followed all the same Principles: and hence the Empire itself, was both more extensive, and of longer duration, than any that had ever gone before it.

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I. TX 7 HAT we have hitherto feen, re-VV lating to the raising of Troops, their Divisions and Subdivisions, Armour, Discipline, and Exercises, is in a manner only the Mechanism of War. There are other still more important Cares, which constitute what is called the higher detail of the Service, and depend more immediately upon the General's Ability and Experience. To him it belongs to fettle the general disposition of Marches; to encamp the Troops advantageoufly; to draw them up in order of Battle, provide against the Exigencies of the Field, pursue with Caution, or retreat with Judgment; and lastly, in conducting an Attack or Defence, to put in practice all the Arts, Stratagems, and Address, that long Experience in the Service, and a confummate Knowledge in all the parts of War, are jointly able to fuggest. I shall offer some Reflexions upon the Practice of the Roman Generals in all these great Points of military Conduct, and begin with that which follows immediately after the rendezvous of the Troops, I mean the marching of an Army. This Subject naturally divides itself into three Branches: the general Order V. the Knowledge and Choice of Posts; and lastly, the Disposition and Conduct of a Retreat. We shall speak of each in order.

II. THE marching against an Enemy supposes many preliminary Cares in the General, and many previous Steps taken, in order to his own Safety, and the fuccess of his Designs. I shall suppose the Plan of the War settled, as likewise the manner of acting, and Measures concerted accordingly. Yet still it is incumbent upon a wife Commander, before he puts his Troops in motion, to provide every thing necessary for their Accommodation and Subfiftence; to acquire an exact knowledge of the Country thro' which he marches; to inform himself of the Number and Quality of the Enemy's Forces; to penetrate, if possible, into his Defigns; to study the Character of the Generals employed against him; and by a wife Forefight to be prepared for all the Events and Contingencies that may happen in the course of a Campaign. Now tho' these things come not so properly under fixed Rules, but depend in a great measure upon the Ability and Prudence of the Commander in chief; yet we find every where in History, that the Romans had many Regulations about them, and always treated them with particular Attention. To begin with the care of Provisions, which is of principal account in an Army; it appears to have been the constant Practice.

Practice, to furnish the Soldiers with a cer-CH AP. tain proportion of Corn, which they were obliged to carry along with them in their Marches. This on extraordinary Occasions amounted to four Bushels, or a Month's Allowance, and feldom was lefs than what might ferve for fifteen or twenty Days. They chose rather to give them Corn than Bread, because it was lighter, and might therefore be carried with greater ease. Indeed this put them to the trouble of grinding and baking it themselves; but then they were used to it, and could upon occasion make it into I know not what variety of Dishes. Besides the common Bread, they made a kind of foft boiled Food of it, very agreeable to the Troops: they mingled it with Milk, Roots, and Herbs, and made Pancakes of it, upon a small Plate laid over the Fire, or upon hot Ashes, as was anciently the manner of regaling Guefts, and is still practifed throughout the East, where these kind of thin Cakes are much preserred to our best Bread. Their Drink was answerable to this Diet, being no more than a mixture of Vinegar and Water. It was called Posea, could at all times be easily procured, and was particularly ferviceable to quench the Thirst immediately. It has been by a state of aparalog Rivaciand Poet, we have et

HII. I have heard it observed, that nothing gives greater Difficulty to military Men, in the reading of ancient History, than the Article of Provisions. Cato's Maxim, that the War feeds the War, holds good in plenti-

CHAP ful Countries, and with regard to small Armies: yet still it is more generally true, that the War does not furnish Provisions upon command, or at a fixed time. They must be provided both for the present and the future. We do not however find, that either the Greeks or Romans had the precaution to provide Magazines of Forage, to lay up Provisions, to have a Commissary-General of Stores, or to be followed by a great number of Carriages. But then we are to confider, that in the Wars of the Greeks against each other, their Troops were little numerous, and accustomed to a sober Life: that they did not remove far from their own Country, and almost always returned regularly every Winter: fo that it is plain, it was not difficult for them to have Provisions in abundance, especially the Athenians, who were masters at Sea. The fame may be faid of the Romans. The care of subfifting the Troops was infinitely less weighty with them, than it is at present with most of the Nations of Europe. Their Armies were much less numerous, and they had a much smaller number of Cavalry. A Consular Army consisted of near seventeen thousand Foot, to which they had not above eighteen hundred Horse. In our Days, to feventeen thousand Foot, we have often more than fix thousand Horse. What a vast difference must this make in the consumption of Forage and Provisions! Let me add, that the fober manner of Life in the Army, confined to mere Necessaries, spared them an infinite

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finite multitude of Servants, Horses, and CHAP. Baggage, which now exhaust our Magazines, starve our Armies, retard the execution of Enterprises, and often render them impracticable. Nor was this the manner of living only of the Soldiers, but likewise of the Officers and Generals. Not only Confuls and Dictators in the early Ages of the Commonwealth, but even Emperors themselves; Trajan, Adrian, Pescennius, Severus, Probus, Julian, and many others, not only lived without Luxury, but contented themselves with boiled Flour or Beans, a piece of Cheese or Bacon, and made it their Glory to level themfelves, in this respect, with the meanest of the Soldiers. It is easy to conceive how much this must contribute to diminish the Train of an Army, to support the Taste of Frugality and Simplicity amongst the Troops, and banish all Luxury and idle Shew from the Camp.

IV. But the care of Provisions was less burdensom to the Ancients, we find that both it, and all other Accommodations proper for the march of an Army, were not less attended to by their Generals. Xenophon, who was himself a Soldier, and whose Writings abound with Maxims of War, is frequent in his Reslexions upon this Article. One of the principal Instructions he makes Cambyses King of Persia give his Son Cyrus, who afterwards became so glorious, was not to embark

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CHAP.in any Expedition, 'till he had first informed himself, whether Subsistence were provided for the Troops. In his Account of the Behaviour of the same Cyrus, after his arrival in the Camp of his Uncle Cyaxares, he enters into an immense Detail, with respect to all the Necessaries of an Army. That Prince was to march fifteen Days thro' Countries that had been destroyed. and in which there were neither Provisions nor Forage. He ordered enough of both for twenty Days to be carried, and that the Soldiers, instead of loading themselves with Baggage, should exchange that Burden for an equal one of Provisions, without troubling themfelves about Beds and Coverlets for fleeping, the want of which their Fatigues would supply. They were accustomed to drink Wine: and as a fudden and total difuse of it might be attended with ill Consequences, he ordered them to carry a certain quantity with them, and to use themselves by degrees to do without it, and be contented with Water. He advised them also to carry falt Provisions along with them, Hand-mills for grinding Corn, and Medicines for the fick: to put into every Carriage a Sickle and a Mattock, and upon every Beast of burden an Ax and a Scythe: and to take care to provide themfelves with a thousand other Necessaries. He carried also along with him Smiths, Shoemakers and other Workmen, with all manmer of Tools used in their Trades. For the rest, he declared publickly, that whoever

would

would charge himself with the care of send- CHAP. ing Provisions to the Camp, should be honoured and rewarded by himfelf and his Friends, and even supplied with Money for that Service, provided they would give Security, and engage to follow the Army.

V. THE Reader will here be pleased to observe, that as I am now entered upon the higher Detail of War, I shall not so intirely confine myself to the Romans, as not from time to time to mention the Practices of other Nations, where they any way tend to illustrate the Point in hand. For as the Roman Writers upon this Subject are but few, and have not entered very circumstantially into Matters, we are often at a lofs with regard to some of the most important parts of their Discipline. This however we may be certain of, that as they excelled particularly in the Art of War, and readily adopted the Improvements of other Nations; the more we know of the Progress and Attainments of the Ancients in this respect, the better we shall be able to judge of the uncommon Proficiency of the Romans. We have already feen some of their wife Precautions with regard to the Subfiftence and Accommodation of the Troops, for which they provided no less by fixed and general Regulations, than Cyrus does in the particular Instance recorded by Xenophon. I shall only add, that Hiftory abounds with Examples of this prudent Care and Forefight in their Generals.

'till he had fully fettled every thing relating to Provisions. Cæsar, in all his Wars, was extremely attentive to the safety of his Convoys, and the keeping up a free communication with those Countries, whence he received his Supplies. We find that he regularly distributed Corn to the Army, and always took care, before the time for a new Distribution arrived, to have it brought to the Camp by means of his Allies: or if he chanced to be disappointed here, so contrived his March, as to pass by some great Town, where he could readily be furnished with whatever he stood in need of.

VI. Bur besides the care of Provisions, it is further incumbent upon a wife General, to acquaint himself thoroughly with the nature of the Country thro' which he is to march. I take it for granted that the Romans omitted none of the usual and obvious Methods for this Purpose: that they furnished themselves with Guides; interrogated the Natives; and, where fuch were to be had, procured exact Maps of the Country, delineating the Towns, their number and distance, the Roads and Mountains, the Rivers, the Fords; and the nature and qualities of them all. But what particularly deferves our Notice in the Roman Policy; they scarce ever entered into a War with any distant State, 'till they had first contracted an Alliance with fome contiguous Power,

Power, who might unite his Forces to their CHAP. in the intended Invasion. This Practice was, attended with numberless Advantages. They had hereby timely Notice of the Enemy's Defigns: they were made acquainted with the number and quality of his Forces: and when they approached with their Army, were not only plentifully supplied with all kind of military Stories, but joined by a confiderable Body of Troops perfectly acquainted with the Country, and able to inform them where they might make their Impression with greatest probability of Success. Thus when they invaded Philip King of Macedon, they took care to fecure the Friendship of the Ætolians, whose Troops were of unspeakable Service to them in that War. In their Expedition against Antiochus they made use of the same Policy, having previously contracted Amity with several of the petty Princes and States of Afia Minor. Every one knows what use Cæsar made of the pretended Alliance with the Æduans, and that it was one of the principal Engines by which he compleated the reduction of Gaul. Indeed nothing can fall out more fortunately for an Army, about to invade a Country to which they are strangers, than to act in conjunction with Troops contiguous to the Territories they attack: because as by this means they make War with all the Advantages of Natives, they are not only the better enabled to guard against Ambuscades and Surprises, but can in their

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CHAP their turn make use of all those Stratagems
V. and savourable Opportunities of Action, which the particular nature of the Country furnishes. Whoever therefore considers the artful Conduct of the Romans in this respect, will find himself necessitated to own, that Defigns concerted with so much Wisdom and Foresight merited all the Success with which they were for the most part attended.

VII. THESE preliminary Cares fettled, it is now time to put the Troops in motion. The Romans were very exact in the Order of their Marches. In the Morning, at the first founding of the Trumpet, every one took down his Tent, and began to make up his Baggage: at the fecond founding, every one loaded his Baggage: and at the third, the Legions moved out of their Quarters, and put themselves in the form and order they were that Day to march in. But none were to take down their Tents, 'till the Conful and military Tribunes had first taken down theirs; whether for the greater Respect, or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the reft, it was necessary they should be the first at work, that their Baggage might be in a readiness to march at the third found of the Trumpet, as well as that of the private Soldier. For Commanders, who give Rules to all the rest, ought to be very exact in observing them themselves; since, if they break their own Orders, they encourage others to do

the like; Example always operating more CHAP. strongly than Precept. Hence that constant, care in the Roman Generals, to be themselves Patterns to the Troops, with regard to all the Duties of the Service; nor do we meet with any thing in their whole Discipline, more truly deferving of imitation, or better calculated to promote Submiffion and Obedience in the Army. For when Soldiers find the General keeps strictly to the Rules he gives, they are the more careful to observe them likewise, concluding, that as he therein grants no Indulgence to himself, he certainly will not do it to others: nay they implicitly believe fuch Orders good and necessary, because he that gave them is so punctual an observer of them.

VIII. As to the particular Form and Difposition of the Roman March, we meet with very little on that Subject in ancient Authors. In the general it appears, that whether they marched in a Friend's or Enemy's Country, whether they believed the Enemy near or far off, they proceeded with the same Care and Circumspection: and this certainly was a very wife Policy. For a General may be mistaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers; nay, may think those Friends, who want but an advantageous Opportunity of declaring themselves Foes: so that all imaginable Caution ought to be observed, in all Times, and in all Places. To which let me add, that were there nothing else as a Motive to it, but k 4 the

CHAP. the keeping up exactly the military Discipline, yet for that Reason singly, it ought constantly to be done. The Method followed most commonly by the Romans in their Marches feems to have been this. They had always fome Troops of Horse scouting abroad in order to discover the Roads. After them followed the right Wing, with all its Carriages immediately in the Rear. Then came a Legion with its Carriages; after that another; and fo a third, a fourth, &c. in order. Last of all came the left Wing and its Baggage, with a Party of Horse in their rear. If, during the March, the Army happened to be affaulted in the front, or in the rear, they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right Wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and most agreeable to the nature of the Place: and then, when they were cleared and difincumbered of their Baggage, all of them unanimously made head against the Enemy. If they were affaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that fide where they were like to be most fafe, and then addreffed themselves to the Fight.

IX. This, I say, was the most common order of their Marches: for as to any fixed and standing Rule, none could possibly be established; because the Form must vary, according to the Country you are in, and the Enemy you have to do with. Julius Cæsar, when he marched against the Nervians, so

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long as he thought the Enemy at a distance, CHAP. proceeded exactly according to the Disposition here described. But upon a nearer approach he changed it entirely. For then all the Cavalry were fent before. After them followed fix Legions without Baggage: and last of all the Carriages, guarded by two new raised Legions. This was an excellent Method, as he was fure the Enemy could only attempt him in the van; but might be of ill Consequence, where the rear of the Army was liable to be attacked. One thing the Romans particularly attended to, and that was, that the Troops did not straggle or march unequally, some too fast, others too flow, which very much weakens an Army, and exposes it to great Disorder. Hence their Care, in training up their Men, to inure them to the military Pace; that is, to the walking over a certain stated space of Ground within a fixed and limited time. This, as we have already observed, amounted to twenty miles in five Hours, which made the usual Day's March of a Roman Army. To accustom the Soldiers to it, three times a Month, the Foot as well as Horse were obliged to take this March. Upon extraordinary occasions they were wont to march four and twenty Miles in the same space of time. an exact Calculation of what Cæsar relates of a fudden March, which he made at the time he besieged Gergovia, we find that in four and twenty Hours he marched fifty Miles. This he did with the utmost expedition. In reducing

CHAP reducing it to less than half, it makes the V. usual rate of an extraordinary Day's March.

X. It is remarkable with regard to modern Wars, that they not only impoverish the Princes that are overcome, but even the Conquerors themselves: for as one loses his Country, fo the other loses his Money. In ancient times the case was otherwise; it appearing that the Conqueror always enriched himself by the War. The reason of this difference feems to be, that in our times no publick account is taken of the Plunder; or indeed rather, that the barbarous Custom of pillaging the conquered Countries, is not now fo much practifed as formerly. Amongst the Romans, all the Spoil was delivered in and appropriated to the Publick, which afterwards distributed it as it saw cause. To this purpose they had their Quæstors, in whose hands all the Pillage and Taxes were deposited, of which the General disposed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or fick, and discharging the other Necessities of the Army. 'Tis true the Conful had power to give the Plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it; but that Liberty never bred any Diforder. For when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the Spoil was brought into a publick Place, and distributed Man by Man, according to every one's Merit. This Custom made the Soldiers more intent upon Victory than

than Plunder. The Practice of the Roman CHAP. Legions was, to break and diforder an Enemy, but not to pursue; for they never went out of their Ranks upon any occasion whatever. Only the Horse, the light-armed Troops, and what other Soldiers were not of the Legions, followed the Chace. But had the Plunder of the Field belonged to whoever could catch it, it would have been neither reasonable nor possible to have kept the Legions to their Ranks, or to have exposed them to fo many Dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Victory, the Publick was always enriched. For when a Conful entered in triumph, he brought with him great Riches into the Treasury of Rome, confisting of Taxes, Contributions, Ranfoms and Plunder. The Romans had likewise another Custom well contrived for the preservation of Discipline; and that was, to deposit a third part of every Soldier's pay, with the Enfigns of their respective Companies, who never restored it 'till the War was at an end. This ferved two very excellent Purposes: First, every Soldier had a Stock of his own, which without this Precaution would have been fquandered away, as they were most of them young and pro-Secondly, knowing their Stocks to be in their Enfign's hands, they were the more careful to defend and keep by him, whether in the Camp, in the Field of Battle, or upon a March. This Custom contributed much to their Valour, and is necessary to be obferved

CHAP. served by any General, who would reduce his V. Soldiers to the Discipline of the Romans.

XI. Among the various orders of the Roman Marches, one particularly deferves our Notice, which is frequently mentioned by Historians, and which they term forming the Army itineri & prako. It was, when the Line of March was fo contrived, as to correspond exactly with the Line of Battle; or, to express myself a little more clearly, when the Columns of Horse and Foot were disposed in such a manner, that upon the sudden appearance of an Enemy they could fall immediately into an order proper for fighting. There is not perhaps any thing in the Science of Arms more subtle and useful than this, and the Romans seem to have made it their particular study. I do not at present recollect in any of their Historians, a minute and cireumfrantial Account of a March of this kind, where the disposition of the Columns is exactly marked, and the manner in which they formed in order of Battle, upon the approach of the Enemy. What most readily occurs to my Memory is, the fine March of Hamilcar against Spendius, which has been so judicloufly explained by the Chevalier Folard, in his admirable Comment upon Polybius. As the whole Art of War furnishes nothing more compleat in its kind, whether we regard the boldness of the Attempt, or the well-concerted Motions by which it was accomplished, Iam

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I am fatisfied I shall do the Reader a particu-C HAP. lar Pleasure, in laying a full and distinct Account of it before him.

XII. Upon the conclusion of the first Punick War, the Carthaginian Mercenaries revolting, chose Matho and Spendius for their Leaders. Hanno was fent against them with an Army; but receiving'a confiderable Check, the Rebels blocked up Carthage on every side, and possessed themselves of all the Passes leading to the Peninsula on which it stood. In this Exigence the Carthaginians had recourse to Hamilcar the Father of Hannibal, who had given eminent proof of his Abilities when he commanded their Armies in Sicily. Accordingly he took the Field with ten thousand Men, and feventy Elephants; but was for fome time at a loss how to meet with the Enemy upon equal Ground. For besides the other Places of Advantage which the Mercenaries had feized, Hanno had fuffered them to get possession of the only Bridge by which the River Bagradas was passable to those who were to travel from Carthage into the Continent. This River had not many Fords, and the few it had were so well watched, that it was not easy for even a fingle Man to get over without being seen. As for the Bridge itself, the Enemy guarded it with the utmost Care, and had built a Town close by it, for the more commodious lodging of the Troops that were appointed to that Service. Hamilof an Expedient to gain one by stealth. He had observed, that upon the blowing of certain Winds, the Mouth of the Bagradas used to be choaked up with Sand and Gravel, which formed a kind of Bar across it, and rendered it fordable. Remaining therefore in his Camp between the Sea and the Mountains, he waited the Opportunity of these Winds; which no sooner arrived, than marching suddenly in the Night, he passed the Stream unperceived, and the next morning appeared in the Plain, to the great Astonishment both of the Carthaginians and the Enemy.

XIII. HAMILCAR by this Step put all to the hazard. Had he failed in his Attempt against Spendius, his whole Army must inevitably have been destroyed, for a Retreat was now become impossible. But neither was the Danger less great to his Country by continuing inactive: and therefore he wisely confidered, that in fuch an Extremity, it was better to try fome way where Fortune and his own ability in War offered a prospect of Success, than by a timorous diffident Conduct expose himself to the same Ruin, without a fingle Effort to evade it. He was now upon the other fide the Bagradas. The Plains were favourable to him, because he had a confiderable Body of Horse. The River itfelf too was of no small Advantage, as it

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ferved to secure his Baggage, and cover one CHAP. of his Flanks. Spendius was advancing to meet him at the head of ten thousand Men. Besides these, he understood that a Detachment of fifteen thousand was marching with all diligence from Utica; and as it was their business to come upon his flank and rear, rather than to join Spendius, he made no doubt of their proceeding accordingly. Upon these Considerations he regulated his order of Battle, and the disposition of his March. To make head against Spendius, he placed his Elephants in the first Line, and immediately behind them his Cavalry, intermixed with Platoons of light-armed Foot. The heavyarmed Infantry formed the third Line, in order to oppose the Detachment he expected upon his rear from Utica. By this Disposition he was enabled to make head on all fides. For as he made no doubt but his first Line of Elephants, of which Spendius was totally unprovided, would be fufficient to break the Body he commanded; and that the Cavalry, aided by the light-armed Foot, falling in immediately, would ferve to compleat the Rout: fo his third Line confisting of the flower of his African Infantry, he thought himself strong enough likewise to deal with the Rebels from Utica.

XIV. EACH of these Lines marched in sour Columns, the Columns of Cavalry following immediately behind the Elephants, and those

CH AP.of the Infantry immediately behind the Ca-The distance between the Columns was equal to the space they were to occupy in the Line of Battle. By this Disposition, upon the first appearance of the Enemy, the Army could form in an Instant. For the Columns being commanded to halt, and wheel at once into their place in the Line, were in order of Battle presently. Hamilcar continuing his March, perceived, as the Enemy approached, that the Detachment from Utica, instead of coming in upon his rear, had actually joined Spendius, and formed a second Line of Foot behind that he commanded. As he had foreseen that this might happen, his order of March was contrived to furnish a speedy Remedy. It now became necessary to change his whole Disposition, and oppose a strong front of Infantry to the Enemy, with the Elephants at the head of all, according to the usual Custom. To that end the Columns were ordered to halt, and the Elephants forming in front, the Cavalry mean-while fell back between the intervals of the Foot, ranging themselves in two Divisions behind the two extremities of the Line of Infantry, which was formed in an instant by the wheeling of the Columns. The Rebels deceived by this artful Motion, and mistaking the Retreat of the Cavalry for a real Flight, advanced brifkly to the Attack, broke thro' the Elephants, and charged the Carthaginian Foot. Mean-while the Cavalry, which, as we have already observed, had ranged itself CHAP. in two Columns behind the two Wings of the Infantry, wheeling to the right and left from the Rear, appeared all on a sudden in the same Line with the Foot, covering the Flanks of the Carthaginian Army, and considerably overwinging the Enemy. The Rebels astonished at this extraordinary Motion, quickly fell into Disorder, and at last betook themselves to Flight. Hamilear pursued them with his Horse and Elephants, and following them quite to the Town and Bridge, easily got possession of that important Pass.

XV. From this Recital it appears, to what a degree of Perfection the Ancients had arrived in the Science of Marches, which is a capital Article in the grand operations of War. And tho' the Instance here given be of an African Commander, and therefore does not fo immediately regard the Roman People, yet if we confider, that these last are allowed to have excelled all Nations in the knowledge of Arms, and that they often regulated their Marches upon this Plan, it feems reasonable to believe, that had their Historians entered into particular Details of this kind, we should have met with many Examples of military Conduct in their Generals, no less surprising than that now before us. Indeed as it frequently happens in War, that the Enemy, tho' not actually in fight, is yet hourly expected, this way of ordering an Army feems VOL. I.

CHAP. very necessary; and the General who excels

in it, and is at the same time sufficiently on his guard against Surprises, will seldom or ever be worsted. I have often admired, in reading Cæsar's Commentaries, the confummate Prudence and Circumspection of that great Man, especially in relation to Surprises. Tho' he was the ablest General of his time, and commanded the finest Army that perhaps ever appeared in the World, yet he always proceeded with the utmost Caution, and was extremely careful of believing any thing too eafily, that was not reasonably to be supposed. If a great number of the Enemy was beaten and purfued by a few of his Men, if a few of them attacked a greater Party of his, if they ran unexpectedly, and without any visible Cause, on these occasions he was always very much upon his Guard, and never fancied his Enemy so weak, as not to understand his own Business. It seems in the general a good Rule, the weaker and more careless an Enemy appears to be, the more to apprehend and dread him. In Cases of this kind, an experienced Commander will comport himfelf in two different manners. He will fear the Enemy in his own Thoughts, and order his Affairs accordingly; but in his Words and outward Behaviour, he will affect to defpife him. This last way gives courage to the Soldiers, and makes them confident of Victory. The other keeps the General upon his guard, and renders him less liable to be circumvented:

circumvented: for to march thro' an Enemy's CHAP. Country is more dangerous, and requires greater Address and Foresight, than to fight a pitched Battle.

XVI. WE proceed now to the fecond Particular mentioned on the head of Marches, namely, the knowledge and choice of Posts. As this will again fall under our notice in the next Chapter concerning Incampments, we need fay the less of it here. It has however a strict and necessary Connection with the marching of an Army. For whether we are to retreat or advance, or which way foever our Rout lies, it often happens, that the fafety of the Army depends upon seizing some advantageous Posts that command the Country thro' which we march. The Romans applied themselves with particular Attention to this part of War, and we meet with feveral very early traces of it in their History. Livy relates an Example of this kind in the Person of Publius Decius, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Conful Cornelius commanded against the Samnites, and finding the Conful and Army falling by accident into a Vale, where they might have been encompassed and cut off by the Enemy: " Do you fee, (faid he to Cornelius,) that " Eminence which commands the Enemy's " Camp? there lies our Hope. It is a Post " that may ferve to extricate us out of our " present Danger, if we are careful only to

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CHAP." feize it quickly, and avail ourselves of the " blindness of the Samnites, who have ne-" glected it." The Historian had before informed us, that Decius observed a Hill over the Enemy's Camp, not eafily to be ascended by those who were compleatly armed, but to those lightly armed, accessible enough. The Conful ordered him to take possession of it with three thousand Men. He obeyed the Order, fecured the Roman Army, and defigning to march away in the Night, and fave both himself and his Party, addressed himself in these Words to some of his Companions: " Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, that whilst " we have yet Light, we may explore " where the Enemy keeps his Guards, and " which way we may make our Retreat." Accordingly he went out in Person upon this Defign, and habited like a Soldier, that the Enemy might not know his rank in the Army, took an exact view of the Ground, and the fituation of their Camp. Whoever attentively confiders this Relation, will find how useful and necessary it is for a Commander, to be acquainted with the nature of Coasts and Countries, and that not only in a general, but in an exquisite and more particular way. Had not Decius understood those things very well, he could not fo fuddenly have discerned the advantage of that Hill, and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the Roman Army. Neither could he have judged at that distance, whether it was accessible or not: and when he had

had possessed himself of it, and was to draw CHAP. off afterwards; as the Enemy environed him, on every fide, he could never have found out the best way for his Retreat, nor have guessed fo well where the Enemy kept his Guards. Fabius Maximus is another Example of a confummate knowledge this way. He commanded the Roman Army fix Months against Hannibal, and by a feries of well-concerted Motions, and a judicious choice of Posts, conducted himself so happily, that during all that time he never suffered any considerable Difaster, nor could be compelled to fight against his Will, tho' the artful Carthaginian left no Stratagem untried, to draw him to an Engagement, or intangle him in an Ambuscade. But of all the Roman Generals. none feems to have been a greater master in this part of War than Julius Cæsar. We meet with many Instances of it in his Commentaries, particularly in that famous Campaign in Spain, where by a happy choice of Posts, and an exquisite Address in improving the Advantages the nature of the Country afforded, he compelled a veteran Army to furrender themselves Prisoners of War without striking a Blow.

XVII. THE third and last Particular we mentioned in relation to Marches, was the Disposition and Conduct of a Retreat. This is, without dispute, the nicest Point in the whole Business of War. For besides all the

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CHAP Attentions requisite in ordinary Marches, you are under the Disadvantage of being continually pressed by an Enemy, commonly superior in Force, and flushed with Success. The finest Retreat we meet with in ancient History, is that of the ten thousand Greeks under the conduct of Xenophon, who has left us a particular Account of that famous Expedition. We there see that the hollow Square, which was invented purposely for a Retreat, is very incommodious when the Enemy is directly in your Rear. Xenophon fays fo in express terms, and that the Greeks were obliged to discontinue that Order, and march in two Columns, with a Body of Referve of fix hundred Men, who were not confined to the space between the Columns, fo as to compleat the figure of the Square, but formed fometimes the Van, fometimes the Rear, filed off by the two Flanks where the Columns were obliged to approach, or posted themselves in the interval when they extended to the Right and Left; in a word, without being tied down to any fixed Post, ran wherever their affistance was wanted. What furprises most in this Retreat is, that upon a computation of the way made by the Troops, which Xenophon regularly fets down, we find their Day's Marches one with another, to fall but little short of twenty-four Miles. Our Armies feldom advance half the way, even when they have no Enemy upon their hands, nor any of those other Disadvantages

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vantages the Greeks laboured under. We find CHAP. likewise in the Roman History, several Examples of well conducted Retreats, in which their Generals have happily extricated themfelves out of Dangers that seemed to threaten their Armies with unavoidable Destruction. Quintus Lutatius having the Cimbri upon his Heels, and being arrived at a River; that the Enemy might give him time to pass, pretended a resolution to fight them, pitched his Camp, intrenched himself, set up his Standard, and fent out parties of Horse to provide Forage. The Cimbri believing he meant to incamp there, came and incamped by him, and divided themselves into several Parties, to go in quest of Provisions. Lutatius having notice of this, feized the opportunity fo favourable to his Defign, and throwing Bridges over the River, passed it before the Enemy could have time to disturb him. Lucius Minucius a Roman Consul was in Liguria with an Army, and shut up by the Enemy between two Mountains, infomuch that he could not disengage himself. Being sensible of the danger he was in, he fent certain Numidians which he had in his Army, upon small illconditioned Horses, towards the places where the Enemy had their Guard. At first fight they put themselves into a posture to defend the Passes: but when they observed the Numidians in ill order, and ill mounted in respect of themselves, they began to despise them, and to be more remis in their Guard; 14 which

CHAP which was no fooner perceived by the Numidians, than clapping Spurs to their Horses, and charging them fuddenly, they passed on in spite of all opposition, and by the Mischief and Devastation they made every where in the Country, constrained the Eaemy to give free paffage to the whole Army. I shall mention only one Instance more, and that is the Retreat of Marc Antony, when he was pursued into Syria by a great Body of Parthian Horse. He observed that every Morning by break of Day they were upon his back as foon as he moved, and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorough his March. In order to deceive them, and obtain some respite, he resolved not to remove before Noon; which the Parthians observing, concluded he could not flir that Day, and returned to their Posts, infomuch that he had opportunity of marching all the rest of the Day without interruption. But this was only a temporary Expedient, calculated for prefent Relief; and therefore to screen himself from the Arrows of the Parthians, with which the Army was greatly incommoded, he made use of the following Device, practifed often by the Romans on other occasions. He ordered the Soldiers, when the Enemy came near them, to cast themselves into the figure of the Testudo, so that their Targets should close altogether above their Heads, and defend them from the missive Weapons discharged at them. In this case the first Rank

Rank stood upright on their Feet, and the CHAP. rest stooped lower and lower by degrees, till the last Rank kneeled down upon their Knees; so that every Rank covering with their Targets the Heads of all in the Rank before them, they represented a Tortoise-shell, or a sort of Pent-house. By this Contrivance he made good his Retreat, and arrived in Syria without considerable loss.

XVIII. BEFORE I conclude this Chapter, it will naturally be expected I should explain what was the Practice and Discipline of the Romans, when they had finished the Day's March, and were arrived near the place of Incampment. In this case the military Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that Service, advanced before all the rest, diligently to view and confider the fituation of the Place. When they had chosen the Ground, they began by marking the General's Quarter with a White Flag or Streamer, and distinctly set out its Boundaries. Then the Quarters of the feveral Tribunes were appointed, and afterwads those of the Legions, all with distinct Flags of feveral Colours. Every Legion, as well of the Allies as of the Romans, had their portion of Ground affigned and marked out, for drawing the Line round the Camp, which was fet about immediately, part of the Troops continuing mean-while under Arms, to defend those that were at work upon the Intrenchment, in case of any sudden Surprise. CHAP. All this was finished in a very short space, VI. the Romans being remarkably expert in it by constant Practice; for they never altered the figure of their Camp, nor omitted to fortify it in all the forms, tho' but for one Night's continuance. But this naturally leads me to the subject of the next Chapter.

C H A P. VI.

the Earth dor and of the Of INCAMPMENTS.

NE of the most necessary and be-neficial Parts of the military Art is, to know how to incamp well, and to practife it constantly. No wonder therefore that the Romans, among whom military Discipline was carried to fuch a degree of Perfection, and who exacted the most rigorous Submission to all the Laws and Rules of it, were particularly attentive to this Article. And indeed the Armies of that People, tho' still in the Territory of Rome, and tho' they had only one Night to pass in a place, incamped nevertheless in all the forms, with no other difference than that the Camp was less fortified there perhaps than in the Enemy's Country. It was always of a fquare form, contrary to the custom of the Greeks, who made theirs round. The Ditch and Rampart, which confifted of four equal fides, was equally distributed

to be raifed by the two Roman Legions, and CHAP. the two Legions of the Allies, who perfected VI. it without intermission. If the Enemy were near, part of the Troops continued under Arms, whilst the rest were employed in throwing up the Intrenchments. They began by digging Trenches of greater or less depth, according to the occasion. were at least eight Foot broad by fix deep: but we often find them twelve Foot in breadth. fometimes more, to fifteen or twenty. Of the Earth dug out of the Trenches, and thrown up on the fide of the Camp, they formed the Rampart; and to make it the firmer, mingled it with Turf cut in a certain fize and form. Sometimes they drove double rows of Stakes into the Earth, leaving fo much of the length above Ground, as the height of the Work was to be of; and then interweaving them with Twigs, in the manner of Basket-work, filled the space between with the Earth rifing out of the Ditch. This was an expeditious and fafe way of forming the Line, and appears to have been always practifed, when they incamped in places where these Materials were to be found. Upon the brow of the Rampart the Palifades were planted. Polybius, speaking of the Order given by 2. Flamininus to his Troops, to cut Stakes against there should be occasion for them, offers feveral very curious Remarks upon this subject: and as that judicious Historian, who was himself an expert Warrior, feems

of the Romans in this Point, I shall beg leave to lay some of his Observations before the Reader.

II. THIS Custom fays Polybius, which is eafy to put in practice amongst the Romans, passes for impossible with the Greeks. They can hardly support their own weight upon their Marches, whilst the Romans, notwithstanding the Buckler which hangs at their Shoulders, and the Javelins which they carry in their Hands, load themselves also with Stakes or Palifades, which are very different from those of the Greeks. With the latter those are best, which have many strong Branches about the Trunk. The Romans, on the contrary, leave but three or four at most upon it, and that only on one fide. In this manner a Man can carry two or three bound together, and much more use may be made of them. Those of the Greeks are more easily pulled up. If the Stake be fixed by itself; as its Branches are strong, and in great number, two or three Soldiers will eafily pull it away, and thereby make an opening for the Enemy, without reckoning that the neighbouring Stakes will be loofened, because their Branches are too short to be interwoven with each other. But this is not the case with the Romans. The Branches of their Palisades are fo ftrongly inferted into each other, that it is hard to diftinguish the Stake they belong

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long to: and it is as little practicable to thrust CHAP. the Hand thro' these Branches to pull up the Palifades; because being well fastened and twifted together, they leave no opening, and are carefully sharpened at their ends. Even tho' they could be taken hold of, it would not be easy to pull them out of the Ground, and that for two Reasons. The first is, because they are driven in fo deep, that they cannot be moved: and the fecond, because their Branches are interwoven with each other in fuch a manner, that one cannot be flirred Two or three Men without feveral more. might unite their strength in vain to draw one of them out, which however if they effected, by drawing it a great while to and fro 'till it was loofe, the opening it would leave would be almost imperceptible. Stakes therefore have three Advantages. They are every where to be had; they are easy to carry; and are a fecure Barrier to a Camp, because very difficult to break thorough. my Opinion, adds the Historian, there is nothing practifed by the Romans in War, more worthy of being imitated.

III. The form and distribution of the several parts of the Roman Camp, admits of great Distinctions, and has occasioned many Disputes amongst the learned. The following Description is taken chiefly from Polybius, who of all the Ancients is the most full and explicit upon this Article. He speaks of a con-

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CHAP fular Army, which in his time confifted of two Roman Legions, and two Legions of the Allies. A Roman Legion contained four thousand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horse. A Legion of the Allies was equal to the number of Infantry, and generally double in Cavalry. All together therefore, Romans and Allies, they made eighteen thousand fix hundred Men. After the place for the Camp was marked out, which was always chosen for its convenience in respect to Water and Forage, a part of it was allotted for the General's Tent, called otherwise the Prætorium, because the ancient Latins stiled all their Commanders Pratores. The Ground pitched upon for this purpose was generally higher than the rest of the Camp, that he might with the greater ease see all that passed, and dispatch the necessary Orders. A Flag was planted upon it, and round that a fquare space marked out in such manner, that the four fides were an hundred Feet distant from the Flag, and the Ground occupied by the Conful about four Acres. Near this Tent were erected the Altar on which Sacrifices were offered, and the Tribunal for dispensing Justice. The two Roman Legions had each fix Tribunes, which made twelve in all. Their Tents were placed in a right Line parallel to the front of the Prætorium, at the distance of fifty Foot. In this space of fifty Foot were the Horses, Beasts of burden, and the whole Equipage of the Tribunes. Their Tents

Tents were pitched in such a manner, that CHAP. they had the Prætorium in the rear, and in the front all the rest of the Camp. The Tents of the Tribunes, at equal distance from each other, took up the whole breadth of the Ground upon which the two Roman Legions were incamped.

IV. BETWEEN the Tents of the Legions and Tribunes, a space of an hundred Foot in breadth was left, which formed a large Street called Principia, that ran across the whole Camp, and divided it into two parts, the upper and the lower. Beyond this Street were placed the Tents of the Legions. The space which they occupied was divided in the midst into two equal parts by a Street of fifty Foot broad, which extended the whole length of the Camp. On each fide of this Street, in fo many feveral Lines, were the Quarters of the Horse, the Triarii, the Principes and the Hastati. The Velites had no distinct Quarters, but were variously mingled with the rest of the Foot, four hundred and eighty of them being joined to the Hastati, a like number to the Principes, and two hundred and forty to the Triarii. To form a distinct idea of the Roman Camp, we must call to mind, that the Cavalry of each Legion was divided into ten Troops, thirty Men to a Troop; and that the Triarii, Principes, and Hastati, were likewise severally divided into ten Maniples of an hundred and twenty Men each, except thofe CHAP.those of the Triarii, which consisted only of VI. half that number. In conformity to this distribution, the Lines on which these several Bodies incamped, were each divided into ten Squares, extended length-wife from the Tents of the Tribunes. These Squares were an hundred Foot every way, except in the Lines of Triarii, where, because of the smaller number of Troops, they were only fifty Foot broad by an hundred long, and may therefore more properly be termed half Squares. Across the middle of these Lodgments, between the fifth and fixth Squares, ran a Street of fifty Foot broad, cutting the Lines at right Angles, and extending from one fide of the Camp to the other. It was called Quintana, because it opened beyond the fifth Maniple.

> V. THE order and disposition of the several Lines was as follows. On each fide the middle Street, that ran according to the length of the Camp, the Cavalry of the two Legions were quartered facing each other, and feparated by the whole breadth of the Street. As there were ten Squares on each fide, and every Square lodged thirty Horse, the twenty together contained just fix hundred, which made the intire Cavalry of two Legions. Adjoining to the Cavalry the Triarii were quartered, a Maniple behind a Troop of Horse, both in the same form. They joined as to the Ground, but faced differently, the Triarii turning their Backs upon the Horse. And here,

here, as we have already observed, because CHAP. the Triarii were less in number than the other Troops, the Ground assigned to each Maniple was only half as broad as long. Fronting the Triarii on each side, was a Street of sifty Foot broad, running parallel to that between the Quarters of the Horse. On the opposite side of this Street was the Line of Lodgments belonging to the Principes. Behind the Principes the Hastai were quartered, joining as to the Ground, but fronting the other way.

VI. Thus far we have described the Quarters of the two Roman Legions. It remains that we dispose of the Allies. Their Infantry equalled that of the Romans, and their Cavalry was twice the number. In removing for the Extraordinarii a fifth part of the Foot, or fixteen hundred and eighty Men, and a third of the Horse, or four hundred Men, there remained in the whole feven thousand five hundred and twenty Men, Horse and Foot, to quarter. These were disposed upon the two Wings of the Legions, being feparated from the Hastati on each side, by a Street of fifty Foot. The Cavalry were directly opposite to the Hastati, upon a breadth of an hundred and thirty-three Foot, and something more. Behind them, and on the same Line, the Infantry were incamped, upon a breadth of two hundred Foot. The Præfecti were lodged at the fides of the Tribunes, VOL. I. overCHAP. over-against their respective Wings. At the head of every Troop and Maniple, were the Tents of the Captains of Horse and Centurions. On the right fide of the Pratorium stood the Quastorium, assigned to the Quafter, or Treasurer of the Army, and hard by the Forum. This last ferved not only for the fale of Commodities, but also for the meeting of Councils, and giving audience to Ambassadors. On the other side of the Prætorium were lodged the Legati, or Lieutenant-Generals. On the right and left, still in the fame Line with the Pratorium, and directly behind the Præfects of the Allies, were the Quarters of the extraordinary Cavalry Evocatorum, and of the other volunteer Roman Horse, Selectorum. All this Cavalry faced on one fide towards the Forum and place of the Quafter, and on the other towards the Lodgments of the Legati. They not only incamped near the Conful's Person, but commonly attended him upon Marches, that they might be at hand to execute his Orders. The extraordinary and volunteer Roman Foot adjoined to the Horse last spoken of, forming the extremities of the Line towards the two fides of the Camp. Above this Line was a Street of an hundred Foot broad, extending the whole breadth of the Camp, and beyond that the Quarters of the extraordinary Horse of the Allies, facing the Prætorium, Treasury, and the Tents of the Legati. The extraordinary Foot of the Allies

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were directly behind their Horse, fronting CHAP. the Intrenchment and upper extremity of the Camp. The void spaces that remained on both sides were allotted to Strangers and Allies, who came later than the rest.

VII. BETWEEN the Rampart and the Tents, there was an open Place or Street of two hundred Foot in breadth, which was continued all along the four equal fides of the Camp. This Interval was of very great use, either for the entrance or departure of the Legions. For each Body of Troops advanced into that Space by the Street before it, fo that marching thither different ways, they were in no danger of crowding and breaking each other's Ranks. Besides which, the Cattle, and whatever was taken from the Enemy, was placed there, where a Guard was kept during the night. Another confiderable Advantage of it was, that in the Attacks by night, neither Fire nor Dart could do any great execution in the Camp; the Soldiers being at fo great a distance, and under cover of their Tents. But the principal Intention of it feems to have been, for the drawing up of the Troops who were to defend the Line, and to leave fufficient room for the Cavalry to fcour it. My Lord Orrery however is of opinion, that it was rather too narrow to answer both these Services. If it was only defigned for the Foot, they lost the benefit of their Horse, which experience teaches us to be of fingular use on fuch m 2

CHAP. fuch Occasions. For whatever Foot storm a Line, must enter it in great Confusion and Diforder, and can very hardly indeed refift small Squadrons of Horse, who are ready to receive them, and charge them all along the infide of the Line. For these Reasons he considers the narrowness of this Space as a defect in the Roman method of incamping, and thinks that a breadth of three hundred Foot at least ought to have been allowed for the the defence and scouring of the Line. It is probable the Romans would have done fo, had they not found the other fufficient; and we have this to fay in their favour, that tho' their Camps were frequently attacked, we meet with but few Instances in History of their being forced.

nary Troops incamped; and that it was the CHAP. fame as the Prætorian, which took its Name. from its nearness to the Prætorium. Gate opposite to this, at the other extremity of the Camp, was called Porta Decumana, because near the ten Maniples of each Legion; and without doubt is the fame with the Quaftorian, mentioned by Livy in the Place above cited. As to the right and left Principals, they had their Name from being on the right and left of the Camp, fronting the Street called Principia. I shall conclude this Description of the Roman Camp with observing, that when a Confular Army confifted of more than four Legions, they were lodged still in the same order, only the figure of the Camp was a long Square, in proportion to the additional Forces which were to be contained in it. When both the Confular Armies were united, they took up the Ground of two fuch perfect Squares.

IX. A wonderful Order was observed Night and Day throughout the Camp, in respect to the Watch-word, Centinels, and Guards; and it was in this its Security and Quiet consisted. To render the Guard more regular and less fatiguing, the Night was divided into four Parts or Watches, and the Day into four Stations. There seems to have been assigned one Company of Foot, and one Troop of Horse, to each of the four Gates every Day. The Roman Discipline

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CHAP was extremely strict in this particular, punishing with an exemplary Severity fuch as deferted their Post, or abandoned their Corps of Guard. Polybius takes notice of the excellent Effects of this Discipline, upon occasion of the Siege of Agrigentum in Sicily, during the first Punick War. The Roman Guards had dispersed themselves a little too far in quest of Forage. The Carthaginians laying hold of the Opportunity, made a vigorous Sally from the Town, and had well nigh forced the Camp; when the Soldiers, fenfible of the extreme Penalty they had incurred by neglecting their Duty, resolved to repair the Fault by some remarkable Behaviour; and accordingly rallying together, they not only fustained the Shock of the Enemy, to whom they were far inferior in number, but in the end made fo great a flaughter among them, as compelled them to retreat into the Town, tho' they were upon the very point of carrying the Roman Lines. The Night-Guards were four out of every Manipulus, who continued on Duty three Hours, and were then relieved by those next in turn. To keep the Soldiers alert, they had the Circuitio Vigilum, or Patrols, performed commonly four times in the Night by some of the Horse. Upon extraordinary Occasions, the Tribunes and Lieutenant-Generals, and fometimes the General himself made these Circuits in person, and took a strict view of the Watch in every part of the Camp.

X.

X. WHAT we have hitherto faid regards CHAP. only the Plan, Disposition, and well order- VI. ing of the Roman Camp. But there are many other Particulars to be taken into confideration, in incamping an Army to advantage: the choice of the Ground; the convenience of Provision and Forage; the security of Convoys; and the Precautions needful to prevent Surprise, or the being taken at a Disadvantage. We cannot however here enter into a particular Detail of the Roman Practice, with relation to these several Articles; because not being subject to any fixed and invariable Rules, they depend in a manner intirely upon the Prudence and Discretion of the General, who must therein be guided by the nature of the Country, the posture of the Enemy, and his own Strength. Two things in particular they were more than ordinarily attentive to; Health, and Safety. The first they endeavoured to fecure, by avoiding all Moraffes and fenny Places, or where the Wind was cold and unwholfom; which Unwholfomness they did not fo much compute from the fituation of the Place, as from the Appearance and Complexion of the Inhabitants. Exercife contributes greatly to Health, and therefore the Romans took care to keep their Troops always employed, either in casting up new Works round the Camp, or in hunting after Provision and Forage, or in performing those several Exercises, that tend to render the Body robust and active. It is observed in

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CHAP.our Days, that the immoderate Labour Soldiers are obliged to undergo, destroys our Armies: and yet it was by incredible Labour that the Romans preserved themselves. The reason of the difference I take to be this: their Fatigues were continual and without respite; whereas our Men are perpetually shifting from the extremes of Labour to the extremes of Idleness, than which nothing can be more destructive. Who could believe, that there was nothing, even to Cleanliness, of which particular care was not taken in the Roman Camp. As the great Street fituated in the front of the Prætorium was much frequented by the Officers and Soldiers, who passed through it to receive and carry Orders, and upon their other Occasions; a number of Men were appointed to sweep and clean it every Day in Winter, and to water it in Summer to prevent the Duft.

XI. But besides Health, Safety was like-wise another important Consideration with the Romans. To this end, in choosing a place of Incampment, they always had a particular eye to the convenience of Water, Provisions, and Forage. We see evidently in Cassar's Commentaries, that there was nothing about which he was more solicitous, than the contriving his Marches in such manner, as to have his Camp seated near some navigable River, and a Country behind him, whence he could be easily, and at a reasonable rate, supplied

with every thing necessary for the subfishence CHAP. of his Army. Other Inconveniences may, find a remedy in time, but Hunger, the longer it lasts, the more infallibly it destroys. And hence it was, that where the above-mentioned Advantages could not be obtained, the Romans made it their first Care, after fortifying their Camp, to lay in fuch a quantity of all necessary Stores, as might be sufficient for the time of their continuance in it. Nor were they less attentive to the strength of their Camp, and the Precautions necessary for its defence. This is a part of the Art of War in which they incontestibly excelled all Nations. Constant Practice made them expert in it; for they never quartered their Troops in Towns and open Villages, but always in standing Camps, which were carefully intrenched and fortified, in proportion to the Danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. And here we may observe, that whereas the Greeks chose always to incamp where there was fome River, or Wood, or Bank, or other natural Rampart to defend them; the Romans, on the contrary, stood not so much on the strength of Situation, as on their own ways of fortifying. Hence the Grecian Camps were often without Intrenchments, and varied in their form, according to the nature of the Place; but among the Romans one constant Method was inviolably obferved, nor would they ever lodge in a Camp, that

CHAP that was not furrounded with a Ditch and a VI. Rampart.

XII. This Practice of intrenched and fortified Camps was attended with many folid and defireable Advantages. The Army was hereby kept fafe, and freed from the Danger of having any of its Quarters beat up, by Surprise or a sudden Attack. It was eased of the trouble of keeping many and great Guards, fince a few ferves the turn for all, when all are at hand in case of an Attempt. It could never be compelled to fight against its will, than which no greater Misfortune can befal an Army. In fine, as the fuccess of Arms is uncertain, it had always a fecure Retreat in case of the worst. These things considered, it will not appear wonderful, that the Romans were fo strict in this Article, and confidered the Custom of fortifying Camps regularly, as one of the most essential parts of military Discipline. In the War with the Gauls, the Commanders of the Roman Army were reproached with having omitted this wife Precaution, and the loss of the Battle of Allia was in part attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid the like Misfortune for the time to come, it became in a manner an established Law amongst them, never to hazard a Battle 'till they had finished their Camp. Paulus Æmilius, in the second Macedonian War, suspended and arrested the Ardor of his whole Army to attack Perseus, for no other

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other Reason, but because they had not forme dC HAP. their Camp. The fortified Camp, in case of VI a Difaster, put a stop to the Enemy's Victory, received the Troops that retired in fafety, enabled them to renew the Battle with more Success, and prevented their being intirely routed; whereas without the refuge of a Camp, an Army, tho' composed of good Troops, was exposed to a final Defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. I may add to all these Advantages, that an intrenched Camp, by reason of the open Air, the healthliness of its Situation, which always must be minded, and the cleanliness which may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly less subject to Infection and Sickness, than Villages and ftrong Towns; infomuch that fome great Captains have concluded, an Army will be likelier preferved, and kept found and untainted three Months in a well feated and regulated Camp, than three Weeks in the ordinary Villages and Country Towns.

XIII. I have the longer and more particularly infifted on this Practice of intrenched Camps, because it appears evident from History, that the Romans owed as many of their Victories to their Ability in this part of War, as to their other excellent military Discipline and Valour. It would be almost endless to enumerate, what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their standing Camps; and how often they warded off Dangers,

CHAP. Dangers, and brought their Wars to a for-VI. tunate iffue by the same Proceeding. For having first wearied out their Enemies by fafe and beneficial Delays, they would on fome great Advantage give them Battle and defeat them; which artful Method of making War they neither could have effected nor rationally attempted, but by their thoroughly knowing how to incamp advantageously, by constantly practifing it, and by a timely providing of Food and Forage. Vegetius observes, that one of the principal Causes of the ruin of the Roman Empire was, that they had loft the Art of fortifying their Camp; by which Negligence they were eafily overwhelmed by the Barbarian Horse. And indeed when under the Emperors, they had ascertained the Limits of their Dominion, refolving to extend their Conquests no farther, but to rest fatisfied with maintaining the possession of what they had acquired; it is well known, that they effectually accomplished this defign by means of the standing Camps, which they kept upon the Euphrates, the Danube, and the Rhine. And so long as this Method was followed, the bordering Nations found it impossible to break through the Roman Barriers, or hurt the Tranquillity of their Empire. But when in process of time, the military Discipline began to decline, and the Art of incamping, in particular, was loft, or grew into difuse; the Romans, by abandoning the Banks of these several Rivers, opened a free passage

passage to the Barbarians, who meeting now HAP. with no resistance, poured in upon them like VI. a Torrent, and easily overwhelmed a feeble race of Men, whom Luxury, and an undisturbed Peace of many Ages, had rendered utterly unsit for War.

XIV. And here, as it falls fo naturally in my way, and has a strict Connexion with my Subject, I cannot forbear observing, that in the last Age, the French, who had many excellent Commanders, if not the most of any one Nation, and to whom the Art of War owes much of its present Improvement, began to revive, and with great Benefit to themselves, this almost obsolete part of it. For when the Prince of Orange, the Imperialists under the Count de Souches, and the Flemish Forces were united; the Prince of Conde, one of the greateft Captains that any Age has produced, being fent to oppose them, would not give them Battle, but incamped himself advantageously on the French Frontiers, fo that they were justly afraid to enter them, and leave him at their Backs. By this Management he kept them long at bay, and when he found his Opportunity, gave them at Seneff so confiderable a Blow, that the French, from having been on the defensive, became afterwards the Affaulters, and closed that Campaign with taking fome of the Enemy's Towns. The Marshal de Turenne also, who was sent General to the War in Germany, and who in the military Art had CHA Phad hardly a superior, having there to do with the Count de Montecuculi, one of the greatest Captains of his time; would still by intrenched Camps, when the Germans were the strongest, preserve himself and Army, spin out the War, and cover those Territories and Places he had won, while he himself had been the most powerful.

XV. And here it is particularly worthy of notice, that when upon the Marshal de Turenne's death, the French King fent the Prince of Conde to command in his stead, he also by intrenched Incampments weathered that Storm, which in itself was so threatning, not only by the fudden loss of so great a Captain, but also by the Germans being led by the Count de Montecuculi, and the Duke of Lorain, two Persons as confiderable as the very Forces they headed. I fay it particularly deferves our observation, that two fuch justly celebrated Commanders, as the Prince of Conde, and Monsieur Turenne, should observe the very same Methods, in managing the fame War; whereas usually when one General fucceeds another, in heading the same Army, and ordering the same War, the last comer judges it a kind of diminution to his own Skill, to tread in the very Paths of his Predecessor. But as the Prince of Conde observed a quite different Conduct on this occasion, we may thence naturally gather the three following Particulars. First, that he judged himself so justly secure in his own Reputation,

putation, that it could receive no diminution, by CHAP. his following the Steps of the dead General, more especially as he had done the like before, and fuccessfully, in Flanders. Secondly, that a wife and great Captain will rather, by imitating his Predecessor, confirm that Course to be the best which he knows to be so in itself, than try new Methods of War, whereby out of a mere Hope to do the like thing by a different way, he may hazard his Reputation, his Army, and the Country he is to cover and protect. Thirdly, what two fuch Generals have practifed, all Circumstances considered, amounts to little less than a Demonstration, that by Camps intrenched and well posted, a Country may be best secured, an invading Enemy best refifted, and in time, all Advantages being judiciously taken, defeated or made to retire.

XVI. THESE Examples ancient and modern, fufficiently evince the Benefit of this Practice, and with what Judgment the Romans made it an effential part of their military Discipline. I shall only add, as an indisputable Argument in its favour, that the great Cæsar himself has given his fanction to it, by constantly following it in his Wars with the Gauls. He had to do with a brave and a warlike Nation, paffionately fond of Liberty, and therefore extremely averse to the Roman Yoke. To keep them in awe, he established standing Camps in different parts of the Country, where the Soldiers were quartered in large

Bodies,

CHAP. Bodies, and furrounded with strong Intrenchments. This he thought the likeliest Method to prevent Insurrections, or suppress them speedily when they should happen, as the Troops would be always in a readiness to march, and in condition to act. It was likewise the best security against Treachery and Surprise. Accordingly we find, that all the Efforts of the Gauls to recover their Liberty were without effect, the Roman Camps standing as so many Bulwarks, against which they made frequent Attacks, they were yet never able to prevail.

C H A P. VII.

Of BATTLES.

I. I AVING raised our Troops, armed and disciplined them, put them upon the March, and lodged them in a Camp; it is now time to draw them out into the Field, that we may see how they acquitted themselves on a Day of Battle. It is in this view military Merit appears in all its extent. To know whether a General were worthy of that Name, the Romans examined the Conduct he observed on this critical Occasion. They did not expect Success from the number of Troops, which is often a Disadvantage, but from his Prudence

Prudence and Valour, the Cause and Affurance CHAP. of Victory. They confidered him as the Soul. VII. of his Army, that directs all its Motions, whose Dictates every thing obeys, and upon whose good or bad Conduct the issue of the Battle depends. The first Consideration, and that which demands the greatest force of Judgment is, to examine whether it be proper or no to come to an Engagement, and to balance exactly the Advantages with the Difadvantages. The blind Temerity of Varro, notwithstanding his Collegue's Remonstrances, and the Advice of Fabius, drew upon the Republick the unfortunate Battle of Canna; whereas a delay of a few Weeks, would probably have ruined Hannibal for ever. Perseus, on the contrary, let flip the Occasion of fighting the Romans, in not taking the advantage of the Ardor of his Army, and attacking them instantly after the defeat of their Horse, which had thrown their Troops into Diforder and Consternation. Cafar had been lost after the Battle of Dyrrhachium, if Pompey had known how to improve his Advantage. Great Enterprifes have their decifive Moments. The important Point lies, in wifely refolving what to choose, and in seizing the present Occasion, which never returns when once neglected.

II. But not to infift any longer upon this, which rests intirely in the Breast of the General; we shall suppose the Resolution to fight taken, and proceed to examine, what Precautions

CHAP. tions the Romans made use of, in order to VII. fecure the Victory. These may in the general be reduced to two. First, the inspiring their

be reduced to two. First, the inspiring their Troops with Courage and Confidence. Secondly, the ranging them judiciously in order of Battle. To inspire their Troops with Confidence, they began by confulting the Gods, and endeavouring to incline them in their They confulted them either by the flight or finging of Birds, by the inspection of the Entrails of Victims, by the manner in which the facred Chickens pecked their Corn, and by things of the like nature. They laboured to render them propitious by Sacrifices, Vows, and Prayers. Many of the Generals, especially in the earlier times, discharged these Duties with great Solemnity and Sentiments of Religion; and would never hazard an Engagement, until by fome favourable Omens they had brought the Troops to believe that the Gods were on their fide. Paulus Æmilius. before he gave Perseus Battle, facrificed twenty Oxen fuccessively to Hercules, without finding any favourable Sign in all those Victims. It was not 'till the one and twentieth, that he believed he faw fomething which promifed him the Victory. This attention to Religion was highly necessary among a People strongly addicted to Superstition, and over whom the Omens of which we speak, however trifling in themselves, had yet a powerful Influence. Hence the Generals who neglected this Precaution, had often but too just cause to repent of

of their Folly; as it tended greatly to dispirit CHAP. the Troops, and begot an ill Opinion of their Conduct; insomuch that we seldom find them successful in their Undertakings. The wisest and best Commanders chose always to comply with the Prejudices of the Vulgar, and even where they despised these Ceremonies in their Hearts, affected yet a greater Veneration for them in publick.

III. AFTER having paid these Duties to the Gods, they applied themselves to Men, and the General exhorted his Soldiers. It feems to have been an established Custom with all Nations among the Ancients, to harangue their Troops before a Battle; nor can we deny that the Custom was very reasonable in itself, and might contribute greatly to the Victory. When an Army is upon the point of engaging an Enemy, what can be more proper, than to oppose the fear of a feemingly approaching Death with the most powerful Reasons, and fuch as, if not capable of totally extinguishing it, may yet in some measure allay and overcome it. Such Reasons are the Love of our Country, the Obligation to defend it at the price of our Blood, the remembrance of past Victories, the necessity of supporting the Glory of our Nation, the Injustice of a violent and cruel Enemy, the Dangers to which the Fathers, Mothers, Wives, and Children of the Soldiers are exposed: these Motives, I say, and many of the like nature, represented from the Mouth

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CHAP. Mouth of a General, beloved and respected by his Troops, may make a very strong Impression upon their Minds. Not, as Cyrus in Xenophon observes, that such Discourses can in an Instant change the Disposition of the Soldiers, and from timorous and abject as they might be, make them immediately bold and intrepid: but they awaken, they rouse the Courage Nature had before given them, and add a new Force and Vivacity to it. To judge rightly of this Custom of haranguing the Troops, as constantly practifed among the Romans, we must go back to the Ages wherein they lived, and confider their Manners with particular Attention. Their Armies were composed of the fame Citizens, to whom, in the City, and in time of Peace, it was customary to communicate all the Affairs of the State. The General did no more in the Camp, or in the Field of Battle, than he would have been obliged to do in the Rostrum or Tribunal of Harangues. He did his Troops Honour, and attracted their Confidence and Affection in imparting to them his Defigns, Motives, and Measures. Add to this, that the fight of the Generals, Officers, and Soldiers affembled, communicated a reciprocal Courage and Ardor to them all. Every one piqued himself at that time upon the goodness of his Aspect and Appearance, and obliged his Neighbour The Fear of some was abated to do the same. or intirely banished by the Valour of others. The Disposition of particular Persons became that THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. CXCVII that of the whole Body, and gave Affairs CHAP. VII.

IV. LET me observe here, that there were many Occasions besides Battles, when it wasnecessary to excite the Good-will and Zeal of the Soldier: if, for instance, a difficult and hasty March was to be made, to extricate the Army out of a dangerous fituation, or obtain one more commodious: if Courage, Patience, and Constancy were required, for supporting Famine, and other Diffresses, painful to Nature: if some difficult, dangerous, but very important Enterprise was to be undertaken: if it was necessary to console, encourage, and reanimate the Troops after a Defeat: if an hazardous Retreat was to be made in view of the Enemy, in a Country he was master of: in fine, if only a generous Effort was wanting to terminate a War, or some important Undertaking. Upon these and the like Occasions, the Generals never failed to speak in publick to the Army, in order to found their Dispofitions by their Acclamations more or less strong; to inform them of their Reasons for fuch and fuch Conduct, and conciliate them to it; to dispel the false Reports, which exaggerated Difficulties, and discouraged them; to let them see the Remedies preparing for the Distresses they were under, and the Success to be expected from them; to explain the Precautions it was necessary to take, and the Motives for taking them. It was the General's Interest n 3

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CHAP Interest to flatter the Soldier, in making him the Confident of his Designs, Fears and Expedients, in order to engage him to share in them, and act in concert, and from the same Motives with himself. The General in the midst of Soldiers, who, as well as himself, were all not only Members of the State, but had a share in the Authority of the Government, was considered as a Father in the midst of his Family.

V. It may not be eafy to conceive how he could make himself heard by the Troops: but if we call to mind, that the Armies of the Roman People were not very numerous, that Difficulty will in a great measure vanish. Befides, I pretend not to fay that the Generals were heard distinctly, or in any other manner than the Orators in the publick Affemblies. All People did not hear: yet the whole People were informed, the whole People deliberated and decided, and none of them complained of not having heard. It sufficed that the most ancient, the most considerable, the principals of Companies and Quarters were present at the Harangue, of which they afterwards gave an account to the rest. On the Column of Trajan, the Emperor is feen haranguing the Troops from a Tribunal of Turf, raifed higher than the Soldiers Heads, with the principal Officers around him upon the Platform, and the Multitude forming a Circle at a distance. The great Men at Rome accustomed themselves from

from their youth to speak upon occasion with CHAP. a strong and clear Voice; and as these Harangues were made in the Camp to the Soldiers quiet and unarmed, it is not easy to conceive in how little room a great number of them could stand upright, when they pressed close to each other. I insist the longer upon this, because many blame the Historians of Antiquity, for the supposititious Harangues, as they call them, which they have inferted in their Works. It must indeed be owned, that the Discourses made by Generals on the occafions of which we speak, were not always exactly the fame as Historians have repeated For most Authors, writing in the time when the Art of Eloquence was highly in esteem, have endeavoured, in adorning and inlarging the Harangues they record, to leave Proofs to Posterity, that they were not less excellent Orators than Historians. But the Fact itself, that Generals frequently spoke in publick to their Troops, is evident beyond dispute. Cæsar, whose Commentaries are a plain and naked relation of what he himself performed at the head of his Army, furnishes many Examples of this kind. When he marched against Ariovistus, a sudden Consternation feizing the Soldiers, which was like to be attended with very difagreeable Effects, he affembled them, reprehended them in a long and fevere Speech, and thereby put a stop to the growing Evil. In like manner, upon occasion of a considerable Check received before

CHAP. Gergovia, owing to the too forward Valour of the Troops, and their neglect of his Injunctions, he judged it necessary to call them together, expostulate with them upon their ill-timed Bravery, and fortify them against any Damp their late Disaster might have thrown upon their Spirits. I could easily produce other Instances of the same kind, but these are abundantly sufficient to evince the Point in question.

VI. WHEN the Armies were numerous, and upon the point of giving Battle, the Ancients had a very fimple and natural way of haranguing the Men. The General on horseback rode thro' the Ranks, and spoke fomething to the feveral Bodies of Troops in order to animate them. Where he had to do with different Nations, as very often happened, he addressed those of his own Language in person, and made known his Views and Defigns to the rest by Interpreters. Hamibal acted in this manner at the Battle of Zama in Africa. He thought it incumbent on him to exhort his Troops: and as every thing was different among them, Language, Customs, Laws, Arms, Habits, and Interests, so he made use of different Motives to animate To the auxiliary Troops, he proposed an immediate Reward, and an augmentation of their Pay out of the Booty that should be taken. He inflamed the peculiar and natural Hatred of the Gauls against the Romans. for

for the Ligurians, who inhabited a moun-CHAP. tainous and barren Country, he fet before VII. them the fertile Valleys of Italy, as the fruit of their Victory. He represented to the Moors and Numidians, the cruel and violent Government of Masinissa, to which they would be subjected, if overcome. In this manner he animated these different Nations, by the different views of Hope and Fear. to the Carthaginians, he omitted nothing that might excite their Valour, and addressed himfelf to them in the warmest and most pathetic Terms. He put them in mind of their Country, their houshold Gods, the Tombs of their Ancestors, the Terror and Consternation of their Fathers and Mothers, their Wives and Children; in fine, that the Fate of Carthage depended upon that Battle, the Event of which would either ruin and reduce her into perpetual Slavery, or render her Mistress of the Universe, every thing being extreme which she had either to hope or fear. This is a very fine Discourse; but how did he make these different Nations understand it? Livy informs us: He spoke to the Carthaginians himself, and ordered the Commanders of each Nation to repeat to their respective Troops what he had faid. In this manner the General fometimes affembled the Officers of his Army, and after having explained what he defired the Troops might be told, he fent them back to their several Brigades or Companies, in order to report what they had heard,

VII. rian observes this particular of Alexander the Great, before the famous Battle of Arbela.

VII. AFTER inspiring the Troops with Refolution and Confidence, and disposing them to act courageously against the Enemy, the next care of the General was, to range them judiciously in order of Battle. manner of drawing up the Infantry in three Lines, continued long in use among the Romans, and with uniformity enough. Hastati were placed in the front, in thick and firm Ranks; the Principes behind them, but not altogether fo close; and after them the Triarii in fo wide and loofe an order, that upon occasion, they could receive both the Principes and Hastati into their Body in any Distress. The Velites, and in latter times the Bowmen and Slingers, were not drawn up in this regular manner, but disposed of either before the front of the Hastati, or scattered up and down among the void spaces of the fame Hastati, or sometimes placed in two Bodies in the Wings: but wherever they were fixed, these light Soldiers began the Combat, skirmishing in flying Parties with the first Troops of the Enemy. If they prevailed, which very feldom happened, they profecuted the Victory; but upon a repulse, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, and rallied again in the Rear. When they were retired, the Hastati advanced against the Enemy;

Enemy; and in case they found themselves CHAP. overpowered, retiring foftly towards the Principes, fell into the intervals of their Ranks, and, together with them, renewed the Fight. But if the Principes and Hastati thus joined were too weak to fustain the fury of the Battle, they all fell back into the wider intervals of the Triarii, and then all together being united into a firm mass, they made another Effort, much more impetuous than any before. If this Affault proved ineffectual, the Day was intirely loft as to the Foot, there being no farther referves. This way of marshalling the Foot, was exactly like the order of Trees, which Gardeners call the Quincunx; as appears from the beautiful comparison between them in Virgil's second Georgick. And as the reason of that position of the Trees, is not only for Beauty and Figure, but that every particular Tree may have room to spread its Roots and Boughs, without intangling and hindering the rest; so in this ranking of the Men, the Army was not only fet out to the best advantage, and made the greatest show, but every particular Soldier had free room to use his Weapons, and to withdraw himself between the void spaces behind him, without occasioning any Confufion or Disturbance.

VIII. THE Stratagem of rallying thus three times, has been reckoned almost the whole Art and Secret of the Roman Discipline;

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CHAP. and 'twas almost impossible it should prove VII. unsuccessful, if duly observed. For Fortune, in every Engagement, must have failed them three feveral times, before they could be routed; and the Enemy must have had the Strength and Resolution to overcome them in three feveral Encounters, for the decision of one Battle: whereas most other Nations, and even the Grecians themselves, drawing up their whole Army as it were in one front, trusted themselves and fortunes to the success of a fingle Charge. The Roman Cavalry was posted at the two Corners of the Army, like the Wings on a Body; and fought fometimes on foot, fometimes on horfeback, as occasion required, in the same manner as our Dragoons. The confederate or auxiliary Forces composed the two Points of the Battle, and covered the whole Body of the Romans. As to the Stations of the Commanders, the General commonly took up his Post near the middle of the Army, between the Principes and the Triarii, as the fittest place to give orders equally to all the Troops. The Legati and and Tribunes were usually posted by him; unless the former were ordered to command the Wings, or the others fome particular Part of the Army. The Centurions stood every Man at the head of his Century, to lead them up; tho' fometimes, out of Courage and Honour, they exposed themselves in the van of the Army, or were placed there for particular Reasons by the General: as Salust reports of Catiline,

rions, with the Evocati, and the flower of the common Soldiers, in the front of the Battle. But the Primipili, or chief Centurions, had the Honour to stand with the Tribunes near the General's person. The common Soldiers were placed in several Ranks, at the discretion of the Centurions, according to their Age, Strength, and Experience, every Man having three Foot square allowed him to manage his Arms in; and it was religiously observed in their Discipline, never to abandon their Ranks, or break their Order upon any account.

IX. But besides the common Methods of drawing up a Roman Army, which are fufficiently explained by every Historian of any note; there were feveral other very fingular Methods of forming their Battle into odd Shapes, according to the nature of the Body they were to oppose. Of this kind was the Cuneus, when the Army was ranged in the figure of a Wedge, the most proper to pierce and break the Order of the Enemy. This was otherwise called Caput Porcinum, which it in some measure resembled. And here I beg leave to observe, that this last Name feems to confirm the Conjecture of the Chevalier Folard, who maintains that the Cuneus was no other than the Column, or a Battalion drawn up with a small front and great depth. The triangular Order he looks upon

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CHAP.upon as childish and absurd, and such as never was nor could be practifed with Success, because of the extreme weakness of the Angles. The Authors, however, who give that form to the Cuneus, have invented another order of Battle in opposition to it, which they term the Forfex. This was when the Army was drawn up in the figure of a Pair of Sheers, as it were on purpose to receive the Cuneus, in cafe the Enemy should make use of that Disposition. For while he endeavoured to open, and as it were to cleave their Squadrons with his Wedge, by keeping their Troops extended like the Sheers, and receiving him in the middle, they not only hindered the Damage defigned to their own Men, but commonly cut the adverse Body in pieces. The Globus was when the Soldiers cast themfelves into a circular Order, upon an apprehension of being furrounded. Cæsar, in the fifth Book of his Commentaries, speaks of this Disposition as very proper in cases of Danger and Extremity. The Turris reprefented an oblong Square, after the fashion of a Tower, with very few Men in a File, and the Ranks extended to a great length. feems of very ancient Original, as being mentioned in Homer. The last order I shall take notice of is the Serra, or Saw; when the first Companies in the front of the Army, beginning the Engagement, fometimes proceeded, and fometimes drew back; fo that by the help of a large Fancy, one might find some refemblance

resemblance between them and the Teeth of CHAP. that Instrument.

X. IT was usual enough among the Romans, to raise great Cries, and to strike their Swords against their Bucklers, as they advanced to charge an Enemy. This Noise, joined to that of the Trumpets, was very proper to suppress in them, by a kind of Stupefaction, all fear of Danger, and to inspire them with a Courage and Boldness, that had no view but Victory, and defied Death. But tho' fuch Shoutings were allowed, nay even encouraged as useful, going towards the Enemy, yet a deep Silence was observed by the Soldiery, when they were about to engage, that the orders of the Officers, and the words of Command, might be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. 'Tis observed that the Greeks went always filently to Battle, alledging for it, that they had more to do than to fay to their Enemies. But the Shoutings of which we speak, is in reality a kind of Doing, as it stirs up the Men, and often damps the Enemy. The Troops marched fometimes foftly and coolly to the Charge, and fometimes, when they approached the Enemy, they fprung forward with impetuofity as fast as they could move. Great Men have been divided in Opinion upon these different Methods of attacking. It feems however to be generally agreed, that where two Armies engage in a plain Field, a Commander ought never

CHAP to allow, much less order his Men to receive the Charge, but still to meet the Enemy in giving it. Pompey, in the decisive Battle of Pharsalia, by the advice of Triarius, commanded his Soldiers to receive Cafar's Affault, and to undergo the Shock of his Army, without removing from the place whereon they stood, as by this means Cafar's Men would be disordered in their advance, and Pompey's, by not moving, keep their Order. But Cæfar himself observes upon it, that according to his Judgment, the Advice was against all Reason; because there is a certain keenness and alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, who is inflamed with a defire to fight, and therefore no Commander should repress or restrain it, but rather increase and set it forward. The Event justified Casar's Opinion, and showed that it was well-grounded.

XI. HITHERTO we have contented ourselves with general Observations: but as it is impossible from these alone, to give any tolerable Idea of the Address and Ability of a Commander in a Day of Battle, because his Conduct must vary according to Circumstances; I shall now beg leave to lay before the Reader, an Account of some celebrated Actions of Antiquity, taken from the Descriptions of such Historians, as being themselves military Men, have traced them with the utmost Exactness, and distinctly explained the Reasons of the several Steps taken. The first Instance

of this kind that we meet with in History, is CHAP. the famous Battle of Thymbra, between Crafus. and Cyrus, which transferred the Empire of Asia from the Assyrians of Babylon to the Medes and Perfians. Tho' this Action does not fo immediately and strictly regard the Subject we are upon, as having no Relation to the Roman History, I shall yet give a particular Description of it here, not only because it is the first pitched Battle, of which we have any full and circumstantial Account, but because Cyrus being looked upon as one of the greatest Captains of Antiquity, those of the Profession may be glad to trace him in all his Steps, thro' this important Engagement; and the rather, as what we shall present them with on this Subject is taken from Xenophon, one of the greatest Commanders, as well as finest Writers, of the Age in which he lived.

XII. In Cyrus's Army the Companies of Foot confisted of a hundred Men each, exclusive of the Captain. Each Company was subdivided into four Parts, which consisted severally of four and twenty Men, not including the Person who commanded the Platoon. Each of these Subdivisions was again divided into two Files, consisting in consequence of twelve Men. Every ten Companies had a particular superior Officer to command them, who sufficiently answers to what we call a Colonel. Over ten of these again was another superior Commander, whom we shall Vol. I.

CHAP term a Brigadier. When Cyrus came at the Head of the thirty thousand Persians, who had been fent to the Aid of his Uncle Cyaxares, he made a confiderable Change in the arms of his Troops. 'Till then, two thirds of them made use only of Javelins and Bows, and therefore could not fight but at a distance from the Enemy. Instead of these, Cyrus armed the greatest part of them with Cuirasses, Bucklers, and Swords or Battle-axes, and left only a few of his Soldiers in light Armour. The Persians did not know at that Time what it was to fight on horse-back. Cyrus, who was convinced that nothing was of fo great Importance towards the gaining of a Battle as Cavalry, was fenfible of the great Inconvenience he laboured under in that respect, and therefore took wife and early Precautions to remedy that Evil. He succeeded in his Defign, and by little and little formed a Body of Persian Cavalry, which amounted to ten thousand Men, and were the best Troops in his Army.

XIII. XENOPHON has not acquainted us with the precise Number of Troops on both sides, but as this may be in some sort collected, by putting together certain scattered Passages of our Author, we shall endeavour to fix it in the best manner we can. Cyrus's Army amounted in the whole to an hundred and ninety-six thousand Men, Horse and Foot. Of these there were seventy thousand natural born

Persians,

Persians, viz. ten thousand Cuirassiers of Horse, CHAP. twenty thousand Cuirassiers of Foot, twenty, thousand Pikemen, and twenty thousand lightarmed Soldiers. The rest of the Army, to the number of one hundred and twenty-fix thousand men, confisted of an hundred thoufand Median, Armenian, and Arabian Foot, and twenty-fix thousand Horse of the same Nations. Besides these Troops, Cyrus had three hundred Chariots of War, armed with Scythes, each Chariot drawn by four Horses a-breaft, covered with Trappings that were shot-proof; as were also the Horses of the Persian Cuirassiers. He had likewise ordered a great Number of Chariots to be made of a larger fize, upon each of which was placed a Tower of about eighteen or twenty Foot high, in which were lodged twenty Archers. Each Chariot was drawn upon Wheels by fixteen Oxen yoked in a breast. There was moreover a confiderable Number of Camels, upon each

XIV. CROESUS'S Army was above twice as numerous as that of Cyrus, amounting in all to four hundred and twenty thousand Men, of which fixty thousand were Cavalry. The Troops confisted chiefly of Babylonians, Lydians, Phrygians, Cappadocians, of the Nations about the Hellespont, and of Egyptians, to the number of three hundred and fixty thousand

of which were two Arabian Archers, back to back; fo that one looked towards the Head, and the other towards the Tail of the Camel.

Men.

ccxii

CHAP. Men. The Egyptians alone made a body of an hundred and twenty thousand. They had

Bucklers that covered them from head to foot, very long Pikes, and short Swords, but very broad. The rest of the Army was made up of Cyprians, Cilicians, Lycaonians, Paphlagonians, Thracians, and Ionians. The Army in Order of Battle was ranged in one Line, the Infantry in the Centre, and the Calvary on the two Wings. All the Troops, both Foot and Horse, were thirty Men deep: but the Egyptians, who, as we have taken notice, were an hundred and twenty thousand in number, and who were the principal Strength of Cræsus's Infantry, in the Centre of which they were posted; were divided into twelve large Bodies or square Battalions, of ten thousand Men each, which had an hundred Men in front, and as many in depth, with an Interval or Space between every Battalion, that they might act and fight independent of, and without interfering with one another. Crasus would gladly have perfuaded them to range themfelves in less depth, that he might make the wider Front. For the Armies being in an immense Plain, which gave room for extending their Wings to right and left, he was in hopes by this means of furrounding and hemming in the Enemy. But he could not prevail with the Egyptians to change the Order of Battle to which they had been accustomed. His Army, as it was thus drawn out into one Line,

took up near forty Stadia, or five Miles in CHAP. VII.

XV. ARASPES, who under pretence of Difcontent had retired to Crassus's Army, and had received particular Orders from Cyrus, to observe well the Manner of that General's ranging his Troops, returned to the Persian Camp the Day before the Battle. Cyrus in drawing up his Army, governed himself by the Disposition of the Enemy, of which that young Median Nobleman had given him an exact account. The Persian Troops had been generally used to engage four and twenty Men deep, but Cyrus thought fit to change that Disposition. It was necessary for him to form as wide a Front as possible, without too much weakening his Phalanx, to prevent his Army's being inclosed and hemmed in. His Infantry was excellent, and most advantageously armed with Cuirasses, Partizans, Battle-axes, and Swords; and provided they could join the Enemy in close Fight, there was but little reason to believe the Lydian Phalanx, that were only armed with light Bucklers and Javelins, could support the Charge. Cyrus therefore thinned the Files of his Infantry one half, and ranged them only twelve Men deep. The Cavalry was drawn out on the two Wings, the Right commanded by Chrysantes, and the Left by Hystaspes. The whole Front of the Army took up but thirty-two Stadia, or four Miles in Extent, and confequently was at each

end

CHAP end near four Stadia, or half a Mile short of the Enemy's Front. Behind the first Line at a little distance, Cyrus placed the Spear-men, and behind them the Archers. Both the one and the other were covered by the Soldiers in their front, over whose Heads they could fling their Javelins, and shoot their Arrows at the Enemy.

XVI. BEHIND all these he formed another Line, to ferve for the Rear, which confifted of the Flower of his Army. Their Bufiness was to have their Eyes upon those that were placed before them, to encourage those that did their Duty, to sustain and threaten those that gave way, and even to kill those as Traitors that perfifted obstinately in flying; by that means to keep the Cowards in awe, and make them have as great a terror of the Troops in the Rear as they could possibly have of the Enemy. Behind the Army were placed those moving Towers which I have already described. These formed a Line equal and parallel to that of the Army, and did not only serve to annoy the Enemy by the perpetual Discharges of the Archers that were in them, but might likewise be looked upon as a kind of moveable Forts or Redoubts, under which the Persian Troops might rally, in case they were broken and pushed by the Enemy. Just behind these Towers were two other Lines, which also were parallel and equal to the Front of the Army: the one was formed of the Baggage,

and

and the other of the Chariots which carried CHAP. the Women, and fuch other Persons as were, unfit for Service. To close all these Lines, and to fecure them from the Infults of the Enemy, Cyrus placed in the Rear of all two thousand Infantry, two thousand Horse, and the Troop of Camels, which was pretty numerous. Cyrus's Defign in forming two Lines of the Baggage was, not only to make his Army appear the more numerous, but likewife to oblige the Enemy, in case they were resolved to surround him, as he knew they intended, to make the longer Circuit, and consequently to weaken their Line, by stretching it out so far. We have still the Persian Chariots of War armed with Scythes to speak of. These were divided into three Bodies of an hundred each. One of these Bodies, commanded by Abradates, King of Sufiana, was placed in the Front of the Battle, and the other two upon the Flanks of the Army.

XVII. WHEN the two Armies were in fight of each other, and the Enemy had observed how much the Front of theirs exceeded that of Cyrus, they made the Centre of their Army halt, whilst the two Wings advanced projecting to the right and left, with design to inclose Cyrus's Army, and begin their Attack on every Side on the same time. This Movement did not at all alarm Cyrus, because he expected it; but observing that many of his Officers, and even Abradates himself, discovered some uneasy

Appre-

CHAP. Apprehensions; These Troops disturb you, says he; believe me they will be the first routed, and to you Abradates I give that as a Signal, for the falling upon the Enemy with your Chariots. When the two detached Bodies of the Lydians were sufficiently extended, Crasus gave the Signal to his main Battle to march up directly to the Front of the Persian Army, whilst the two Wings, that were wheeling round upon their Flanks, advanced on each Side; fo that Cyrus's Army was inclosed on three Sides; and, as Xenophon expresses it, looked like a fmall Square drawn within a great one. In an Instant, on the first Signal Cyrus gave, his Troops faced about on every fide, keeping a profound filence in expectation of the Event. The Prince himself at the head of some Horse, briskly followed by a Body of Foot, fell upon the Forces that were marching to attack his right Flank, and put them in great Disorder. The Chariots then driving furiously upon the Lydians compleated the Defeat. In the same moment the Troops of the left Flank, knowing by the Noise that Cyrus had begun the Battle on the Right, advanced to the Enemy; and immediately the Squadron of Camels was made to advance likewise, as Cyrus had ordered. The Enemy's Cavalry did not expect this, and their Horses at a distance, as soon as they were senfible of the Approach of those Animals, whose Smell they cannot endure, began to fnort and prance, to run foul upon and overturn one another,

another, throwing their Riders, and treading CHAP. them under their Feet. Whilst they were in this Confusion, a small Body of Horse, commanded by Artageses, pushed them very warmly to prevent their rallying; and the Chariots armed with Scythes falling suriously upon them, they were intirely routed, with a dreadful slaughter.

XVIII. This being the Signal which Cyrus had given Abradates for attacking the Front of the Enemy's Army, he drove like Lightning upon them with all his Chariots. Their first Ranks were not able to stand so violent a Charge, but gave way and were dispersed. Having broken and overthrown them, Abradates came up to the Egyptian Battalions, which being covered with their Bucklers, and marching in fuch close order, that the Chariots had not room to pierce amongst them, gave him much more trouble, and would not have been broken, had it not been for the Violence of the Horses that trod upon them. 'Twas a most dreadful Spectacle to fee the Heaps of Men and Horses, overturned Chariots, broken Arms, and all the direful Effects of the sharp Scythes, which cut every thing in pieces that came in their way. But Abradates's Chariot having the Misfortune to be overturned, he and his Men were killed, after they had fignalized their Valour in a very extraordinary manner. The Egyptians then marching forward in close Order, and covered with their Bucklers, obliged

CHAP. ed the Persian Infantry to give way, and drove them beyond their fourth Line, as far as to their Machines. There the Egyptians met with a fresh Storm of Arrows and Javelins, that were poured upon their Heads from the rolling Towers: and the Battalions of the Perhans Rear-guard advancing fword in hand, hindered their Archers and Spear-men from retreating any farther, and obliged them to return to their Charge.

> XIX. Cyrus in the mean time having put both the Horse and Foot to flight on the left of the Egyptians, did not amuse himself in pursuing the Runaways, but pushing on directly to the Centre, had the Mortification to find his Persian Troops had been forced to give way; and rightly judging that the only means to prevent the Egyptians from gaining farther ground, would be to attack them behind, he did so, and fell upon their Rear. The Cavalry came up at the same time, and the Enemy was pushed with great Fury. The Egyptians being attacked on all fides, faced about every way, and defended themselves with wonderful bravery. Cyrus himself was in great Danger; his Horse, which a Solder had stabbed under the Belly, finking under him, he fell in the midst of his Enemies. Here was an Opportunity, fays Xenophon, of feeing how important it is for a Commander to have the Affection of his Soldiers. Officers and Men, equally alarmed at the Danger in which they faw their Leader, actuels

ran

ran headlong into the thick forest of Pikes to rescue and save him. He quickly remounted another Horse, and the Battle became more bloody than ever. At length Cyrus, admiring the Valour of the Egyptians, and being concerned to see such brave Men perish, offered them honourable Conditions, if they would surrender, letting them know at the same time that all their Allies had abandoned them. The Egyptians accepted the Conditions, after which the Persians meeting with no farther Opposition, a total Rout of the Enemy ensued.

XX. 'Tis allowed that Cyrus's Victory was chiefly owing his Perfian Cavalry, which was a new Establishment, and entirely the Fruit of that Prince's Care and Activity in forming his People, and perfecting them in a part of the military Art, of which till his Time they had been utterly ignorant. The Chariots armed with Scythes did good Service, and the use of them was ever after retained among the Persians. The Camels too were not unserviceable in this Battle, tho' Xenophon makes no great account of them, and observes, that in his time they made no other use of them, than for carrying the Baggage. I shall not undertake here to enlarge upon Cyrus's Merit. 'Tis fufficient to observe, that in this affair we see all the Qualities of a great General shine out in him. Before the Battle, an admirable fagacity and forefight in discovering and disconcerting the Enemy's Measures; an infinite Exactness VII.

CHAP actness in the detail of Affairs, in taking care that his Army should be provided with every thing necessary, and all his Orders punctually obeyed at the time prefixed; a wonderful application to gain the Hearts of his Soldiers, and to inspire them with Confidence and Ardor: in the heat of Action, what a Spirit and Activity? what a presence of Mind in giving Orders as Occasion requires? what Courage and Intrepidity, and at the fame time what Humanity towards the Enemy, whose Valour he respects, and whose Blood he is unwilling to shed? I have met with but one Objection to the Manner in which he drew up his Troops in Order of Battle, namely, his placing no Troops to cover his Flanks, to sustain his armed Chariots, and to oppose the two Bodies of Troops which Crassus had detached to fall upon the Flanks of his Army. But it is very possible that fuch a Circumstance might escape Xenophon in describing the Battle; tho' it must be owned, that the Fall of Abradates, which was immediately followed by the Attack of the Persian Infantry, hardly leaves room for such a Conjecture.

> sentited hundred was by chief the con-XX. I shall now present the Reader with the Description of two Battles in which the Romans were concerned, those of Cannæ and Zama, distinguished by the importance of their Consequences, and the Abilities of the Generals who commanded in them. Hannibal having defeated the Romans in three successive Engagements, aloution.

gagements, and desirous of bringing them to CHAP. another general Action, that by one decifive, VII. Blow he might put an end to the War, removed his Camp to the Neighbourhood of Canna, an open champian Country, and fit for Cavalry to act in, in which he was greatly superior to the Enemy. The Romans, headed by the Confuls Paulus Æmilius and Varro, followed him thither, where after fome Disputes Paulus was obliged to give way to the Obstinacy of his Collegue, who was resolutely bent upon fight-The two Armies were very unequal as to number. There was in that of the Romans, including the Allies, fourfcore thousand Foot, and fomething more than fix thousand Horse; and in that of the Carthaginians, forty thousand Foot, all well disciplined and inured to War, and ten thousand Horse. Varro, at day-break, having made the Troops of the great Camp pass the Aufidus, drew them up immediately in Battle, after having joined them with those of the little Camp. The whole Infantry were upon one Line, closer and of greater depth than usual. The Cavalry was upon the two Wings: that of the Romans on the right, defended by the Aufidus; and that of the Allies on the left Wing. The light-armed Troops were advanced in the Front of the Battle to some distance. Paulus Æmilius commanded the right Wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius Geminus, the Conful of the preceding year, was in the Centre.

XXII. HAN-

CHAP. VII.

XXII. HANNIBAL immediately drew up his Army in one line. He posted his Spanish and Gallick Cavalry on the left, fustained by the Aufidus, to oppose the Roman Horse; and upon the same Line, half his heavy-armed African Infantry: then the Spanish and Gallick Infantry, which properly formed the Centre; on their right the other half of the African Infantry; and lastly the Numidian Horse, who composed the right Wing. The light-armed Troops were in the Front, facing those of the Romans. Asdrubal had the left, Hanno the right; Hannabal, having his Brother with him, referved the Command of the Centre to himself. The African Troops might have been taken for a Body of Romans, so much did they resemble them by their Arms, which they had gained in the Battles of Trebia and Thrasymenus, and which they now employed against those who had fuffered them to be taken from them. The Spaniards and Gauls had Shields of the same Form; but their Swords were very different. Those of the former were equally proper for cutting and thrufting, whereas those of the Gauls cut only with the Edge, and at a certain Distance. The Soldiers of those two Nations, especially the Gauls, had a dreadful aspect, in confequence of their extraordinary Stature. The latter were naked from their Belts upwards. The Spaniards wore linen Habits, the extreme whiteness of which, exalted by a border of a purple colour, made a furprifingly splendid Appearance.

his Advantages as a great Captain, forgot nothing that could conduce to the Victory. A Wind peculiar to that Region, called in the Country Vulturnus, blew always at a certain Period. He took care to draw up in fuch a manner, that his Army, facing the North, had it in their Backs, and the Enemy fronting the South, had it in their Faces; fo that he was not in the least incommoded with it, whereas the Romans, whose Eyes it filled with Dust, scarce saw before them. From hence we may judge how far Hannibal carried his Attention, which nothing seems to escape.

XX. THE two Armies marched against each other, and began the Charge. After that of the light-armed Soldiers on both fides, which was only a Prelude, the Action began by the two Wings of the Cavalry on the fide of the Aufidus. Hannibal's left Wing, which was an old Corps, to whose Valour he was principally indebted for his Successes, attacked that of the Romans with fo much Force and Violence, that they had never experienced the like. This Charge was not made in the usual manner of Attacks of Cavalry, by fometimes falling back, and fometimes returning to the Affault; but in fighting man to man, and very near, because they had not room enough to extend themfelves, being pent up on one fide by the River, and on the other by the Infantry. The Shock was furious, and equally fustained on both fides :

CHAP fides; and whilst it was still doubtful to which fide the Victory would incline, the Roman Horse, according to a Custom usual enough in their Corps, and which was sometimes successful, but was now very ill applied, dismounted and fought on Foot. When Hannibal was informed of this, he cried out: I am as well pleased with them in that Posture, as I should be to have them all delivered up to me to be bound hand and foot. Accordingly, after having defended themselves with the utmost Valour, most of them sell upon the Spot. Assured and made a great slaughter of them.

XXIV. WHILST the Horse were thus engaged, the Infantry of both Armies advanced also against each other. The Battle began at first in the Centre. As soon as Hannibal perceived that his left Wing began to have the advantage, he made the Gauls and Spaniards move that were in the main Body, and whom he commanded in Person. In proportion as he advanced, he rounded his front in form of a Half-moon, with its convex fide towards the Enemy. At first, the opposite Centre of the Romans charged them. After some refistance the Spaniards and Gauls began to give way, and to lose ground. The rest of the Roman Infantry also moved on in order to take them in flank. They fell back according to the Orders they had received, continuing to fight, and regained the ground where they had

had at first been drawn up in Battle. The CHAP. Romans, feeing that the Spaniards and Gauls continued to retreat, continued also to pursue them. Hannibal, well pleased to see every thing succeed according to his Defign, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his Forces, gave orders, that his Africans should wheel to the right and left upon the Romans. Those two Bodies, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, having wheeled about fuddenly towards the space or hollow, into which the Romans had thrown themselves in disorder and confusion, charged them on both fides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themselves.

XXV. In the mean time the Numidian Cavalry on the right Wing, was engaged also with the Enemy opposite to them, namely the Cavalry of the Allies of the Romans. Tho' they did not distinguish themselves in this Battle, and the advantage was equal on both fides, they were however very useful: for they found the Enemies which they had in their front sufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to affift their own People. But when the left Wing where Afdrubal commanded had routed, as we have faid, the whole Horse of the right Wing of the Romans, and had joined the Numidians, the Cavalry of the Allies did not wait to be attacked by them, but fled with the utmost VOL. I. precipi

CHAP precipitation. It is faid, that Astrobal then VII. did a thing, which no less shews his Prudence, than it contributed to the success of the Battle. As the Numidians were very numerous, and never did their Duty better than when an Enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the Romans to prevent their rallying, and led on the Spanish and Gallick Horse to the Charge, to support the African Infantry. Accordingly he fell upon the Roman Foot in the Rear, which being attacked at the same time in the Flanks, and surrounded on all sides, was intirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies of Valour.

XXVI. THE Battle of Zama, between Hannibal and Scipio, is one of the most memorable recorded in History; the disposition on both fides being the masterpiece of two of the greatest Generals that ever the World produced. Scipio drew up his Troops in the following manner. He posted the Hastati in the front Line, leaving intervals between the Cohorts. In the second Line he placed the Principes, with their Cohorts not behind the spaces of the first Line, as was the custom of the Romans, but behind the Cohorts of that front Line, in order to leave openings for the Elephants of the Enemy which were very numerous. The Triarii formed the third Line in the same order, and served as a Body of referve. He placed Lalius on the left Wing with the Italian Cavalry, and Mafinisa

on

on the right with his Numidians. In the CHAP. spaces of the first Line he placed the lightarmed Soldiers, and ordered them to begin the Battle in fuch a manner, that if they could not fustain the Charge of the Elephants, they should retire; such of them as were most fpeedy, behind the whole Army, thro' the spaces that divided it in right Lines; and those who should find themselves too much pressed, thro' the spaces between the Lines on the right and left, in order to leave those Animals a passage, in which they would be exposed to the Darts discharged upon them on all sides. As to Hannibal, in order to give the Enemy more Terror, he placed in the front his fourscore Elephants, a number which he never had before in any Battle. In the first Line he posted the auxiliary Troops of the Ligurians and Gauls, with the Baleareans and Moors, who amounted in all to twelve thoufand Men. The fecond Line, in which the principal force of the Army confifted, was composed of Africans and Carthaginians. He posted the Troops he had brought with him from Italy in the third Line, and placed them above a stadium from the second Line. The Numidian Cavalry were upon the left Wing, and the Carthaginian upon the right.

XXVII. EVERY thing being ready for the Battle, and the Numidian Cavalry on both fides having long skirmished, Hannibal gave orders for the Elephants to move against the

P 2

Enemy.

CHAP. Enmey. The Romans immediately made the Trumpets found, and at the same time raised fuch great Cries, that the Elephants which advanced against the right of the Romans, turned back, and put the Moors and Numidians that formed Hannibal's left into Disorder. Masinissa seeing their Confusion, easily put them intirely to the Rout. The rest of the Elephants advanced between the two Armies into the Plain, and fell upon the light-armed Romans, a great number of whom they crushed to Death, notwithstanding the continual shower of Darts discharged upon them from all fides. At length being terrified, some of them ran thro' the spaces Scipio had prudently left, and others in their flight returned upon their own right Wing, purfued by the Roman Horse, who with their Spears drove them quite out of the Field of Battle. Lælius took this instant for charging the Carthaginian Cavalry, who turned about and fled full speed. He pursued them warmly, whilst Masinissa did the fame on his Side.

> XXVIII. THE Army of the Carthaginians was uncovered on the right and left by its Cavalry. The Infantry then on both fides advanced flowly and in good order, except that which Hannibal had brought from Italy, which formed the third Line, and continued in its first Post. When they were near each other, the Romans raising great Cries according to their Custom, and striking their Swords upon

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upon their Shields, charged the Enemy with CHAP. vigour. On the fide of the Carthaginians, VII. the Body of foreign Troops that formed the front Line, also raised great Cries, but confused, and dissonant from each other, because they were of different Nations. As they could use neither Swords nor Javelins, but fought hand to hand, the Strangers at first had fome advantage over the Romans by their agility and boldness, and wounded a great number. However, the latter having the fuperiority by their good Order, and the nature of their Arms, gained ground, supported by the fecond Line who followed, and inceffantly encouraged them to fight with Valour; whereas the Strangers being neither followed nor affisted by the Carthaginians, whose inaction on the contrary intimidated them, loft courage, gave way, and believing themselves openly abandoned by their own Troops, fell, in retiring, upon their fecond Line, and attacked it in order to open themselves a passage. The latter found themselves obliged to defend their Lives courageously: so that the Carthaginians attacked by the Strangers, contrary to their Expectation, faw they had two Enemies to fight, their own Troops, and the Romans. Quite out of their Senses, and in a manner transported with fury, they made a great flaughter of both, and put the Hastati into disorder. Those who commanded the Principes having made their Troops advance, rallied them without difficulty. The greatest

part

CHAP part of the Strangers and Carthaginians fell in this Place, partly cut in pieces by one another, and partly by the Romans. Hannibal would not fuffer those that fled to mingle with those who remained, lest full of Terror as they were, and covered with Wounds, they might induce Disorder among those who had received no Blow hitherto: he even ordered the front Rank to present their Pikes, which obliged them to retire along the Wings into the Plain.

XXIX. THE Space between the two Armies being then covered with Blood, and with the dead, Scipio was in Perplexity enough; for he did not know how to make his Troops move in good Order, over that confused heap of Arms and dead Bodies, still bleeding and lying upon each other. He ordered the wounded Men to be carried behind the Army; the Retreat to be founded for the Hastati, who were pursuing the Enemy; posted them opposite to the Centre of the Carthaginians in expectation of a new Charge; and made the Principes and Triarii advance on both Wings. When they were upon the same front with the Hastati, a new Battle began between the two Armies. The Infantry alternately gave way, and returned to the Charge with great Courage and Vigour. As Number, Resolution, and Arms were equal on both fides, and they fought with fuch obstinacy that they fell in their Posts rather than give way, the fate of the Battle

was long doubtful, and it could not be con-CHAP. jectured which fide would remain mafters, of the Field. Things being in this state, Lalius and Masinissa, after having pursued the Enemy's Cavalry a confiderable time, returned very opportunely for attacking the Infantry in the rear. This last Charge decided the Victory. A great number of the Carthaginians were killed upon the field of Battle, where they were furrounded on all fides. Many of them having dispersed in the Plains round about, were cut off by the Roman Cavalry that occupied all the Country. The Carthaginians left above twenty thousand dead upon the spot, as well of their own Citizens as Allies. Almost as many were taken, with an hundred and thirty Enfigns and Standards, and eleven Elephants. Hannibal escaped with a small number of Horse to Adrumetum, after having tried, both before and during the Battle, all possible means for obtaining the Victory. The Romans loft only fifteen hundred Men.

XXX. Having thus given an Account of some of the most memorable Battles of Antiquity, explained the Conduct of the Generals. and laid open the Reasons of that Conduct; I shall conclude this Chapter with a few general Remarks, tending still farther to illustrate this great Branch of War, and which in some measure offer themselves in consequence of what has been already faid. The first is, that tho' most Nations had a certain fixed and par-

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ticular

CHAP ticular form of giving Battle, yet they never VII adhered to it so closely, as not to vary when Circumstances required it. The drawing up an Army to the very best advantage, is doubtless a great furtherance to the gaining of the Victory. But the doing so depends much, not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General, the Nature of the Ground, and the Quality of his own Forces, but also on those of his Enemies, and on the Disposition of him who commands them. Hence the greatest Captains of older times, whose military Knowledge and Practice the Moderns so justly value, always acted herein according to their own Judgment, without confining themselves to any standing Rules. We have seen that Cyrus being to fight against Crassus in a large Plain, where he found the Enemy taking measures to furround him, drew up his Men but twelve deep in File, whereas formerly the File was twenty-four deep. By this means he augmented the front of his Army double, prevented his being two much over-winged by Crafus, and won the Victory. It is observable too of Scipio at the Battle of Zama, that he placed the Battalions of his feveral Lines directly behind one another, and not facing the Intervals of the Lines before them, as was the common Custom. His Design in this was, to give free iffue to the Elephants, whose Shock might otherwise have disordered his Men, and render'd them incapable of making any refistance. Cafar, a Battle keeps to

quite altered the manner of the Roman Imbattelling. For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbered him in Horse, he covered one of his Flanks with a little River, and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank; among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of this best Infantry, and there began the Battle. By this means, having all his Horse in one Wing, and those accompanied with select legionary Foot, he soon routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his, and then falling into the flanks and rear of his Enemy, gained the Victory.

XXXI. THE drawing up the Army in feveral Lines, as the nature of the Ground, and the number of the Forces would allow, is what was most peculiar to the Roman Difcipline, and has been found fo confonant to Reason and Experience, that it is established as a standing Maxim of War at this Day. In effect these Lines are so many Armies: and the fecond Line being intire, tho' the first should be broken, often recovers the Day; especially if the second Line be at so just a distance from the first, as not to be disordered by it when overthrown; and also so near, that fome Battalions of the fecond Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginnings of a breach in the first, without too much discomposing itself. It has likewise been often observed, that whoever in a Battle keeps together CHAP gether a Body of Men, that are not led to fight until all the Enemy's Squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry away the Victory; and that he who has the last Reserves, is the likeliest in the end to have the Honour of the Day. One fignal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance. At the Battle of Dreux in France, where the Constable Montmorency, and Francis Duke of Guise, the greatest Captains of that Age, commanded the Royalists; and Lewis Prince of Condé, and the Admiral Chatillon the Protestants; the two last defeated all the Forces they faw, took the Constable Prisoner, past over the Bellies of the Switzers, who made almost a miraculous refiftance, and concluded they had therefore won the Victory. In the mean while the Duke of Guife, who led the left Wing of the French King's Army, either by defign, as his Enemies faid, or as an Act of high Conduct, fo covered his Troops with the Village of Blainville, and the Trees and Shrubs about it, that he was not so much as feen by the Protestants; nor moved from thence, until the Constable was taken Prisoner, the Marshal de St. André killed, and all those Forces which were confidered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists, intirely routed, and so confusedly flying, that he was in no danger of having his Squadrons difordered by the Runaways of his own Party. But then, advancing with his Troops which were intire, he foon s of beloomos yllasto et vante na d turned

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. CEXX

of Condé Prisoner, and overthrew all that opposed him. For 'tis a tedious and difficult, if not an impossible Task, to put into good Order again an Army that has newly fought, so as to bring it suddenly to renew the Charge; some being busied about the Pillage and Prisoners they had taken, or are pursuing; others being loth to return to new Dangers; and all in effect being so heated and disordered, that they do not, or will not hear the Commands of their Superiors.

XXXII. ONE thing among the Romans particularly deferves our Notice, and that is, that tho' they strove with incredible Emulation to obtain the first Posts in the Army, yet that Ambition once gratified, they did not difdain to accept of inferior Offices after the higher, and to ferve under those over whom they had commanded. It is amazing to confider what amultitude of consular Senators fell in the Battle of Cannæ. We have feen that Fabius, who had been thrice Conful, and Dictator, ferved as Lieutenant under his own Son: and that the great Scipio accepted the same Character from his Brother. Nor are these to be considered as Instances singular in their kind, for it was in reality the common Practice. Hence it was always in the power of a Roman General, to have expert, vigilant, and valiant Commanders, at the head of those several larger Divisions, of which an Army is usually composed in a Day

CHAP Day of Battle: Men of Judgment, Authority, VII. and Presence of Mind, to remedy all Disorders, and to improve all Advantages in the critical Moment; than which there is nothing of greater importance in general Engagements, as the least Delay or Remissiness is but too often irreparable. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the most able and consummate General, neither is nor can be of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders, and lay hold of all Advantages in an instant, when Armies are once engaged. The utmost he can do is, to choose well the Field of Battle, to draw up his Army according thereto to most advantage, to give his general Orders with Prudence and Forefight, and to give the best Orders whereever he is in person: but he cannot be every where, nor fend his Orders timely enough to every Place to have them fuccessfully obeyed. And therefore 'tis indifputably necessary, that he have under him expert chief Officers, at the head of all the great Divisions of the Army, who may supply what is impossible for him fingly to command. For he can be well obeyed but to the time he fends his Troops to the Charge: after that, those only who lead them, and are with them, can actuate them according to the general Orders, or as the Occafionrequires; which those under him must have the Judgment to lay hold of as it were in the twinkling of an Eye, fo short are the Moments to acquire the Victory land and an .IIIXXX Landing to tothe celebrated for his

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Men of Judgment, Authority.

XXXIII. THE placing the best Men in the VII. Wings of an Army, is very ancient, and feldom has been omitted, but to the loss of those who were guilty of fuch Omission. The Reason is, that the Troops on the Wings are not wedged in, as the Troops in the main Battle are; but are at liberty to take all Advantages, which Accident, the good Conduct of the Commander in chief, or the ill Conduct of the Enemy, throw in their way: nor can a General fo much as rationally hope to fall into the flank and rear of his Enemy, but by attacking one of his Wings; because he cannot overwing him, but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks. Hence an able Commander chooses always to begin the Battle on that fide, where he judges himself the strongest, and his Enemy the weakest; advancing with those Troops as expeditiously as he can, whilft the rest of the Army moves as flowly as they may. For if his first Impression be successful, he may fall into the flank and part of the rear of the Enemy, while the refidue of the whole Army is marching to attack them in front: but then the motion of the Army must be quicker, as soon as ever they fee that the advanced Wing is successful.

Such was the Conduct of Epaminondas, at the famous Battles of Leutra and Mantinea. Such too was the Method followed by Julius Cafar, when he fought against Ariovistus and the Germans. Hannibal, so justly celebrated for his

Skill

VII. Battle of Cannæ, placed, as we have feen, all his best Men in his two Wings, and his worst Men in the Centre; whereby, when the Romans came to the Charge, who had placed their choicest Men in their main Battle, they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibal's Army, which was the very thing he designed they should do: for then with his two Wings, in which were the slower of all his Troops, he immediately wheeled upon the Romans, and totally deseated them.

XXXIV. AFTER the Battle was fought, and the Victory apparently won, the great Danger was, as it still is, to purfue with too much Ardor, without regard to what passed in the rest of the Army. Hence that Custom so inviolably observed among the Romans, of never fuffering the Legions to follow the Chace, or break their Ranks upon any Occasion whatever. Only the Horse, the light-armed Men, and what Soldiers were not of the Legions, were fent upon this Service; and the Pursuit was conducted with fo much Caution, that a certain number of Squadrons always followed in good Order, ready to fall upon and break the Enemy anew, should they rally and face about. How many Victories feemingly won, have in an instant been lost, for want of care in these two Particulars of such high Concernment, which therefore ought never to be omitted. It is certain that nothing more encourages

courages flying Enemies to rally, and fight CHAP. again, than the feeing a diforderly Pursuit of them. For in such a Pursuit, all the Advantages of the prevailing Party immediately vanish, if the Chaced do but turn about; fuch an Evidence of restored Valour, too often daunting those who are to oppose it: nor can any thing more deter the flying Party from fuch a Step, than to fee feveral Bodies in good Order following close behind them, and ready to make them repent of their Confidence, should they venture upon any farther Oppofition. And tho' brave Officers will not ceafe preffing, promifing, and even threatening their Men that fly, to face about; yet the private Soldier, who fees those Bodies ready to fall on, concludes it is fafer to run than to refift, and therefore is too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that nature: for where once Terror has feized the Minds of the Troops, they hear no Counsels but those which their own Fears suggest.

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Of the Attack and Defence of Places.

WHAT we have to offer upon this Subject falls naturally under three general Heads. First, The manner of fortifying Towns in use among the Ancients. Secondly, The Machines of War employed by them in Sieges. Thirdly, The Nature and Conduct of an Attack and Defence. As to the first, how far soever we look back into Antiquity, we find amongst the Greeks and Romans, Cities fortified in a regular manner, with their Fosses, Curtains and Towers. Vitruvius, in treating of the Construction of Places of War in his time, fays, that the Towers ought to project beyond the Walls, in order that when the Enemy approaches, the Defenders upon the right and left may take them in flank: that they ought to be round, and faced with many Stones, because such as are square, are foon beat bown by the Machines of War and battering Rams, which eafily break their Angles: and that near the Towers the Wall should be cut within-fide the breadth of the Towers. and the ways broke in this manner only be joined and continued by Beams laid upon the

two Extremities, without being made fast CHAP. with Iron, that in case the Enemy should make VIII. himself master of any part of the Wall, the Besieged might remove this wooden Bridge, and thereby prevent his passage to the other parts of the Wall, and into the Towers. The best Towns of the Ancients were situated upon Eminences. They inclosed them fometimes within two or three Walls and Ditches. Berosus, cited by Josephus, informs us that Nebuchadnezzar fortified Babylon with a triple Inclosure of Brick Walls, of a surprising strength and height. Polybius, speaking of Syringa, the Capital of Hyrcania, which Antiochus besieged, fays, that City was furrounded with three Ditches, each forty-five Foot broad, and twenty-two deep. Upon each fide of these was a double Intrenchment, and behind all a strong Wall. The City of Jerusalem, says Josephus, was surrounded by a triple Wall, except on the fide of the Valleys, where there was but one, because they were inaccessible. To these they had added many other Works, one of which, continues the Historian, had it been compleated, would have rendered the City impregnable. The Stones of which it was built, were thirty Foot long by fifteen broad, which made it so strong, that it was in a manner impossible to sap, or shake it with Machines. The whole was flanked with Towers from Space to Space of extraordinary folidity, and built with wonderful Art. Vol. I. II. THE

CHAP.

II. THE Ancients did not generally support their Walls on the infide with Earth, in the manner of the Talus or Slope, which made the Attacks more dangerous. For tho' the Enemy had gained fome footing upon them, he could not affure himself of taking the City. It was necessary to get down, and to make use of the Ladder by which he had mounted; and that descent exposed the Soldier to very great danger. Vitruvius however observes, that there is nothing renders a Rampart fo strong, as when the Walls both of the Curtain and Towers are supported by Earth. For then neither Rams, Mines, nor any other Machines can shake them. The Places of War of the Ancients were not always fortified with Stone Walls. They were fometimes inclosed within good Ramparts of Earth, of great firmness and folidity. manner of coating them with Turf was not unknown to them, nor the Art of supporting the Earth with strong Fascines, made fast by Stakes, and of arming the top of the Rampart with a Ruff or Fraise of Palisades, and the foot of the Parapet, or Pas de Souris, with They often planted Palisades also in the Ditch, to defend themselves against sudden Attacks. They made Walls also with Beams croffed over one another, with spaces between them in manner of a Chequer, the void parts of which they filled up with Earth and Stones. Such almost were the Walls of the City of Bourges, which

which Cafar, in the seventh Book of his Wars CHAP. with the Gauls, describes as follows. Walls of Bourges, and almost those of the Country, were made of pieces of Wood forty Foot in length, laid along the Earth at the distance of two Foot from each other, and croffed over by others of equal length and at equal distance, with their ends to the front of the Wall. The spaces on the inside were filled up with Earth and Fascines, and on the outfide with folid Stones. He adds, that the Work by this disposition was agreeable to the Eye, and very strong; because the Wood was of great force against the Ram, and the Stones against Fire: besides which, the thickness of the Wall, which was generally forty Foot, or the length of the Beams, made it next to impossible either to make a breach in it, or throw it down in any manner.

III. What I shall say in the sequel, when I come to explain the manner of attacking and defending Places, will shew more distinctly what kind of Fortifications those of the Ancients were. It is pretended that the Moderns excel them very much in this point. But as the method of Attack and Defence is intirely different, no just Comparison can be made. The use of Muskets, Bombs, Cannons, and other Fire-arms since the invention of Gunpowder, has occasioned many alterations in the way of conducting Sieges, the duration of which has been very much abridged of late.

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CHAP. But these Changes are not so considerable as many imagine, and have added nothing either to the Merit or Capacity of Generals. The Moderns have imagined nothing that the Ancients could use, and have not used. We have borrowed from them the breadth and depth of Fosses, the thickness of Walls, the Towers to flank the Curtains, the Palisades, the Intrenchments within the Ramparts and Towers, the advantage of many Flanks, in multiplying of which confifts the chief Improvement of modern Fortification, and which Fire-arms make the more easy to execute. These are the Remarks of Men of Ability and Judgment, who to a profound knowledge of the manner in which the Ancients made War, unite a perfect Experience of the modern Practice of it.

> IV. Bur let us now proceed to the Machines made use of by the Ancients in their Sieges. The principal of these were, the Tortoise, the Catapulta, the Balista, the Ram, and moving Towers. The Tortoise was a Machine composed of very strong and solid timber-work. The height of it, to the uppermost Beam, which sustained the Roof, was twelve Foot. The Base was square, and each of its fronts twenty-five Foot. It was covered with a kind of quilted Mattress made of raw Hides, and prepared with different Drugs, to prevent its being fet on fire by Combustibles. This heavy Machine Machine

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Machine was supported upon four wheels, and CHAP. had the name of Tortoise from its serving as a VIII. very strong covering and defence, against the enormous weight thrown down on it; those under it being fafe in the fame manner as a Tortoise under her Shell. It was used both to fill up the Ditch, and for fapping. For the filling up of the Ditch, it was necessary to join several of them together in a Line, and very near one another. Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the Siege of Halicarnassus by Alexander the Great, says, that he first caused three Tortoises to approach, in order to fill up the Ditch; and that afterwards he planted his Rams upon the space filled up, to batter the Wall. This Machine is often mentioned by Authors. There were, without doubt, Tortoises of different forms and fizes. Some indeed are of opinion, that because of its enormous weight, it could not be moved from place to place on Wheels, but was pushed forwards on Rollers. Under these Rollers the way was laid with strong Planks, to faciliate its motion, and prevent its finking into the Ground, from whence it would have been very difficult to have removed it. The Ancients have observed, that the Roof had a thicker covering of Hides, Hurdles, Sea-weed, Sc. than the Sides, as it was exposed to much greater Shocks from the weight thrown upon it by the Besieged. It had a Door in front, which was drawn up by a Chain as far as was necessary, and covered the Soldiers at work in filling up the Ditch.

V. THE

CHAP. V. THE Musculus, tho' very little understood by modern Authors, who have reprefented it variously, was undoubtedly a kind of Tortoife, very low, and with a sharp Roof. Such was that of Cafar at the Siege of Marfeilles. It was fixty Foot in Length, and was moved forward to the Walls upon Rollers, where it was fixed over the part of the Ditch filled up. The Tower of Brick which he built there, communicated with this Musculus and the Trenches. Cafar fays the Planks of the Roof were covered with Bricks and Mortar, over which Hides were laid, to prevent the Mortar from diffolving by the Water which the Befieged might pour down upon it: and to fecure it from Stones and Fire, it was again covered over with thick quilted Mattreffes properly prepared. All this was done under Mantles, after which it was thrust forward on a sudden from the Tower to the Walls. Besides this, there was another kind of Musculus, that was used for levelling the Ground, and laying the Planks on which the Tortoifes and moving Towers were to advance to the Ditch. They were like this, of greater length than breadth, and equal in breadth to the way they were to There were feveral other Machines intended to cover the Soldiers, called Crates, Plutei, Vinea, which I shall not undertake to describe here, to avoid Prolixity. They may be comprised in general under the Name of Mantles, or Sheds.

VI. THE

VI. THE Catapulta and Balista were intend-CHAP. ed for discharging Darts, Arrows, and Stones. VIII. They were of different fizes, and confequently produced more or less effect. Some were used in Battles, and might be called Fieldpieces: others were employed in Sieges, which was the use most commonly made of them. The Balista must have been the heaviest and most difficult to carry, because there was always a greater number of Catapultæ in the Armies. Livy, in his Description of the Siege of Carthage, fays, that there were an hundred and twenty great, and more than two hundred small Catapultæ taken, with thirty-three great Balista, and fifty-two small ones. Fosephus mentions the same difference amongst the Romans, who had three hundred Catapulta, and forty Balista, at the Siege of Jerusalem. These Machines had a force which it is not easy to comprehend, but which all good Authors attest. Vegetius fays, that the Baliftæ discharged Darts with fo much rapidity and violence, that nothing could refift their Force. Atheneus tells us, that Agefistratus made one of little more than two Foot in length, which shot Darts almost five hundred Paces. These Machines were not unlike our Cross-bows. There were others of much greater force, which threw Stones of three hundred weight, upwards of an hundred and twenty-five Paces. We find surprising effects of them in Josephus. The Darts of the Catapulta, he tells us, destroyed 94

from the Balistæ beat down the Battlements, and broke the Angles of the Towers; nor was there any Phalanx so deep, but one of these Stones would sweep a whole File of it from one end to the other. Folard, in his Commentary upon Polybius, says their Force was very near equal to that of Artillery.

VII. THE Ram was composed of a large long Beam, armed at one end with Iron in the form of a Ram's Head, and of the same bigness with the Beam. This piece of Wood was fuspended by Chains in aquilibrio, in order to be fet in motion with the greater ease. An hundred Men, more or less, worked it by main Strength, to strike it against a Wall or Rampart, in order to beat them down after having shaken them by repeated Blows. Care was taken to clothe this Beam with wet Leather, to prevent its being fet on fire. It was flung under a kind of moving Tortoise or Gallery, which covered more than half of it, in order to shelter those who worked the Ram from the Stones and Darts of the Besieged. The effects of this Machine were prodigious. As it was one of those that did most hurt, many Methods were contrived to render it useless. Fire was darted upon the Roof that covered, and the Timber that supported it, in order to burn them with the Ram. To deaden its Blows, Sacks of Wool were let down against the Place at which it was levelled. A Machine

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was also made use of against it, called the Wolf, CHAP. by way of opposition to the Ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple it, in order to draw it to themselves, or break it. Josephus relates a surprising action of a Jew, who, at the Siege of Jotophat, threw a Stone of an uncommon fize upon the Head of the Ram with fuch Violence, that he loofened it from the the Beam, and made it fall down. He leaped afterwards from the top of the Wall to the bottom, took the Head from the midst of the Enemy, and carried it back with him. He received five Arrows in his Body; and notwithstanding those Wounds, boldly kept his Post till through loss of Blood and Strength, he fell from the Wall, and the Ram's Head with him, with which he would never part.

VIII. THE moving Towers were made of an affemblage of Beams and strong Planks, not unlike a House. To secure them against the Fires thrown by the Besieged, they were covered with raw Hides, or with pieces of Cloth made of Hair. Their height was in proportion to their Base. They were sometimes thirty Foot square, and sometimes forty or fifty. They were higher than the Walls or even Towers of the City. They were supported upon several Wheels according to to mechanic Principles, by the means of which the Machine was easily made to move, how great soever it might be. The Town was in great danger if this Tower could approach the Walls:

CHAP. Walls: for it had Stairs from one Story to anther, and included different methods of attack. At bottom it had a Ram to batter the Wall, and on the middle Story a Draw-bridge, made of two Beams with Rails of Basket-work, which let down eafily upon the Wall of the Cty, when within reach of it. The Besiegers passed upon this Bridge to make themselves masters of the Wall. Upon the higher Stories were Soldiers armed with Partizans, and miffive weapons, who kept a perpetual discharge upon the Works. When Affairs were in this posture, a Place seldom held out long; for what could those hope who had nothing to confide in but the height of their Ramparts, when they faw others fuddenly appear which commanded them? The People of Namur demanded to capitulate, when Cafar's Tower, of which they had made a Jest whilst at a diffance, was feen to move towards them They believed this a Prodigy, fays very fast. Cafar, and were aftonished that Men of our fize should think of carrying so vast and heavy a Machine to their Walls. Their Deputies observed, that the Romans were doubtless affished by the Gods in their Wars, fince they could make Machines of fo enormous a fize advance fo fwiftly. It is indeed no wonder they were furprifed, as they had neither feen nor heard of any fuch thing before, and as this Tower feemed to advance by Inchantment and of itself, the mechanic Powers that moved it being imperceptible to those of the Place.

Place. These Towers were sometimes fur-CHAP. rounded with Corridors or Galleries at each Story, to prevent their being fet on fire: and indeed nothing better could have been invented for this purpose, as the Galleries were filled with Troops armed with missive Weapons, who made their discharges from behind the Parapets, if we may fo term them, and were always ready to pull out the Darts of Fire, and extinguish all other Combustibles thrown against the Tower; so that it was impossible for the Fire to make the least progress, the Remedy being always at hand. These Corridors were built upon Beams that projected five or fix Foot beyond the Tower, several of which kind are still to be feen upon Trajan's Column.

IX. HAVING thus described the principal Machines made use of by the Ancients in Sieges, I now proceed to the Attack and Defence of Places, which I shall treat in as brief a manner as possible, confining myself to the most essential Parts. When Cities were extremely strong and populous, they were furrounded with an Intrenchment on the side next the Town, and another on that towards the Country. These were called Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation. The Besiegers pitched their Camp between these two Lines. Those of Contravallation were against the besieged City, the others against Attempts from without. When it was foreseen

CHAP-feen that the Siege would be of long duration; it was often changed into a Blockade, and then the two Lines in question were folid Walls of strong Masonry, flanked with Towers at proper distances. There is a remarkable Example of this at the Siege of Plata by the Lacedamonians and Thebans, of which Thucydides has left us a very particular Account. The two furrounding Lines were composed of two Walls fixteen Foot distant, and the Soldiers lay in that Space, which was divided into Quarters; so that it might have been taken for only one Wall with high Towers from distance to distance. These Towers occupied the whole Interval, in order to enable the Befiegers to defend themselves at the same time against those within and those without. The Quarters of the Soldiers could not be gone round without croffing the Towers, and the top of the Wall was skirted with a Parapet of Ofier. There was a Ditch on each fide, the Earth of which had been used to make Bricks for the Wall. In this manner Thucydides describes these two surrounding Walls, which were of no great circumference, the City being very small. This Siege, or rather Blockade, was very famous among the Ancients, and the more on account of the furpriling escape of the Garrison, notwithstanding all these Fortifications. For this purpose they applied Ladders to the inward Wall. After they had got upon the Platform, and feized the two adjoining Towers, they drew other fide of the outward Wall, by which they descended to the bottom, drawing up in Line of Battle as fast as they came down. In this manner by the favour of a dark Night, they got safe to Athens.

X. THE Camp of the Roman Army before Numantia, took up a much greater extent of That City was four and twenty Stadia in circumference, that is to fay, a League. Scipio, when he invested it, caused a Line of Circumvallation to be drawn, which inclosed more than twice the Ground the City stood upon. When this Work was finished, another Line was thrown up against the Befieged, at a reasonable distance from the first, composed of a Rampart of eight Foot thick by ten high, which was strengthened with strong Palisades. The whole was flanked with Towers of an hundred Foot from each other. It is not easy to comprehend in what manner the Romans compleated these immense Works; a Line of Circumvallation of more than two Leagues in compass! but nothing is more certain than the Fact. He also erected four Posts upon the Banks of the River Duæra, contiguous to the Lines; and contrived a Stoccado or Chain of floating Beams, pierced through crofs-wife with long Stakes pointed with Iron, to prevent Barks from entering, and Divers from getting any Intelligence of what was doing in the Camp. XI.

XI. CÆSAR'S Circumvallation before Alefia, VIII. was formed of Fascines instead of Turf, with its Parapet and Fraise made of large Stakes, whose Branches were cut in points, and burnt at the ends, like Stags Horns. They feemed like Wings at the foot of the Parapet, or like the Oars of a Galley inclining downwards. Of the same nature are the Fraises of the Moderns, that are far from being fo well imagined, and are smooth-pointed Palisades, bending downwards to prevent scaling. The Moderns fix them in the fame manner at the bottom of the Parapet, where they form a kind of Cincture very agreeable to the Eye. The Battlements mentioned by Cæfar were like the modern Embrazures for Cannon. Here the Archers were placed. Upon the Parapet of the Towers, field Balistas were planted to flank the Works. Towers were not always of Wood, but sometimes of Earth covered with Turf, or strengthened with Fascines. They were much higher than the rest of the Intrenchment, and sometimes had Towers of Wood raifed upon them for battering the Places that commanded the Camp. Authors have believed, that these Intrenchments and Works of the Ancients in the Field. were perpendicular: but that Opinion is very abfurd. These had a Platform with its Talus

or Slope, and fometimes Banquettes, in the form of Steps for ascending; besides which, at the Towers, there were Ways made to go

up. All this was indispensibly necessary in CHAP. Casar's Lines, as they were very high, to prevent the Earth from falling away.

XII. Thus much for the two Lines of Circumvallation. We proceed now to the Ground inclosed between the two Fosses, which is far the most curious part of this celebrated Blockade, and will be best explained in Cæsar's own Words. " As the Soldiers " were employed at the same time to fetch "Wood and Provisions from a confiderable " distance, and to work at the Fortifications, " and the Enemy often fallied at feveral Gates. " to interrupt them; Cæsar found it necessary " to make some addition to his Lines, that "they might not require fo many Men to " guard them. He therefore took Trees of " no great height, or large Branches, which " he caused to be made sharp at the ends, " and running a Trench of five Foot deep " before the Lines, he ordered them to be " put into it, and made fast at bottom, so that " they could not be pulled up. This Trench " was again filled up in fuch a manner that " nothing but the tops of the Branches ap-" peared, of which the points must have run " into those who should have endeavoured to " pass them. As there were five Rows of " them interwoven in a manner with each " other, they were unavoidable. In the front " of these he caused Pits of three Foot deep " to be dug, in the form of the Quincunx. VIII. "and sharpened at the top, which rose only four Inches above the level of the Ground, into which they were planted three Foot deeper than the Pits, for the sake of sirmines. The Pits were covered over with Bushes to deceive the Enemy. There were eight Rows of them, at the distance of three Foot from each other. In the front of all he sowed the whole space between the Pits and the advanced Ditch, with Crows Feet of an extraordinary size, which the Soldiers called Spurs." The other Line, to prevent Succours from without, was intirely the same with this.

XIII. Tho' Trenches, oblique Lines, Mines, and other the like Inventions, feem neither often nor clearly expressed in Authors, we can hardly suppose with reason, that they were not in use amongst the Greeks and Romans. Is it probable, that with the Ancients, whose Generals, among their other excellent Qualities, had in an eminent degree that of taking great care to spare the Blood and Lives of their Soldiers, Approaches were made in befieging without any precautions against the Machines of the Befieged, whose Ramparts were so well provided, and Defence so bloody? Tho' there were no mention of this in any of the Historians, who might possibly in the Description of Sieges omit this Circumstance, as well

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known to all the World; we should not con-CHAP. clude that fuch able Generals either did not VIII. know, or neglected things, on the one fide fo important, and on the other fo eafy; and which must naturally have entered the thoughts of every Man, ever so little versed in attacking Places. But several Historians fpeak of them; of which one shall suffice for all the rest: this is Polybius, where he relates the Siege of the City Echinna by Philip. He concludes the Description of it with these Words: " To cover from the Arrows of the "Befieged, as well those that went from the " Camp to the Works, as those who returned " from the Works to the Camp, Trenches " were drawn from the Camp to the Tor-" toises, and those Trenches covered at top." Long before Philip, Demetrius Poliocertes had used the same method at the Siege of Rhodes. Diodorus Siculus tells us, that famous Warrior caused Tortoises, and Galleries cut in the Earth, or covered Mines, to be made, for communication with the Batteries of Rams; and ordered a Trench with Blinds over head, to cover and secure the Troops, in going and coming from the Towers and Tortoifes. The Seamen and Marines were appointed for this Service: the Work was four Stadia in length, that is to fay, five hundred Paces.

XIV. But the their Approaches were not intirely like these of the Moderns, nor so deep in the Earth, the Fire from our Works being of a quite different nature from that of the Vol. I.

CHAP. Catapultæ and Balistæ, tho' surprisingly violent; VIII. yet it is certain from the above Accounts, and others that might be produced in great number, that they went under cover from their Camp to their Batteries, and used more or less Precaution, according to the Strength and Valour of the Befieged, and the number of their Machines, by which they regulated the form of their Approaches or Trenches. These were of two forts. The first were composed of a Blind of Hurdles or strong Fascines, placed on the side of each other, without any space between them; fo that they formed a kind of Wall of five or fix Foot high, with Loop-holes cut from space to space, between the Fascines, or through the Hurdles. To support this Blind, it is supposed they planted forked pieces of Wood in the Ground, upon which long Poles were laid cross-wise, with the Fascines or The other kind Hurdles made fast to them. of Approaches was very different from the former, and confifted of feveral Trenches or Galleries of Communication covered at top, drawn in a right line from the Camp to the Works, or to the Parallels, not much unlike ours. The Galleries of Communication were cut ten or twelve Foot broad in the Earth. The Workmen threw up the Earth on both fides, which they supported with Fascines, and covered the space with Hurdles and Earth laid upon Poles and Rafters. The whole length of these Galleries in the Earth, they cut Loopholes through the fides and iffues to go out at. On the fides of those covered Trenches or Com-

be-

Communications were Esplanades, or places CHAP. of Arms, which extended the whole front of the Attack. These Places were spacious, and capable of containing a great Body of Troops in order of Battle: for here they were posted to support their Towers, Tortoises, Batteries of Rams, Balistas, and Catapultas, against the Sallies of the Besieged.

XV. THE first parallel Trench, next the Body of the Place, was drawn along the fide of the Fossé, and served as a Communication to the battering Towers and Tortoifes of the Besiegers. This fort of Communications to the moving Towers were fometimes covered at top by a Blind of Hurdles and Fascines; because as they ran along the side of the Counterscarp, they were exposed to the downright discharges of the Towers and Ramparts of the Besieged. Loop-holes were cut in the sides of them, through which the Besiegers battered without intermission the Works. Thefe covered Lines ferved besides for filling up the Fosses, and had Passages of Communication with the battering Tortoises cut in them, which Tortoises were pushed forward upon the part of the Fossé filled. When the Walls of a Place were not high, these Trenches were not covered with Blinds, either at top or in front, but only with a Parapet of the Earth dug out of them, like those of the Moderns. At some distance from this Parallel another was cut behind it, which left a space

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OHAP. between them of the nature of our Esplanades VIII. or Places of Arms. Here the Batteries of Balistas and Catapultas were erected, which differed from ours only in being higher. There was sometimes a third upon the same parallel Line. These Places of Arms contained all the Troops that guarded the Works. The Lines communicated by the Galleries or Trenches covered at top.

XVI. IT is certain therefore the use of Trenches was well known to the Ancients, without which they could have formed no Siege. These Trenches are often mentioned in Authors by the Latin Word Aggeres, which does not always fignify Cavaliers or Platforms. The Cavaliers were Mounts of Earth, on which Machines were planted, and were thrown up in the following manner. The Work was begun at a small distance from that side of the Fossé next the Country. It was carried on under the cover of Mantles or moving Sheds of confiderable height, behind which the Soldiers worked in fecurity from the Machines of the Befieged. This fort of Mantles or Galleries were not always composed of Hurdles and Fascines, but of raw Hides, Mattresses, or of a Curtain made of strong Cables, the whole fuspended between very high Masts fixed in the Ground, which broke the force of whatever was discharged against it. The Work was continued to the height of these suspended Curtains, which were raised in proportion with it. At the same time the void **fpaces**

stones, Earth, and other Materials; whilst fome were employed in levelling and beating down the Earth, to make it firm, and capable of sustaining the weight of the Towers and Machines to be planted upon it. From these Towers and Batteries of Balistas and Catapultas, an hail of Stones, Arrows, and large Darts were discharged upon the Ramparts and Works of the Besieged.

XVII. THE Terrass which Alexander the Great caused to be raised against the Rock of Coriana was very furprising. That Rock, which was supposed impregnable, was two thousand five hundred Paces high, and seven or eight hundred round. It was exceffively steep on all fides, having only one path hewn out of the rock, by which no more than one Man could ascend without difficulty. It was besides surrounded with a deep Abyss, which ferved instead of a Fossé, and which it was necessary to fill up, in order to approach it. All these Difficulties were not capable of difcouraging Alexander, to whose Valour and Fortune nothing appeared impossible. He began therefore by ordering the high Fir-trees, that furrounded the Place in great numbers, to be cut down, in order to use them as Stairs to defcend into the Fossé. His Troops worked night and day in filling it up. Tho' the whole Army were employed in their turns at this Work, they could do no more than thirty Foot a Day, and fomething less a Night, so difficult

was

CHAP.was the Work. When it was more advanced, VIII. and began to come nearer the due height, they drove Piles into both fides of the Fossé at proper distances from each other, with Beams laid cross, in order to support the weight to be laid on it. They then formed a kind of Floor or Bridge of Wicker and Fascines, which they covered with Earth to equal the height of the fide of the Fossé, so that the Army could advance on a Way even with the Rock. then the Barbarians had derided the Undertaking, believing it utterly impracticable: but when they faw themselves exposed to the Darts of the Enemy, who worked upon their Terrass behind the Mantles; they began to lofe courage, demanded to capitulate, and foon after furrendered the Rock to Alexander.

> XVIII. THE filling up of the Fosses was not always fo difficult as in this Instance, but never failed to require great Precautions and Labour. The Soldiers worked under cover in the Tortoises, and other the like Machines. The Fossés were filled up with Stones, the trunks of Trees, and Fascines, the whole mingled with Earth. It was necessary that these Works should be of great solidity, to bear the prodigious weight of the Machines planted upon them, which would have made them fall in, if this kind of Caufeway had been composed only of Fascines. If the Fosses were full of Water, they began by drawing it off, either intirely or in part, by different Drains, hwich they cut for that purpose. XIX.

XIX. WHILST the Works were carrying CHAP. on, the Besieged were not idle. They ran many Mines under the Fossé to the part of it filled up, in order to carry off the Earth, which they handed from Man to Man into the City. This hindered the Work from advancing, the Besieged carrying off as fast as the Besiegers laid on. They used also another more effectual Stratagem, which was to cut large Cavities underneath the Works of the Enemy. After having removed some of the Earth without its being discovered, they supported the rest with Props or large Beams, which they smeared over with Grease and other Combustibles. They then filled up the void space between the Props with dry Wood, and fuch things as would foonest burn, and set them on fire. Hence when the Props gave way, the whole fell into a kind of Gulf, with the Tortoifes, battering Rams, and the Men employed in working them.

XX. THE Befiegers used the same Artifice to make the Walls of Places fall down. When Darius befieged Chalcedon, the Walls were fo strong, and the Place so well provided of all Necessaries, that the Inhabitants were in no pain about the Siege. The King did not make any Approaches to the Walls, nor lay waste the Country; he lay still, as if he expected a confiderable Reinforcement. But whilst the People of Chalcedon had no other thought than that of guarding their Walls. cclxiv

CHAP. Walls, he opened at the distance of three VIII. quarters of a League from the City, a Mine, which the Persians carried on as far as the Market-place. They judged themselves directly under it, from the Roots of the Olive-Trees which they knew grew there. They then opened their Mine, and entering by that Passage, took the Place, whilst the Besieged were still employed in keeping guard upon the Walls. In the same manner A. Servilius the Dictator took the City Fidenæ, having caused feveral false Attacks to be made on different fides, whilst a Mine carried on as far as the Citadel, opened him a passage there for his Troops. Another Dictator, the celebrated Camillus, could not terminate the long Siege of Veii but by this Stratagem. He undertook to run a Mine as far as the Citadel of that Place; and that the Work might not be difcontinued, nor the Troops discouraged by the length of it, he divided them into fix Brigades, who relieved each other every fix Hours. The Work being carried on night and day, it extended at length to the Citadel, and the City was taken. At the Siege of Athens by Sylla, it is aftonishing to consider the Mines and Countermines used on both sides. The Miners were not long before they met and fought furiously under Ground. The Romans having cut their way as far as the Wall, fapped a great part of it, and supported it in a manner in the Air on Props of Wood, to which they fet fire without loss of Time. The Wall fell suddenly into the Fossé with an incredible Noise and Ruins, and all that were upon it perished.

XXI. THE Mines from the Camp to the CHAP. infide of a Place were long used before the in- VIII. vention of Sapping, and confifted at first in only running the Mine from the Camp to the Wall, and from thence a confiderable way into the Place, underneath fome large Temple, or other great Building little frequented in the Night. When they came thither they cut a large Space, which they propped up with large Timbers. They then opened a Passage of the whole breadth of this Space, for entering the Place in great numbers, whilst the Soldiers advanced into it through the Mine with the utmost Diligence. The other kind of Mines, for fapping the Foundation of a Wall, were opened very near the Camp to avoid being discovered, and were carried under the Fossé to the foot of the Wall, when they were inlarged to the right and left of the Foundations. This latter part was made very large, to receive the great number of Workmen, and long in proportion to the extent of the Wall to be thrown down. This being done, they began to fap at bottom, and as the Stones were pulled out, and the Work advanced, they propped the Superstructure with Timbers four foot high, which were fixed under the bottom Stones of the Foundation. As foon as the Work was finished, they laid Faggots and other Combustibles between the Props; and after they had fet them no fire they quitted that part of the Mine, and repassed the Fossé to avoid being stifled with the Smoke;

CHAP. Smoke; besides which, there was reason to viii. fear, that the Wall in falling would break into the Mine, and bury all under it in its Ruins.

XXII. THE Ancients used several Methods to defend themselves against the Enemy after the Breach was made. Sometimes, but not fo frequently, they made use of Trees cut down, which they extended along the whole front of the Breach very near each other, in order that the Branches might mingle together: they tied the Trunks very firmly to one another, fo that it was impossible to separate these Trees, which formed an impenetrable Fence, behind which a multitude of Soldiers were posted, armed with Pikes and long Par-Sometimes the Breaches were made tizans. fo fuddenly, either by Saps above, or under Ground, or by the violent Blows of the Rams, that the Befieged often found their Works laid open when they least thought of it. had recourse on such occasions to a very simple Refuge, in order to gain time to look about them, and to intrench behind the Breach. They threw down upon the ruins of the Wall a prodigious quantity of dry Wood, and other combustible Matter, to which they fet fire. This occasioned so violent a Flame, that it was impossible for the Besiegers to pass through it, or approach the Breach. Garrison of Haliartus in Bæotia thought of this Remedy against the Romans.

XXIII. But the most usual Method was CHAP. to erect new Walls behind the Breaches, which are now called Retirades, or Retrenchments. Thefe Works generally were not parallel with the ruined Walls, but described a kind of Semi-circle towards the Place, of which the two ends joined the two fides of the Wall that remained whole. They did not omit to cut a very large and deep Ditch before this Work, in order that the Besiegers might be under the necessity of attacking it with no less difficulty, and all the Machines employed against the strongest Walls. Sylla having beat down great part of the Walls of the Piræum with his battering Rams, caused the Breach to be immediately attacked, where fo furious a Battle enfued, that he was obliged to found a Retreat. The Befieged improving the opportunity this gave them, immediately ran a fecond Wall behind the Breach. Sylla perceiving it made his Machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, that being newly built, it could not refift their Violence. The effect answered with no great difficulty, and he immediately ordered the Affault to be given. The Action was warm and vigorous, but he was at last repulsed with Loss, and obliged to abandon his Defign. History abounds with Examples of this kind.

XXIV. HAVING thus given fome Account of the Fortifications of the Ancients, described the principal Machines made use of by them cclxviii

CHAP.in their Sieges, and explained their Conduct VIII. in the Attack and Defence of Places; I might here, agreeably to what I have done in the Chapter upon Battles, entertain the Reader with a Description of some of the most celebrated Sieges of Antiquity, in order to give him the juster Idea of this part of War. as this would too much swell the DISCOURSE, and is besides rather curious than useful, because of the great Changes that have been introduced by the invention of Artillery and Gun-powder, I shall content myself with referring to the Historians themselves, where these Sieges are related at large. Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, and Josephus furnish abundant Examples of this kind. The most curious and remarkable are those of Plataa by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans; of Syracuse by the Athenians; of Lilybaum, Syracuse, Carthage, and Numantia by the Romans; but above all of Alesia by Julius Cæsar, and of Jerusalem by Titus Vespasian. These two last are so minutely and circumstantially described; the one by Cæsar, who formed and conducted it; the other by Josephus, who was an Eye-witness of all that passed, that whoever peruses them attentively, will meet with every thing that is worth knowing upon this Subject, and be enabled to form a clear and comprehensive Judgment of the high degree of Perfection to which the Ancients, and in particular the Romans, had carried this important Branch of the Art of War. C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK I.

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THE ARGUMENT.

I. Description and Division of Gaul. II. Design by the Helvetians of invading it. III. Prepa-V. Difficulties. VII. March. VIII. rations. Cæsar's Resolution to hinder it. X. He attacks and defeats them at the River Arar. Their Embassy to Cæsar, and his Answer. XIV. Cæsar reduced to great Straits for want of Corn, by the Perfidy of Dumnorix the Æduan; whom nevertheless he pardons. XVII. Cæsar defeats the Helvetians in a second Battle. XXI. Ther furrender, and are obliged to return to their own Country. XXII. The Gauls congratulate Cæsar upon his Victory. XXIII. And complain to him of the Irruption of the Germans into Gaul under Arioviftus. XXIV. Cæfar's Embaffy to Arioviftus. XXVII. His Answer. XXVIII. Cæsar leads his Army against Ariovistus. XXX. The Consternation that seizes his Troops. XXXI. He animates them by a Speech. XXXIII. Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus. XXXVII. Breaks off by the Approach of the German Cavalry. XXXVIII. Perfidy and Cruelty of Arioviftus. XXXIX. Cæfar and Ariovistus prepare for Battle. Manner of fighting in use among the German Horse. XLI. Cæsar defeats the Germans with great Slaughter, obliges them to repass the Rhine; and by one Battle puts an end to the War.



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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

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BOOK I.

HE whole Country of Gaul is divided BOOK into three Parts: of which the Belgians inhabit one; the Aquitains another; and a People called in their own Language Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. These all differ from each other in their Language, Customs, and Laws. The Gauls are divided from the Aquitains by the River Garonne, and by the Marne and the Seine from the Belgians. Of all these Nations the Belgians are the most warlike; as being farthest removed from the Culture and Refinements of the Province, and but little reforted to by Merchants, who furnish the Means of Luxury and Voluptuousness. They are also fituated next to the Germans, who inhabit beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually engaged in War. For this Reason likewise the Helvetians are distinguished by their Bravery beBOOK youd the rest of the Gauls; because they are almost constantly at war with the Germans, either for the Defence of their own Territories, or acting themselves as the Aggressors. One of these Divisions, that which we have faid was possessed by the Gauls, begins at the River Rhine, and is bounded by the Garonne, the Ocean, and the Territories of the Belgians. It touches also, towards the Helvetians and Sequani, upon the River Rhine, extending itself northward. The Country of the Belgians, commencing from the remotest Confines of Gaul, stretches as far as the lower Rhine, running all the way between the North and East? Aguitain extends from the Garonne to the Pyrenean Mountains, and that part of the Ocean which borders upon Spain. Its Situation is North-West.

> II. ORGETORIX was by far the richest and most illustrious of the Helvetians. This Nobleman, in the Confulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, prompted by an aspiring Ambition, formed a Confederacy of the principal Men of the State; and perfuaded the People to quit their Country in a Body, representing: " that as they surpassed " all the Nations around them in Valour, it " would be easy for them to gain the intire Sovereignty of Gaul." He the fooner brought them into this Design, because the Helvetians, by the Nature of their Situation, are every where confined within very narrow Territories: On one fide by the Rhine, a broad and deep River, which separates their Country from that of the Germans: On the other by Mount Jura, a high Ridge of Hills, which runs between them and the Sequani: Lastly, by the Lake Lemanus, and the River Rhone, which is the Boundary on the

this BOOK eafily I.

the fide of the Roman Province. By this means it happened, that they could not so easily enlarge their Territories, or make Conquests on the neighbouring States; which, to Men of a war-like Spirit, and fond of Fighting, was abundant cause of Discontent: For being a numerous People, and of great Fame for their Bravery, they thought themselves much too strained in a Country, which was but two hundred and forty Miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

III. URGED by these Considerations, and still more by the Authority and Persuasions of Orgetorix, they resolved to provide every thing necessary for an Expedition; to buy up a great number of Waggons and Carriage-Horses; to form large Magazines of Corn, that they might have sufficient to supply them in their March; to establish Peace and Amity with the neighbouring States. They imagined two Years would be fufficient for these Preparations, and obliged themselves by a Law to begin their March on the third. The whole Management of this Defign was committed to Orgetorix, who undertook an Embassy to the neighbouring States. On this Occasion he persuaded Casticus, the Son of Catamantales, of the Nation of the Sequani, whose Father had for many Years enjoyed the Sovereignty over that People, and been stiled Friend and Ally by the Senate of Rome, to possess himself of the supreme Authority in his own Country, which his Father had held before him. He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Æduan, the Brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time the leading Man in his own State, and greatly beloved by the People, to attempt the same among the Aduans: and the more to secure him to his Interest, gave him his Daughter in Marriage. He B 3 told

BOOK told them, " That they might with the greatest " Facility accomplish their Designs; as he was " himself assured of attaining the supreme Autho-" rity in his own State, which was without Dif-" pute the most powerful and considerable of all " Gaul; and would then employ his whole Inte-" rest and Forces, to establish them in their refpective Sovereignties." Moved by these Confiderations, they reciprocally bound themselves by a folemn Oath; not doubting, when they had once attained the chief Sway in their feveral States, with the united Forces of three such powerful and mighty Nations, to render themselves Masters of The Helvetians having Notice of this all Gaul. Design, obliged Orgetorix, according to the Custom of their Country, to answer to the Charge brought against him in Chains: and had he been found guilty, the Law condemned him to be burnt alive. On the Day appointed for his Trial, he affembled all his Slaves and Domesticks, amounting to ten thousand Men; and all his Clients and Debtors, of which the Number was very great: By their means he rescued himself out of the Hands of his Judges. While the People, provoked at this Contempt of the Laws, were preparing to support their Authority by Force, and the Magistrates had affembled a great Number of Men for that Purpose; Orgetorix died: Nor are the Helvetians without Suspicion of his having made away with himfelf.

IV. AFTER his Death, the Helvetians still continued to prosecute with the same Diligence, the Design they had formed of quitting their Country. When they had completed their Preparations, they set fire to all their Towns, to the Number of twelve; to their Boroughs and Villages, which amounted to sour hundred; and to their other pri-

vate Buildings. They likewise burnt all their BOOK Corn, except what they had resolved to carry along with them; that having no Hope of returning to their own Country, they might be the more disposed to confront all Dangers. Each Man had Orders to carry out with him Provisions for three Months. The Rauraci, Tulingians, and Latobrigians, neighbouring Nations, being persuaded to follow the same Counsel, likewise set sire to their Towns and Villages, and joined with them in the Expedition. The Boians too, who had formerly inhabited beyond the Rhine, and passing over into Noricum, had settled in that Country, and possessed themselves of Noreia its Capital City, were associated into the Design.

V. THERE were only two Ways by which they could march out of their own Country: One through the Territories of the Sequani, between Mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow and difficult, infomuch that in fome Places a fingle File of Waggons could hardly pass. The impending Mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of Men was fufficient to stop them. The other lay through our Province, far easier and readier; because the Rhone, which flows between the Confines of the Helvetians and Allobrogians, a People lately subjected to the Romans, was in fome Places fordable: And Geneva, a frontier Town of the Allobrogians, adjoining to the Territories of the Helvetians, had a Bridge belonging to this last People. They therefore doubted not, either of perfuading the Allobrogians, who as yet seemed to bear no great Affection to the People of Rome; or at least of obliging them by Force, to grant them a Passage through their Territories. Every thing being now ready for the Expedition,

BOOK Expedition, they appointed a Day for their general I. Rendezvous on the Banks of the Rhone. The Day fixed on was the Twenty-eighth of March, in the Confulship of L. Piso and A. Gabinius.

VI. CÆSAR having notice of these Proceedings, and that it was the Design of the Helvetians to attempt a Passage through the Province, hastened his Departure from Rome; and posting by great Journeys into farther Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with breaking down the Bridge over the Rhone; and as there was at that time but one Roman Legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great Levies to be made throughout the whole The Helvetians being informed of his Province. Arrival, deputed feveral Noblemen of the first Rank, with Numeius and Verodoctius at their head, to wait upon him in the Name of the State, and represent, "that they meant not to offer the least "Injury to the Roman Province; that Necessity " alone had determined them to the Defign of " paffing through it, because they had no other " way by which to direct their March; that they " therefore intreated they might have his Per-" mission for that purpose." But Casar bearing in mind, that L. Cassus the Consul had been flain, and his Army routed, and made to pass under the Yoke by the Helvetians, did not think proper to grant their Request. Neither could he persuade himself, that Men so ill affected to the People of Rome, if permitted to pass through the Province, would abstain from Acts of Hostility and Violence. However, that he might gain time, till the Troops he had ordered to be raifed could affemble; he told the Ambassadors he would consider of their Demand, and that if they returned by the Nineteenth of April, they should have his final Answer. Meanwhile

Meanwhile with the Legion he then had, and BOOK the Soldiers that came in to him from all Parts of the Province, he ran a Wall fixteen Feet high, and nineteen Miles in length, with a Ditch, from the Lake Lemanus into which the Rhone discharges itself, to Mount Jura, which divides the Territories of the Sequani from the Helvetians. This Work finished, he raised Redoubts from space to space, and manned them with Troops, that if the Enemy should attempt to force a Passage, he might be in a condition to hinder them. When the Day appointed came, and the Ambassadors returned for an Answer, he told them; that he could not, confiftent with the Usage and Behaviour of the People of Rome on the like Occasions, grant any Troops a Passage through the Province: and should they attempt it by Force, he let them fee he was prepared to oppose them.

VII. THE Helvetians driven from this Hope, endeavourd to force the Passage of the River; some with Boats coupled together, or Floats which they had prepared in great Numbers; others by the Fords of the Rhone, where was the least Depth of Water; fometimes by Day, but oftener in the Night: but being repulfed by the Strength of the Works, the Concourse of the Troops, and the Discharge of Darts, they at last abandoned the Attempt. There was still one Way left through the Territories of the Sequani, by which however, without the Consent of the Natives, they could not march, because of the Narrowness of the Pass. As they were not able to prevail by their own Application, they fent Ambassadors to Dumnorix the Æduan, that thro' his Intercession they might obtain this Favour of the Sequani. Dumnorix by his Popularity and Generofity had great Influence with Helvetians, because from among them he had married the Daughter of Orgetorix. Besides, urged by ambitious Views, he was framing to himself Schemes of Power, and wanted to have as many States as possible bound to him by Offices of Kindness. He therefore charged himself with the Negotiation, obtained for the Helvetians the Liberty of passing through the Territories of the Sequani, and engaged the two Nations mutually to give Hostages. The Sequani, not to molest the Helvetians in their March; and the Helvetians, to pass without offering any Insult or Injury to the Country.

VIII. CÆSAR foon had Intelligence of their March, and that they now defigned to pass through the Country of the Sequani and Aduans into the Territories of the Santones, which border upon those of the Tolosatians, a State that makes Part of the Roman Province. Should this happen, he forefaw many Inconveniencies likely to arife, from the Neighbourhood of a warlike and disaffected People, in an open and plentiful Country. For these Refons he gave the Command of the new Works he had raised to T. Labienus his Lieutenant, and he himself hastened by great Journeys into Italy. There he raifed two Legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round Aquileia, out of their Winter-quarters; and with these five Legions, took the nearest way over the Alps into farther Gaul. The Centrones, Graioceli, and Caturigians, feizing the higher Grounds, endeavoured to oppose his March. But having repulfed them in feveral Encounters, he in feven Days after fetting out from Ocelum, a City in the extreme Confines of the nearer Province, arrived among the Vocontians, whose Territories lie within the farther Province. Thence

he led his Army into the Country of the Allobrogians; BOOK and croffing their Territories, entered upon the Lands of the Segusians. These are the first on the other side the Rhone, beyond the Boundaries of the Roman Province.

IX. THE Helvetians had by this Time marched their Forces through the narrow Pass of Mount Jura, and the Territories of the Sequani; and were come into the Country of the Aduans, plundering The Æduans, unable to defend their Lands. themselves and Possessions from the Violence of their Enemies, fent Ambassadors to Casar to request Aid. They told him, "That such at all times " had been their Merit with the People of Rome, " that they might challenge greater Regard, than to " have their Lands laid waste, their Children led " into Captivity, and their Towns affaulted and " taken, almost in the very Sight of a Roman " Army." At the fame time also the Ambarri, Friends and Allies of the Æduans, fent to inform him: " That compelled to abandon the open Coun-" try, they could hardly defend their Towns from " the Rage of the Enemy." The Allobrogians likewife, who had Dwellings and Possessions beyond the Rhone, fled to him for Protection, and affured him: "That there was nothing left them but a " naked and desolate Country." Whereupon Casar, moved by these Complaints and Remonstrances, resolved not to wait 'till the Fortunes of his Allies should be confumed, and the Helvetians arrive in the Territories of the Santones.

X. THE River Arar flows into the Rhone, thro' the Confines of the Æduans and Sequani, with a Current incredibly smooth and gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to distinguish by the Eye, which way its Waters glide. The Helvetians were

BOOK at this time employed in passing it on Floats and a Bridge of Boats. When Cæsar was informed by his Spies, that three Parts of their Forces were got over the River, and that the fourth still remained on this Side; he left his Camp about midnight with three Legions, and came up with the Party of the Enemy that had not yet passed. found them unprepared, and incumbered with their Baggage, he attacked them immediately, and killed a great Number on the Spot. The rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest Woods. This was called the Tigurine Canton, being one of the four into which the whole Body of the Helvetians are divided. This very Canton, in the Memory of our Fathers, marching out of their own Territories, had vanquished and killed the Conful L. Cassius, and obliged his Army to pass under the Yoke. Thus, whether by Chance or the Direction of the immortal Gods, that Part of the Helvetian State which had brought fo fignal a Calamity upon the Roman People, were the first to feel the Weight of their Resentment. In this Casar avenged not only the publick, but likewise his own domestick Injuries; because in the same Battle with Cassius, was slain also L. Piso his Lieutenant, the Grandfather of L. Pifo, Cafar's Father-in-law.

> XI. AFTER this Battle, that he might come up with the remaining Forces of the Helvetians, he caused a Bridge to be made across the Arar, and carried over his Army. The Helvetians difmayed at his fudden Approach, as he had fpent only one Day in paffing the River, which they had with the utmost Difficulty accomplished in twenty, fent an Embaffy to him, at the head of which was Divico, who had been General of the Helvetians in the War against Cassius. He addressed Casar to

this Effect: " That if the People of Rome were BOOK " disposed to conclude a Peace with the Helvetians, "they would go and fettle in whatever Country " Cæsar should think fit to assign them: but if " they persisted in the Design of making War, he " would do well to call to mind the ancient Difco grace of the Roman People, and the Valour of the Helvetic Nation: That in having surprised one of the Cantons, while the others, who had copaffed the River, could not return to fuccour it, there was no Reason to be much elated on " the Advantage, nor to despise his Enemies: "That the Helveians had learned of their Ance-" ftors, to depend more on Courage than on Cun-" ning and Ambushes; and it therefore imported " him to beware, not to render the Place where "they were then posted famous and memorable " with Posterity, by a new Defeat of the Roman

XII. To this Cafar replied: "That he there-" fore the less doubted of the Issue, as he well. "knew all the Circumstances of the Affair to " which the Helvetians referred; and refented them "the more strongly, as they had happened unde-" fervedly to the Roman People: That had they " been conscious of any Injury on their Side, it " would have been easy for them to have kept up-" on their Guard; but herein were they deceived, " that neither did they know of any thing which " might give them cause of Fear, nor could they " apprehend they had any thing to fear without " cause: That supposing him inclined to overlook " old Injuries, could they expect he would also " forget their late Infults, in attempting, against " his Will, to force a Passage through the Province, and laying waste the Territories of the Aduans,

" People, and the Destruction of their Army."

I.

BOOK " Aduans, Ambarri, and Allobrogians? That their " boafting so insolently of their Victory, and wondering that Vengeance had been deferred fo long, were a new Set of Provocations. But "they ought to remember, that the immortal "Gods were fometimes wont to grant long Im-" punity, and a great run of Prosperity to Men, " whom they purfued with the Punishment of their " Crimes, that by the fad Reverse of their Condi-" tion, Vengeance might fall the heavier. " these were just Grounds of Resentment, yet, if "they would fatisfy the Æduans and their Allies " for the Ravages committed in their Country, as likewife the Allobrogians, and give Hostages " for the Performance of their Promifes, he was " ready to conclude a Peace with them." Divico replied: " That fuch were the Institutions of "the Helvetians, derived from their Ancestors, "that they had been accustomed to receive, not " to give Hostages; and that no body knew it bet-" ter than the Romans." Having returned this Answer, he departed.

> XIII. THE next Day they decamped. Cefar did the fame; and ordered all the Cavalry, whom, to the Number of four thousand, he had raised in the Province, and drawn together from the Æduans and their Allies, to go before, and observe the Enemy's March. But preffing too close upon their Rear, they were obliged to engage in a difadvantageous Place, and loft a few Men. The Helvetians, encouraged by this Success, as having, with no more than five hundred Horse, repulsed so great a Multitude, began to face us more boldly, and fometimes to fally from their Rear, and attack Cæsar kept back his Men from fighting; thinking it fufficient for the present, to strait

en the Enemy's Forages, and prevent their ravage-BOOK ing and plundering the Country. In this manner I. the Armies marched for fifteen Days together; infomuch that between our Van, and the Rear of the Helvetians, the Distance did not exceed five or six Miles.

XIV. In the mean time Cafar daily preffed the Æduans for the Corn which they had promifed in the name of the Publick. For by reason of the Coldness of the Climate, (Gaul, as we have faid, lying confiderably to the North,) he was fo far from finding the Corn ripe in the Fields, that there was not even fufficient Forage for the Horses. Neither could he make use of those Supplies which came to him by the way of the Arar, because the Helvetians had turned off from the River, and he was determined not to leave them. The Æduans put him off from day to day with fair Speeches; fometimes pretending that it was bought up, and ready to be fent; fometimes, that it was actually on the way. But when he faw no End of these Delays, and that the Day approached for delivering out Corn to the Army; calling together their Chiefs, of whom he had a great Number in his Camp; among the rest Divitiacus, and Liscus their supreme Magistrate, who is stiled Vergobret in the Language of the Country, and created yearly, with a Power of Life and Death; he feverely inveighed against them: " That at a time when " Corn was neither to be procured for Money, nor " had out of the Fields, in fo urgent a Conjunc-" ture, and while the Enemy was fo near, they " had not taken care to supply him;" adding, " that as he had engaged in that War chiefly at " their Request, he had the greater Reason to " complain of their abandoning him." XV. UPON

BOOK XV. Upon this, Lifeus, moved by Cafar's Speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed: "That there were fome among them whose Authority with the People was very great; and who, tho' but private Men, had yet more Power than the Magistrates themselves: "That these, by artful and seditious Speeches, a-46 larmed the Multitude, and perfuaded them to keep back their Corn; infinuating, that if their own State could not obtain the Sovereignty of "Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the "Helvetians, Gauls like themselves, than the Ro-" mans; there not being the least Reason to que-" ftion, but these last, after having subdued the " Helvetians, would, along with the rest of Gaul, " deprive the Æduans also of their Liberty: That "the very fame Men gave Intelligence to the Enemy of all the Defigns of the Romans, and what-66 foever was transacted in their Camp; his Au-"thority not being fufficient to restrain them: " Nay, that tho' compelled by necessity, he had " now made a Discovery of the whole matter to " Cafar, he was not ignorant of the Danger to " which he exposed himself by such a Conduct; " and had, for that reason, chosen to be silent, as " long as he thought it confistent with the Safety " of the State." Casar perceived, that Dumnorix, the Brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at by this Speech. But as he was unwilling that these Matters should be debated in the Presence of so many Witnesses, he speedily dismissed the Council, retaining only Liscus. He then question'd him apart on what he had just faid, and was answered with greater Courage and Freedom. He put the fame Questions to others also in private, who all confirmed the Truth of what had been told him: "That Dumnorix was a Man of an enterprising " Spirit,

Spirit, fond of Revolutions, and in great fa-BOOK vour with the People, because of his Liberality: "That he had for many Years farmed the Cu-" floms, and other publick Revenues of the Æ-" duans, at a very low price; no one daring to " bid against him: That by this means he had confiderably increased his Estate, and was en-" abled to extend his Bounty to all about him: "That he constantly kept a great Number of " Horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever " he went: That his Interest was not confined " merely to his own Country, but extended like-" wife to the neighbouring States: That the better " to support this Interest, he had married his " Mother to a Man of principal Rank and Au-" thority among the Biturigians, had himself tak-" en a Wife from among the Helvetians, and " matched his Sifter and the rest of his Kindred " into other the most powerful States: That he " favoured and wished well to the Helvetians on " the score of that Alliance, and personally hated " Cæsar, and the Romans, because by their Arrival " his Power had been diminished, and Divitiacus " his Brother restored to his former Credit and " Authority: That should the Romans be over-" thrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the " Sovereignty by means of the Helvetians. On " the contrary, should they prevail, he must not " only give up these Hopes, but even all Expecta-" tion of retaining the Influence he had already " acquired." Cafar likewise found upon Inquiry, that in the last Engagement of the Horse, Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan Cavalry, was the first that fled, and by that flight struck a Ter-

for into the rest of the Troops.

BOOK XVI. THESE things appearing, and other undoubted Circumstances concurring to heighten his Suspicions: That he had procured for the Helvetians a Passage through the Territories of the Sequani: That he had effected an Exchange of Hostages between the two Nations: That he had done all this not only without Permission from him, or his own State, but even without their Knowledge and Participation: That he was accused by the chief Magistrate of the Æduans: They seemed altogether a fufficient ground to Cafar, why he should either himself take cognizance of the Matter, or order the State to proceed against him. One thing, however, still kept him in suspence; the Confideration of his Brother Divitiacus, a Man of fingular Probity, Juffice, and Moderation; a faithful Ally of the Roman People, and on the foot of Friendship with Cæsar. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had fo great a Value: before he took any farther Step in the Affair, he fent for Divitiacus; and having removed the usual Interpreters, addressed him by C. Valerius Procillus, a Prince of the Province of Gaul, his intimate Friend, in whom he reposed the greatest Confidence. He put him in mind of what had been faid of Dumnorix in his own presence in the Council of the Gauls, and repeated the fresh Complaints made to himself against him in private. He urged, and even requested, that without Offence to him, he might either proceed against him himself, or order the State to take the Matter under Consideration. Divitiacus embracing Cafar with many Tears, begged him not to take any fevere Resolution against his Brother. " He was " fensible," he told him, " of the Truth of all "that was alledged, and had himfelf more reason

" to be diffatisfied than any Man: That at a time BOOK " when his Authority was great, both at home " and in the other Provinces of Gaul, and his " Brother but little confidered on account of his "Youth, he had used his Interest to bring him " into Credit: That though Dumnorix had made " use of that Power acquired by his means, to di-" minish his Favour with the People, and even to " urge on his Ruin, he nevertheless still found " himself swayed by his Affection, and a Regard " for the Esteem of the Publick: That should " his Brother meet with any rigorous Treatment " from Cæser, while he himself possessed so large a " fhare of his Favour, all Men would believe it "done with his Confent, and the Minds of the " Gauls be for ever alienated from him." Cæfar obferving his concern, took him by the Hand, comforted him, defired him to make an end of speaking, affured him, that fuch was his Regard for him, he would for his fake overlook not only his own Injuries, but even those of the Republick. He then fent for Dumnorix, call'd him into his Brother's Prefence, declared the Subjects of Complaint he had against him, mentioned what he himself knew, what was laid to his Charge by the State, and admonished him for the suture to avoid all cause of Sufpicion; adding, that he would forgive what was past for the fake of his Brother Divitiacus. He appointed, however, fome to have an Eye over him, that he might be informed of his Behaviour, and of those he conversed with.

XVII. THE fame Day, having learnt by his Scouts, that the Enemy had posted themselves under a Hill about eight Miles from his Camp, he sent out a Party to view the Ground, and examine the ascent of the Hill. These reporting it to be extremely

I. tenant about midnight, with two Legions, and the fame Guides who had examined the Ground the Day before; and having acquainted him with his Design, ordered him to get possession of the Top of the Hill. He himself set out three Hours after with the rest of the Army, by the same Rout the Helvetians had taken, and sent all the Cavalry before. P. Considius, an Officer of Reputation, who had served in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards that of M. Crassus, advanced with a small Party to get Intelligence.

XVIII. AT Day-break, when Labienus had got possession of the top of the Hill, and Casar was within a Mile and a half of the Enemies Camp; while they in the mean time, as he afterwards learnt from his Prisoners, knew nothing either of his, or Labienus's Approach: Confidius came galloping back, and affured Cæfar, that the Summit of the Mountain was possessed by the Enemy, and that he had feen the Gallick Arms and Enfigns there. Cæsar retired to a neighbouring Hill, and drew up his Men in order of Battle. Labienus, whose Instructions were, not to engage the Enemy till he faw the rest of the Army approaching their Camp, that the Attack might be made on all Sides at the same time; having gained the Top of the Hill, waited the Arrival of our Men, without flirring from his Post. At length, when the Day was far spent, Cafar understood by his Spies, that Labienus was in possession of the Mountain, that the Enemy had decamped, and that Confidius, blinded by Fear, had reported what he never faw. The rest of that Day he followed the Enemy at the usual Distance, and encamped within three Miles of them.

XIX. THE Day after, as the time drew near BOOK for delivering out Corn to the Army, and as he was not above eighteen Miles from Bibracte the Capital of the Æduans, where he hoped to find fufficient Supplies for the Subfiftence of his Troops; he quitted the Pursuit of the Helvetians, and directed his March thither. The Enemy being informed of this Motion by fome Deferters, who had belonged to the Troop of L. Emilius, an Officer of Horse among the Gauls; and either ascribing it to Fear in the Romans, the rather, because they had not attacked them the Day before, though possessed of the higher Ground; or flattering themfelves with the Hopes of intercepting their Provifions: all on a fudden changed their Resolution, and instead of continuing their former March began to pursue and harrass our Rear. Cæsar observing this, retired to a neighbouring Hill, and fent his Cavalry to fustain the Charge of the Enemy. In the mean time he drew up his four veteran Legions in three Lines towards the middle of the Hill; in fuch a manner, that the two Legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and all the Auxiliaries, were posted above them; and the whole Mountain was covered with his Troops. He ordered all the Baggage to be brought into one Place, and committed it to the Charge of those who stood on the upper Part of the Hill. The Helvetians following with all their Forces, drew their Carriages likewife into one Place; and having repulfed our Cavalry, and formed themselves into a Phalanx, advanced in close Order to attack

XX. CESAR having first sent away his own Horse, and afterwards those of all his Officers, that by making the Danger equal, no Hope might C 2

BOOK remain but in Victory; encouraged his Men, and began the Charge. The Romans, who fought with the Advantage of the higher Ground, pouring their Darts upon the Enemy from above, eafily broke their Phalanx; and then fell upon them Sword in Hand. What greatly incumbered the Gauls in this Fight, was, that their Targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the Javelins of the Romans, they could neither draw out the Javelins, because forked at the Extremity, nor act with Agility in the Battle, because deprived in a manner of the use of their left Arms: so that many, after long toffing their Targets to and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose rather to throw them away, and expose themselves without Defence to the Weapons of their Enemies. At length however, being overpowered with Wounds, they began to give ground; and observing a Mountain at about a Mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the Mountain, and our Men pursuing them; the Boians and Tulingians, who to the Number of fifteen thousand covered their Retreat, and ferved as a Guard to their Rear, falling upon the Romans in Flank as they advanced, began to furround them. This being perceived by the Helvetians, who had retired to the Mountain, they again returned upon us, and renewed the Fight. The Romans facing about, charged the Enemy in three Bodies; their first and fecond Line making head against those who had been forced to retreat, and their third fustaining the Assault of the Boians and Tulingians. The Battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the Enemy being at last obliged to give way, one Part withdrew towards the Hill whither they had before retreated, and the rest the tered themselves behind the Carriages. During

ing this whole Action, tho' itlas fted from one BOOK o' clock in the Afternoon till Evening, no Man faw the Back of an Enemy. The Fight was renewed with great Obstinacy at the Carriages, and continued till the Night was far spent: for the Gauls making use of their Carts by way of a Rampart, darted their Javelins upon us from above; and fome thrusting their Lances through the Wheels of the Waggons, wounded our Men. After a long Dispute, we at last got possession of their Baggage and Camp. A Son and Daughter of Orgetorix were found among the Prisoners. Only an hundred and twenty thousand of the Enemy survived this Defeat; who retreating all that Night, and continuing their March without Intermission, arrived on the fourth Day in the Territories of the Lingones. The Romans mean-while made no Attempt to pursue them; the Care of their Wounded, and of burying their Dead, obliging them to continue upon the Spot three Days. Cafar fent 'Letters and Messengers to the Lingones, not to furnish them with Corn or other Necessaries, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same Treatment with the Fugitives; and after a Repose of three Days, set forward to pursue them with all his Forces.

XXI. THE Helvetians, compelled by an extreme Want of all Things, sent Ambassadors to him to treat about a Surrender. These meeting him on the Way, and throwing themselves at his Feet; in suppliant Terms, and with many Tears, begged for Peace. Casar gave them no express Answer at that time; only ordered the Helvetians to wait for him in the Place where they then were, which they did accordingly. Upon his Arrival, he demanded Hostages, their Arms, and the Slaves

BOOK who had deferted to their Camp. As the Executtion of all this took up some time; about four thousand Men of the Canton called Urbigenus. either fearing Punishment should they deliver up their Arms, or induced by the Hopes of escaping; because in so great a Multitude they fancied their Flight might be concealed, nay perhaps remain altogether unknown; stole out of the Camp in the beginning of the Night, and took the Rout of Germany and the Rhine. Cafar being informed of it, dispatched Orders to those through whose Territories they must pass, to stop and send them back wherever they should be found, if they meant to acquit themselves of favouring their Escape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive Urbigenians were treated as Enemies. All the reft, upon delivering the Hostages that were required of them, their Arms, and the Deferters, were admitted to a Surfender. The Helvetians, Tulingians, and Latobrigians, had Orders to return to their own Country, and rebuild the Towns and Villages they had burnt. And because having lost all their Corn, they were utterly without the means of subsisting themselves, he gave it in charge to the Allobrogians to supply Cafar's Design in this was, that the Lands deserted by the Helvetians might not be left vacant, lest the Germans beyond the Rhine, drawn by the Goodness of the Soil, should be tempted to seize them, and thereby become Neighbours to the Allobrogians and the Roman Province in Gaul. The Boians, at the Request of the Aduans, who esteemed them highly on account of their Valour, were permitted to settle in their Territories; where they affigned them Lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the Rights and Privileges of Natives. A Roll was found in the Helvetian Camp, written in Greek Characters, and brought to Cafar. It contained

List of all who had set out upon this Expedition BOOK capable of bearing Arms; likewise of the Children, Women, and old Men. By this it appeared, that the Number of the Helvetians was two hundred and sixty-three thousand, of the Tulingians thirty-six thousand, of the Latobrigians fourteen thousand, of the Rauraci twenty-three thousand, of the Boians thirty-two thousand; in all three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which ninety-two thousand were sit to bear Arms. A Review being made by Cæsar's Command, of those that returned to their own Country, the Number was found to be an hundred and ten thousand.

XXII. THE War with the Helvetians being ended, Ambaffadors from all Parts of Gaul, Men of principal Confideration in their feveral States, waited upon Cæsar to congratulate his Success. They told him; "That tho' they were fensible the People of Rome, in the War against the Helvetians, " meant chiefly to avenge the Injuries formerly " received from that Nation, yet had the Event of " it been highly advantageous to all Gaul; be-" cause in a time of full Prosperity, the Helvetians had left their Territories with design to make War " upon the other States; that having brought them under Subjection, they might choose themselves " a Habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest " of the Country tributary." They requested, "That they might have his Permission to hold by " a Day prefixed, a general Assembly of all the " Provinces of Gaul; there being some things they wanted to discuss and propose to him, which " concerned the whole Nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the Day for the Affembly, and bound themselves by an Oath, not to discover their Deliberations to any,

BOOK any, unless named for that purpose by general. Consent.

XXIII. Upon the rifing of the Council, the fame Chiefs of the States as before, returned to Cafar, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, of Matters that regarded their own and the common Safety. Their Defire being granted, they all threw themselves at his Feet, and with Tears represented; "That it was of no less "Importance to them to have their present De-" liberations kept fecret, than to fucceed in the "Request they were going to make; because " should any Discovery happen, they were in " danger of being exposed to the utmost Cruelties." Divitiacus the Æduan spoke in the name of the rest. He told him; "That two Factions divided all Gaul; " one headed by the Æduans, the other by the " Averni; that after a Contention of many Years " between these for the Superiority, the Averni and Sequani came at last to a Resolution of " calling in the Germans: That at first only fifteen thousand had crossed the Rhine; but being a " wild and favage People, and greatly liking " the Customs, Manners, and plenteous Country " of the Gauls, others foon followed; infomuch " that at present there were not less than an hundred " and twenty thousand of them in Gaul: That "the Æduans, and their Allies, had frequently " tried their Strength against them in Battle; but by a Succession of Defeats had lost all their "Nobility, Senate, and Cavalry: That broken " by these Calamities and Losses, tho' formerly " they had held the first sway in Gaul, both by "their own Valour, and the Favour and " Friendship of the People of Rome, yet now they "were reduced to the necessity of fending their " principa

principal Noblemen as Hostages to the Sequani, BOOK and of obliging themselves by an Oath, neither " to demand their Hostages back, nor implore the 44 Affistance of the Roman People, nor refuse a pere petual Submission to the Dominion and Authority of the Sequani: That he alone of all the " Æduans had refused to take the Oath, or give " his Children for Hostages, and on that account " had fled his Country, and came to Rome to imof plore the Affistance of the Senate; as being the only Man in the State, whom neither Obligation of Oath, nor the Restraint of Hostages, with-" held from fuch a Step: That after all it had fared worse with the victorious Sequani, than with "the vanquished Æduans; because Ariovistus King of the Germans had seated himself in their Terri-"tories, had feized a third of their Lands, the " most fertile in all Gaul, and now ordered them " to give up another third in behalf of the Ha-" rudes, who had passed the Rhine a few Months 66 before with twenty-four thousand Men, and " wanted a Settlement and Habitations: That in a " few Years all the native Gauls would be driven " from their Territories, and all the Germans transof plant themselves over the Rhine, the Climate " being far superior to that of their own Country, " and the way of living not admitting a Com-" parison: That Ariovistus, ever since the Defeat " of the Gauls at Amagetobria, had behaved with " unheard-of Tyranny and Haughtiness, demand-" ing the Children of the first Nobility as Hostages, " and exercifing all manner of Cruelties upon "them, if his Orders were not implicitly followed " in every thing: That he was a Man of a favage, " passionate, and imperious Character, whose "Government was no longer to be born; and un-" less some resource was found in Casar and the " People

BOOK "People of Rome, the Gauls must all follow the I. "Example of the Helvetians, and like them abandon their Country, in order to find some other Habitation and Settlement, remote from the Germans, wherever Fortune should point it out to them: That were these Complaints and Representations to come to the Knowledge of Ariovistus, he made no doubt of his insticting the severest Punishments upon all the Hostages in his Hands: but that it would be easy for Casar, by his own Authority, and that of the Army he commanded; by the same of his late Victory, and the Terror of the Roman Name; to hinder any more Germans from passing the Rhine, and to defend Gaul from the Insults of Ariovistus."

XXIV. WHEN Divitiacus had made an end of speaking, all who were present, with many Tears, began to implore Casar's Aid. He observed that the Sequani alone did nothing of all this; but penfive, and with downcast Looks, kept their Eyes fixed upon the Ground. Wondering what might be the Cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no Answer, but continued filent, as before, with the same Air of Dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one Word in return, Divitiacus the Æduan again refumed the Discourse, and obferved: " That the Condition of the Sequani was " by fo much more deplorable and wretched than "that of the rest of the Gauls; as they alone durst " not, even in fecret, complain of their Wrongs, or " apply any where for Redress; and no less dreaded " the Cruelty of Ariovistus, when absent, than if " actually present before their Eyes: That other " States had it still in their Power to escape by Flight; " but the Sequani, who had received him into their

" Territories,

" Territories, and put him in possession of all their BOOK

"Towns, were exposed upon Discovery to every kind of Torment." Casar being made acquainted with these Things, encouraged the Gauls, and promised to have a regard to their Complaints. He told them: "That he was in great Hopes "Ariovistus, induced by his Intercession, and the "Authority of the People of Rome, would put an "end to his Oppressions." Having returned this Answer, he dismissed the Assembly.

XXV. Many urgent Reasons occurred upon this Occasion to Casar, why he should consider feriously of the Proposals of the Gauls, and redress the Injuries of which they complained. He law the Æduans, Friends and Allies of the People of Rome, held in Subjection and Servitude by the Germans, and compelled to give Hostages to Ariovistus and the Sequani; which, in the present flourishing State of the Roman Affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. He faw it likewise of dangerous Consequence, to suffer the Germans by little and little to transport themselves over the Rbine, and fettle in great multitudes in Gaul. For that fierce and favage People, having once possessed themselves of the whole Country of Gaul, were but too likely, after the Example of the Teutones and Cimbri, to break into the Roman Province, and thence advance to Italy itself; more especially as the Rhone was the only Boundary by which the Sequani were divided from the Territories of the Republick. It therefore appeared necessary to provide withour Delay against these Evils; and the rather, because Ariovistus was become so insolent, and took so much upon him, that his Conduct was no longer to be endured.

XXVI.

BOOK XXVI. For these Reasons he thought proper to fend Ambassadors to Ariovistus, to desire he would appoint a Place for an Interview, that they might discourse together about some publick Affairs of the highest Importance to them both. Ariovistus replied: "That if he had wanted any thing of " Cafar, he would himfelf have waited on him for " that purpose; and if Casar had any thing to desire of him, he must likewise come in Person to demand it: That for his own part, he could e neither venture into these Provinces of Gaul " where Cafar commanded without an Army, or bring an Army into the Field without great "Trouble and Expence: That he besides wondered extremely, what Business, either Casar, or the "People of Rome, could have in his Division of "Gaul, which belong'd to him by right of Con-" quest." This Answer being reported to Cafar, he again fent an Embassy to him to this effect: "That fince, notwithstanding the great Obligations " he lay under both to himself and the People of " Rome, in having, during his Confulship, been declared King and Ally by the Senate; he yet " manifested so little Acknowledgment to either, as even to refuse an Interview, and decline treating of Affairs that regarded the common Interest; "these were the Particulars he required of him: " First, not to bring any more Germans over the Rbine into Gaul. Secondly, to restore the Ho-" stages he had taken from the Æduans, and per-" mit the Sequani likewise to do the same. Lastly, to forbear all Injuries towards the Æduans, and " neither make War upon them nor their Allies. "That his Compliance with these Conditions "would establish a perpetual Friendship and " Amity between him and the People of Rome. "But if he refused Conditions so just; as the " Senate

Senate had decreed in the Confulship of M.BOOK

" Messala and M. Piso, that whoever had the I.

" charge of the Province of Gaul, should, as

" far as was confistent with the Interest of the

"Commonwealth, defend the Aduans, and the

other Allies of the People of Rome; he thought

" himself bound not to overlook their just Com-

" plaints."

XXVII. To this Ariovistus replied: " That " by the Laws of War, the Conqueror had a " right to impose what Terms he pleased upon the "Conquered: That in consequence of this, the " People of Rome did not govern the vanquished " by the Prescriptions of another, but according to their own Pleasure: That if he did not inter-" meddle with the Roman Conquests, but left them " to the free Enjoyment of their Rights, no more ought they to concern themselves in what re-" garded him: That the Æduans having tried the " Fortune of War, had been overcome and rendered " tributary; and it would be the highest Injustice " in Cæsar to offer at diminishing his just Revenues: That he was refolved not to part with the " Hostages the Æduans had put into his hands; 66 but would nevertheless engage, neither to make War upon them nor their Allies, provided they " observed the Treaty he had made with them, " and regularly paid the Tribute agreed upon; if otherwise, the Title of Friends and Allies of the " People of Rome would be found to stand them " but in little stead: That as to Casar's Menace " of not overlooking the Complaints of the " Aduans, he would have him know, no one had " ever entered into a War with Ariovistus, but to " his own Destruction: That he might when he " pleased bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted

BOOK" not, foon be made fensible what the invincible I. "Germans, trained up from their Infancy in the Exercise of Arms, and who for fourteen Years together had never slept under a Roof, were capable of atchieving."

XXVIII. At the same time that Casar received this Answer, Ambassadors also arrived from the Aduans and Treviri. From the Aduans, to complain: "That the Harudes, who had lately come " over into Gaul, were plundering their Territories; " infomuch, that even by their Submissions and " Hostages they were not able to obtain Peace of " Ariovistus." From the Treviri, to inform him: "That an hundred Cantons of the Suevians, headed by two Brothers, Nasua and Cimberius, were " arrived upon the Banks of the Rbine, with defign "to cross that River." Casar deeply affected with this Intelligence, determined to undertake the War without delay, left this new Band of Suevians, joining the old Forces of Ariovistus, should enable him to make a greater Refistance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the Subfiftence of his Army, he advanced towards him by great Marches.

AXIX. The third Day he was informed that Ariovistus approached with all his Forces to take possession of Vesontio, the Capital of the Sequani; and that he had already got three Days March beyond his own Territories. Casar judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this Design, as the Town itself was not only full of all forts of warlike Ammunition, but likewise strongly fortisted by Nature, and commodiously situated for carrying on the War. For the River Doux forming a Circle round it, as if described with a pair of Compasses.

leaves only an Interval of fix hundred Feet, which BOOK is also inaccessible by reason of a very high and steep Mountain, whose Roots are washed on each Side by the River. This Mountain is shut in with a Wall, which forming a Citadel, joins it to the Town. Hither Casar marched Day and Night without intermission; and having possessed himself of the Place, put a Garrison into it.

XXX. WHILST he tarried here a few Days, to fettle the Order of his Convoys and Supplies, the Curiofity of our Men, and the Talk of the Gauls, (who proclaimed on all Occasions the prodigious Stature of the Germans, their invincible Courage, and great Skill in Arms; infomuch that in the frequent Encounters with them, they had found it impossible to withstand their very Looks) spread fuch a fudden Terror thro' the whole Army, that they were not a little disturbed by the Apprehensions it occasioned. This Fear first began amongst the Military Tribunes, the Officers of the Allies, and others that had voluntarily followed Cefar from Rome; who being but little acquainted with military Affairs, lamented the great Danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. Some of these, upon various Pretences, defired leave to return. Others, out of shame, and unwilling to incur the suspicion of Cowardife, continued in the Camp. But these last, incapable of putting on a chearful Countenance, and at times even unable to suppress their Tears, sculked in their Tents, either bemoaning their Fate, or discoursing with their Companions upon the common Danger. Wills were made all over the Camp, and the Consternation began to seize even those of more experience, the veteran Soldiers, the Centurions, and the Officers of the Cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater VOL. I.

BOOK shew of Resolution, said it was not the Enemy they feared, but the narrow Passes and vast Forest's that lay between them and Ariovistus, and the Difficulty there would be in furnishing the Army with Provisions. Some even told Cefar, that when he gave Orders for marching, the Army, attentive to nothing but their Fears, would refuse to obey.

> XXXI. CÆSAR observing the general Consternation, called a Council of War; and having fummoned all the Centurions of the Army to be present, inveighed against them with great severity; for prefuming to enquire, or at all concern themfelves, which way, or on what defign they were to march. " Arioviftus." he told them, " during his Confulship, had earnestly fought the Al-" liance of the Roman People. Why therefore " should any one imagine, he would fo rashly and " hastily depart from his Engagements? That on " the contrary, he was himself firmly persuaded. that as foon as he came to know his Demands, " and the equal Conditions he was about to pro-" pose to him, he would be very far from reject-" ing either his Friendship, or that of the People of Rome. But if urged on by Madness and Rage, he was refolved upon War, what, after " all, had they to be afraid of? Or why should they distrust either their own Bravery, or his " Care and Conduct? That they were to deal with Enemies of whom trial had been already made in the memory of their Fathers, when by the " Victory of C. Marius over the Teutones and Cim-" bri, the Army itself acquired no less Glory than " the General who commanded it: That trial " had likewise been lately made of them in Italy in the fervile War, when they had also the Ad-" vantage

vantage of being exercised in the Roman Disci-BOOK on which Occasion it appeared, how " much Resolution and Constancy were able to " effect; fince they had vanquished in the end those " very Enemies armed and flushed with Victory, " whom at first they had without Cause dreaded " even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very " fame Germans, with whom the Helvetians had fo " often fought, not only in their own Country, but " in Germany itself, and for the most part come off " victorious, tho' they had by no means been a " match for our Army: That if the Defeat and " Flight of the Gauls gave uneafiness to any, these " would readily find upon enquiry, that Ariovistus " confining himself many Months to his Camp " and Fastnesses, and declining a general Action, " had thereby tired out the Gauls with the length " of the War; who despairing at last of a Battle, " and beginning to disperse, were thereupon attack-" ed and routed, rather by Conduct and Craft, " than the superior Valour of the Germans. But "tho' a Stratagem of this kind might take with " rude and uncultivated People, yet could not " even the German himself hope that it would avail " against a Roman Army: That as to those who " sheltered their Cowardise under the Pretence of narrow Passes, and the Difficulty of pro-" curing Provisions, he thought it argued no small "Presumption in them, either to betray such a " distrust of their General's Conduct, or offer " to prescribe to him what he ought to do: That " these things fell properly under his Care: That " the Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were to furnish " him with Provisions: That the Corn was now " ripe in the Fields; and that themselves would " foon be Judges as to what regarded the Ways: "That the Report of the Army's refusing to obey D 2

BOOK "him gave him not the least Disturbance; because " he very well knew, that no General had ever been so far slighted by his Soldiers, whose ill " Success, Avarice, or other Crimes, had not " justly drawn that Misfortune upon him: That " in all these respects he fancied himself secure, " as the whole Course of his Life would witness " for his Integrity, and his good Fortune had " shewn itself in the War against the Helvetians: "That he was therefore resolved to execute with-" out delay, what he otherwise intended to have " put off a little longer; and would give Orders for decamping the very next Night, three " Hours before Day, that he might as foon as " posible know, whether Honour and a Sense of "Duty, or an ignominious Cowardife had the " ascendant in his Army: Nay, that should all the " rest of the Troops abandon him, he would " nevertheless march with the tenth Legion alone, " of whose Fidelity and Courage he had no man-" ner of doubt, and which should serve him for " his Pretorian Guard." Cafar had always principally favoured this Legion, and placed his chief Confidence in it, on account of its Valour.

XXXII. This Speech made a wonderful Change upon the Minds of all, and begot an uncommon Alacrity and Eagerness for the War. The tenth Legion in particular, returned him thanks by their Tribunes, for the favourable Opinion he had express'd of them, and affored him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other Legions less industrious, by their Tribunes and principal Centurions, to reconcile themselves to Casar; protesting they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the General, to direct in matters of War. Having accepted

by means of Divitiacus, in whom of all the Gauls he most consided, that by taking a Circuit of above forty Miles, he might avoid the narrow Passes, and lead his Army thro' an open Country; he set forward three Hours after midnight, as he had said; and after a March of seven Days successively, understood by his Scouts, that he was within four and twenty Miles of Ariovistus's Camp.

XXXIII. ARIOVISTUS being informed of his Arrival, fent Ambassadors to acquaint him: "That " he was now willing to accept of an Interview, " as they were come nearer one another, and he " believed it might be done without Danger." Cafar did not decline the Proposal, imagining he was now disposed to listen to reason, since he offered that of his own accord, which he had before refused at his request: Neither was he without hope, that in regard of the Benefits he had received, both from himself and the People of Rome, he would, upon knowing his Demands, defift from his Obstinacy. The fifth Day after was appointed for the Inteview. Mean-time, as Ambassadors were continually paffing and repaffing, Ariovistus, under pretence that he was afraid of an Ambuscade, demanded: "That Cæfar should bring no Infantry " with him to the Conference: That they should " both come attended by their Cavalry only: "That otherwise he could not resolve to give him " a meeting." Cafar unwilling to drop the Design of the Interview; but neither caring to trust his Safety to the Gauls; thought the best way was, to dismount all the Gallick Cavalry, and give their Horses to the Soldiers of the tenth Legion, who had the greatest share of his Confidence; that in case of Danger, he might have a Guard on which D 3

BOOK he could rely. This being done accordingly, one I. of the Soldiers of that Legion faid pleasantly enough; "That Cafar had done even more than he had promised; that he had only given them hopes of becoming his Pretorian Guard; and now he had raised them to the Rank of Horse."

XXXIV. THERE was a large Plain, and in the midst of it a rising Ground of considerable height, equally distant from both Camps. At this Place, by Appointment, the Conference was held. Cafar stationed the legionary Soldiers, whom he had brought with him on the Horses of the Gauls, two hundred Paces from the Mount. Arioviftus did the fame with the German Cavalry. The Converfation was on horseback, each being accompanied by ten Friends or principal Officers, for fo Ariowiftus had defired. When they were come to the Place; Cafar began by putting him in mind of the Favours he had received both from himself and the People of Rome; "That he had been stiled Friend " and Ally by the Senate; that very confider-" able Presents had been sent him; that these " Honours conferred by the Romans on very few, " and only for fignal Services to the State, had " yet been bestowed on him, not on account of " any just Claim on his Side, but merely by the "Favour of Cæfar, and the Bounty of the Senate." He told him likewise, " of the just and ancient "Alliance between the Romans and the Æduans; of the many honourable Decrees of the Senate " in their Favour: That they had always held the " first Rank and Authority in Gaul, even before their Alliance with Rome: That it was the conse stant Maxim of the Roman People, not only to " defend their Friends and Allies in the possession of their just Rights, but likewise to study the " Enlargement

"Enlargement of their Honour, Interest, and BOOK Dignity: That it could never therefore be sup"posed, they would submitto see them stript of those Privileges which had belonged to them, before they were received into their Friendship." In sine, he concluded with repeating the same Demands which he had before made by his Ambassadors;
That he would not make War upon the Aduans or their Allies; that he would restore their Hostages; that if he could not oblige any of the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he would

" fuffer no more of them to come into Gaul."

XXXV. ARIOVISTUS spoke little to Cæfar's Demands, but enlarged greatly on his own Virtues: "That he had croffed the Rhine, not of his own " motion, but invited and intreated by the Gauls themselves: That the great Hopes and Expectations they had given him, had been his only "Inducement to quit his Country and Relations; "That he had Settlements in Gaul affigned by the "Gauls themselves; Hostages voluntarily sent; " and a Tribute in consequence of the Rights of "War; it being the constant Practice of Conquerors, to impose that Mark of Subjection on " those they had subdued: That he had not made "War upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him: "That though all their feveral States had united " against him, and brought up their Forces with " design to crush him, he had yet found means to " vanquish and disperse them in one Battle: That " if they were again resolved to try the Fortune " of War, he was ready and prepared to receive " them; but if they rather chose Peace, it was " unjust in them to refuse a Tribute, which they " had hitherto voluntarily paid: That the Friend-" ship of the People of Rome ought to be an Ho40

BOOK" nour and Security to him, not a Detriment; " nor had he courted it in any other view: but " if by their Alliance he must submit to lose his "Tributes, and his Right over the People he had " fubdued, he was no less willing to give it up, " than he had been ambitious to obtain it: That " he had indeed brought over a Multitude of "Germans into Gaul, yet not with any Design of " disturbing the Country, but merely for his own " Security; as appeared by his not coming but at " the Request of the Natives; and his not attack-" ing them, but defending himself: That his " Arrival in Gaul was prior to that of the Romans, whose Army had never till that time passed the Boundaries of their own Province. What could " they mean by coming into a Country that be-" longed to him? Or why should they concern "themselves with a part of Gaul that was no less " his Property, than the Province itself was that of the People of Rome? If it would not be allowable in him to make any Attempt upon their Possessions, neither could they without In-" justice disturb him in the Enjoyment of his Rights. That as to the pretence of Alliance between the Romans and Æduans, he was not fo " much a Barbarian, nor so wholly a Stranger to the " Affairs of the World, as not to know; that neither " had the Æduans affifted the Romans, in the late "War against the Allobrogians; nor received any " Affistance from them, in their many Conflicts with himself and the Sequani. That he ought to " be jealous of Cæsar's pretended Regard to the " Æduans; and had but too much reason to suspect, that the Continuance of the Roman Army in " Gaul could be with no other Defign than that of " oppressing him. That if he did not therefore "depart, and withdraw his Troops out of those " Parts. 5516913

" Parts, he would no longer look upon him as a BOOK

" Friend, but an Enemy. - That he was well af-

" fured, should he even slay him in Battle, he

" should do a Pleasure to many of the Nobles

" and great Men at Rome, who had explained

"themselves to him by Couriers, and whose Fa-

" vour and Friendship he might procure by his Death: but that if he would retire, and leave

him in the undiffurbed Poffession of Ganl, he

" would not only amply reward him, but engage,

" at his own Cost and Hazard, to put an end to

" any War Cafar should think fit to undertake."

XXXVI. MANY Reasons were offered by Casar, in return to this Speech, why he could not depart from his first Demands: " That neither his own " Honour, nor that of the People of Rome, would fuffer him to abandon Allies, who had deferved " fo well of the Commonwealth: That it no way " appeared to him, wherein Arioviftus had a juster "Claim to the Possession of Gaul than the Romans: "That the Averni and Ruteni had been subdued " by 2. Fabius Maximus; who yet contented with " their Submission, had neither reduced their "Country into a Province, nor fubjected it to a " Tribute: That if Antiquity of Title was to " decide, the Romans had an undoubted Right to " the Sovereignty of Gaul: If, on the contrary, " the Decree of the Senate was to take place, "Gaul must remain free, and subject only to its own Laws." es be fealous of Certar's precende

Interview, Cæfar was informed, that Ariovistus's Cavalry were drawing nearer the Mount, and had even affaulted the Romans with Stones and Darts. Cæfar immediately broke off the Conference, re-

treated

BOOK treated to his own Men, and strictly charged them to forbear all Acts of Hostility towards the Enemy. He did not fear the Success of an Action, with that chosen Legion, against the German Cavalry; but he was willing to maintain a Conduct perfeetly clear, and not give the Enemy the least handle to affert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an Ambuscade by a pretended Conference. When it was known in the Camp, with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the Interview; that he had ordered the Romans to depart out of Gaul; that his Cavalry had fallen upon Cafar's Guard; and that an end had thereby been put to the Conference; a much greater Alacrity and Defire of fighting spread themselves thro' the whole Army. The mon mont self will should

> XXXVIII. Two Days after, Ariovistus sent Ambassadors to Cæsar, to propose a renewal of the Negotiation begun; and that he would either again appoint a Day for a Conference, or depute some one to bring the Treaty to a Conclusion. Cafar faw no reason for granting a second Interview, more especially when he considered, that the time before, the Germans could not be restrained from falling upon our Men. Neither was he inclined to fend any of his principal Officers; it feeming too great a venture, to expose them to the Perfidy of these Barbarians. He therefore cast his Eyes upon C. Valerius Procillus, the Son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young Man of great Merit and Politeness, whose Father been made free of the City by C. Valerius Flaccus. His fingular Integrity, and Knowledge of the Language of the Gauls, which Ariovistus, by reason of long stay in those Parts, spoke readily; fitted him in a particular manner for this Embassy: and as he was likewife 311.17

likewise one towards whom it would no way avail BOOK the Germans to use any treachery, he thought him I. less liable to an Insult of that kind. M. Mettius was joined in Commission with him, who was allied to Ariovistus by the rights of Hospitality. Their Instructions were, to hear the German's Proposals, and carry back a report of them to Casar. But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's Camp, than in presence of the whole Army, calling out to know their Business, and whether they were come as Spies, he commanded them to be put in Irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

XXXIX. The fame Day he came forward with all his Forces, and lodged himself under a Hill, about fix Miles from our Camp. The Day after he went two Miles beyond it, to cut off Cæsar's Communication with the Æduans and Sequani, from whom he received all his Provisions. Cæsar, for five Days continually, drew up his Men in order of Battle before the Camp, that if Ariovistus had a mind, he might not be without an Opportunity of coming to an Engagement. The Germans kept all that time within their Lines; only we had daily Skirmishes with their Cavalry, whose manner of fighting was this. They had about fix thousand Horse, who chose a like number out of the Foot, each his Man, and all remarkable for Strength and Agility. These continually accompanied them in Battle, and ferved as a Rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire: if the Action became dangerous, they advanced to their relief: if any Horseman was considerably wounded, and fell from his Horse, they gathered round to defend him: if speed was required, either for a hasty Pursuit, or sudden Retreat, they were become fo nimble and alert by continual Exercise,

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BOOK ercise, that laying hold of the Mains of the Horses,

I. they could run as fast as they.

XL. CASAR finding that Ariovifus declined a Battle, thought it necessary to provide for the freedom of his Convoys. With this view he marked out a Place for a Camp, fix hundred Paces beyond that of the Enemy, whither he marched with his whole Army drawn up in three Lines. The first and fecond Line had Orders to continue under Arms, and the third to employ themselves in fortifying the Camp. Ariovistus sent sixteen thousand light-armed Foot, and all his Horse, to alarm our Men, and hinder the Work. But Cafar remained firm to his first Defign, ordering the two Lines that continued under Arms to keep off the Enemy, and the third to go on with the Intrenchments. The Work being finished, he left two Legions there, with part of the Auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former Camp. The next Day he affembled all his Troops from both Camps, drew them up according to Custom, and offered the Enemy Battle: but they still refusing to come to an Engagement, he retired again about Noon. Ariovistus then detached part of his Forces to attack the leffer Camp. A sharp Conflict ensued, that lasted 'till Night. At Sun-set Ariovistus thought proper to found a Retreat, after many Wounds given and received. Cafar inquiring of the Prisoners, why Ariovistus so obstinately refused an Engagement, found: that it was the Custom among the Germans, for the Women to decide by Lots and Divination, when it was proper to hazard a Battle; and that these had declared, the Army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new Moon and a mach readily yet tant a both had Light out to the larger or too has below the XLI.

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XLI. THE Day after, Cafer having left a fuffi-BOOK cient Guard in his two Camps, ranged all the auxiliary Troops before the leffer Comp, placing them directly in view of the Enemy for the greater flew. because the number of legionary Soldiers was but inconfiderable, compared with that of the Germans. Then advancing at the head of all his Forces in three Lines, he marched quite up to the Enemy's Camp. Upon this the Germans, compelled by Necessity, appeared before their Intrenchments; and having distributed their Troops by Nations, and disposed them at equal distances one from another, the Harudes, Marcomani, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians; encompassed the whole Army with a Line of Carriages, to take away all hopes of Safety by Flight. The Women mounted upon these Carriages, weeping and tearing their Hair, conjured the Soldiers as they advanced to Battle, not to fuffer them to become Slaves to the Romans. Cafar having appointed a Lieutenant and Questor to each Legion, to serve as Witnesses of every Man's Courage and Behaviour, began the Battle in Person at the Head of the right Wing, observing the Enemy to be weakest on that side. The Signal being given, our Men charged fo brifkly, and the Enemy advanced so swiftly and suddenly to meet them, that the Romans not having time to throw their Darts, betook themselves immediately to their Swords. But the Germans quickly casting themselves into a Phalanx, according to the Custom of their Country, sustained the shock with great Firmness. Many of our Soldiers leaped upon the Phalanx, tore up the Buckters of the Enemy with their Hands, and wounded those that lay under them. Their left Wing was foon routed and put to flight; but on the right

BOOK they had the Advantage, and were like to overpower the Romans by their numbers. Young Craffus, who commanded the Cavalry, and was more at liberty than those immediately engaged in the Fight, observing this, made the third Line advance to support them. Upon this the Battle was renewed, and the Enemy every where put to the rout: nor did they cease their Flight 'till they had reached the Banks of the Rhine, about fifty Miles di-Stant from the place of Combat. There only a few escaped; some by swimming, others by Boats. Of this last number was Ariovistus, who embarking in a small Vessel he found by the edge of the River, got fafe to the other fide. All the rest were cut to pieces in the Pursuit by our Cavalry. Ariovistus had two Wives; one a Suevian, whom he had brought with him from Germany; the other a Norican, Sifter to King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul. Both perished in this Flight. Of his two Daughters, one was killed, the other taken Prisoner. C. Valerius Procillus, whom his Keepers dragged after them in their Flight, bound with a triple Chain, fell in with Cæsar in Person, as he was pursuing the German Cavalry. Nor was the Victory itself more grateful to that General, than his good Fortune in recovering out of the hands of the Enemy a Man, the most distinguished for his Probity of the whole Province of Gaul, his intimate and familiar Friend; and to find the Joy and Success of that Day no way diminished or clouded, by the loss of a Person he so highly esteemed. Procillus told him, that Lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive upon the Spot, or referved for another time; and that the Lot three times favourable, had preferved his Life. Mettius was likewife reco. vered and brought. XI.II.

they had the Advantage, and were like to over

XLII. This Battle being reported beyond the BOOK Rhine, the Suevians, who were advanced as far as the Banks of that River, thought proper to return to their own Country. But retreating in disorder and confusion, they were attacked by the Ubians, a People bordering upon the Rhine, and many of them cut to pieces. Casar having in one Campaign put an end to two very considerable Wars, went into Winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the Season of the Year required. He distributed his Army among the Sequani, left Labienus to command in his absence, and set out himself for Cifalpine Gaul, to preside in the Assembly of the States.

vishes had two Wives; one a success, where he had brought with him from Geometry; the other a Nortean, Sifter to King Focies, whose he had martied in Gad. Both perished in this Hight. Of his two Daughters, one was killed, the other taken

Prisoner C. Valerius Procillus, whom his Keeper dragged after tixen in their Flight, bound with a triple Chain, fell in with Cefar in Person, as he was purfuing the German Cavalty. Nor was the Videsy itielf more grateful to that General, than his good Fortune in recovering out of the bands of the Enemy a Man, the most diffinguished for his Probity of the whole Province of Coul, are into mare and familiar Friend; and to find the Joy and Success of that Day no way diminished or council, SULLUÇ.Dr a Perfon he to highly ettermed Provilles rold him, that Lots had been thrice amount in his own prefence, to decide whether he that his be burnt alive upon the Spot, or referved for his ther time; and that the Lot three times favoured had preferved his Life. Metting was likewise regred and brought.

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WARY in GAUL.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK II,

THE ARGUMENT.

I. The Confederacy of the Belgians against the People of Rome. III. The Rhemi submit upon the Approach of Cæsar. IV. And inform him of the Strength and Designs of the Confederates. VI. Cæsar passes the Axona with his Army. VII. Bibrax, a Town belonging to the Rhemi, affaulted by the Belgians. Cæfar relieves it, and obliges the Belgians to retire. IX. The Armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an Engagement. XI. The Belgians despairing of Success, decamp and return home. XII. Cæsar attacks their Rear, and makes great Slaughter. XIII. He then marches against the Suessiones, and obliges them to submit. XIV. Advancing next into the Country of the Bellovaci, he pardons them at the Intercession of Divitiacus. XVI. The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their Defence. XXIII. They are defeated however in a long and bloody Engagement, and almost all cut off. XXIX. Cæsar prepares to attack the Attuatici. XXXI. They submit. XXXIII. But falling treacherously upon the Romans during the Night; XXXIV. Are many of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for Slaves.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK II.

N the Winter, whilst Casar was in Hither Gaul, as we have intimated above; he was alarmed by frequent Reports, which were also confirmed by Letters from Labienus, that all the Belgians, who, as has been faid, possessed one of the three Divisions of Gaul, had joined in a League against the People of Rome, and ratified it by an Exchange of Hostages. The Causes of this Confederacy were: First, their fear lest the Romans, having fubdued all the rest of Gaul, should next turn their Arms against them: And then the Perfuasions and Importunity of some among the Celtæ; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the Neighbourhood of the Germans in Gaul, fo were they no less displeased to see a Roman Army take up Winter-quarters and grow habitual in the Country: Others, from a Levity and Inconstancy of Temper,

BOOK Temper, were fond of every Project that tended II. to a Revolution. In fine, fome were influenced by ambitious Views, it being usual in Gaul, for such as were most powerful in their several States, and had Men and Money at command, to exercise a kind of Sovereignty over their Fellow-subjects, which they foresaw would be greatly checked by the Authority and Credit of the Romans in Gaul.

II. CÆSAR, roused by these Messages and Reports, levied two new Legions in Hither Gaul; and early in the Spring, fent Q. Pedius his Lieutenant to conduct them over the Alps. Himself, as soon as there began to be Forage in the Fields, came to the Army. He commissioned the Senones, and other Gauls who bordered on the Belgians, to inform themselves of the Motions and Designs of the Confederates, and fend him from time to time They all agree in their Rean exact Account. ports; that they were levying Troops, and drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous. Whereupon thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, and having settled the necessary Supplies for his Army, he decamped, and in fifteen Days arrived on the Confines of the Belgians.

III. As his Approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected; the Rhemi, who of all the Belgians lay the nearest to Celtic Gaul, dispatched Iccius and Autobrigius, the two principal Men of their State, to represent to Cæsar: "That they put themselves and Fortunes under the Power and Protection of the Romans, as having neither approved of the Designs of the rest of the Belgians, nor had any share in their Confected deracy against the People of Rome: That on the contrary, they were ready to give Hostages,

" to

to execute his Commands, to receive him into BOOK their Towns, and to furnish him with Corn and other Supplies for his Army: That indeed the rest of the Belgians were all in Arms, and that the Germans on this side the Rhine had associated with them: Nay, that so universal and prevalent was the Infatuation, they had not even been able to draw off the Suessiones, a People united to them by the nearest Ties of Blood and Friendship, who were subject to the same Laws, lived under the same Form of Government, and acknowledged but one common Ma-

IV. CÆSAR inquiring of the Ambassadors, what States had taken up Arms, of what Name and Consideration, and what Forces they could bring into the Field; found: That the Belgians were for the most part Germans originally, who having formerly croffed the Rhine, had been drawn by the Fertility of the Country to fettle in those Parts. after driving out the ancient Inhabitants: That in the late Irruption of the Teutones and Cimbri, when all the other Provinces of Gaul were over-run, they alone had ventured to stand upon their Defence; nor suffered the Barbarians to set foot in their Territories; whence it happened, that prefuming on fo well-known an Instance of their Bravery, they laid claim to great Authority, and challenged high military Renown. As to their Numbers, the Rhemi told him they could give him the most exact Information; because in consequence of their Affinity and Neighbourhood, they had Opportunities of knowing what Quota of Men each particular State had promifed to furnish in the common Council of Belgium. " That the Bello-" vaci held the most distinguished Rank, as sur-E 3

" gistrate."

54

BOOK" paffing all the other States in Prowefs, Authori-"ty, and Number of Forces: That they were " able to muster an hundred thousand fighting " Men, and had promifed out of that Number fixty thousand chosen Troops, in consideration of which they demanded the whole Administra-That next to them in Digni-" tion of the War. ty were the Suessiones, a People bordering upon "their own Territories, and possessed of a very 46 large and fruitful Country, over which even of 14 late Years Divitiacus had been King, one of the most powerful Princes of all Gaul, and who be-" fides his Dominions in those Parts, reigned also over Britain: That their present Sovereign was "Galba, whose singular Prudence and Justice had " procured him, by the confent of all the Confe-" derates, the supreme Command in the War: "That these had within their Territories twelve " fortified Towns, and promised to bring into the "Field fifty thousand Men. That the like Num-" ber had been stipulated by the Nervians, who 56 inhabiting the remotest Provinces of Gaul, were " esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the " Belgian Nations. That the Atrebatians were to " furnish fifteen thousand: The Ambiani ten thou-" fand: The Morini twenty-five thousand: The " Menapians nine thousand: The Caletes ten thous fand: The Velocaskans and Veromanduans the like " Number: The Atuatici twenty-nine thousand: 44 And the Condrusians, Eburones, Ceresians, and " Pæmani, all comprehended under the common " Name of Germans, forty thousand.

V. CÆSAR exhorting the Men of Rheims to continue firm in their Alliance, and promising amply to reward their Fidelity, ordered the whole Body of their Senate to repair to his Camp, and the Sons

of their principal Nobility to be brought him as BOOK Hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the Day appointed. He then addressed himself to Divitiacus the Æduan, representing in the warmest manner, of what Consequence it was to the common Cause, to divide the Forces of the Enemy, that he might not be reduced to the Necessity of encountering so great a Multitude at once. This he told him, might easily be effected, if the Æduans would march their Forces into the Territories of the Bellovaci, to plunder and lay waste the Country. With these Instructions he dismissed them.

VI. MEAN-TIME, being informed by his Scouts, and the People of Rheims, that all the Forces of the Belgians were marching towards him in a Body, and that they were even advanced within a few Miles, he made all the hafte he could to pass his Army over the Axona, which divides the Rhemi from the rest of the Belgians, and encamped on the farther fide of that River. By this Situation he fecured all behind him, covered one fide of his Camp with the River, and rendered the Communication with the Rhemi, and those other States. whence he expected to be supplied with Provisions. fafe and easy. Adjoining to his Camp was a Bridge over the River; there he placed a strong Guard, and left 2. Titurius Sabinus his Lieutenant on the other fide with fix Cohorts. He then drew round his Camp a Ditch eighteen Foot broad, strengthened with a Rampart twelve Foot high.

VII. THE Belgians in their March fell furiously upon Bibrax, a Town belonging to the Rhemi, about eight Miles distant from Casar's Camp. The Inhabitants with great difficulty held out against that E 4 Day's

BOOK Day's Affault. The manner of storming a Town is II. the same among the Belgians as among the Gauls: for having furrounded the Walls with the whole Body of their Army, and by a continual Discharge from their Slings cleared the Ramparts, they approach the Gates under covert of their Bucklers, and undermine the Walls. This was easy in the present Case: because the Multitude employed in throwing Stones and Darts was fo great, that none of the Garrison durst appear upon the Walls. Night had put an end to the Affault, Iccius, who then commanded in the Town, a Man of principal Rank and Authority among the Rhemi, and one of those who had come Ambassadors to Casar to treat about a Peace, dispatched Messengers to acquaint him, that unless he was speedily relieved, it would be impossible for him to hold out any longer.

> VIII. HEREUPON Cafar, making use of those for Guides who had come express to his Camp from Iccius, detached about midnight a Party of Cretan and Numidian Archers, with some Balearean Slingers, to the affiftance of the Garrison. Their Arrival encouraged the befieged to fland upon their defence, and inspired them with hopes of repulfing the Enemy, who now began to despair of Success, when they heard that a Reinforcement had entered the Town. Wherefore, after a short stay before the Place, having plundered all the Country round about, and burnt the Houses and Villages wherever they came, they marched in a Body towards Cæsar's Camp, and posted themselves within two Miles of his Army, inclosing a space of more than eight thousand Paces in Circumference, as as near as could be computed from the Smoke and Fires of their Camp.

IX.

BOOK, Day's Affault The manner of floringer a Fourt IX. CASAR at first resolved to avoid coming BOOK to a Battle, as well on account of the numbers of the Enemy, as the high Opinion entertained of their Courage. He suffered the Horse however to engage daily in small Skirmishes, that he might the better judge of the Valour of the Belgian Troops, and the Refolution and Bravery of his own Men. Finding that the Romans were nothing inferior to the Enemy in Courage, he resolved to wait for them before his Camp; the Ground being very commodious, and as it were formed by Nature for the reception of an Army. For the Hill on which the Camp flood, rifing with an eafy ascent from the Plain, was but just of a sufficient breadth on the fide facing the Enemy, to receive the feveral Lines of the Army drawn up in Order of Battle. On the right hand and on the left the descent was steep; whereby the Mountain swelling in front, but gradually abating its declivity as you advanced towards the Bottom, came at last to a Plain. Along each Side of the Hill Cafar dug a Trench of about four hundred Paces in length, and built Forts at the Extremities, where he placed Engines to repulse the Enemy, should they offer to attack him in flank, or endeavour, during the Fight, to furround him with their numbers. These Dispositions being made, and having left the two new levied Legions in his Camp, as a Body of Referve in case of Need, he drew up the other fix in order of Battle. The Belgians likewife drew up their Troops, and stood fronting our Army.

X. Between Cæsar and the Enemy there was a small Morass. The Belgians waited to see if we would pass it: Our Men on the other hand were ready in Arms, that should the Enemy attempt to come

BOOK come over, they might fall upon them, and take II. advantage of their Confusion. Mean-time the Cavalry on both sides engaged; but as neither Army would hazard the passage of the Morass, Casar, who had the better in the Skirmish of the Horse, led back his Men to their Camp. The Belgians marched directly towards the Axona, which, as we have said, lay behind our Camp; and having sound a Ford, endeavoured to pass over part of their Army. Their Design was, if possible, to make themselves masters of the Fort where Q. Titurius commanded, and break down the Bridge; or, should they sail in that Attempt, to ravage and lay waste the Territories of the Rhemi, whence our Army was supplied with Provisions.

XI. CÆSAR being informed of these things by Titurius, croffed the Bridge with his Cavalry, lightarmed Numidians, Archers, and Slingers, marched to attack the Enemy. A very sharp Conflict enfued: for the Romans falling upon them while they were yet passing the River, and by reafon of their Diforder unable to defend themselves, flew great numbers. The rest, who with undaunted Courage advanced upon the Bodies of their Companions, were repulfed by the Multitude of Darts from our Men; and the Cavalry furrounding those that were already got over, put them all to the Sword. The Belgians being thus disappointed, both in their Design upon Bibrax, and the Pasfage of the Axona; finding too that Provisions began to be scarce, and that our Army could not be drawn to fight them at a disadvantage, called a Council of War. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every Man to his own Country; with a Refolution however to affemble from all Parts, in defence of that State, whose Territories

Territories should be first invaded by the Romans: BOOK for they concluded it much safer to carry on the War at home, where they might have Provisions and every thing at command, than venture a Battle within the Confines of a foreign State. These Reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful Consideration: for the Bellovaci having Intelligence that Divitiacus and the Æduans were advancing towards their Territories, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards, to defend their own Country.

XII. This Resolution being taken; about the fecond Watch of the Night, they left their Camp with great Noise and Tumult, regarding neither the Order of their March, nor the due Subordination of Command, but each Man pressing for the foremost Rank, that he might get the sooner home, infomuch that their Retreat had all the Appearance of a precipitate Flight. Cæfur, who had immediate Notice of this from his Spies, apprehending some Stratagem, because he as yet knew nothing of the Reason of their Departure, would not stir out of his Trenches. But early in the Morning. upon more certain Intelligence of their Retreat, he detached all the Cavalry, under Q. Pedius and L. Arunculeius Cotta, his Lieutenants, to harafs and retard them in their March T. Labienus had Orders to follow with three Legions. These falling upon their Rear, and pursuing them many Miles, made a dreadful flaughter of the flying Troops. Whilft the Rear, upon finding themselves attacked, faced about, and valiantly fuftained the Charge. of our Men; the Vanguard, as fancying themselves out of danger, were not to be reftrained either by Necessity or the Voice of their Commanders, but upon hearing the Alarm behind them, broke their Ranks, BOOK Ranks, and betook themselves to slight. Thus the Romans, with little or no Loss on their side, continued the Slaughter all the remaining part of the Day. About Sun-set they gave over the Pursuit, and in obedience to the Orders they had received, returned to their Camp.

XIII. THE next Day, before the Enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their Consternation, Cæsar led his Army into the Territories of the Suessiones, which join to those of the Rhemi; and after a long March reached Noviodunum. in hopes of carrying the Town by Affault, because he understood it was destitute of a Garrison: but as the Ditch was broad, and the Wall very high, the Defendants, tho' few in number, withstood all his Efforts. Wherefore having fortified his Camp, he began to provide Engines, and get every thing in readiness for a Siege. Mean-time such of the Suesfiones as had escaped the late Slaughter, threw themfelves during the Night into the Town. But Cafar advancing his Preparations with great Expedition, and approaching under cover of his Mantelets to the very Walls, where he cast up a Mount, and planted his battering Towers; the Gauls aftonished at the Greatness of the Works, as having never feen or heard of any fuch before, and at the Difpatch wherewith they were carried on, fent Deputies to treat about a Surrender, and by the Mediation of the Rhemi obtained Conditions of Peace.

XIV. CÆSAR having received the principal Men of their State as Hostages, amongst whom were the two Sons of Galba their King; and obliged them to deliver up all their Arms, admitted the Suessiones to a Surrender, and led his Army against the Bellovaci. These retiring with their Effects into

into Bratuspantium their capital City, and under-BOOK standing that Cæsar was advanced within five Miles of the Town, sent a Deputation of all their old Men, who came forth in venerable Procession to meet him, signifying by out-stretched Hands, and in the most submissive Terms, that they put themselves under his Power and Protection, nor pretended to appear in Arms against the People of Rome: and when he approached still nearer the City, and encamped within view of the Walls, the Women and Children from the Ramparts, with extended Arms, according to the Custom of their Country, besought the Romans for Peace.

XV. HEREUPON Divitiacus, who after the Retreat of the Belgian Army, had dismissed the Æduans, and returned to Cæsar's Camp, interposed in their behalf, representing: " That the Bellovaci " had always lived in strict Friendship and Alli-" ance with the Æduans: That the artful Infinua-"tions of their Chiefs, who misrepresented Casar, " as one that had enslaved the Æduan State, and " held it under an ignominious Tyranny and Oporeffion, had alone induced them to forfake their " ancient Allies, and take up Arms against the "People of Rome: That the Authors of this " Advice, feeing its pernicious Effects, and the "Ruin they had brought upon their Country, were retired into Britain: That not only the Bel-" lovaci themselves, but the Æduans too, in their " behalf, implored his Clemency and Forgiveness: "That in granting their Request, he would greatly " enlarge the Credit and Authority of the Æduans " among the Belgian States; which was of fo much " the greater moment, as in all their Wars they were wont to have recourse to them for Affift-" ance." Casar, out of regard to Divitiacus and

BOOK the Æduans, promised to grant them Pardon and II. Protection; but as they were possessed of very extensive Territories, and surpassed in Power and number of Forces all the other Belgian States, he demanded six hundred Hostages.

XVI. THESE being accordingly delivered, together with all their Arms, Cafar left their City. and advanced into the Country of the Ambiani; who fubmitted immediately upon his Approach. Adjoining to them were the Nervians; of whose Manners and Genius Cæsar inquiring, found: "That they fuffered no refort of Merchants into " their Cities, nor would allow of the importation " of Wine, or other Commodities tending to " Luxury; as imagining that thereby the Minds of " Men were enfeebled, and their martial Fire and " Courage extinguished: That they were Men of a " warlike Spirit; but altogether unacquainted with the Refinements of Life: that they continually " inveighed against the rest of the Belgians, for ig-" nominiously submitting to the Roman Yoke, and " abandoning the steddy Bravery of their An-" ceftors: In fine, that they had openly declared " their Resolution, of neither sending Ambassa-" dors to Casar, nor accepting any Terms of " Peace." Cæsar, after a March of three Days cross their Territories, understood from some Prifoners: " That he was now advanced within ten " Miles of the Sambre, on the other fide of which "the Enemy had posted themselves, and there " waited the coming up of the Romans: That they " had been joined by the Atrebatians and Veroman-" duans, neighbouring Nations, whom they had " persuaded to take part in, and share the Fortune " of the War: That they expected also to be rein-" forced by the Atuatici, who were already on " their

- " their March: And that all their Women, and BOOK
- " fuch as on account of their Age were unfit to II.
- " bear Arms, had been conveyed to a Place of
- " fafety, inacceffible by reason of the Marshes
- " that furrounded it."

XVII. CÆSAR, upon this Intelligence, fent his Scouts and Centurions before, to choose out a convenient Place for his Camp. Mean-time, as many of the Belgians who had lately submitted, and also not a few Gauls, followed the Roman Army; fome of these, as was afterwards known from the Prisoners, observing the Order and Disposition of our March, deferted in the Night to the Enemy, and informed them: " That the feveral Legions were " feparated from one another, by a number of " Carriages posted between them: that they would "therefore have a favourable Opportunity, as " foon as the first Legion was arrived in the Camp, " and while the rest were yet a great way behind, " of falling upon it incumbered with the Baggage, " and obtaining an eafy Victory; by which, and " the Plunder of the Carriages, they would strike " fuch a terror thro' the whole Army, as must ne-" ceffarily draw after it a total Defeat." This Advice was the more readily liftened to, because of old the Nervians, being very weak in Horse, (nor even as yet have they greatly increased their Strength this way, placing their whole Confidence in their Foot,) in order to fecure themselves against the Inroads of the Cavalry of the neighbouring Nations, had every where fortified the Country with Barricades of young Trees; which being split in the middle, and bent down on both fides; the void Spaces were fo closely interwoven with Brambles, Thorns, and a multitude of Boughs, iffuing II. a Fence not only impossible to be passed, but even to be seen through. As these therefore must greatly impede and perplex the March of the Roman Army, they thought the Advice given them by the Belgians was by no means to be neglected.

XVIII. THE Place chosen by our Men for their Camp was a Hill, running with an even defect from the summit 'till it reached the Banks of the Sambre. Directly opposite to this, on the farther side of the River, and at the distance of about two hundred Paces, was another Hill, of a like acclivity with the former, plain and open round the Bottom, but covered on the Top with Woods, so thick that they hindered the Prospect. Among these Woods the Enemy lay concealed, and only a few Squadrons of Horse appeared on the open Ground by the River-side, whose depth in that Place did not exceed three Foot.

XIX CÆSAR having sent the Cavalry before, followed himself with the rest of the Army. But the Order and Disposition of his March differed from the Account given in to the Enemy by the Belgians. For knowing that the Nervians were near, he led up six Legions in front, ready equipped for Battle, according to his usual Custom. After them followed the Baggage of the whole Army; and then the two new Legions, who closed the March and served as a Guard to the Carriages. Mean-time the Roman Cavalry, with the Slingers and Archers, having passed the River, engaged the Enemy's Horse: but as they retired from time to time into the Woods, and again sallied upon our Men, who durst not pursue them beyond

the open Ground; the fix Legions that formed the BOOK Van coming up during these successive Rencounters, began to intrench themselves. When the first Line of our Carriages appeared within fight of those that lay concealed in the Woods, which was the time previously concerted by the Enemy for giving the Onset: the Nervians, who stood ready drawn up within the Thicket, and had mutually exhorted one another to a resolute Behaviour, rushed fuddenly forward with all their Forces, and fell furiously upon our Cavalry. These being easily repulsed and broken; they ran down with incredible speed to the Sambre, insomuch that at one and the fame inftant, they feemed to be in the Woods, in the River, and charging our Men on the other side. Nor were they less expeditious in mounting the Hill, and attacking those who were employed in fortifying the Camp.

XX. Now had Cafar all the Parts of a General upon his hands at once: to erect the Standard, which was the Signal for the Men to fly to Arms: to proclaim the Battle by found of Trumpet: to draw off the Soldiers from the Works: to recal those that were gone to fetch Materials for the Rampart: to draw up the Army in Order of Battle: to encourage his Men: and give the Word of Onset: in most of which he was prevented by the shortness of the Time, and the sudden Assault of the Enemy. In this Emergency, two things chiefly contributed to the Preservation of the Romans: one, the Ability and Experience of the Soldiers, who practifed in former Battles, knew their Duty, and what was expedient in the present Conjuncture, no less than the Officers themselves: the other, the Orders given by Casar to his several Lieutenants, not to quit the Works, and the Le-Vol. I. gions

BOOK gions where they commanded, 'till the Fortifications of the Camp were finished. For these, upon
seeing the Danger, and sudden Approach of the
Enemy, waited not for new Instructions from the
General, but gave forth such Orders, as their own
Prudence, and the present Necessity suggested.

XXI. CÆSAR having made the necessary Dispofitions, ran to encourage his Men; and, as Chance ordered it, fell in with the tenth Legion. exhorting them in few Words to exert their wonted Bravery, and manfully fustain the Assault without Terror or Difmay; as he faw the Enemy within reach of Dart, he gave the Signal to engage. Haftening thence to another quarter of the Field, he found the Battle already begun. So short was the time allowed us to prepare ourselves, and such the Refolution and Impetuosity of the Nervians in rushing to the Encounter, that neither could the Officers find leifure to regulate the Enfigns, nor the Soldiers to put on their Helmets, or uncase their Targets. Each Man, as he arrived from the Works, joined himself to the first Standard that came in his way, that he might not lofe that time in looking for his own Company, which was to be employed in fighting the Enemy.

XXII. THE Army being drawn up, rather according to the nature of the Place, the declivity of the Hill, and the particular necessity of the Time; than agreeable to Order and the Rules of War: as the Legions were forced to engage separately, some in one Place, some in another; and the View of the Fight was every where interrupted by the thick Hedges described above: it was not possible in these Circumstances, to distinguish with any certainty, where to send the necessary Supplies;

how

how to provide against the Exigencies of the Field; BOOK nor indeed for one Man to have an Eye to all the II.

Occurrences that called for Notice and Redress.

In such an unequal Situation of Things therefore, much room was left for the various Events and Interposition of Fortune.

XXIII. THE Soldiers of the ninth and tenth Legions, who were upon the left of the Army, having cast their Darts, advanced against the Atrebatians, with whom it was their fortune to engage. These now weary, breathless, and overpowered with Wounds, were quickly driven from the higher Ground quite back to the Sambre, where the Romans still preffing them Sword in hand, slew great numbers as they endeavoured to pass the River. Nor did our Men decline pursuing them to the other fide: but following too far, 'till they were drawn into a Place of disadvantage, the Enemy suddenly faced about, and renewed the Charge; yet were a fecond time obliged to betake themselves to flight. So likewise, in another quarter of the Field, the eleventh and eighth Legions, having overthrown the Veromanduans against whom they fought, drove them from the higher Ground to the very Banks of the River.

XXIV. As by this means the Front, and left fide of the Roman Camp, lay in a manner quite exposed; for the twelfth Legion, and not far from that the seventh, were posted in the right Wing: the Nervians headed by Boduognatus their King, advanced thither in a close Body; and whilst one Party endeavoured to surround the Legions by taking them in flank, the rest mounted the Hill in order to get possession of the Camp. At the same time our Cavalry, with the light-armed Infan-

try,

BOOKtry, who in the very beginning of the Engagement had been repulfed and broken, as we have related above; returning to the Camp, and meeting the Enemy in Front, again betook themselves to flight. The Servants too of the Army, who from the Top of the Hill had beheld our Men victorious, and purfuing the Enemy cross the River; having fallied out for the fake of Plunder: when they now looked back, and faw the Nervians in possession of the Camp, sled with the utmost This Confusion was still more in-Precipitation. creased by the Clamour and Uproar of those that attended the Carriages; infomuch that the Panick fpreading on all fides, each Man thought of providing for his Safety by Flight. The Cavalry of Treves, who were in the highest Esteem among the Gauls for their Valour, and had been fent by the State to reinforce Cæsar's Army; alarmed by these feveral Appearances: when they faw our Camp filled with Multitudes of the Enemy; the Legions overpowered, and in a manner quite furrounded; the Horse, Archers, Slingers, and Numidians, routed, difperfed, and flying on all hands: imagining all was loft, returned to their own Country, and reported; that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and their Camp and Baggage in possession of the Enemy.

> XXV. CÆSAR having encouraged the tenth Legion, hastened to the right Wing of the Army. He there found his Men overpowered by the Enemy; the Enfigns of the twelfth Legion all crowded into one place, and the Soldiers themselves standing fo close together, that they had not room to use their Arms; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort flain, the Standard-bearer killed, and the Standard taken; the Centurions of the other Cohorts

horts almost all either killed or dangerously wound-BOOK ed; among these P. Sextius Baculus, the first Cen- IL turion of the Legion, a Man of great Courage, fo weakened by the multitude of his Wounds, that he was hardly able to support himself; the rest discouraged and avoiding the Fight, and some even running away, because abandoned by the Troops that were to fustain them; the Enemy pressing vigorously in Front from the lower Ground, and at the fame time flanking the Legions on either fide with great Fury; in a word, things reduced to the last Extremity, and no Body of Referve to restore the Battle. Whereupon fnatching a Buckler from a Soldier who stood in the Rear of the Legion, for he himself was come thither without one; and pressing to the Front of the Battle; he called the Centurions by Name, encouraged the rest, and commanded the Soldiers to advance the Enfigns, and widen their Ranks, that they might be the more at liberty to use their Swords. His Arrival inspiring the Men with Hope, and reviving their Courage, as every one was ambitious of diftinguishing himself in the presence of his General, and even in his greatest Extremity, redoubled his Efforts; the Progress of the Enemy was a little checked. Howard the grante

XXVI. CÆSAR observing that the seventh Legion, which sought at some distance from the other, was likewise very much pressed by the Enemy, commanded the military Tribunes to draw the two Legions together by degrees, and joining them back to back, oppose the Enemy with a double Front. This being done; as they were now in a Condition to support each other, and no longer feared being surrounded, they began to make a more vigorous Opposition, and fight with greater Courage. Mean-time the two new Legions that formed the Rear of our Army, and had been appointed

BOO Kpointed to guard the Baggage; hearing of the II. Battle, advanced with all possible speed, and were seen by the Nervians from the top of the Hill: and T. Labienus, who had made himself Master of the Enemy's Camp, observing from the higher Ground how matters went on our side, detached the tenth Legion to our assistance. These understanding, by the Flight of Cavalry and Servants, the Distress we were in, and the Danger that threatned the Camp, the Legions, and the General, made all the haste they could to join us.

XXVII. THE Arrival of this Detachment produced fo great a Change in our Favour, that many of the Soldiers, who before lay oppressed with Wounds, now refuming Courage, and supporting themselves with their Shields, renewed the Fight. Nay the very Servants of the Camp observing the Consternation of the Enemy, unarmed as they were, rushed amongst their armed Battalions. The Cavalry too, striving by extraordinary Efforts of Valour to wipe away the Ignominy of their late Flight, charged the Enemy in all Places where the void Spaces between the Legions fuffered them to advance. Mean-time the Nervians, tho' now reduced to the last Extremity, exerted themfelves with fuch determined Courage, that their front Ranks being cut off, those who stood behind mounted the Bodies of the flain, and thence continued to maintain the Fight; and when these too by their Fall had raifed a Mountain of Carcafes, fuch as remained ascending the Pile, poured their Javelins upon us as from a Rampart, and even returned the Darts thrown at them by our Men. Fame therefore deceived not in proclaiming fo loudly the Bravery of a People, who thus adventured to cross a very broad River, climb the steepest Banks Banks, and rush upon an Enemy possessed of all BOOK the Advantages of Ground: Distinculties, which though seemingly unsurmountable, appeared yet as nothing to Men of their Resolution and Magnanimity.

XXVIII. THE Battle being ended, and the Name and Nation of the Nervians in a manner quite extinguished; the old Men, who with the Women and Children, as we have related above, had been conveyed into a Place furrounded with Bogs and Marshes; hearing of this terrible Overthrow, and judging that nothing would now be able to ftop the Progress of the Conquerors, or protect the Conquered from their victorious Arms, refolved, with the Consent of all that survived the late Disaster, to fend Ambassadors to Casar, and surrender themfelves. These in reciting the Calamities of their Country, represented: That of fix hundred Senators, there remained only three; and that from fixty thousand fighting Men, they were reduced to five hundred. Cæfar, as a proof of his Compassion towards this brave and unfortunate People, readily took them under his Protection, allowing them free and full Possession of their Towns and Territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring Nations, to abstain from Injuries and Wrongs.

XXIX. THE Atuatici, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their Forces to join the Nervians, and hearing of their Defeat, immediately returned home: when abandoning all their other Towns and Castles, they conveyed themselves and their Riches into a Place of great Srength, which Nature had fortisted with uncommon Care. For it was on every side surrounded

BOOKrounded with high Rocks and Precipices, having only one Avenue of about two hundred Foot broad, that approached the Town with a gentle rifing. Here they raifed a double Wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther Security, they laid great numbers of huge Stones, and strong pointed Beams. This People were descended from the Teutones and Cimbri, who in their March towards the Alps and Italy, left their heavy Baggage on this side the Rhine, with a Detachment of fix thousand Men to guard it. These, after the final Overthrow of their Countrymen, being for many Years haraffed and persecuted by the neighbouring States; fometimes invading others, fometimes defending themselves; at last, with the Consent of all the bordering Nations, obtained Peace, and chose this Place for a Habitation.

> XXX. On the first Arrival of the Roman Army, they made frequent Sallies from the Town, and engaged our Men in small Skirmishes. But Cafar having drawn a Line of Contravallation, twelve Feet high, fifteen Miles in Circumference, and every where well fortified with Redoubts; they kept themselves within their Walls. When we had now finished our Approaches, cast up a Mount, and were preparing a Tower of Assault behind the Works; they began at first to deride us from the Battlements, and in reproachful Language ask the meaning of that prodigious Engine, raised at such a distance! With what Hands or Strength, Men of our fize and make, (for the Gauls, who are for the most part very tall, despise the small stature of the Romans,) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a Machine against their Walls? and oder bluow of sen i

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XXXI. Bur when they faw it removed and BOOK approaching near the Town, aftonished at the new and unufual Appearance, they fent Ambassadors to Cæfar to fue for Peace. These being accordingly introduced, told him: " That they "doubted not but the Romans were aided in their "Wars by the Gods themselves; it seeming to " them a more than human Task, to transport with " fuch facility an Engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought upon a level with " their Enemies, and enabled to engage them in " close Fight. That they therefore put themselves " and Fortunes into his Hands, requesting only, that " if his Clemency and Goodness, of which they " had heard fo much from others, had determined " him to spare the Atuatici, he would not deprive " them of their Arms: That the neighbouring " Nations were almost all their Enemies, as en-" vying their fuperior Valour; nor would it be " possible for them to defend themselves from their "Attacks, if their Arms were taken away: In " fine, that if such must be their Fate, they would " rather choose to undergo any Fortune from the " Hands of the Romans, than expose themselves " to be cruelly butchered by those over whom "they had been wont to exercise dominion."

XXXII. To this Cæsar replied: "That in re"gard of his usual Conduct on these Occasions,
"rather than for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them Terms of Peace, provided
they submitted before the Battering-Ram touched
their Walls; but that no Surrender would be
accepted unless they agreed to deliver up their
Arms: That he would take the same care of
them as he had before done of the Nervians, and
"lay

II. "ing Nations, to abstain from all Injuries to"wards a People who had put themselves under
"the Protection of the Romans." The Ambassadors returning with this Answer to their Countrymen, they accepted in Appearance the Conditions
offered them by Casar, and threw so vast a Quantity
of Arms into the Ditch before the Town, that the
Heap almost reached to the top of the Wall.
Nevertheless, as was afterwards known, they retained about a third part, and concealed them
privately within the Town. The Gates being
thrown open, they enjoyed Peace for the remaining part of that Day.

AXXIII. In the Evening Cafar ordered the Gates to be shut, and the Soldiers to quit the Town, that no Injury might be offered to the Inhabitants during the Night. Whereupon the Atuatici, in consequence of a Design they had before concerted, imagining that the Romans, after the Surrender of the Place, would either set no Guard at all, or at least keep watch with less Precaution: partly arming themselves with such Weapons as they had privately retained, partly with Targets made of Bark or Wicker, and covered over hastily with Hides; made a surious Sally about midnight with all their Forces, and charged our Works on that side where they seemed to be of easiest Access.

XXXIV. THE Alarm being immediately given by lighting Fires, as Casar had before commanded, the Soldiers ran to the Attack from the neighbouring Forts. A very sharp Constitute ensued: for the Enemy now driven to Despair, and having no hope but in their Valour, fought with all possible Bravery, though the Romans had the Advantage

of the Ground, and poured their Javelins upon BOOK them both from the Towers and the top of the Rampart. About four thousand were slain upon the spot, and the rest obliged to retire into the Town. Next Day the Gates were forced, no one offering to make the least Resistance; and the Army having taken possession of the Place, the Inhabitants, to the Number of sifty-three thousand, were fold for Slaves.

XXXV. ABOUT the same time P. Crassus, whom Cæsar had sent with a Legion against the Venetians, Unellians, Osismians, Curiosolitæ, Sesuvians, Aulerci, and Rhedones, Maritime States inhabiting along the Sea-coast, dispatched Messengers to acquaint him, that all these Nations had submitted to the Dominion and Authority of the Romans.

XXXVI. THE Campaign being ended, and all the Provinces of Gaul subdued; such was the Opinion conceived of this War amongst all the Barbarians round about, that even the Nations beyond the Rbine fent Ambassadors to Casar, offering to give Hostages, and submit to his Commands. But he being then in hafte to return to Italy and Illyricum, ordered them to attend him the next Mean-time, having disposed his Army Spring. into Winter-quarters in the Territories of the Andes, Turones, and Carnutes, which States lay the nearest to the Provinces that had been the feat of the War, he himself set out for Italy. The Senate being informed of these Successes by Casar's Letters, decreed a Thanksgiving of fifteen Days: a Number never allowed to any General before.

C TULIUS CAESARS

COMMENTARIES

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WARS in GAUL

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK III.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. The Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, fall unexpectedly upon Ser. Galba, Cæfar's Lieutenant. III. But are overthrown with great Slaughter. VI. Galba leads back his Legion into the Country of the Allobrogians. VII. At the same time the Venetians and other States bordering upon the Ocean revolt. IX. Cæsar prepares to attack them, not without great Difficulty. X. He divides his Army, and distributes it into the several Provinces of Gaul. XII. The Advantages of the Venetians, and the manner of their Defence. XIII. A Description of their Shipping, and its suitableness to the nature of the Coast. XIV. Cæsar finding it in vain to attack them by Land, comes to a naval Engagement with them, and gets the Victory. XVII. Meantime Q. Titurius Sabinus his Lieutenant, by an artful Stratagem defeats the Unellians. XXI. At the same time P. Crassus in Aquitain, baving vanquished the Sotiates, obliges them to submit, Together with several other States of the XXIV. same Province. XXIX. Cæsar attacks Morini aud Menapians with success; but the Season being far advanced, he is obliged to send his Army into Winter-quarters.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK III.

ÆSAR, upon his departure for Italy, fent Sergius Galba with the twelfth Legion, and part of the Cavalry, against the Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, whose Territories extend from the Confines of the Allobrogians, the Lake Lemanus, and the River Rhone, all the way to the top of the Alps. His design in this Expedition was to open a free passage over those Mountains to the Roman Merchants. who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous Exactions. Galba, whose Orders also were, to put the Legion into Winter-quarters in those parts, if he saw it necesfary; after some successful Encounters, and making himself master of several Forts, was addressed by Ambassadors from all Nations found. Having fettled the Terms of Peace, and received Hostages

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BOOK for their Fidelity; he refolved to quarter two Co-III. horts among the Nantuates; and himself, with the other Cohorts, to winter in a Town of the Veragrians, called Octodurus. This Town, which is situated in the midst of a Valley, upon a Plain of no great extent, is bounded on all sides by very high Mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a River, he lest one part to the Gauls, and assigned the other to his Legion for their Winterquarters, commanding it to be fortissed with a Ditch and Rampart.

II. AFTER many Days spent here, and that Orders had been given for the bringing in of Corn to fupply the Camp; he was fuddenly informed by his Spies, that the Gauls had abandoned in the Night that part of the City allotted to them, and that the impending Mountains were covered with great multitudes of the Veragrians and Seduni. Many Reasons conspired to induce the Gauls to this fudden Resolution of renewing the War, and falling upon our Men. First, the small number of the Roman Troops, who were therefore despised by the Enemy, as not amounting in all to one Legion; two entire Cohorts having been detached, and even of those that remained with Galba, many being gone out in quest of Provisions: and then their Persuasion, that by reason of the inequality of the Ground, where it would be easy for them to pour upon us from the tops of the Mountains, and overwhelm us with their Darts, our Men would not be able to frand the very first Assault. Add to all this their inward Regret, at feeing their Children torn from them under the name of Hostages; and that they firmly believed it to be the design of the Romans, in seizing the summits of the Mountains, not only to open a free Passage over the Alps, but

to secure to themselves the perpetual Possession of BOOK those Parts, and annex them to the adjoining III.

Province.

III. UPON this Intelligence Galba, who had neither compleated the Fortifications of his Camp, nor laid in fufficient store of Corn and other Provisions; as little apprehending an Insurrection of this kind, among a People that had submitted and given Hostages; having speedily assembled a Council of War, began to ask their Advice in the present Exigence. As the Danger which threatened them was fudden and unexpected, and as they faw the Mountains on every fide covered with multitudes of armed Soldiers; infomuch that there was no room to hope, either for Succours, or any Convoys of Provision, because the Enemy were in possession of all the Avenues to the Camp: some believing the Case to be altogether desperate, proposed to abandon the Baggage, and attempt by a Sally the recovery of their old Quarters. But the greater number were for referving this Expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time to wait the decision of Fortune, and in the best manner they were able defend the Camp.

IV. AFTER a short Space, and even before there was sufficient time for the putting in execution what had been resolved on; the Enemy, at a Signal given, came rushing upon us from all parts, and begun the Assault by a shower of Stones and Darts. Our Men at first made a brave and vigorous Resistance, plying them with their Javelins from the Ramparts, whence not a single Weapon was discharged in vain: and as any part of the Camp appeared hard pressed for want of Men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head against Vol. I.

the Affailants. But in this the Gauls had greatly the Advantage, that when fatigued with the length of the Fight, they found themselves under a necessity to retire, fresh Men succeeded in their place; whereas on our side, by reason of the small number of Troops, no resource of this kind was left: so that not only such as were wearied with sighting were yet obliged to continue in their Posts; but we could not even permit the wounded to retire, or for a Moment abandon the Charge.

V. THE Battle had now lasted upwards of fix Hours without Intermission; infomuch that the Romans not only found their Strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of Weapons, wherewith to annoy the Enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged the Combat with greater Fury than ever; and meeting with but a faint Refiftance, fell to demolishing the Rampart and filling up the Ditch. All was giving way before them, when P. Sextius Baculus, a Centurion of the first Rank, the same, who as we have related above, received fo many Wounds in the Battle against the Nervians; as likewise C. Volusenus, a military Tribune, one equally diftinguished for his Conduct and Bravery; came to Galba, and represented: That the only Refuge now left, was by a fudden Sally, to put all upon the iffue of a bold Attack. Accordingly Galba, calling the Centurions together, by them gave immediate Notice to the Soldiers, to keep for some time only on the defensive; and having provided themselves with the Weapons thrown at them by the Enemy, and a little recovered their Strength, upon a Signal given, to fally out of the Camp, and place all their hopes of Safety in their Valour. These Orders were exactly followed: and the Romans rushing furiously upon the Enemy, from

from all parts, neither gave them time to compre-BOOK hend the meaning of fo unexpected an Attack, nor III. to recover out of the Confusion into which it had thrown them. Thus Fortune changing Sides, they every where furrounded and put to the Sword the Gauls, who had so lately entertained hopes of mastering our Camp. Of thirty thousand armed Troops, which Number, as appeared afterwards, were present in this Assault, more than ten thoufand perished in the Field. The rest sled in great Terror and Confusion, and were even forced to abandon the Summits of the Mountains. Romans feeing the Enemy entirely difperfed, and obliged every where to throw down their Arms, quitted the Pursuit, and retired within their Intrenchments.

VI. AFTER this Battle; Galba, unwilling a fecond time to expose himself to the inconstancy of Fortune, and besides considering, that he had met with an Opposition he little expected, when he first resolved to winter in these Parts: above all, finding himself in great want of Corn and Forage; the next Day set fire to the Town, and began his march back into the Province. As there was no Enemy in the Field to disturb or oppose him in his Retreat, he brought the Legion safe into the Country of the Nantuates, and thence into the Territories of the Allobrogians, where he put them into Winter-quarters.

VII. THE Infurrection being thus entirely quelled, Cæsar for many Reasons believed, that Gaul was now restored to a state of Tranquillity. The Belians had been overcome, the Germans expelled, and the Seduni, and other Inhabitants of the Alps, forced to submit. He therefore in the beginning of Winter ventured upon a Progress into Illyricum,

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BOOK from a defire he had to visit those Nations, and III. acquaint himself with the Country; when all on a studden a new War broke out in Gaul. The Occasion of it was as follows: The seventh Legion, commanded by young Crassus, was quartered among the Andes, a People bordering upon the Ocean. As there was great scarcity of Corn in these parts, Crassus sent some Officers of the Cavalry, and military Tribunes, to solicit a Supply from the neighbouring States. Of this number were T. Terrasidius, sent to the Eusubians; M. Trebius Gallus, to the Curiosolitæ; and Q. Velanius, and T. Silius, to the Venetians.

VIII. This last State is by far the most powerful and confiderable of all the Nations inhabiting along the Sea-coast: and that not only on account their vast Shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty Traffick to Britain; and their Skill and Experience in naval Affairs, in which they greatly furpass the other maritime States: but because lying upon a large and open Coast, against which the Sea rages with great violence, and where the Havens being few in number, are all subject to their Jurisdiction; they have most of the Nations that trade in those Seas tributaries to their State. Among them the Revolt began by detaining Silius and Velanius; as by this means they hoped to recover the Hostages they had put into the Hands of Crassus. neighbouring States, moved by their Authority and Example, as the Gauls are in general very fudden and forward in their Refolves, detained for the fame Reason Trebius and Terrasidius; and speedily dispatching Ambassadors from one to another, they by their Princes entered into a Confederacy, or acting in all things with common Confent, and alike exposing themselves to the fame iffue of Fortune; earnestly foliciting at the fame

fame time the other Provinces, rather to stand up BOOK in defence of that Liberty they had received of III. their Ancestors, than tamely submit to the ignominious Yoke of the Romans. All the Nations upon the Sea-coast coming readily into this Alliance, they jointly sent Ambassadors to Crassus, to acquaint him; That if he expected to have his Officers restored, he must first send them back their Hostages.

IX. CÆSAR having Intelligence of these things from Crassus, and being then at a great distance from Gaul, ordered in the mean-time; that a number of Galleys should be built upon the Loire, a River which runs into the Ocean; and that Mariners, Rowers, and Pilots, should be drawn together from the Province. These Orders being executed with great dispatch, he himself, as foon as the Season of the Year permitted, came to The Venetians, and other States in the Army. Alliance with them, having notice of his Arrival; and reflecting at the fame time upon the greatness of their Crime in detaining and loading with Irons Ambassadors, a Name ever looked upon amongst all Nations as facred and inviolable; began to make Preparations proportioned to the Danger that threatened them; more especially to provide themfelves with all kinds of warlike Stores; and that with fo much the greater Alacrity and Confidence, as the Nature and Situation of the Country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themselves. They knew that the Passes by Land were every where cut afunder, by the many Friths and Arms of the Ocean, that run up in those Parts; and that the Approach by Sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of Harbours, and the little Knowledge the Romans had of the Coast. G 3 Neither

BOOK Neither did they imagine it possible for our Army, III. to continue long in that Country, by reason of the great scarcity of Corn: and should even all these Expectations deceive them, they had still a mighty Confidence in the strength and number of their The Romans, they were fenfible, had Shipping. but a very inconfiderable Fleet; and were befides perfect Strangers to the Ports, Islands, and Shallows of the Coast, where the chief weight of the War was like to fall. At the time they forefaw, that our Pilots, accustomed only to the Navigation of the Mediterranean, a Sea bounded and shut in on all fides by the Continent, must needs find themfelves greatly at a lofs, when they came to enter the vast and open Spaces of the wide Atlantick In confequence of these Reflections, and the Refolutions formed upon them, they fet about fortifying their Towns, and conveying all their Corn into Places of strength, ordering as many Ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the Venetian Ports; it appearing, that Cafar intended to begin the War by attacking that State. They likewise brought over to their Alliance the Osismians, Lexovians, Nannetes, Ambiani, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapians; and dispatched Ambafadors into Britain, which lies over-against their Coast, to solicit Assistance from thence.

X. All these Difficulties before-mentioned attended the prosecution of this War: but Casar was urged by many Considerations to undertake and carry it on with Vigour: The Insult offered to the Commonwealth in detaining the Roman Knights: a Revolt, and Insurrection, after Submission, and Hostages given: the Confederacy of so many States: above all his Fear, lest by neglecting to oppose these first Commotions, he should

should give Encouragement to the other Provinces BOOK of Gaul to follow the Example. Reflecting therefore upon the Genius and Temper of the Gauls, fond of Revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new Wars; and considering at the same time, that it was the natural Bent and Disposition of Mankind, to aspire after Liberty, and abhor the Yoke of Servitude; he determined, before the Infection should spread wider, to divide his Army, and distribute it into the several Provinces of Gaul.

XI. PURSUANT to this Design, T. Labienus his Lieutenant was fent with the Cavalry to Treves, whose Territory extends along the Banks of the Rhine. To him he gave it in charge, to take a Progress to Rheims, and the other Belgian States, in order to retain them in Obedience; as likewise to oppose the Germans, should they attempt by Force the Passage of the River; a Report then prevailing that they had been invited over by the Belgians. P. Crassus, with twelve legionary Cohorts, and a great Body of Horse, had Orders to march into Aguitain, to prevent the Arrival of any Supplies from that Quarter, and the Junction of the Forces of fo many powerful Nations. 2. Titurius Sabinus, at the head of three Legions, entered the Country of the Unellians, Curiosolitæ, and Lexovians, to find Employment for the Troops that had been drawn together in those Parts. To young Brutus he gave the Command of the Fleet, and of all the Veffels from Gaul, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the Santones, Pictones, and other Provinces that continued in Obedience; strongly recommending to him at the same time, to use the greatest Difpatch, and fail with all Expedition for the Venetian G 4 Coast.

BOOKCoast. He himself, at the head of the Land-army, III. set out upon his march thither.

XII. THE Situation of most of the Towns in those Parts is fuch, that standing upon the Edges of Promontories, or upon Points of Land that run out into the Sea, there is no approaching them with an Army at high-water, which happens always twice in twelve Hours. Neither is it possible for a Fleet to draw near: because upon the Recess of the Tide, the Ships would be in danger of being dashed against the Shallows and Banks of Sand. Both these Reasons therefore concurred to secure their Towns from Affault: and if at any time, by the greatness of the Works carried on against them, and huge artificial Mounts that ferved to prevent the Ingress of the Sea, and were raised to an Height nearly equalling their Walls, they faw themselves reduced to Extremity; then, by bringing up their Ships, of which they had always a great Number in readiness, they easily found means to carry off their Effects, and withdraw into the nearest Towns, where they again defended themselves by the same Advantages of Situation as before. In this manner did they elude all Cæfar's Attempts during a great part of the Summer, and that with fo much the more Success, because our Fleet was kept back by Tempests, and found the Navigation extremely dangerous in that vast and boundless Ocean, where the Tides are great, and the Havens both few in Number, and at a confiderable diffance one from another.

XIII. For the Venetian Ships were built and fitted out in this manner. Their Bottoms were somewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themtelves to the Shallows, and sustain without Danger

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the regrefs of the Tides. Their Prows were veryBOOK high and erect, as likewise their Sterns, to bear the III. hugeness of the Billows, and the violence of Tempests. The Body of the Vessel was entirely of Oak, to stand the Shocks and Assaults of that tempestuous Ocean. The Benches of the Rowers were made of strong Beams of about a Foot in breadth, and fastened with iron Nails an Inch thick. Inflead of Cables they fecured their Anchors with Chains of Iron; and made use of Skins, and a fort of thin pliant Leather, by way of Sails: either because they wanted Canvas, and were ignorant of the Art of making Sail-cloth; or, which is more probable, because they imagined that Canvas-fails were not so proper to bear the Violence of Tempests, the Rage and Fury of the Winds, and to govern Ships of that Bulk and Burden. Between our Fleet, and Veffels of fuch a make, the nature of the Encounter was this; that in Agility, and a ready Command of Oars, we had indeed the Advantage; but in other Respects, regarding the Situation of the Coast, and the Assaults of Storms, all things ran very much in their Favour: for neither could our Ships injure them with their Beaks, so great was their Strength and Firmness; nor could we eafily throw in our Darts, because of their height above us: which also was the Reason, that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the Enemy, and bring them to close Fight. Add to all this, that when the Sea began to rage, and they were forced to fubmit to the Pleasure of the Winds, they could both weather the Storm better, and more fecurely trust themselves among the Shallows, as fearing nothing from the Rocks and Cliffs, upon the Recess of the Tide. The Romans, on the other hand, had reason to be under a continual dread of these and such like Accidents.

XIV. CÆSAR having taken many of their III. Towns, and finding that he only fatigued his Army to no purpose, because he could neither prevent the Retreat of the Enemy, nor force their Garrifons to a Surrender; refolved to wait the Arrival of his Fleet. Which being accordingly come up. was no fooner descried by the Venetians, than about two hundred and twenty of their best Ships, well equipped for Service, and furnished with all kind of Weapons, flood out to Sea, and drew up in order of Battle against us. Neither Brutus who commanded the Fleet, nor the Centurions and military Tribunes who had the Charge of particular Vessels, knew what Course to take, or in what manner to conduct the Fight. For they were no Strangers to the Strength and Firmness of the Venetian Shipping, which rendered them proof against our Beaks: and when they had even raised Turrets upon the Decks, yet being still over-topped by the lofty Sterns of the Enemy, the Romans could not with any Advantage throw in their Darts; whereas those fent by the Gauls, coming from above, defcended with great violence on our Men. In this Exigence, a particular kind of Instrument used by the Mariners, proved of fignal Service in giving a favourable Issue to the Combat. They had provided themselves with long Poles, armed at one end with long Scythes, not unlike those made use of in attacking the Walls of Towns. With these they laid hold of the Enemy's Tackle, and drawing off the Galley by the extreme Force of Oars, cut afunder the Ropes that fastened the Sail-yards to the Mast. These giving way, the Sail-yards necessarily came down; infomuch that as all the Hopes and Expectations of the Gauls depended entirely on their Sails and Rigging, by depriving them of

of this Resource, we at the same time rendered BOOK their Vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest depended altogether upon the Valour of the Troops, in which the Romans had greatly the Advantage; and the rather, because they sought within View of Casar and the whole Army, so that not a single Act of Bravery could pass unobserved: for all the adjoining Hills and Eminences, which afforded a near Prospect of the Sea, were covered with our Men.

XV. THE Enemy's Sail-yards being, as we have faid, cut down; and many of their Ships fingly furrounded by two or three of ours at a time; the Romans used their utmost Endeavours to board them. Which the Venetians observing, and that we had already made ourselves Masters of a great part of their Fleet; as they could fall upon no Expedient to prevent fo great a Misfortune, they began to think of providing for their Safety by Flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the Advantage of the Wind; when all of a fudden so dead a Calm ensued, that not a Vessel could stir out of its Place. Nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final Period to the War; for the Romans attacking their Ships one after another, took them with ease; infomuch that of all that vast Number that came out against us, but a very few, under favour of the Night, escaped safe to Land, after a Conflict that continued from nine in the Morning 'till Sun-fet.

XVI. This Battle put an end to the War with the Venetians, and all the Nations upon the Sea-Coast. For as the entire Body of their Youth, and all those also of more advanced Age, who were capable III. Counsels, were present in the Action; and as they had likewise drawn together their whole naval Strength: such as survived this Defeat, having neither any place of Resuge whereunto to retire, nor means lest of desending their Towns, surrendered themselves and their all to Casar's Mercy. But he thought it necessary to proceed against them with the greater Severity, that he might impress upon the Minds of the Gauls for the suture, a more inviolable Regard to the sacred Character of Ambassadors. Having therefore caused all their Senators to be put to death, he ordered the rest to be sold for Slaves.

XVII. DURING these Transactions against the Venetians, Q. Titurius Sabinus entered the Territories of the Unellians, at the head of the Troops put under his Command by Cæfar. Viridovix was invested with the supreme Authority in these Parts, and had been appointed General in chief, by all the States concerned in the Revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful Army. Nay but a very few Days before, the Aulerci, Eburovices, and Lexovians, having massacred their Senate, because they refused to engage in the War, had shut their Gates against the Romans, and joined themselves to Viridovix. Besides all this, he had very much strengthened his Army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of Gaul; Men of desperate Fortunes, or accustomed to live by Robbery, whom the hopes of Plunder, and love of War, had drawn off from the daily Labours of their Calling and the Cares of Agriculture.

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XVIII. SABINUS kept close within his Camp, BOOK which was fituated in a manner every way advantageous; while Viridovix, who had posted himself at the distance of about two Miles, daily drew out his Men, and offered him Battle. This Behaviour of the Roman General, not only drew upon him the Contempt of the Enemy, but occasioned also fome murmuring among his own Troops, and filled the Gauls with fo high a Conceit of his Fear, that that they even adventured to come up to his very Trenches. The Reason of his acting in this manner was, that he thought it not justifiable in a Lieutenant, in the Absence of the Commander in chief, to hazard a Battle with fo superior an Army, unless upon Terms of evident Advantage.

XIX. HAVING confirmed them in this Belief. that his Reserve was the effect of Fear; he made choice of a certain Gaul from among the Auxiliaries, a Man of Address, and every way qualified for carrying on his Defign. Him he persuaded by great Rewards, and still greater Promises, to go over to the Enemy, instructing him at the same time in the Part he was to act. This Gaul coming to their Camp as a Deferter, laid before them the Fear of the Romans, and the Extremities to which Cæsar was reduced in the War against the Venetians: nor did he fail to infinuate, that there was great Reason to believe Sabinus intended the next Night privately to draw off his Army, and march to Cafar's Affistance. No sooner was this heard by the Gauls, than they all cried out with one Voice, that they ought not to lose so fair an Occasion of Succefs, but go and attack the Roman Camp. Many Reasons concurred to fix them in this Resolution: The Reserve of Sabinus for some Days past: the Intelligence · III.

BOOK Intelligence from the Deferter confirming their belief of his Fear: the want of Provisions, of which they had taken no great Care to lay in a fufficient Stock: the Hopes conceived from the Venetian War: and in fine, that readiness with which Men are apt to believe what falls in with their Expectations and Wishes. Urged by these Considerations, they would not fuffer Viridovix and the rest of the General Officers to difmifs the Council, before they had obtained their Confent for the taking up of Arms, and falling upon the Roman Camp. Propofal being at last agreed to, they provided themselves with Fascines and Hurdles to fill up the Ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain Victory.

> XX. THE Roman Camp stood upon an Eminence, which rose with a gentle Ascent, for the space of about a Mile. Hither the Gauls advanced with fo much hafte, in order to come upon our Troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themselves quite out of Sabinus having encouraged his Men, whom he faw eager to engage, gave the Word of As the Enemy were very much incumbred with the Loads of Fascines they had brought to fill up the Ditch, he ordered a fudden Sally from the two feveral Gates of the Camp: and fo well did it succeed, by reason of the Advantage of the Ground, the Inexperience and Weariness of the Gauls, the Bravery of the Roman Troops, and their Ability acquired in former Battles; that the Enemy could not fustain the very first Charge of our Men, but immediately betook themselves to flight. The Romans, who were fresh and vigorous, purfuing them under all these Disadvantages, put great numbers to the Sword; and the rest being followed

by the Cavalry, very few escaped the Slaughter. BOOK
Thus at one and the same time, Sabinus had an
Account of the Defeat of the Venetians by Sea, and
Casar of the Victory obtained by Sabinus at Land.
All the several States in those Parts readily submitted to Titurius: for as the Gauls are very prompt and forward to undertake a War, so are they of a Disposition that easily relents and gives way to the Strokes of Adversity.

XXI. Much about the same time P. Crassus arrived in Aquitain; a Country, which as we have before observed, for extent of Territory, and number of Inhabitants, is deservedly counted a third Part of Gaul. This General understanding that he was to conduct a War in those Parts, where but a few Years before L. Valerius Præconinus had been flain, and his Army put to the rout; and whence L. Manilius the Proconful had been driven with the loss of his Baggage: foon became fensible that he must act with more than ordinary Circumspection and Vigour. Having therefore made Provifion of Corn, affembled his auxiliary Troops and Cavalry, and strengthened his Army with a choice Body of Volunteers, drawn together by name from Toulouse, Carcaso, and Narbonne, which States make up that Part of the Roman Province that lies the nearest to Aquitain; he advanced with all his Forces into the Territories of the Sotiates. These, upon the first notice of his Arrival, having levied a great Army, and attacking him in his March with the whole Body of their Cavalry, in which their chief strength consisted, were nevertheless repulsed and purfued by our Men. But all on a fudden their Infantry appearing in a Valley, where they had been defignedly placed in Ambush, fell furiously upon

BOOK the Romans disordered with the Pursuit, and renew-III. ed the Fight.

> XXII. THE Battle was long and obstinate. For the Sotiates, proud of their former Victories, imagined that the Fate of all Aquitain depended fingly on their Bravery. The Romans, on the other hand, were ambitious of shewing what they could atchieve under a young Leader, in the Absence of their General, and unsupported by the rest of the Legions. At length however, the Enemy overpowered with Wounds, betook themselves to flight; and a great Slaughter enfuing, Crassus marched immediately and invested their Capital; where meeting with a brave Resistance, he was forced to make his Approaches by Towers and Mantelets. Enemy fometimes fallying out, fometimes carrying on their Mines to our very Works, (in which kind of Service the Aquitains are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a Country that abounds in Veins of Copper;) when they faw that the Diligence of the Romans enabled them to furmount all these Difficulties, fent Ambassadors to Crassus, and requested they might be admitted to a Surrender. Which being accordingly agreed to, they in Obedience to his Defire delivered up their Arms.

XXIII. But while the Romans were wholly intent upon the execution of the Treaty: Adiatomus, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to escape on the other side of the Town, with a Body of six hundred sworn Friends, who in the Language of the Country are called Soldurians. Their condition and manner of Life is this: To live in a perfect Community of Goods with those to whom they have engaged themselves in Friendship: if any Missortune besals them, to share in it, or make

away with themselves: nor is there a single In-BOOK stance of any one upon Record, who upon the death of him to whom he had vowed a Friendship, refused to submit to the same Fate. Adiatomus, as we have said, endeavouring to make his Escape with his Body of Friends, and the Alarm being given on that side of the Works, the Soldiers immediately ran to Arms; when a surious Combat ensued, in which he was at last repulsed, and driven back into the Town. He obtained however from Crassus the same Conditions of Surrender as had been granted to the rest of the Inhabitants.

XXIV. CRASSUS having received their Arms and Hostages, led his Troops into the Territories of the Vocatians and Tarusatians. But now the Gauls, roused by the unexpected Progress of the Romans, who had in a few Days after their Arrival made themselves masters of a Town strongly fortified both by Art and Nature; began to fend Ambaffadors into all Parts; to join in a mutual League; to ratify their Engagements by an exchange of Hoftages; and to levy Troops. Ambaffadors were likewise dispatched to all the States of Hither Spain that bordered upon Aquitain, to folicit a Supply of Troops and Leaders: upon whose Arrival, they immediately took the Field with great Confidence, and a numerous and well appointed Army. None were fuffered to command but fuch as had ferved under Sertorius, and were therefore accounted Men of confummate Ability and Experience in the Art of War. These, according to the Custom of the Romans, made it their Study to choose a Camp to Advantage; to secure themselves by Lines and Intrenchments; and to intercept our Convoys. Crassus perceiving their Defign; as his own Army was not strong enough VOL. I. to

BOOK to admit of fending out Detachments; and as the III. Gauls could upon all Occasions employ numerous Parties, possess themselves of the Passes, and at the same time have a sufficient number of Troops to guard the Camp; by which means he foresaw he must soon be reduced to great Straits for want of Provisions, while the Enemy would be every Day growing more powerful: he for all these Reasons resolved not to delay coming to an Engagement. Having laid his Design before a Council of War, and finding them unanimous in their Approbation of it, he appointed the next Day for the Engagement.

XXV. EARLY in the Morning he drew all his Forces out of the Camp, and disposing them in two Lines, with the auxiliary Troops in the Center, flood expecting what Refolution the Enemy would take. But the Gauls, tho' they believed they might fafely hazard a Battle, on account of their Numbers, their former Renown in War, and the Handful of Men they were to oppose; yet thought it would be still better, by seizing the Passes, and intercepting our Convoys, to fecure the Victory without Expence of Blood: and should the want of Provisions at length force the Romans to think of a Retreat; they might then fall upon them embarassed in their March, incumbered with their Baggage, and dejected by their Misfortunes. This Resolution being approved by all their Leaders, they kept within their Camp, tho' our Men appeared before them in Order of Battle.

XXVI. CRASSUS perceiving their Design, and that this Delay served rather to abate the Courage of the Enemy, and add fresh Spirits to his own Men, among whom an universal Cry arose, that

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he ought no longer to put off the Engagement, BOOK but march directly to their Camp: having encouraged his Troops, he refolved to give way to their present Ardor, and accordingly led them to the Affault. There some were employed in filling up the Ditch; others in driving the Enemy with their Darts from the Works; while the Auxiliaries, in whom Crassus had no great Confidence, yet that they might appear to have some share at least in the Engagement, were appointed to carry Stones and Darts to them that fought, and to supply Materials for raising the Mount. At the same time the Enemy fought with great Constancy and Resolution, and made no small Havock with their Darts, which came upon us from above. During this warmth of Opposition, the Cavalry having taken a Compass round the Camp, came and told Crassus, that the Intrenchments were not fortified with the fame Care in all Parts, and that it would be eafy to force an Entrance by the postern Gate.

XXVII. Crassus having exhorted the Officers of the Cavalry to encourage their Men by great Rewards and Promises; instructed them in the Part they were to act. They, in consequence of the Orders they had received, drawing out four Cohorts, which having been left to guard the Camp, were quite fresh and fit for Action; and fetching with them a large Compass, that they might not be feen from the Enemy's Camp; while the Eyes and Minds of all were intent upon the Combat, fell fuddenly upon that Part of the Intrenchments of which we have spoken above; and having forced their way through, were actually got within the Camp before they were fo much as feen by the Enemy, or any Apprehension entertained of what they were about. Upon this a great Uproar being H 2

BOOK heard on that fide, our Men redoubled their III. Efforts, and as always happens to Troops animated with the hopes of Victory, began to push the Gauls with greater Fury than ever. The Enemy thus surrounded on all Sides, and without hopes of retrieving their Affairs, endeavoured to make their Escape over the Rampart, and save themselves by Flight. But being pursued by the Cavalry, who soon came up with them in these open and level Plains: of fifty thousand Men that had been drawn together out of Spain and Aquitain, scarce a fourth Part escaped; nor did the Horse return to the Camp'till very late in the Evening, after they had quite tired themselves with the Slaughter.

XXVIII. Upon the Report of this Defeat, the greatest part of Aquitain immediately submitted to Crassus, and of their own accord sent him Hostages. Of this number were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Garites, Ausci, Garumni, Siburzates, and Cocasates. Only a few Nations, and those the most remote, relying on the Season of the Year, because the Winter was at hand, neglected to take this Step.

XXIX. Much about the same time Cæsar, tho' the Summer was now almost spent; yet because all the rest of Gaul being subdued, the Morini and Menapians were still in Arms, and had not sent Ambassadors to treat about a Peace; resolved to lead his Army against them, hoping he should soon be able to put an end to that War. Their manner of opposing him was very different from that of the other Gauls. For understanding that the most powerful Nations, when it came to a Battle, had always been overthrown and put to rout; and inhabiting themselves in a Country that abounded

abounded in Woods and Marshes, they retired BOOK thither with all their Effects. Casar coming to the Entrance of the Wood, began to intrench himself: and although no Enemy in the mean-time appeared, yet no sooner had our Men dispersed themselves in order to set about fortifying the Camp, than on a sudden they came pouring upon us from all parts of the Wood, and charged with great Briskness. The Romans immediately slew to their Arms, and drove them back with considerable Slaughter; but adventuring a little too far into the Wood, lost some Men.

XXX. CÆSAR spent the remaining Days in cutting down the Wood; and to screen his Men from any fudden and unexpected Attack, ordered the Trees that had been felled to be placed on each fide the Army, that they might ferve as a Barricade against the Attempts of the Enemy. Having with incredible Dispatch advanced a great way into the Wood in a few Days, infomuch that all their Cattle and Baggage fell into our Hands; they themselves retired into the thicker and more covered spaces of the Forest. The Season growing bad, we were forced to intermit the Work; and the Rains foon became fo violent and continual. that the Soldiers could no longer endure to lie in their Tents. Wherefore Casar having laid waste their Lands, and set fire to their Towns and Houses, led back his Army, and disposed it into Winter-quarters among the Aulerci, Lexovians, and other States whom he had last subdued.

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

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WARS in GAUL.

POOK IV.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German Nations, expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul. II. The Manners and way of Life of the Suevians. III. And of the Ubians, IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri drive the Menapians from their Habitations. V. Cæfar knowing the wavering and unsettled Temper of the Gauls, repairs early in the Spring to the Army. VI. Embassy of the Germans to Cæfar, and bis Answer. IX. An Action between the Cavalry, in which the Germans have the advantage. X. But are afterwards driven from their Camp with great Slaughter. XIII. And purfued by Cæsar, who makes a Bridge over the Rhine for that purpose. XVI. Cæsar lays waste the Territories of Sigambri. XVII. And having freed the Ubians from the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul. XVIII. He then passes over into Britain. XXII. And lands his Army with great difficulty, the Natives making a vigorous Opposition. XXIV. They are defeated at length, and send Ambassadors to sue for Peace. XXVI. Cæfar's Fleet almost entirely ruined by a Storm. which induces the Britons to revolt. XXIX. Their way of fighting from their Chariots. XXX. Which disconcerts the Romans at first. XXXI. But being again put to flight, they obtain Peace. XXXII. After which Cæfar returns into Gaul. XXXIII. And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of Plunder tempted to fall upon some of his detached 1 arties, obliges them to submit.

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BOOK IV.

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HE following Winter, being that in which Cn. Pompey and M. Craffus were Confuls, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German Nations, passed the Rhine in a great Body, not far from its Mouth. The Cause of their taking this Step was, that being much exposed to the Hostilities of the Suevians, they had for many Years been harassed with continual Wars and hindered from cultivating their Lands.

II. THE Suevians are by far the most warlike and considerable of all the German Nations. They are said to be composed of a hundred Cantons, each of which sends yearly into the Field a thousand armed Men. The rest, who continue in their several Districts, employ themselves in cultivating their Lands, that it may furnish a sufficient Supply both

BOOK both for themselves and for the Army. again take up Arms the following Campaign, and are fucceeded in the care of the Lands by the Troops that served the Year before. live in the continual Exercise both of Agriculture and War. They allow of no fuch thing as Property or private Possession in the distribution of their Lands; their Residence, for the sake of Tillage, being confined to a fingle Year. Corn is not much in use among them, because they prefer a milk or flesh-diet, and are greatly addicted to Hunting. Thus the Quality of their Food, their perpetual Exercise, and free unconfined manner of Life (because being from their Childhood settered by no Rules of Duty or Education, they acknowledge no Law but Will and Pleasure) contribute to make them strong, and of an extraordinary Stature. They have likewife accustomed themselves, though inhabiting a Climate naturally very cold, to bathe in their Rivers, and clothe themselves only with Skins, which as they are very finall, leave great part of their Body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed refort to them, but rather to purchase their Spoils taken in War, than import any Goods into the Country: for even Beafts of Carriage, in which the Gault take so much Delight, that they are ready to purchase them at any Price, are yet very little valued by the Germans when brought among them. And though those of their own Country are both small and very ill shaped, yet by daily Exercise they make them capable of all kinds of Service. Their Cavalry often difmount in time of Action, to fight on Foot; and their Horses are fo train'd, that they ftir not from the place where they are left, but wait the return of their Riders, who betake themselves to them again in case of Necessity. Nothing is more dishonourable in their Account,

Account, or more opposite to their Customs, than BOOK the use of Horse-furniture: and therefore however IV. sew themselves, they scruple not to attack any Number of their Enemies whom they see so equipped. They suffer no Wine to be imported into their Territories, as imagining that it both enervates the Mind, and unsits the Body for Exercise and Labour. It is accounted much to the Honour of the Nation, to have the Country for a great way round them waste and uninhabited; for by this they think is intimated, that the united Force of many States has been found insufficient to withstand their single Valour. And hence it is, that on one side, the Country is said to lie desolate for the space of six hundred Miles.

III. On the other fide they are bounded by the Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent People, and fomewhat more civilized than the other German Nations; because inhabiting along the Banks of the Rhine, they are much reforted to by Merchants; and have besides, by bordering upon the States of Gaul, given into many of their Customs. The Suevians having tried the Strength of this People in many Wars, and finding them too numerous and potent to be driven out of their Territomies; prevailed yet so far as to impose a Tribute upon them, and very much reduce and weaken their Power.

IV. THE Usipetes and Tenchtheri, of whom we have spoken above, were likewise engaged in this Quarrel; and after withstanding the Power of the Suevians for many Years, were nevertheless at length driven from their Territories. Having wandered over many Regions of Germany during the space of three Years, they arrived at last upon the Banks of

BOOK of the Rbine, towards those Parts inhabited by the Menapians, who had Houses, Lands, and Villages on both fides the River. But alarmed at the Approach of fo prodigious a Multitude, they abandoned all their Habitations beyond the Rhine; and having disposed their Troops on this side the River, fet themselves to oppose the Passage of the Germans. These having tried every Expedient; and finding they could neither force the Passage, because of their want of Shipping; nor steal over privately, by reason of the Guards kept by the Menapians; counterfeited a Retreat into their own Country; and after three Days March fuddenly turned back: when their Cavalry recovering all this Ground in the space of one Night, easily overpowered the Menapians, little expecting or prepared for fuch a Visit: for having been apprifed by their Scouts of the Departure of the Germans, they had returned, fearless of Danger, to their Habitations beyond the Rhine. These being all put to the Sword, and their Shipping seized; before the Menapians on this fide had intelligence of their Approach, they paffed the River: and feizing all their Towns and Houses, supported themselves the rest of the Winter with the Provisions there found.

V. CÆSAR being informed of these things, and dreading the Levity of the Gauls, who are very changeable in their Counsels, and fond of Novelties; determined to trust nothing to their Resolves. For it is the Custom of that People to stop Travellers even against their will, and enquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any Affair and in their Towns, upon the Arrival of a foreign Merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what Country he comes from, and how things stood at his Departure. Moved

by these Reports, they often enter upon the most BOOK important Deliberations, and concert Measures they foon have cause to repent, as being founded wholly on vain Rumours, and Answers seigned for the most part designedly to please them. Cafar, who was aware of this Custom, fearing the War if neglected might become formidable, made all the hafte he could to join the Army. Upon his Arrival he found, that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreseen. Some of the States of Gaul had fent Ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to leave the Banks of the Rhine, and affuring them that all their Demands should be readily complied with. The Germans, allured by these Hopes, were already extending their Incursions on all fides, and had penetrated into the Territories of the Eburones and Condrusians, both which Nations are under the Protection of the Treviri. Cæsar. having affembled the Chiefs of the Gauls, diffembled his knowledge of their fecret Designs; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their Alliance with the People of Rome; demanded a certain number of Cavalry of them, and prepared to march against the Germans.

VI. Having provided himself with Corn, and drawn together a select Body of Horse, he began his March towards those Parts where he understood the Germans then were. When he was come within a sew Days journey of their Camp, Ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him to this effect: "That the Germans had no Design of be-" ing the first to begin a War with the People of "Rome; but neither, if they were attacked, would "they decline having recourse to Arms: That it "was the Custom of their Nation, handed down

BOOK to them by their Ancestors, rather to oppose the IV. " Efforts of their Enemies, than expect Relief from Remonstrances: but thus far they were " however willing to own, that it was against their "Inclination they were come into those Parts. " having been driven from their Habitations: "That if the Romans were disposed to accept of " their Friendship, they might become very useful " and ferviceable Allies, and would rest satisfied either with fuch Lands as they should think or proper to affign them, or in the quiet Possession of those they had already obtained by force of " Arms: That they yielded in Valour to the " Suevians alone, for whom the immortal Gods themselves were not an equal match; but knew " of no other Nation under Heaven able to refift the Efforts of their Bravery." Cafar made fuch a Reply as best suited his present Views, but the Conclusion of his Speech was to this purpose : "That he could enter into no treaty of Friend-" ship with them so long as they continued in "Gaul: That Men who had been unable to defend " their own Territories were not likely to gain " Countries by force from others: That there were no uncultivated Lands in Gaul, sufficient " to fatisfy fo great a multitude, without invading the Properties of others: But that, if they of pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the Ubians, whose Ambassadors were then in his " Camp, to complain of the Injuries of the "Suevians, and request his Aid against their In-" croachments: This he promifed to obtain for " them of the Ubians." The Ambassadors replied, they would report this to their Countrymen, and in three Days return with an Answer: requesting in the mean-time, that he would not advance with his Army. But this Cafar refused; as knowing, that

Cavalry over the Mense, to forage and plunder in the Territories of the Ambivariti. He therefore concluded, that they only waited the return of this Party, and with that View were for interposing Delays.

VII. THE Mense rises in the Mountains of Vause; in the Territories of the Lingones, and receiving a certain Branch of the Rhine, called the Vahal, forms with it the Island of the Batavians, about fourscore Miles below which it discharges itself into the Sea. The Rhine itself takes its rife in the Territories of the Lepontians, who inhabit the Alps; and after a long and rapid Course thro' the Country of the Nantuates, Helvetians, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Treboci, and Treviri, divides itself as it approaches nearer the Sea into feveral Channels, and forming a great number of very large Islands, inhabited for the most part by fierce and favage Nations, some of whom are reported to feed only on Fish and the Eggs of Birds; it at last discharges itself into the Ocean by many different Mouths.

VIII. CÆSAR being now only twelve Miles distant from the Enemy, was met upon his way by the Ambassadors on the Day appointed. They were very earnest in their Requests that he would advance no farther: but not being able to prevail, intreated; that he would fend to the Cavalry who made the Advance-Guard, to restrain them from beginning the Fight; and in the mean-time permit them to send Ambassadors to the Ubians: from whose Senate and Magistrates if they could obtain the Conditions offered them by Cæsar, under the Sanction of a solemn Oath, they declared themselves ready to accept them; requiring only that he would allow

IV. Matters to a final Issue. But Casar imagining all these Proffers to have no other Tendency than the delay of a few Days, 'till their Cavalry should arrive, told them nevertheless; that he would advance that Day only four Miles farther for the sake of Water; but desired their Chiefs to attend him the Day after, that he might know their Demands. Mean-time he sent Orders to the Officers of the Cavalry who were gone before, not to attack the Enemy; and in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their Ground, 'till he should come up with the rest of the Army.

IX. Bur the Enemy, upon feeing our Horse advance, whose number amounted to five thousand; whereas they themselves did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the Absence of those who had been fent to forage beyond the Meufe: yet falling fuddenly upon the Romans, who had no Apprehenfion of their Defign, because they knew their Ambassadors had been with Casar a little before, and obtained a Day's Truce; they eafily put them into Disorder. And when our Men recovering a little began to make Resistance, they according to Custom dismounted, and stabbing our Horses under the Belly, and by that means overthrowing many of the Riders, in a very short time put the rest to flight; and so great was the Consternation, that they continued driving them before them, 'till at last they came within fight of the Army. In this Skirmish we lost seventy-four Men, and among them Piso of Aquitain, a Man of distinguished Valour and illustrious Descent, whose Grandfather had been sovereign Magistrate in his own State, and been honoured by the Senate of Rome with the title of Friend. This brave Officer, feeing his Brother

Brother furrounded by the Enemy, ran to his BOOK Affistance, and rescued him: but his own Horse IV. being wounded, and he overthrown, the Enemy fell upon him, against whom nevertheless he made a brave Resistance; till at last surrounded on all sides, he fell overpowered with Wounds. Which his Brother perceiving, who was by this time out of Danger, and had got to a considerable Distance; setting Spurs to his Horse, he rushed among the the thickest of the Enemy, and was slain.

X. AFTER this Battle, Cafar resolved neither to give audience to their Ambassadors, nor admit them to Terms of Peace; feeing they had treacherously applied for a Truce, and afterwards of their own accord broke it. He likewise considered, that it would be downright Madness to delay coming to an Action 'till their Army should be augmented, and their Cavalry join them; and the more fo, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the Levity of the Gauls, among whom they had already acquired a confiderable Reputation by this fuccessful Attack, and to whom it therefore behoved him by no means to allow time to enter into Meafures against him. Upon all these Accounts he determined to come to an Engagement with the Enemy as foon as possible, and communicated his Defign to his Questor and Lieutenants. A very lucky Accident fell out to bring about Cafar's Purpose; for the Day after, in the Morning, the Germans persisting in their Treachery and Dissimulation, came in great numbers to the Camp; all their Nobility and Princes making part of their Embaffy. Their Design was, as they pretended, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the Day before; because contrary to Engagements made and come under at their own Request, they Vol. I.

BOOKhad fallen upon our Men; but their real Motive IV. was to obtain if possible another insidious Truce. Casar overjoyed to have them thus in his Power, ordered them to be secured, and immediately drew his Forces out of the Camp. The Cavalry, whom he supposed terrified with the late Engagement, were commanded to follow in the Rear.

XI. HAVING drawn up his Army in three Lines, and made a very expeditious March of eight Miles, he appeared before the Enemy's Camp, before they had the least Apprehension of his Design. things conspiring to throw them into a sudden Confternation, which was not a little increased by our unexpected Appearance, and the Absence of their own Officers; and hardly any time left them, either to take Counfel, or fly to Arms: they were utterly at a loss what Course to take, whether to draw out their Forces and oppose the Enemy, or content themselves with defending the Camp, or in fine, to feek for Safety in flight. Fear was evident from the Tumult and Uproar we perceived among them, our Soldiers, infligated by the Remembrance of their treacherous Behaviour the Day before, broke into the Camp. could first provide themselves with Arms made a shew of Resistance, and for some time maintained the Fight amidst the Baggage and Carriages. But the Women and Children (for the Germans had brought all their Families and Effects with them over the Rbine) betook themselves to slight on all fides. Cæsar sent the Cavalry in pursuit of them.

XII. THE Germans hearing the Noise behind them, and seeing their Wives and Children put to the Sword, threw down their Arms, abandoned their Ensigns, and sled out of the Camp. Being arrived

arrived at the confluence of the Rhine and the BOOK Meuse, and finding it impossible to continue their IV. flight any farther; after a dreadful Slaughter of those that pretended to make resistance, the rest threw themselves into the River; where what with Fear, Weariness, and the force of the Current, they almost all perished. Thus our Army, without the loss of a Man, and with very few wounded, returned to their Camp, having put an end to this formidable War, in which the number of the Enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty thousand. Casar offered those whom he had detained in his Camp liberty to depart: but they dreading the Resentment of the Gauls, whose Lands they had laid waste, chose rather to continue with him, and obtained his Confent for that purpose.

XIII. THE War with the Germans being ended, Casar for many Reasons resolved to carry his Army over the Rhine. But what chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found the Germans were easily prevailed upon to transport their Forces into Gaul, he thought it might be of no small Service to alarm them upon their own Account, by letting them fee, that the Romans wanted neither Ability nor Refolution to pass the Rkine with an Army. Add to all this, that the Cavalry of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who, as we have related above, had passed the Meuse for the fake of Forage and Plunder, and by that means escaped the Disaster of the late Fight; upon hearing of the Defeat of their Countrymen, had repassed the Rhine, retired into the Territories of the Sicambrians, and joined their Forces to theirs. And upon Cafar's fending Deputies to require, that these Troops, which had presumed to make War upon him and the Gauls, might be delivered up, I 2

BOOKhe had received for Answer: " That the Rhine IV. " was the Boundary of the Roman Empire: That

" if he thought it unjustifiable in the Germans to

pass over into Gaul without his leave, upon


" what Pretence could he claim any Power or

. Authority beyond the Rhine?"

XIV. But the Ubians, who alone of all the Nations beyond the Rhine had fent Ambaffadors to Cæsar, entered into an Alliance with him, and given him Hostages, earnestly intreated him to come over to their Affistance, they being very hard pressed by the Suevians: " Or, if the Affairs of the "Commonwealth would not allow of his being there in Person, that he would only order his "Army to cross the Rhine, which would both be " fufficient for their present Support, and also se-" cure them for the time to come. Because such " was the Reputation and Opinion conceived of a " Roman Army, even amongst the most remote " German Nations, from their defeating Arioviftus, and the Success of the last Battle, that their " Friendship and Name would alone be a sufficient They promifed likewise a great num-" Defence. " ber of Ships for the transporting of the Army."

XV. CÆSAR for all these Reasons above-mentioned, determined to cross the Rhine. But to make use of Shipping appeared to him neither safe, nor suitable to the Dignity of the Roman Name. Wherefore, altho' he understood that the making of a Bridge would be attended with very great Difficulties, on account of the Breadth, Depth, and Rapidity of the River; yet was he of opinion, that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his Army, or lay aside the Design altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the Bridge was thus:





A. The two Beams, each a foot and half thick joined at two feets distance

B. The two Beams opposits to these, joined in the same manner, C. The Beam two feet thick, inserted between y double Stakes, & extended from one to the other, D. The Braces,

E. The Planks over which the Earth & Turf were laid,

F. The Buttresses to support & Bridge against the violence of the Current.

G. The upper Defences against Vefsels and Trunks of Trees.

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
H. One

I.The t K.The

L. The M.Ase

N.The

P. The



H. One of the foot & half Stakes by itself.

I. The two foot Beam inserted between the double Stakes.

K. The double Stakes joined at the distance of two feet.

L. The Braces that joined the Stakes.

M. Aseperate Figure of one of the Braces,

N. The Hurdles that coverd & Bridge, O. The Crofs Timber for laying & Hurdles on.

P. The Machine for driving the double Stakes.



thus: Two Beams, each a Foot and a half thick, BOOK sharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a IV. Length proportioned to the Depth of the River, were joined together at the distance of about two These were funk into the River by Engines. and afterwards strongly driven with Rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined according to the direction of the Stream. Directly opposite to these, at the diftance of forty Feet lower down, were placed two other Beams joined together like the former, but floping against the current of the River. These Stakes were kept firm by a large Beam, extended from one to the other, and which being two Feet in thickness, exactly filled the Interval of the two Stakes, and was throngly fattened at either end with iron Nails, so contrived, that the Violence of the Stream ferved only to bind the Work faster together. This being continued through the whole Breadth of the River, he ordered Planks to be laid acrofs, which for the greater convenience of paffing, were further covered with Hurdles. Towards the lower part of the Stream other Stakes were funk in the form of Buttreffes. which supported the Bridge against the Violence of the Current; and above, at some distance, there were others; that if Trunks of Trees or Veffels should be fent down the River by the Enemy, to destroy the Work, the Shock might be broken by these Defences, and the Bridge thereby secured from damage.

XVI. THE Bridge being finished within ten Days from the time they began to fetch the Materials, Casar led over his Army; and leaving a strong Guard on each side of the River, marched directly into the Territories of the Sicambri. Mean-time Ambassadors arriving from several States to desire

1 3

Peace,

118 CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES OF

BOOK Peace, and court his Alliance, he gave them a very favourable Reception, and appointed them to fend Hostages. The Sicambri, when they understood that the Bridge was begun, by Advice of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri who had taken Shelter among them, resolved upon a Retreat: and having abandoned their Territories, and carried off all their Effects, withdrew into the neighbouring Woods and Desarts.

XVII. CÆSAR, after a short stay in their Country, having burnt all their Houses and Villages, and cut down their Corn, marched into the Territories of the Ubians. As he had promifed these last his Affistance against the Attempts of the Suevians, he understood from them: that the Suevians being informed by their Spies of the Bridge built upon the Rhine, had, according to their Custom, called a Council, and dispatched Orders into all Parts for the People to forfake their Towns, and convey their Wives, Children, and Effects into the Woods; commanding at the fame time, that all fuch as were able to bear Arms should meet at the Place of general Rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the Country, refolving there to wait the Arrival of the Romans, and give them Battle. Cafar, upon this Intelligence, having accomplished all he intended in carrying his Army over the Rhine, by spreading an universal Terror among the Germans, taking Vengeance of the Sicambri, and fetting the Ubians at liberty; after a stay of only eighteen Days beyond the Rhine, thinking he had done enough both for his own Reputation and the Service of the Republick, led back his Army into Gaul, and broke down the Bridge.

XVIII. Though but a small part of the Summer BOOK now remained; for in those Regions, Gaul, stretching very much to the North, the Winters begin early; Cæsar nevertheless resolved to pass over into Britain, having certain Intelligence, that in all his Wars with the Gauls, the Enemies of the Commonwealth had ever received Affiftance from thence. He indeed forefaw, that the Season of the Year would not permit him to finish the War: yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, if he should but take a View of the Island, learn the Nature of the Inhabitants, and acquaint himfelf with the Coast, Harbours, and Landing-places, to all which the Gauls were perfect Strangers. For almost none but Merchants refort to that Island; nor have even they any Knowledge of the Country, except the Sea-coast, and the Parts opposite to Gaul. Having therefore called together the Merchants from all Parts, they could neither inform him of the largeness of the Island, nor what or how powerful the Nations were that inhabited it, nor of their Customs, Art of War, or the Harbours fit to receive large Ships. For these Reasons, before he embarked himself, he thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a Galley, to get some knowledge of these things; commanding him, as soon as he had informed himself in what he wanted to know, to return with all expedition. He himself marched with his whole Army into the Territories of the Morini, because thence was the nearest Passage into Britain. Here he ordered a great many Ships from the neighbouring Ports to attend him, and the Fleet he had made use of the Year before in the Venetian War.

fore ordered BOOK

BOOK XIX. MEAN-WHILE the Britons having notice IV. of his Design, by the Merchants that resorted to their Island; Ambassadors from many of their States came to Casar, with an offer of Hostages, and Submission to the Authority of the People of Rome. To these he gave a favourable Audience; and exhorting them to continue in the fame mind, fent them back into their own Country. Along with them he dispatched Comius, whom he had constituted King of the Atrebatians; a Man in whose Virtue, Wisdom, and Fidelity he greatly confided, and whose Authority in the Island was very confiderable. To him he gave it in charge, to visit as many States as he could, and persuade them to enter into an Alliance with the Romans, letting them know at the fame time that Cafar defigned as foon as possible to come over in person to their Island. Volusenus having taken a View of the Country, as far as was possible for one who had resolved not to quit his Ship, or trust himself in the hands of the Barbarians, returned on the fifth Day, and acquainted Cafar with his Discoveries.

XX. While Cafar continued in those Parts, for the sake of getting ready his Fleet, Deputies arrived from almost all the Cantons of the Morini, to excuse their late War with the People of Rome, as proceeding wholly from a national Fierceness, and their Ignorance of the Roman Customs; promising likewise an entire Submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely for Casar, who was unwilling to leave any Enemies behind him, nor would the Season of the Year have even allowed him to engage in a War: besides, he judged it by no means proper so far to entangle himself in these trivial Assairs, as to be obliged to postpone the Expedition

Expedition into Britain. He therefore ordered BOOK them to fend him a great Number of Hostages, IV. and upon their being delivered, received them into his Alliance. Having got together about eighty Transports, which he thought would be fufficient for the carrying over two Legions; he distributed the Gallies he had over and above, to the Questor, Lieutenants, and Officers of the Cavalry. There were besides eighteen Transports detained by contrary Winds at a Port about eight Miles off, which he appointed to carry over the Cavalry. The rest of the Army, under the Command of Q. Titurius Sabi. nus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, were fent against the Menapians, and those Cantons of the Morini which had not submitted. P. Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the Harbour where he embarked, with a strong Garrison to maintain it. would mark an inst

XXI. THINGS being in this manner fettled, and the Wind springing up fair, he weighed Anchor about one in the Morning, ordering the Cavalry to embark at the other Port, and follow him. But as these Orders were executed but slowly, he himself about ten in the Morning reached the Coast of Britain, where he faw all the Cliffs covered with the Enemy's Forces. The nature of the Place was fuch, that the Sea being bounded by fleep Mountains, the Enemy might eafily launch their Javelins upon us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient Landing-place, he refolved to lie by 'till three in the Afternoon, and wait the Arrival of the rest of his Fleet. Mean-while having called the Lieutenants and military Tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from Volusenus, instructed them in the Part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and at a Signal given,

IV. pline, which in Sea Affairs especially required Expedition and Dispatch, because of all others the most changeable and uncertain. Having dismissed them, and finding both the Wind and Tide savourable, he made the Signal for weighing Anchor, and after sailing about eight Miles farther, stopp'd over-against a plain and open Shore.

XXII. But the Barbarians perceiving our Defign, fent their Cavalry and Chariots before, which they frequently make use of in Battle; and following with the rest of their Forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing. And indeed we found the Difficulty very great on many accounts: for our Ships being large, required a great depth of Water; and the Soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the Places, and had their Hands embarraffed and loaden with a weight of Armour, were at the fame time to leap from the Ships, stand breasthigh amidst the Waves, and encounter the Enemy; while they, fighting upon dry Ground, or advancing only a little way into the Water; having the free use of all their Limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their Darts, and four on their Horses, well inured to that kind of Service. All these Circumstances serving to fpread a Terror among our Men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting; they pushed not the Enemy with the fame Vigour and Spirit as was usual for them in Combats upon dry Ground.

XXIII. CÆSAR obscrving this, ordered some Gallies, a kind of Shipping less common with the Barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the Transports towards the Shore, in order to set upon the Enemy

in flank, and by means of their Engines, Slings, BOOK and Arrows, drive them to fome diffance. This proved of confiderable fervice to our Men: for what with the furprise occasioned by the make of our Gallies, the motion of the Oars, and the playing of the Engines, the Enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. But our Men still demurring to leap into the Sea, chiefly because of the Depth of the Water in those parts; the Standard-bearer of the tenth Legion, having first invoked the Gods for Success, cried out aloud: · Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, unless you will betray the Roman Eagle into the Hands of the · Enemy; for my part, I am refolved to discharge ' my Duty to Casar and the Commonwealth.' Upon this he jumped into the Sea, and advanced with the Eagle against the Enemy: whereat our Men exhorting one another to prevent fo fignal a Difgrace; all that were in the Ship followed him: which being perceived by those in the nearest Vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the Enemy.

XXIV. The Battle was obstinate on both Sides: but our Men, as being neither able to keep their Ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their respective Standards; because leaping promiscuously from their Ships, every one joined the first Ensign he met; were thereby thrown into great Confusion. The Enemy on the other hand being well acquainted with the Shallows; when they saw our Men advancing singly from the Ships, spurred on their Horses, and attacked them in that perplexity. In one Place great numbers would gather round an handful of the Romuns: others falling upon them in flank, galled them mightily with their Darts. Which Cassar observing, ordered some small Boats

IV. this means the foremost Ranks of our Men having got firm footing, were followed by all the rest; when falling upon the Enemy briskly, they were foon put to the rout. But as the Cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance far into the Island; which was the only thing wanting to render the Victory compleat.

XXV. THE Enemy being thus vanquished in Battle, no sooner got together after their Defeat, than they dispatched Ambassadors to Casar to sue for Peace; offering Hoftages, and an entire Submission to his Commands. Along with these Ambassadors came Comius the Atrebatian, whom Casar, as we have related above, had fent before him into Britain. The Natives seized him as soon as he landed, and tho' he was charged with a Commission from Cæsar, threw him into Irons. upon their late Defeat they thought proper to fend him back, throwing the Blame of what had happened upon the Multitude, and begged of Cæfar to excuse a Fault proceeding from Ignorance. Cæfar, after some Complaints of their Behaviour, in that having of their own accord fent Ambassadors to the Continent to fue for Peace, they had yet without any Reason begun a War against him; told them at last he would forgive their Fault, and ordered them to fend a certain number of Hostages. Part were fent immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to deliver in a few Days. Mean-time they disbanded their Troops, and the feveral Chiefs came to Cafar's Camp, to manage their own Concerns, and those of the States to which they belonged. JVXX VIE ALL this being known to the Britis

Closets, was with the Battle had repaired to 6.

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XXVI. A Peace being thus concluded four BOOK Days after Cæsar's Arrival in Britain, the eighteen Transports appointed to carry the Cavalry, of whom we have spoken above, put to Sea with a But when they had fo near apgentle Gale. proached the Coast, as to be even within view of the Camp; fo violent a Storm all on a fudden arose, that being unable to hold on their Course, fome were obliged to return to the Port whence they fet out, and others driven to the lower end of the Island westward, not without great Danger. There they cast Anchor: but the Waves rising very high, fo as to fill the Ships with Water, they were again in the Night obliged to stand out to Sea, and make for the Continent of Gaul. That very Night it happened to be full Moon, when the Tides upon the Sea-coast always rise highest, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the Romans. Thus at one and the fame time, the Gallies which Cæsar made use of to transport his Men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the Strand, were filled with the Tide; and the Tempest fell furiously upon the Transports that lay at Anchor in the Road. Nor was it possible for our Men to attempt any thing for their preservation. Many of the Ships being dashed to pieces, and the rest having lost their Anchors, Tackle, and Rigging, which rendered them altogether unfit for failing, a general Consternation spread itself thro' the Camp. For there were no other Ships to carry back the Troops, nor any Materials to repair those that had been disabled by the Tempest. And as it had been all along Casar's design to winter in Gaul, he was wholly without Corn to fubfift the Troops in those parts.

XXVII. All this being known to the British Chiefs, who after the Battle had repaired to Ca-

BOOK far's Camp, to perform the Conditions of the Treaty; they began to hold Conferences among them-And as they plainly faw that the Romans were destitute both of Cavalry, Shipping, and Corn; and eafily judged, from the smallness of the Camp, that the number of their Troops was but inconfiderable; in which Notion they were the more confirmed, because Cæsar having brought over the Legions without Baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of Ground: they thought this a convenient Opportunity for taking up Arms, and by intercepting the Roman Convoys to protract the Affair 'till Winter; being confidently perfuaded, that by defeating these Troops, or cutting off their Return, they should effectually put a stop to all future Attempts upon Britain. Having therefore entered into a joint Confederacy, they by degrees left the Camp, and began to draw the Islanders together. But Cafar, tho' he was not yet apprized of their Defign, yet gueffing in part at their Intentions, by the Difaster which had befallen his Fleet, and the Delays formed in relation to the Hostages, determined to provide against all Events. He therefore had Corn daily brought in to his Camp, and ordered the Timber of the Ships that had been most damaged to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what other Materials he wanted. As the Soldiers were indefatigable in this Service, his Fleet was foon in a Condition to fail, having loft only twelve Ships.

XXVIII. During these Transactions, the seventh Legion being sent out to forage according to Custom; as part were employed in cutting down the Corn, and part in carrying it to the Camp, without suspicion of attack; News was brought to Casar, that a greater Cloud of Dust than ordinary

was feen on that fide where the Legion was. CaferBOOK fuspecting how matters went, marched with the IV. Cohorts that were upon Guard, ordering two others to fucceed in their room, and all the Soldiers in the Camp to arm and follow him as foon as poffi-When he was advanced a little way from the Camp, he faw his Men overpower'd by the Enemy, and with great difficulty able to fultain the Fight, being driven into a small Compass, and exposed on every side to the Darts of their Adversaries. For as the Harvest was gathered in every where else, and one only Field left; the Enemy fuspecting that our Men would come thither to forage, had hid themselves during the Night in the Woods; and waiting 'till our Men had quitted their Arms, and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping; they fuddenly attacked them, killed fome, put the rest into disorder, and began to surround them with their Horses and Chariots.

XXIX. THEIR way of fighting with their Chariots is this: First they drive their Chariots on all sides, and throw their Darts; infomuch that by the very terror of the Horses, and noise of the Wheels, they often break the Ranks of the Enemy. When they have forced their way into the midst of the Cavalry, they quit their Chariots, and fight on Foot. Mean-time the Drivers retire a little from the Combat, and place themselves in fuch a manner as to favour the Retreat of their Countrymen, should they be overpower'd by the Enemy. Thus in Action they perform the Part both of nimble Horsemen, and stable Infantry: and by continual Exercise and Use have arrived at that Expertness, that in the most steep and difficult Places, they can stop their Horses upon a full stretch, turn them which way they please, run along the Pole, rest on the Harness, and throw them elves

BOOK themselves back into their Chariots with incredible IV. Dexterity.

XXX. Our Men being aftonished and confounded with this new way of fighting, Cafar came very timely to their Relief: for upon his Approach the Enemy made a stand, and the Romans began to recover from their Fear. This fatisfied Casar for the present, who not thinking it a proper feafon to provoke the Enemy, and bring on a general Engagement, stood facing them for some time, and then led back the Legions to the Camp. continual Rains that followed for fome Days after, both kept the Romans within their Intrenchments, and withheld the Enemy from attacking us. Meantime the Britons dispatched Messengers into all parts, to make known to their Countrymen the small number of the Roman Troops, and the favourable Opportunity they had of making immense Spoils, and freeing their Country for ever from all future Invasions, by storming the Enemy's Camp. Having by this means got together a great Body of Infantry and Cavalry, they drew towards our Intrenchments.

MXXI. CÆSAR, tho' he foresaw that the Enemy, if beaten, would in the same manner as be fore escape the Danger by slight; yet having got about thirty Horse, whom Comius the Atrebatian had brought over with him from Gaul; he drew up the Legions in order of Battle before the Camp: and falling upon the Britons, who were not able to sustain the shock of our Men, soon put them to slight. The Romans pursuing them as long as their strength would permit, made a terrible Slaughter; and setting fire to their Houses and Villages a great way round, returned to the Camp.

from the Enemy to Cafar to fue for Peace. Cafar doubled the number of Hostages he had before imposed upon them, and ordered them to be sent over to him into Gaul, because the Equinox coming on, and his Ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his Return 'till Winter. A fair Wind offering, he set sail a little after midnight, and arrived safe in Gaul. Two of his Transports not being able to reach the same Port with the rest, were driven into a Haven a little lower in the Country.

XXXIII. In these two Vessels were about three hundred Soldiers, who having landed, and being upon their March to the Camp; the Morini, who had submitted to Casar upon his setting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of Plunder, furrounded them at first with only a few Men, and ordered them to lay down their Arms under pain of being put to the Sword. But they, casting themselves into an Orb, stood upon their Defence; when all on a fudden fix thousand more of the Enemy appeared, rouzed by the noise of the Combatants. Cæsar having notice of what passed, sent all his Cavalry to the affiftance of the Romans. Meanwhile our Men withstood all the Attacks of the Enemy, and bravely maintained the Fight for upwards of fix Hours, having flain great Numbers of the Morini, while on their fide only a few were wounded. But no fooner did our Cavalry appear, than the Enemy, throwing down their Arms, betook themfelves to flight, and were almost all slain in the Purfuit:

XXXIV. THE Day after Cæsar sent T. Labienus, with the Legions returned out of Britain, against Vol. I.

Drought of the Benefit of their Marshes, which had served them for shelter the Year before, almost all fell into his Power. Mean-time Q. Titurius, and L. Cotta, who had been sent against the Menapians, having laid waste their Territories with Fire and Sword, and plundered their Habitations, returned to Casar, not being able to come up with the Menapians themselves, who had retired into impenetrable Forests. Casar quartered all his Troops among the Belgians. Only two of the British States sent Hostages into Gaul, the rest neglecting to perform the Conditions of the Treaty. For these Successes a Thanksgiving of twenty Days was decreed by the Senate.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSARs

CHELARS COMMENTARION

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK V.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæsar leaving Orders with his Lieutenants in Gaul to build a Fleet, fets out for Italy and Illyricum. where he puts a stop to the Incursions of the Pirusta. II. Returning thence into Gaul, he marches against the Treviri, and quiets the Disturbances in that Province. IV. Dumnorix withdrawing from the Roman Camp with the Æduan Cavalry, is pursued and flain. VII. Cæsar passes over into Britain. VIII. And forces the Enemy from the Woods in which they had taken shelter. IX. But understanding that his Fleet had suffered greatly by a Storm, he quits the pursuit of the Britons, repairs his Fleet, fortifies bis Camp, and then returns against the Enemy. X. A description of Britain, and its Inhabitants. XI. Cæsar defeats the Britons in various Encounters. XIV. Passes the Thames. XIX. Returns into Gaul. XX. And because of the great scarcity of Corn, distributes his Legions among the several States. XXI. Tafgetius flain among the Carnutes. XXII. Ambiorix and Cativulcus excite several States to a Revolt. XXIII. Ambiorix by an artful Speech persuades Titurius to quit his Camp, and attacking him in his March, cuts him off with his whole Party. XXX. Being afterwards joined by the Nervians, he falls upon Cicero's Camp. XXXVI. The noble Emulation of Pulfio and Varenus. XXXVII. Cæfar marches to Cicero's relief. XLI. The Gauls quit the Siege, and advance to meet him. XLII. Cæsar defeats them in Battle. XLIV. And to prevent their continual Revolts, resolves to pass the Winter in Gaul. XLV. The Senones, Treviri, and other States, bear the Roman Yoke with impatience. XLVII. Indutiomarus attacks Labienus's Camp. XLIX. But being flain in the Attempt, the Gauls separate, and Tranquillity is in a great measure restored.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK V.

N the Confulship of Lucius Domitius, and Appius Claudius, Cafar leaving his Winter-quarters to go into Italy, as was his yearly Custom, gave Orders to his Lieutenants, who had the charge of the Legions, to build as many Ships as posible during the Winter, and to repair such as were old. He prescribed the form and manner of building; ordering them to be fomewhat lower than was usual in the Mediterranean, for the convenience of embarking and landing his Men; which he judged the more necessary, as' he had observed, that by reason of the frequent returns of the Tide, there was less depth of Water upon the British Coast. He likewise commanded them to be built broader than ordinary, that they might receive the greater number of Horses and Carriages; and to be contrived for lightness and expedition, to K 3 which

BOOK which the lowness of their Decks greatly contributed. He fent to Spain for the Materials necessary in building and equipping them; and having finished the Diet of Cisalpine Gaul, set out for Illyricum, upon advice that the Pirusta were laying waste the Province by their Incursions. When he arrived there, he ordered the feveral States to furnish their Contingents, and appointed a Place of general Rendezvous. The Report of this no fooner spread among the Pirusta, than they sent Ambassadors to inform him; that nothing had been done against the Province by publick Authority, and that they were ready to make what Satisfaction he required. Cæsar pleased with their Submission, ordered them to bring him Hostages, and named the Day by which they were to be delivered; threatening them with a fierce War in case of Disobedience. being accordingly brought by the Day prefixed, he appointed Arbitrators between the contending States, to estimate the Damages, and determine what Reparation was to be made.

II. Having dispatched these Affairs, and held a general Diet of the Province, he returned again into Cisalpine Gaul, and thence went to the Army. Upon his Arrival, he visited all the Quarters of the Legions; and found, that by the singular Diligence of the Soldiers, notwithstanding the greatest scarcity of Materials, no less than six hundred Transports, such as we have described above, and twenty-eight Gallies, were in such forwardness, that in a sew Days they would be ready to be launched. Having praised his Soldiers, and those whom he had set over the Works, he gave them what further Instructions he thought necessary, and ordered the whole Fleet to rendezvous at Port-Itius, whence he knew lay the most commodious Passage

distain; it being there not above thirty Miles BOOK distant from the Continent. Leaving what Soldiers he thought necessary for this Purpose, he advanced at the head of sour Legions without Baggage, and eight hundred Horse, into the Country of the Treviri; because they neither appeared at the general Diets of Gaul, nor submitted to the Orders of the Commonwealth; and were besides reported to be soliciting the Germans beyond the Rhine.

III. This State is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in Horse: they have likewise a very strong and numerous Infantry; and, as we have before observed, border upon the Rbine. Two of their principal Men, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were at this time Competitors for the supreme Authority. Cingetorix, as foon as he heard of the Arrival of Cæsar and the Legions, came to him, and assured him; that he and all his Party would continue firm to their Duty, and never abandon the Interest of the Romans: at the same time he informed him of all that had paffed among the Treviri. But Indutiomarus, drawing together great Numbers of Horse and Foot, and securing such as were unable to bear Arms in the Forest of Arden, which extends from the Rhine quit cross the Country of Treves, to the Territories of the Rhemi; resolved to try the fortune of War. But foon after, as feveral of the leading Men of the State, partly out of attachment to Cingetorix, partly terrified by the Approach of the Roman Army, came to Cafar to folicit in their own behalf, fince they found themfelves incapable of effectually ferving their Country: Indutionarus fearing an universal Defection, sent likewife Ambaffadors to him to acquaint him: "That he had chosen to stay at home, and forbear " coming to the Roman Camp, with no other view K 4

BOOK" but to keep the State in its Duty; left, in the V. Absence of the Nobility, the People might have been drawn into some rash Step: That the whole Country was now at his Command; and " he ready, with Cæsar's Permission, to attend him in Person, and put his own Concerns, as well as those of the State, under his Protection." Tho' Cæsar well understood the Reason of his prefent Submission, and by what Considerations he had been deterred from the profecution of his first Defign; yet unwilling to waste the whole Summer in the Country of Treves, when every thing was in readiness for his Expedition into Britain, he ordered Indutiomarus to attend him with two hundred Ho-These being accordingly brought, and among them the Son, and all the nearest Relations of Indutionarus, whom he had specified by name; Cafar encouraged and exhorted him to continue firm in his Duty. Nevertheless, assembling all the principal Men of Treves, he reconciled them one after another to Cingetorix, as well on account of his fingular Merit, as because he thought it of the greatest Importance, to establish thoroughly the Authority of a Man, of whose steddy and inviolable Attachment he had fuch convincing Proof. Indutiomarus highly refented this Proceeding, which tended so much to the diminution of his Power; and as he had all along been an Enemy to the Romans, this new Affront provoked him still more.

IV. These Affairs being settled, Casar arrived with his Legions at the Port of Itius. There he found, that about forty of his Ships, built in the Country of the Belgians, having been attacked by a Storm, and disabled from continuing their Voyage, had been obliged to put back. The rest were all equipped and rigged, ready to obey the first Signal,

Signal. All the Cavalry of Gaul, about four BOOK thousand in number, and the prime Nobility of V. the several States, met him likewise, by order, at this Place. His Design was, to leave only a few of these Nobles behind him in Gaul, on whose Fidelity he could rely; and to take the rest with him to Britain as Hostages, the better to prevent any Commotions during his Absence.

V. DUMNORIX the Æduan, of whom we have fpoken above, was one of those that attended him on this Occasion. Him in particular he resolved to carry along with him, as he knew him to be a lover of Novelties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great Interest and Authority among the Gauls. Besides all this, he had publickly said in an Affembly of the Æduans, that Cæsar had invested him with the Sovereignty of their State: which Refolution, tho' by no means pleasing to the Æduans, they yet durst not send Ambassadors to Cæsar, either to oppose or get reversed: nor was Casar otherwise informed of the matter, but by those whom he had placed about Dumnorix, to have an Eye over his Conduct. Dumnorix, at first, earnestly petitioned to be left in Gaul; sometimes pretending he was unused to failing, and afraid of the Sea; fometimes urging religious Engagements, which required him to stay at home. But finding all his Endeavours to no purpose, he began to solicit the Chiefs of the Gauls, discoursing them apart, and advising them not to leave the Continent. The more to awaken their Fears, he told them: "That Casar had his particular Reasons " for carrying with him all the Nobility of Gaul; " because not daring to dispatch them in their own " Country, he was in hopes of finding a favourable "Opportunity to execute his cruel Purpose in "Britain." He therefore exhorted them to join V. folemn Oath, to purfue with common Consent such Measures as should appear necessary for the preservation of Gaul.

VI. Tho' Cæsar was fully informed of these Practices; yet in confideration of his fingular Regard for the Aduans, he contented himself with endeavouring to check and traverse his Designs: determined notwithstanding to continue inflexible, and at all hazards prevent any Misfortune to himfelf and the Commonwealth from a Spirit, which he found every Day growing more hardy and intrepid. Being therefore detained in this Place about five and twenty Days, during which the North-west Wind, very common on that Coast, hindered him from failing; he studied by the ways of Gentleness and Persuasion, to keep Dumnorix in his Duty, without neglecting however to watch all his Motions. At last, the Wind springing up fair, he ordered the Horse and Foot to embark. As this universally engaged the Attention of the Camp, Dumnorix, unknown to Cafar, drew off the Aduan Cavalry, and began his March homeward. Cæfar being informed of it, immediately put a ftop to the Embarkation; and postponing every other Consideration, ordered out a strong Party of Horse to purfue and bring him back. If he made refistance, or refused to obey, they had Orders to kill him: for he judged, that a Man who had flighted his personal Authority, would not pay any great regard to his Commands in his Absence. When they had overtaken him, he refused to return; and defending himself Sword in hand, implored the Assistance of his Followers, often calling out, that he was free, and the Subject of a free State. The Romans, according to the Orders they had received, furrounded

ed and flew him; upon which all the Æduan Cavalry BOOK returned to Cafar.

VII. THIS Affair concluded; and Labienus being left in Gaul with three Legions, and two thousand Horse, to defend the Port, provide Corn, have an eye upon the Transactions of the Continent, and take measures accordingly; Cæsar weighed Anchor about Sun-set with five Legions, and the same number of Horse he had left with Labienus: and advancing with a gentle South-wind, continued his Course till midnight, when he found himself becalmed: but the Tide still driving him on, at daybreak he saw Britain on his left. When again following the return of the Tide, he rowed with all his might, to reach that part of the Island which he had marked out the Summer before, as most convenient for Landing. And on this occasion the Diligence of the Soldiers cannot be enough commended; who labouring inceffantly at the Oar, urged the Transports and Ships of Burden so swiftly, that they equalled the Course of the Gallies. The whole Fleet reached the Coast of Britain about Noon: nor did any Enemy appear in view. But as Cæfar afterwards understood from the Prisoners; though a great Army of Britons had repaired to the Coast; yet terrified by the vast Number of Ships, which, together with those of the last Year's Expedition, and fuch as had been fitted out by particular Persons for their own use, amounted to upwards of eight hundred; they retired haftily from the Shore, and hid themselves behind the Mountains.

VIII. CÆSAR having landed his Army, and chosen a proper Place for his Camp; as soon as he understood from the Prisoners where the Enemy's Forces

BOOK Forces lay; leaving ten Cohorts upon the Coast, together with three hundred Horse, to guard his Fleet; he fet out about midnight in quest of the Enemy; being under the less concern for his Ships, because he had left them at Anchor upon a smooth and open Shore, under the Charge of Q. Atrius. After a March of twelve Hours during the Night, he came within fight of the Enemy; who having posted themselves behind a River with their Cavalry and Chariots, attacked us from the higher Ground, in order to oppose our Passage: but being repulsed by our Horse, they retreated towards the Woods, into a Place strongly fenced both by Nature and Art, and which, in all probability, had been fortified before on occasion of some domestick War: for all the Avenues were fecured by ftrong Barricades of felled Trees. They never fallied out of the Wood but in finall Parties, thinking it enough to defend the Entrance against our Men. But the Soldiers of the feventh Legion, advancing under cover of their Shields, and having cast up a Mount, forced the Intrenchments with little loss, and obliged the Enemy to abandon the Wood. Cæsar forbid all Pursuit; both because he was unacquainted with the nature of the Country; and the Day being far fpent, he refolved to employ the rest of it in fortifying his Camp.

IX. Early the next Morning, he divided his Troops both Horse and Foot into three Bodies, and sent them out in pursuit of the Enemy. They were advanced but a little way, and just come within sight of the Rear of the Britons, when a Party of Horse from Atrius came to Casar, and informed him, "That a dreadful Storm arising the Night before, had fallen violently upon the Fleet, and driven almost all the Ships ashore: That neither

46 Anchors nor Cables, nor all the Address of the BOOK

" Mariners and Pilots, had been able to refift the

"Fury of the Tempest; which had done unspeak"able Damage to the Fleet, by reason of the Ships

" running foul of one another." Cafar, upon this Intelligence, recalls his Legions and Cavalry, commanding them to give over the Pursuit. He himself returns to his Ships, and finds every thing according to the Reports and Letters he had received; forty of them being entirely destroyed, and the rest so damaged that they were hardly repairable. He therefore fet all the Carpenters of the Army to work, and wrote for others to Gaul; ordering Labienus at the same time, with the Legions under his Command, to build what Ships he He thought it likewise safest, though a could. Work of great Labour and Difficulty, to draw all his Ships on shore, and inclose them within the Fortifications of his Camp. Ten Days were spent in the Service, during which the Soldiers had no intermission of Fatigue, not even in the Night. The Ships being in this manner fecured, and the Camp strongly fortified, he left the same Troops to guard it as before, and returned to the Place where he had quitted the Pursuit of the Enemy. Upon his Arrival he found the Forces of the Britons confiderably increased. The chief Command and Administration of the War, was, by common Consent, conferred upon Cassibelanus; whose Territories were divided from the Maritime States by the Thames, a River eighty Miles distant from the Sea. This Prince had hitherto been engaged in almost continual Wars with his Neighbours: but the Terror of our Arrival making the Britons unite among themselves, they intrusted him with the whole Conduct of the War.

BOOK X. THE inland Parts of Britain are inhabited by those, whom Fame reports to be the Natives of the Soil. The Sea-coast is peopled with Belgians, drawn thither by the love of War and Plunder. These last, passing over from different Parts, and fettling in the Country, still retain the Names of the feveral States whence they are descended. The Island is well peopled, full of Houses built after the manner of the Gauls, and abounds in Cattle. They use brass Money, and iron Rings of a certain weight. The Provinces remote from the Sea produce Tin, and those upon the Coast Iron; but the latter in no great Quantity. Their Brass is all imported. All kinds of Wood grow here the fame as in Gaul, except the Fir and Beech-tree. They think it unlawful to feed upon Hares, Pullets, or Geefe; yet they breed them up for their Diversion and Pleasure. The Climate is more temperate than in Gaul, and the Colds less intense. The Island is triangular, one of its sides facing Gaul. The Extremity towards Kent, whence is the nearest Passage to Gaul, lies Eastward: the other stretches South-west. fide extends about five hundred Miles. Another fide looks towards Spain westward. Over-against this lies Ireland, an Island esteemed not above half as large as Britain, and separated from it by an interval equal to that between Britain and Gaul. In this interval lies the Isle of Mona, besides several other lesser Islands, of which some write, that in the time of the Winter-folflice, they have Night for thirty Days together. We could make out nothing of this upon Enquiry, only discovered by means of our Hour-glasses, that the Nights were shorter than in Gaul. The length of this fide is computed at feven hundred Miles. The last side faces the North-east, and is fronted by no part of

the Continent, only towards one of its Extremities it BOOK feems to eye chiefly the German Coast. It is thought to extend in length about eight hundred Miles. Thus the whole Island takes in a Circuit of two thoufand Miles. The Inhabitants of Kent, which lies wholly on the Sea-coast, are the most civilized of all the Britons, and differ but little in their Manners from the Gauls. The greater part of those within the Country never fow their Lands, but live on Flesh and Milk, and go clad in Skins. All the Britons in general paint themselves with Woad, which gives a bluish Cast to the Skin, and makes them look dreadful in Battle. They are longhair'd; and shave all the rest of the Body except the Head and upper Lip. Ten or twelve of them live together, having their Wives in common; especially Brothers, or Parents and Children amongst themselves: but the Issue is always ascribed to him who first espoused the Mother.

XI. The Enemy's Horse, supported by their Chariots, vigorously charged our Cavalry on their March; yet we every where had the better, and drove them to their Woods and Hills: but after making great Slaughter, venturing to continue the Pursuit too far, we lost some Men. Some time after, fallying unexpectedly from the Woods, and falling fuddenly upon our Men while employed in fortifying their Camp, a sharp Conflict ensued between them and the advanced Guard. Cefer fent two Cohorts to their Affistance; whom the Britons charging in separate Parties, so surprised with their new manner of fighting, that they broke through, routed them, and returned without Lofs. 2. Laberius Durus, a military Tribune, was slain on this occasion: but some fresh Cohorts coming up, the Britons were at last repulsed.

BOOK XII. By this Action which happened within view of the Camp, and of which the whole Army were Spectators, it evidently appeared, that our heavy armed Legions, who could neither purfue those that retired, nor durst venture to forsake their Standards, were by no means a fit match for fuch an Enemy. Nor could even the Cavalry engage without great danger; it being usual for the Britons to counterfeit a Retreat, until they had drawn them a confiderable way from the Legions; when fuddenly quitting their Chariots, they charged them on Foot, and by this unequal manner of fighting, made it alike dangerous to pursue or retire. Add to all this, that they never fought in a Body, but in small Parties, and with considerable Intervals between. They had likewise their Detachments fo placed, as eafily to protect their flying Troops, and fend fresh Supplies where needful.

> XIII. THE next Day they stationed themselves among the Hills, at a diffance from our Camp, and appeared only in small Bodies, nor seemed so forward to skirmish with our Cavalry as the Day before. But about Noon, Cafar ordering out three Legions to forage, with all the Cavalry, under the Command of C. Trebonius his Lieutenant; they fell fuddenly upon the Foragers on all fides, and even attacked the Legions and Standards. Our Men vigorously returning the Charge, repulsed them; and the Cavalry finding themselves supported by the Foot, continued the Pursuit till they had utterly broken them; infomuch that great Numbers being flain, they could neither find an opportunity to rally, descend from their Chariots, or face about to make Resistance. After this Defeat, the auxiliary Troops, which had come in from

from all Parts, returned severally to their own BOOK.
Homes; nor did the Enemy, from this time, appear any more against us with their whole Forces.

XIV. CÆSAR perceiving their Delign, marched towards the Thames, to penetrate into the Kingdom of Cassibelanus. This River is fordable only in one place, and that not without great difficulty. When he arrived, he faw the Enemy drawn up in great Numbers on the other fide. They had likewife fecured the Banks with sharp Stakes, and driven many of the same kind into the Bottom of the River, yet so as to be covered by the Water. Cæsar having Intelligence of this from the Prisoners and Deferters, fent the Cavalry before, ordering the Legions to follow close after; which they did with fo much Expedition and Briskness, though nothing but their Heads were above the Water, that the Enemy, unable to fustain their Charge, quitted the Banks, and betook themselves to flight.

XV. CASSIBELANUS, as we have before intimated, finding himself unable to keep the Field, disbanded all his other Forces; and retaining only four thousand Chariots, watched our Motions, always keeping at some distance from us, and sheltering himself in Woods and inaccessible Places, whither he had likewise made such of the Inhabitants with their Cattle retire, as lay upon our Rout: and if at any time our Cavalry ventured upon a freer Excursion into the Fields, to plunder and lay waste the Country; as he was perfectly acquainted with all the Roads and Defiles, he would fally from the Woods with some of the Chariots, and fall upon our Men dispersed and in disorder. These frequent Alarms obliged us to be much upon our Guard; nor would Cæsar suffer VOL. I.

V. Legions, or to pillage and destroy the Country, unless where the Foot was at hand to sustain them.

XVI. MEAN-TIME the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful States in those parts, send Ambassadors to Casar. Of this State was Mandubratius, who had fled for Protection to Cafar in Gaul, that he might avoid the Fate of his Father Imanuentius, whom Cassibelanus had put to death. The Ambaffadors promifed Obedience and Submission in the name of the Province; and withal intreated him to defend Mandubratius against the Violence of Casfibelanus, and restore him to the Government of their State. Cefar ordered them to deliver forty Hoftages, and furnish his Army with Corn; fending back at the fame time Mandubratius. yielded to his Demands without delay, fent the appointed number of Hostages, and supplied him with Corn.

XVII. THE Protection granted to the Trinobantes, fecuring them from the Infults of the Soldiers; the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Caffi, fend Ambassadors to Cæsar, and submit. them he had Intelligence, that he was not far from the Capital of Cassibelanus, which was situated amidst Woods and Marshes, and whither great numbers of Men and Cattle were retired. A Town among the Britons is nothing more than a thick Wood, fortified with a Ditch and Rampart, to ferve as a place of Retreat against the Incursions of their Enemies. Thither he marched with his Legions : and tho' the Place appeared to be extremely strong both by Art and Nature, he nevertheless resolved to attack it in two feveral Quarters. The Enemy, after a short stand, were obliged at last to give way,

and

pily

and retire by another part of the Wood. VaftBOOK numbers of Cattle were found in the Place; and V. many of the Britons were either made Prisoners, or lost their lives in the Pursuit.

XVIII. WHILE these things passed beyond the Thames, Cashbelanus dispatched Messengers to Kent, which, as we have before observed, was situated along the Sea-coast. This Country was then under the Government of four Kings, Cingetorix, Carnilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, who had Orders to draw all their Forces together, and fall fuddenly upon the naval Camp of the Romans. But our Men fallying upon them as they approached, made great flaughter of their Troops, took Cingetorix one of their Leaders Prisoner, and returned safe to the Camp. Cassibelanus, upon the News of this Battle, discouraged by so many Losses, the Devastation of his Territories, and above all the Revolt of the Provinces; fent Ambassadors to Casar to sue for Peace, by the Mediation of Comius of Arras.

XIX. CÆSAR defigning to pass the Winter in Gaul, because of the frequent Commotions in that Country; and reflecting that but a small part of the Summer remained, during which it would be easy to protract the War; demanded Hostages, and appointed the yearly Tribute which Britain was to pay to the Romans. At the same time he strictly charged Cassibelanus to offer no Injury to Mandubratius or the Trinobantes. Having received the Hostages, he led his Troops back to the Sea-side, where he found his Fleet repaired. Orders were immediately given to launch it: and because the number of Prisoners was exceeding great, and several Ships had been destroyed by the Tempest, he resolved to carry over his Men at two Embarkations. Hap-

BOOK pily it so fell out, notwithstanding the great number of Ships, and their frequent passing and repassing, that not one perished either this or the preceding Year, which had any Soldiers on board: whereas those sent empty to him from the Continent, as well the Ships concerned in the first Embarkation, as others built afterwards by Labienus, to the number of fixty, were almost all driven back or lost. Cafar having waited for them a confiderable time to no purpose, and fearing to lose the proper Season for failing, as the time of the Equinox drew near, chofe to flow his Men on board the few Ships he had: and taking the Opportunity of an extraordinary Calm, fet fail about ten at night, and by daybreak brought his whole Fleet fafe to the Continent of Gaul.

> XX. Having laid up his Fleet, and held a general Affembly of the Gauls at Samarobriva; as the Crop had been very indifferent this Year by reason of the great Droughts, he was obliged to quarter his Legions otherwise than in former Winters, and canton them one by one in the feveral Provinces of One Legion he quartered on the Morini, under the command of C. Fabius: another among the Nervians, under Q. Cicero: a third with the Aduans, under L. Roscius: and a fourth in the Country of the Rhemi, on the Borders of the Treviri, under Labienus. Three were fent into Belgium, over whom he appointed three Commanders; M. Crassus his Questor, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. The eighth and last, which Cafar had newly raised on the other side of the Po, was sent, together with five Cohorts, among the Eburenes, between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambierix and Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this Body were two Commanders; Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L.,

L. Arunculeius Cotta. By this distribution of his BOOK Legions, he thought he had found an easy Remedy against the scarcity of Corn; and yet they all lay within the Compass of an hundred Miles, except that under L. Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly Country. He resolved however not to leave Gaul 'till he had received advice from all his Lieutenants, and was assured that their Quarters were established, fortisied, and secured.

XXI. Among the Carnutes lived Talgetius, a Man of diftinguished Birth, and whose Ancestors had been possessed of the Sovereignty in that State. Cafar had restored him to the Dignity of his Forefathers, in confideration of his Virtue and Affection to him, and the many fignal Services he had done him in all his Wars. It was now the third Year of his Reign, when his Enemies, many of whom were of his own State, conspiring against him, openly assassinated him. The Affair was laid before Cæsar: who fearing lest the great number concerned in the Plot might draw the State into a Revolt, ordered L. Plancus, with a Legion from Belgium, to march speedily into the Country of the Carnutes, fix his Winter-quarters in that Province, and feizing all who had been concerned in the murder of Tasgetius, send them Prisoners to him. Mean-time he was informed by his Lieutenants and Questors, to whom he had committed the care of the Legions, that they were feverally arrived at their appointed Quarters, and had fortified themfelves in them.

XXII. ABOUT fifteen Days after the Arrival of the Legions in their Winter-quarters, a fudden Infurrection and Revolt broke out among the Eburones,

BOOKby the fecret Practices of Ambiorix and Cativulcus. V. These two Princes had been to meet Sabinus and Cotta on their Frontiers, and in a friendly manner had fupplied them with Corn: but now instigated by Indutionarus of Treves, they excited their People to take up Arms; and having furprifed fome Soldiers that were gone to cut Wood, came with a great Body of Troops to attack the Roman Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, afcended the Rampart, and fending out a Detachment of Spanish Horse, put their Cavalry to rout. Upon this, despairing of Success, they drew off their Men from the Attack; and, according to their Custom, demanded a Conference; pretending they had fomething to fay which concerned the common Interest, and might ferve to put an end to the present Differences.

> XXIII. ACCORDINGLY C. Arpinius, a Roman Knight, the Friend of Q. Titurius; and Q. Junius of Spain, who had frequently before been fent by Casar to Ambiorix, were deputed to treat. Ambiorix addressed them in Words to this effect: " That he had in no fort forgot the many Obligations he " lay under to Cafar; who had freed him from the "Tribute he had been wont to pay the Atuatici; and who had restored him his Son and Nephew, " whom that People, after receiving them as Ho-" stages, had treated as Slaves: That the Hostilities he had just committed were not the effect of his " own private Animosity to the Romans, but in consequence of a Resolution of the State; where " the Government was of fuch a nature, that the " People had as much Power over him, as he over " the People: That even the State itself had been " in a manner forced into this War, by a fudden " Confederacy of all Gaul: That he could appeal

" to his own Weakness for the truth of what he BOOK " faid, being not so very unskilled in Affairs as to " imagine, that the Forces of the Eburones were a " match for the Power of the Romans: That it was " a Project formed by all the States of Gaul in com-" mon, who had agreed to storm in one Day, the very "Day on which he spoke, all the Quarters of the " Roman Army; fo that no one might be able to " fuccour another: That it was not easy for Gauls " to resist the Importunity of those of their own "Nation, especially in a Proposal to act in concert " for the recovery of their Liberty: But that, " after having performed what the common Voice " of his Country demanded, he thought he might " now liften to that of Gratitude: That he found " himself compelled by his Attachment to Casar, " and by his Friendship for Sabinus, to give notice " of the extreme Danger to which the Legion was " exposed: That a great Body of Germans had " actually passed the Rhine, and would be there in "two Days at farthest: That Sabinus and Cotta " were to confider, whether it would not be proper " to retire with their Troops, before the neighbour-" ing States could be apprized of their Defign, " and go and join Labienus or Cicero, who were " neither of them distant much above fifty Miles: "That as far as regarded himself, he engaged by " all that was facred to fecure their Retreat thro' " his Territories; and undertook it the more " readily, as he should thereby not only discharge " his Duty to his Country, in delivering it from " the Inconvenience of wintering the Romans, but " at the same time manifest his Gratitude to Cafar." Having made this Speech he withdrew.

XXIV. ARPINIUS and Junius reported what they had heard to the Lieutenants; who alarmed at the L 4 fuddenness

BOOK suddenness of the thing, thought the Information not to be neglected, tho' it came from an Enemy: nor were they a little moved by this Confideration, that it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the Eburones, a weak and inconfiderable State, should of their own accord prefume to take up Arms against the Romans. They therefore laid the Matter before a Council of War, where a warm Debate arose, L. Arunculeius, with a great number of military Tribunes, and Centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their Winter-quarrters, before they had received Orders to that purpose from Casar. They alledged: "That having strongly fortified their " Camp, they were able to defend themselves, even " against all the Forces of the Germans: That " the late Attempt of the Gauls was a sufficient "Proof of this, whom they had not only with-" flood with Courage, but repulsed with Loss: "That they had Provisions in abundance, and " might therefore securely wait the Arrival of Relief " from Cafar and the neighbouring Legions: In 66 fine, that nothing could be more dishonourable, " or argue greater want of Judgment, than in " Affairs of the highest moment, to take Measures " upon the Information of an Enemy." Titurius, on the other hand, exclaimed: " That it would " be then too late to think of retiring, when the " Enemy in greater numbers, and strengthened by the accession of the Germans, should come up " against them; or when the Quarters next them " should have received some signal Check: That " the time for Deliberation was short: That Cafar, " he made no question, was gone into Italy; it not 66 being likely, that either the Carnutes would have " formed the Defign of affaffinating Tasgetius, or the Eburones in so contemptuous a manner

" affaulted

" affaulted the Roman Camp, had they not been BOOK " affured of his Departure: That the Information of an Enemy weighed not with him, but the real " Circumstances of Things. The Rhine was not 4 far off. The Germans were much exasperated " by the death of Ariovistus, and their late frequent "Defeats. Gaul burnt with Impatience to throw " off the Roman Yoke, avenge the many Loffes-" they had fuftained, and recover their former "Glory in War, of which now scarce a Shadow " remained. In short, who could imagine that " Ambiorix, without a certainty of being supported, " would have embarked in fo dangerous an Enter-" prize? That his Opinion was in all Respects " fafe; because, if no such Confederacy had been " formed, they had nothing to apprehend in " marching to the nearest Legion; if, on the con-" trary, all Gaul and Germany were united, Expedition alone could fave them from Destruction: " Whereas, by following the Advice of Cotta, and " those who were against a Retreat; tho' the " Danger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet " were they fure in the end of perishing by Famine." The Dispute continued for some time; Cotta, and the principal Officers, strongly opposing the March of the Troops. At last Sabinus raising his Voice, that he might be heard by the Soldiers without: "Be it fo then, (fays he,) fince you feem fo refolv-" ed: I am not he among you who is most afraid of Death. But if any Misfortune happens, those " who hear me will know whom to blame. In two "Days, did not you oppose it, we might easily " reach the Quarters next us; and there, in con-" junction with our Fellow-Soldiers, confront "the common Danger: whereas by keeping the Troops separate and at a distance, you reduce " them

BOOK" them to the Necessity of perishing by Sword or V. "Famine."

XXV. THE Council was then going to rife: but the Officers, furrounding their Generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their Diffention and Obstinacy. They told them, " That " whatever Resolution was taken, whether to go " or stay, the Danger was by no means great, " provided they acted with union among themfelves; but their Disagreement threatned the "Troops with inevitable Destruction." The Debate continued till Midnight: when at length Cotta, vanquished by Importunity, yielded to the Opinion of Sabinus. Orders were given for marching by break of Day. The remainder of the Night was none of it employed in fleep; each Man being taken up in choosing what things to carry along with him, and what of his Winter-necessaries to leave behind. In short, they did every thing to make their stay more dangerous; and by their Fatigue and want of Rest, incapacitate themfelves for a vigorous Defence upon their March. At Day break they left their Camp, not like Men acting by the advice of an Enemy, but as if Ambiorix had been their particular Friend; marching in a very extended Column, and followed by a great Train of Baggage.

XXVI. THE Enemy judging from the Hurry and Motion in the Camp, that the Romans intended to leave it, placed themselves in Ambuscade in two Bodies in a Wood; where, well-sheltered and covered from View, they waited at about two Miles distance their Arrival; and when the greatest part of the Army had entered a large Valley, suddenly appearing on both sides of it, they attacked them

them at the same time in Front and Rear, and BOOK obliged them to fight in a Place of great disadvan V. tage.

XXVII. THEN at length Titurius, like one who had neglected all the necessary Precautions, unable to hide his Concern, ran up and down among the Troops, and began to dispose them in order of Battle; but with an Air fo timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of Success; as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last Moment of Execution. But Cotta, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the Departure of the Troops, omitted nothing in his Power for the common Safety; calling to and encouraging the Men like an able General, and at the same time fighting with the Bravery of a common Soldier. And because the great Length of the Column rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all Diforders, and repair expeditiously enough to the Places where their Presence was necessary; Orders were given to quit the Defence of the Baggage, and form into an Orb. This Disposition, though not improper in these Circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy Consequences; for being confidered as the Effect of Terror and Despair, it discouraged our Men, and augmented the Confidence of the Enemy. Befides, as unavoidably happens on fuch Occasions, many of the Soldiers quitting their Enfigns, haftened to fetch from the Baggage what they had most of value, and filled all Parts with Uproar and Lamentation.

XXVIII. THE Gauls mean-while conducted themselves with great Prudence; their Officers proclaimed through the Ranks, "That not a Man "should

BOOK" should stir from his Post; that the Booty was " theirs, and every thing belonging to the Romans " must certainly fall into their Hands: but that " all depended upon fecuring the Victory." Our Men were not inferior to the Enemy either in Valour, Number, or way of fighting. Though they had neither General nor Fortune on their fide, they hoped still by their Bravery to furmount all Difficulties; and whenever any of the Cohorts fallied out, fo as to join the Enemy, hand to hand, a confiderable Slaughter of the Gauls enfued. This being perceived by Ambiorix, he ordered his Men to cast their Darts at a distance, to avoid a close Fight, retire before the Romans whenever they advanced, and puriue them as they returned to their Standards: in which way of fighting they were become fo expert, by the lightness of their Arms, and daily Exercise, that it was impossible to do them any hurt. These Orders were exactly followed; infomuch that when any Cohort left the Orb, and came forward to attack the Enemy, they retreated and dispersed in a moment: mean-while it uncocovered its own Flanks, and exposed them to the Darts on either fide. The Danger was still greater when they returned; for then not only the Troops that flood next them, but those who had retired before them, furrounded and charged them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they chose to continue in their Post; neither could their Valour any thing avail them, nor was it possible for Men standing fo close together, to avoid the Darts of fo great a Multitude. And yet notwithstanding all these Disadvantages, and the many Wounds they had received, they still maintained their Ground; and though much of the Day was now fpent, the Fight having continued from Sun-rise till two in the Afternoon, they did nothing in all that time unworthy the Dignity of the Roman Name. At length BOOK T. Balventius, who the Year before had been made first Centurion of a Legion, a Man of distinguished Courage, and great Authority among the Troops, had both his Thighs pierced with a Dart. 2. Lucanius, an Officer of the same Rank, endeavouring to rescue his Son, whom he saw surrounded by the Enemy, was killed after a brave Resistance. And L. Cotta the Lieutenant, encouraging the several Cohorts and Companies, received a Blow on the Mouth from a Sling.

XXIX. So many Misfortunes quite dispirited Titurius; who perceiving Ambiorix at a distance animating his Troops, fent Cn. Pompey his Interpreter, to beg Quarters for himself and his Soldiers. Ambiorix replied; "That he was ready to " grant him a Conference if he defired it: That " he hoped to prevail with the Multitude to spare " the Romans; and that as to Sabinus himself, he " gave his Word no hurt should be done him." Sabinus communicated this Answer to Cotta, proposing that they should leave the Battle, and go and. confer with Ambiorix, from whom he was in hopes of obtaining Quarter both for themselves and their Men. Cotta absolutely refused to treat with an armed Enemy, and perfifted in that Refolution. Sabinus ordered the military Tribunes and principal Centurions that were about his Person to follow him, and when he drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to lay down his Arms, obeyed; charging those that were with him to do the same. Mean-while, as they were treating about the Conditions, Ambiorix spinning out the Deliberations on purpose, he was by degrees surrounded and flain. Then the Gauls, according to their Custom, raifing a Shout, and calling out Victory, charged

V. Disorder. L. Cotta, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the Soldiers. The rest retreated to the Camp they had quitted in the Morning; of whom L. Petrosidius, the Standard-bearer, finding himself fore pressed by the Enemy, threw the Eagle within the Intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before the Camp. Those that remained, with much ado, sustained the Attack till Night; but finding themselves without Hope, they killed one another to the last Man. A sew who escaped out of the Fight, got by different ways to Labienus's Camp, and brought him the News of this sad Event.

XXX. Ambiorix, elated with this Victory, marched immediately at the head of his Cavalry into the Country of the Atuatici, which bordered upon his Territories; and travelling Day and Night without intermission, left Orders for the Infantry to follow him. Having informed them of his Success, and roused them to Arms, he the next Day arrived among the Nervians, and urged them not to lose the favourable Opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the Yoke of Slavery, and avenging the Injuries they had received from the Romans. He told them, " That two of their " Lieutenants had been flain, and a great part of " their Army cut to pieces: That it would be an " eafy matter, fuddenly to attack and deftroy the " Legion quartered in their Country under Cicero: " and that he was himself ready to affift them in " the Enterprise." By this Speech he easily drew in the Nervians.

XXXI. Accordingly, having forthwith difpatched Messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumosians, Pleumosians, and Gorduni, who are all subject to BOOK their State; they affembled what Forces they could, and came unexpectedly upon Cicero's Quarters, who as yet had heard nothing of the Fate of Titurius. Here likewise it unavoidably fell out, that the Soldiers fent to cut Wood for Firing and the Fortifications of the Camp, were intercepted by the fudden Arrival of their Cavalry. Having put all these to the Sword; the Eburones, Atuatici, and Nervians, with their Allies and Tributaries, amounting to a formidable Army, came and attacked the Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, ascended the Rampart, and with great difficulty fustained that Day's Assault; for the Enemy placed all their hopes in Dispatch, and firmly believed that if they came off Conquerors on this Occasion, they could not fail of Victory every where elfe.

XXXII. CICERO's first Care was to write to Cæsar, promising the Messengers great Rewards if they carried his Letters fafe. But as all the ways were befet by the Enemy's Troops, his Couriers were continually intercepted. Mean-while of the Materials brought for fortifying the Camp, an hundred and twenty Towers were built during the Night with incredible Dispatch, and the Works about the Rampart compleated. Next Day the Enemy, with a much greater Force than before, attacked the Camp, filled the Ditch, but were again repulsed by our Men. This continued for feveral Days together. The Night was wholly employed in repairing the Breaches made by Day, infomuch that neither the fick or wounded were permitted to rest. Whatever might be of use to resist the next Day's Affault, was prepared with great diligence during the Night. Stakes were hardened in the Fire; Palisades planted in great Number;

Towers

V. the whole strengthened with a Parapet and Battlements. Cicero himself, though much out of order,
would take no rest, even during the Night; so
that the Soldiers were obliged to force him from
time to time to take some Repose.

XXXIII. MEAN-TIME fuch of the Nervian Chiefs and Leaders, as had any Intimacy or Friendship with Cicero, defired a Conference. This being agreed to, they addressed him in the same strain as Ambiorix had before used towards Sabinus: "That. " all Gaul was in Arms: That the Germans had " passed the Rhine: That Cæsar and the rest of " the Troops were besieged in their Winter-quar-" ters." They told him likewise of the Fate of Sabinus; and to gain Credit, produced Ambiorix; adding: " That it was in vain to expect Relief from those who were themselves in the utmost " diffres: That they meant not however any In-" jury to Cicero and the People of Rome, but mere-" ly to prevent their wintering in the Country, " and establishing that Practice into a Custom: "That he was therefore at liberty to leave his " Quarters without Molestation, and retire in safe-"ty where he pleased." To this Cicero only anfwered: " That it was not usual with the People " of Rome to accept Conditions from an armed " Enemy: But if they would lay down their Arms, " he promised to interpose his Mediation, and per-" mit them to fend Ambassadors to Cæsar, from " whose Justice they might reasonably expect Re-" drefs."

XXXIV. THE Nervians, driven from this Hope, furrounded the Camp with a Line, whose Rampart was eleven Foot high, and Ditch fifteen Foot

Foot deep. They had learnt something of this in BOOK their former Wars with Cæsar, and the Prisoners they had made gave them further Instructions. But being unprovided of the Tools necessary in this kind of Service, they were obliged to cut the Turf with their Swords, dig up the Earth with their Hands, and carry it in their Cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their Number: for in less than three Hours they compleated a Line of sisteen Miles in Circuit. The following Days were employed in raising Towers, proportioned to the height of our Rampart; and in preparing Scythes, and wooden Galleries, in which they were again assisted by the Prisoners.

XXXV. On the feventh Day of the Attack, a very high Wind arifing; they began to throw red-hot Balls of Clay, and burning Javelins, upon the Barracks of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gauls were thatched with Straw. These foon took fire; and the Flames were in a moment spread by the Wind into all parts of the Camp. The Enemy falling on with a mighty Shout, as if already fecured of Victory, advanced their Towers and Galleries, and prepared to scale the Rampart. But fuch was the Constancy and presence of Mind of the Soldiers; that tho' the Flames surrounded them on every fide, and they were oppressed with the multitude of the Enemy's Darts; tho' they faw their Huts, their Baggage, and their whole Fortunes in a blaze; yet not only did they continue firm in their Posts, but scarce a Man offered fo much as to look behind him; fo intent were they on fighting and repelling the Enemy. was much the hardest Day for our Troops; but had nevertheless this fortunate Issue, that far the greatest number of the Enemy were on that Day wounded Vol. I.

BOOK wounded or flain: for as they had crowded close V. up to the Rampart, those behind prevented the front Ranks from retiring. The Flames abating by degrees, and the Enemy having brought forward one of their Towers to the very foot of the Rampart; the Centurions of the third Cohort drew off their Men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, and challenging them to enter: but as not a Man would run the hazard, they attacked them on all fides with Stones, drove them from the Tower, and set it on fire.

XXXVI. In this Legion were two Centurions of distinguished Valour, T. Pulsio, and L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised to the first Rank of their Order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the Pre-eminence in Courage, and at every Year's Promotion contended with great Eagerness for Precedence. In the heat of the Attack before the Rampart, Pulfio addressing Va renus: " What hinders you now (fays he,) or " what more glorious Opportunity would you de-" fire of fignalizing your Bravery? This, this is " the Day for determining the Controversy between " us." At these Words he sallied out of the Camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the Gauls. Nor did Varenus decline the Challenge; but thinking his Honour at stake, followed at some distance. Pulfio darted his Javelin at the Enemy, and transfixed a Gaul that was coming forward to engage him: who falling dead of the Wound, the Multitude advanced to cover him with their Shields, and all poured their Darts upon Pulfio, giving him no time to retire. A Javelin pierced his Shield, and stuck fast in his Belt. This Accident entangling his right Hand, prevented him drawing his Sword, and gave the Enemy time to furround him. Varenus

Varenus his Rival flew to his Affistance, and endea-BOOK voured to rescue him. Immediately the Multitude quitting Pulsio, as fancying the Dart had dispatched him, all turned upon Varenus. He met them with his Sword drawn, charged them hand to hand; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest: but pursuing with too much eagerness, stept into a Hole, and fell down. Pulsio in his turn hastened to extricate him; and both together, after having slain a Multitude of the Gauls, and acquired infinite Applause, retired unhurt within the Intrenchments. Thus Fortune gave such a turn to the Dispute, that each owed his Life to his Adversary; nor was it possible to decide, to which of them the Prize of Valour was due.

XXXVII. As the Defence every Day became more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by the great Multitude of killed and wounded, which confiderably lessened the number of Defendants; Cicero fent Letter upon Letter to inform Cafar of his Danger. Many of these Couriers falling into the Enemy's Hands, were tortured to death within view of our Soldiers. There was at that time in the Roman Camp a Nervian of Distinction, by name Vertico, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to Cicero, and given ample Proofs of his Fidelity. This Man, by the hopes of Liberty, and a promise of great Rewards, engaged one of his Slaves to carry a Letter to Cafar. Having concealed it in his Javelin, and passed thro' the Camp of the Gauls without fuspicion, as being himfelf of that Nation, he arrived fafe at Cæsar's Quarters, who by this means was informed of the Danger of Cicero and the Legion.

M 2

XXXVIII,

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BOOK XXXVIII. CÆSAR, receiving the Letter about five in the Afternoon, immediately dispatched a Messenger to M. Crassus, who was quartered among the Bellovaci, twenty-five Miles off, ordering him to draw out his Legion at midnight, and march with all the expedition he could to join him. Crassus, according to his Orders, came along with the Courier. He fent likewise to C. Fabius, directing him to lead his Legion into the Country of the Atrebatians, which lay in the way to Cicero. wrote to Labienus, if it could be done with fafety, to meet him upon the Frontiers of the Nervians. He himself in the mean-time assembled about four hundred Horse from the nearest Garrisons, refolving not to wait for the rest of the Army, which lay at too great a distance.

> XXXIX. At 'nine in the Morning he had notice from his Scouts of the Arrival of Crassus. That Day he marched twenty Miles, leaving Craffus with a Legion at Samarobriva, where he had deposited the Baggage, Hostages, publick Papers, and all the Provisions which had been laid up for the Winter. Fabius, in consequence of his Instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his Legion. Labienus, who had been informed of the Death of Sabinus, and the Destruction of the Troops under his Command, and who faw all the Forces of Treves advancing against him; fearing lest if he should quit his Quarters, the Enemy might conftrue it as a Flight, and that it would be impossible for him to fustain their Attack, especially as they were flushed with their late Success; wrote to Casar, informing him of the Danger that would attend the quitting his Camp, of the Difaster that happened among the Eburones, and that all the Forces of the Treviri, both Horse

and

and Foot, were encamped within three Miles of BOOK him.

XL. CÆSAR approving his Reasons; tho' he thereby found himself reduced from three to two Legions, was yet fensible that all depended upon expedition. He makes forced Marches; and reaching the Territories of the Nervians, learnt from fome Prisoners the state of the Siege, and the danger the Legion was in. Immediately he engages a Gaulish Horseman, by the Promise of great Rewards, to carry a Letter to Cicero. It was wrote in Greek Characters, that if it fell into the Enemy's Hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The Messenger had Orders, in case he found it impracticable to penetrate himself into the Roman Camp, to tie the Letter to a Javelin, and throw it in. this Letter Cæsar sent Cicero word, that he was already on the March to relieve him, and would be up very foon; exhorting him in the mean-time, to defend himself with his wonted Bravery. The Gaul, dreading a discovery, threw the Letter into the Camp as he had been ordered: but the Javelin by accident sticking in a Tower, remained there two Days unperceived. On the third a Soldier faw it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero; who immediately read it in full Affembly, and diffused the common Joy thro' the whole Camp. At the fame time they perceived the Smoke of the Villages fired by Cæfar in his March, which put the Arrival of the Succours beyond all doubt.

XLI. THE Gauls having notice of it also by their Scouts, thought proper to quit the Siege, and go to meet Cæsar. Their Army consisted of about sixty thousand Men. Cicero, now at liberty, applied again to Vertico, for the Slave spoken of M 2 above;

BOOK above; and having admonished him to use the utmost Diligence and Circumspection, dispatched him with a Letter to Cefar, informing him that the Enemy had raised the Siege, and were advancing against him with all their Forces. Casar received the Letter about midnight, communicated the Contents to his Army, and exhorted them to meet the Enemy with Courage. Next Day he decamped early, and after a March of four Miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side of a large Valley, with a River in front. It was dangerous to engage fo great a Force upon unequal Ground. Knowing therefore that the Siege of Cicero's Camp was raised, and having no longer any Reason to be in a hurry, he encamped in the most convenient Spot he could find, and compleated his Intrenchments. His Army confifting of no more than feven thousand Men without Baggage, required at best but a very small Camp; yet he purposely contracted it as much as possible, to inspire the Enemy with the greater Contempt of him. Mean-time fending out Scouts on all fides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the Valley with most Safety.

XLII. The rest of the Day passed in slight skirmishes between the Cavalry near the Brook; but the main Body of the Army on both sides kept within their Lines: the Gauls, in expectation of more Forces, which were not yet come up: Casar, that by pretending Fear, he might draw the Enemy on this side the Valley, and engage them before his Camp; or, if that could not be effected, that having discovered the Passes, he might be enabled to cross the Valley and Rivulet with less danger. Early next Morning the Enemy's Cavalry coming up to our Camp, charged our Horse; who, by Casar's

far's Orders purposely gave ground, and retired BOOK behind the Works. At the fame time he caused the Ramparts to be raifed higher, the Gates to be barricaded, and cautioned the Soldiers, in the execution of these Orders, to run up and down tumultuously, and affect an air of Timidity and Concern. The Enemy, invited by all these Appearances, croffed the Valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous Post. Our Men mean-while retiring from the Rampart, they approached still nearer, cast their Darts on all sides within the Trenches, and fent Heralds round the Camp to proclaim, that if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty fo to do 'till nine o' Clock, after which no Quarter would be granted. Nay, fo far did they carry their Contempt, that thinking they could not break in by the Gates, (which, to deceive them, were stopt up with fingle rows of Turf,) some began to scale the Rampart, others to fill up the Ditch. But then Cafar fallying by all the Gates at once, and charging them brifkly with his Cavalry, put them fo precipitately to flight, that not a Man offered to make the least Resistance. Great numbers of them were flain, and the rest obliged to throw down their Arms.

XLIII. Nor caring to pursue them far, on account of the Woods and Marshes that lay in his way; and finding that considerable execution had been done upon the spot, he the same Day joined Cicero with all his Forces; where beholding the Towers, Galleries, and other Works of the Gauls, he could not help being struck with Admiration. He then reviewed Cicero's Legion, and found that not a tenth Man had escaped without Wounds; which gave him a just Idea of the greatness of the Man had escaped without wounds;

V.

BOOK Danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous Defence they had made. He bestowed great Commendations on the Legion, and its Commander; and addressed himself to the Centurions and military Tribunes by name, of whose Valour Cicero made honourable mention. He learnt particularly from the Prisoners all the Circumstances of the unhappy Affair of Sabinus and Cotta: and calling the Soldiers together next Day, gave them an Account of the whole Transaction, comforted them, confirmed their Courage, and told them; that a Disaster occasioned by the Imprudence and Rashness of the Lieutenant, ought to give them the less Disturbance; as by the Favour of the immortal Gods, and their Valour, Vengeance had followed fo fuddenly, that neither had the Joy of the Enemy for the Victory continued any time, nor their Grief for the Loss remained long without allay.

> XLIV. MEAN-TIME the Report of Cafar's Victory flew with incredible speed thro' the Country of the Rhemi to Labienus. For tho' he lay at the distance of fifty Miles from Cicero's Camp, whither Casar did not arrive 'till past three in the Afternoon; yet before midnight a Shout was raifed at the Gates of his Camp, by which the Rhemi fignified to him Cæsar's Victory, and their own Congratulation on that Success. The Report of this being carried to the Treviri; Indutiomarus, who the next Day had determined to attack Labienus's Camp, made off in the Night, and retired with all his Forces into his own Country. Cæfar fent back Fabius with his Legion to his former Quarters, refolving to winter himself near Samarobriva with three Legions, distributed in three different Cantonments; and as all Gaul was in motion, to con-

tinue with the Army in Person. For the defeat BOOK and Death of Sabinus spreading every where, almost all the States of Gaul were meditating a Revolt; and with this view fent Meffengers and Deputies into all Parts, to concert Measures, and contrive where to begin the War. Nay they held Assemblies by Night in defart Places; infomuch that during the whole Winter, scarce a Day passed, but Casar had Intelligence of fome new Refolves or Infurrections of the Gauls. Among the rest, L. Roscius his Lieutenant, who commanded the thirteenth Legion, fent him word: that great numbers of Gauls, from the several States of Armorica, had affembled to attack him, and advanced within eight Miles of his Camp; but upon hearing of Cæfar's Victory, had separated so hastily, that their Retreat had all the appearance of a Flight.

XLV. But Cafar fummoning the principal Noblemen of every State to attend him; partly by Menaces, making them fensible he was no Stranger to their Designs; partly by Exhortations, found means to keep the greatest part of Gaul in its duty. The Senones however, a potent State, and of great Authority among the Gauls, formed the Design of publickly affaffinating Cavarinus, whom Cafar had given them for a King; whose Brother Moritagus had held the Sovereignty at Cæsar's Arrival in Gaul, and whose Ancestors had long been in possession of the fame Dignity. But he having Intelligence of the Plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon purfuing him to the very Frontiers, they drove him from his Palace and Throne: and fending Ambaffadors to Casar to justify their Conduct; upon his ordering their whole Senate to repair to him, they refused to submit. So powerful was this Example amongst the Barbarians, that some at last were found fo great a Change did it produce in the Inclinations of all: that except the Æduans and Rhemi, who had been always particularly distinguished and favoured by Cæsar; the first, on account of their ancient and inviolable Fidelity to the People of Rome; the last, for their late Services in the Gallick War; scarce was there a single State in all Gaul that did not incur Suspicion. Nor is this, in truth, so much to be wondered at; as for many other Reasons, so particularly for this: that a People samed above all Nations for their military Virtues, could not with Patience bear to see themselves so far stript of their former Renown, as to be forced to submit to the Yoke of the Romans.

XLVI. INDUTIOMARUS and the Treviri ceased not, during the whole Winter, to fend Ambassadors over the Rhine; foliciting the German States; offering them Money; and urging, that a great part of our Army having already been cut off, much the least considerable remained. But no part of that Country could be perfuaded to come into their Defigns: because having twice before tried their Fortune with the Romans, in the War with Arievistus, and in the Defeat of the Tenchtheri; they were refolved, they told them, to run no more Hazards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this Hope, was not less active in drawing Forces together, foliciting Recruits from the neighbouring States, providing Horses, and encouraging even Out-laws and Convicts, by the Promise of great Rewards, to engage in his Service. And fo great an Authority had he by this means acquired in Gaul, that Ambassadors slocked from all Parts; some publickly, others in a private manner, to request his Protection and Friendship. XLVII. BOOK found of Courage enough

XLVII. FINDING himself thus voluntarily ap-BOOK plied to: on one fide, by the Senones and Carnutes, impelled by a consciousness of the Guilt they had incurred; on the other, by the Nervians and Atuatici, who were preparing for a War with the Romans; and that if he once took the Field, Forces would not be wanting: he called an Affembly of the States in Arms. This, according to the Custom of the Gauls, implies an actual commencement of War; and, by a ftanding Law, obliges all their Youth to appear at the Diet in Arms; in which they are so extremely strict, that who so ever has the misfortune to come last, is put to death in fight of the Multitude, with all manner of Torments. In this Affembly, Cingetorix, the head of the opposite Faction, and Son-in-law of Indutionarus; who, as we have related above, had declared for Cafar, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a publick Enemy, and his Estate confiscated. After which Indutionarus acquainted the Council, that the Senones, Carnutes, and several other States of Gaul had folicited his Affiftance: that he accordingly intended to join his Forces with theirs, taking his Rout thro' the Territories of the Rhemi, and giving up their Lands to be plundered; but that before he began his March, he was defirous of mastering the Camp of Labienus. To that end he gave the necessary Directions.

XLVIII. LABIENUS, whose Camp, both by the nature of the Ground, and the Fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing, either for himself or the Legion; but nevertheless was intent how he might give the Enemy some considerable Blow. Having therefore been informed by Cingetorix and his Adherents, of the Speech

V. Gaul; he sent Deputies to the neighbouring States, solicited Cavalry from all Parts, and appointed them a Day of Rendezvous. Mean-time Indutio-marus, with all his Cavalry, appeared almost every Day within sight of the Camp; one while, to examine its Situation; another, to intimidate Labienus, or invite him to a Conference. On these Occasions, it was usual for the Enemy to cast their Darts over the Rampart. Labienus kept his Men within the Works, and used all the Methods he could think of to make the Gauls believe he was afraid of them.

XLIX. Indutiomarus approaching the Trenches every Day with greater Contempt than before: Labienus received into his Camp, by night, all the Cavalry he had fent for from the neighbouring States; and was so careful to restrain his Men within their Lines, by Guards planted at all the Outlets, that it was impossible for the Treviri to get Intelligence of the Reinforcement he had received. Mean-time Indutionarus, according to Custom, came up to the Camp, and continued there the greater part of the Day. The Cavalry discharged their Darts over the Rampart, and in opprobrious Language challenged our Men to fight. Romans making no Answer, they retired towards Night, but dispersed and without Order. Then Labienus, ordering a sudden Sally with all the Cavalry, strictly cautioned and charged his Men, that as foon as they had put the Gauls to flight, (which happened according to his Expectation,) they should all single out Indutionarus, nor offer to wound a Man of the Enemy, till they faw him flain: for he was unwilling that any Delay, occafioned by the Slaughter of the rest, should give

him an Opportunity to escape. He promised great BOOK Rewards to the Man that should kill him; and sent the Cohorts after to sustain the Horse. The Design succeeded: for as all were intent upon Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken and slain in passing a River, and his Head brought back to the Camp. Our Cavalry, in their Return, put all to the Sword that came in their way. Upon the news of this Deseat, the Forces of the Eburones and Nervians returned home, and Gaul was somewhat quieter the rest of the Winter.

lets, that it was unpossible for the Victim to get Intelligence of the Renforcement he had received.

greater part of the Day. The Cavalry discharged, their Days over the Rampart, and in opproblems. Language that lended our Men to fight. The

C. JULIUS

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WARES IN GALLE.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK VI.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæsar, apprehending greater Commotions in Gaul, augments bis Forces. II. He reduces the Nervians by a sudden Invasion. III. And admits the Senones, Carnutes, and Menapians to a Surrender. VI. Labienus pretending Fear, suddenly attacks and routs the Treviri, IX. Cæfar passes the Rhine a second time. X. The Suevians prepare to oppose the Ro-XI. The Manners of the Gauls and Germans. mans described. XII. The Æduans and Sequani at the head of two opposite Factions in Gaul. The Sequani declining in Power, the Rhemi substitute themselves in their Place. XIII. Description of the Druids. XV. The Religion of the Gauls. XVI. The Gauls and Germans differ much as to their Manners and Customs. XXIII. The Hercynian Forest. XXIV. A Bull with one Horn. Wild Asses. XXIV. Bufalos. XXVII. Cæsar, fearing the Want of Provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against Ambiorix. XXVIII. The great Power of Fortune. XXIX. Ambiorix disbands his Troops, and counsels them to provide for their own Safety. XXX. Cæfar divides bis Army, and marches in Person in quest of Ambiorix. XXXI. Is obliged to proceed with great Circumspection in ravaging the Country. XXXII. The Sicambri cross the Rhine, and fall upon Cicero's Camp, XXXV. The astonishing Bravery of Sextius Baculus upon this Occasion. XXXVII. The Romans suffer some Loss. XXXVIII The Germans at length relinquish the Attack, and return home. XL. Cæsar lays waste the Country of the Eburones. Ambiorix narrowly escapes being taken. XL. Cæsar returns to Italy.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS in GAUL.

BOOK VI.

ÆSAR, for many Reasons, expecting greater Commotions in Gaul, ordered his Lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, to levy Troops. At the same time he defired of Cn. Pompey the Proconful, that fince he was himself detained by publick Affairs at Rome, he would fet on foot the Legion he had inlifted in Cisalpine Gaul, during his Confulship, and fend it to him: for he confidered it as of the utmost Importance towards fecuring a proper Respect from the Gauls for the time to come, to give them such an Idea of the Power of Italy, as might convince them that it was not only able speedily to repair any Losses sustained, but even to bring a greater Force into the Field. Friendship and the good of the Commonwealth equally determined Pompey to yield to this Request: VOL. I.

BOOK and the Levies being compleated with great dili-VI. gence by the Lieutenants, three new Legions were formed and brought into Gaul before the end of Winter. Thus, having doubled the Number of Cohorts loft under Titurius, he foon made the Enemy fensible, both by his Expedition and the Strength of the Reinforcement, of what they had to apprehend from the Power and Discipline of the Romans.

> II. INDUTIOMARUS being flain, as we have related above, the Treviri conferred the Command on his Relations. They perfifted likewife in foliciting the Germans, and making them offers of Money. But not being able to prevail with those that lay nearest them, they applied to some of the more remote States; and finding them inclined to treat, entered into a folemn Engagement with them, giving Hostages for Security of the Money stipulated, and affociating Ambiorix into the Confederacy. Cafar informed of these things, and finding that he was threatned with War on all fides; that the Nervians, Atuatici, and Menapians, with all the Germans on this fide the Rhine, were actually in Arms; that the Senones refused to attend him according to Orders, and were tampering with the Carnutes and other neighbouring States; and that the Treviri were foliciting the Germans by frequent Embaffies; he judged it would be necessary to open the Campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the Winter was at an end, he drew together the four nearest Legions, and fell unexpectedly into the Territories of the Nervians, before they could either affemble in a Body, or find means to fave themselves by Flight. Having carried off a great Number of Men and Cattle, enriched his Soldiers with the Booty, and laid waste the Country; he compelled them to submit

mit and give Hostages, and then led back his Le-BOOK gions to their Winter-quarters.

III. Early in the Spring, having summoned a general Affembly of Gaul, pursuant to his Design : as all the other States but the Senones, Canutes, and Treviri appeared; looking upon this as the beginning of a Revolt, and willing to postpone every thing else, he adjourned the Diet to Paris. City was upon the Borders of the Senones, and had been united with them about an Age before; but was thought to have no share in their present Revolt. Having declared the Adjournment to the Affembly, he the same Day set out with his Legions against the Senones, and by great Marches reached their Territories. Acco, who was at the head of the Confederacy, hearing of his Approach, ordered the Multitude to shelter themselves in the Towns: but before that could be done, the Romans appeared. This obliged them to change their Measures, and fend Deputies to Cæsar, to implore Forgiveness. They were seconded by the Æduans, the old and faithful Allies of the Romans, at whose Request Cæsar readily pardoned them; and the rather, because the Summer being now come, he had no mind to spend the Season for Action in proceeding formally against the Guilty. He ordered them to fend an hundred Hostages, whom he committed to the Custody of the Aduans. The Carnutes too, at the Intercession of the Rhemi, under whose Protection they were, having fent Deputies and Hostages, obtained the same Conditions. Cafar then went to the Assembly of the States, put an end to the Diet, and ordered the Gauls to provide him Cavalry.

VI. Cæsar turned all his Thoughts to the Management of the War with Ambiorix and the Treviri. He ordered Cavarinus to attend him with the Cavalry of the Senones, to prevent any new Commotions in his Absence, either in consequence of the Resentment of that Prince, or the Hatred he had incurred of the State. And having thus settled all things to his mind, as he knew Ambiorix was determined not to hazard a Battle, he set himself to watch his other Designs.

V. THE Menapians, whose Territories border upon those of the Eburones. are secured by Woods and Morasses on every side; and were the only People of Gaul, who had not fent Ambassadors to Casar to desire a Peace. He knew Ambiorix was in good Intelligence with them; and that by means of the Treviri, he had also entered into an Alliance with the Germans. He therefore thought it best to deprive him of these Resources, before he attacked him in person; lest despairing of being able to defend himself, he should either retire among the Menapians, or throw himself into the Arms of the Germans beyond the Rhine. This Resolution being taken, he fent the Baggage of the whole Army to Labienus in the Country of the Treviri, ordered him a Reinforcement of two Legions, and marched himself against the Menapians with five Legions, who carried nothing with them but their Arms. That Nation trufting to their Situation, instead of affembling Forces, retreated to their Woods and Morasses, and carried all their Effects along with them. Cafar, dividing his Forces with C. Fabius his Lieutenant, and M. Crassus his Questor; and having speedily finished his Bridges; entered their Country

Country in three Bodies, fet all their Houses and BOOK Villages on fire, and carried off fuch Numbers of Men and Cattle, that the Menapians were at last constrained to fue for Peace. He granted it, on Condition they fent him Hostages, and engaged not to admit Ambiorix or any one from him into their Territories; threatening to treat them as Enemies if they did. These things fettled, he left Comius of Arras there with a Body of Horse to keep them in Awe, and set out himself against the Treviri.

VI. WHILST Cafar was thus employed, the Treviri, having drawn together a great Number of Horse and Foot, were preparing to attack the Legion which had wintered in their Territories under Labienus. They were now advanced within two Days March of the Lieutenant's Camp, when they learnt that he had received a Reinforcement of two Legions from Cafar. Upon this encamping at about fifteen Miles distance, they resolved to wait for the Auxiliaries they expected from Germany. Labienus having Intelligence of their Defign, and hoping their Rashness might furnish him with an Opportunity of fighting, left the Baggage under a Guard of five Cohorts; and with the twenty-five remaining, and all his Cavalry, marched towards the Enemy, and pitched his Camp about a Mile from them.

VII. BETWEEN Labienus and the Enemy was a River, with steep Banks, and difficult to pass. And indeed neither was Labienus himself minded to try the Passage, nor did he expect the Enemy would offer at fuch an Attempt. The hope of being joined by the Auxiliaries grew stronger in the Camp of the Gauls every Day. Labienus declared publickly in a Council of War; "That as the

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" Germans

BOOK Germans were faid to be upon their march, he " was determined not to expose himself and the "Army to danger, but would decamp early next " Morning." This was foon carried to the Enemy; for as our Cavalry confifted mostly of Gauls, it was natural for some of them to sayour their Countrymen. Labienus affembling the military Tribunes and principal Centurions during the night, laid before them his real Defign: and the better to betray the Enemy into a suspicion of his being afraid, gave Orders for decamping with more Noise and Tumult than was usual in a Roman Army. By this means his March had all the Appearance of a Flight; and the Enemy, whose Camp was fo very near, had notice of it before Daybreak from their Spies.

> VIII. SCARCE had our Rear got without the Trenches, when the Gauls encouraging one another not to lose so fair a Prey, or stay in Expectation of the Germans, at a time the Romans were retreating in fuch a Panick; and confidering it as an Indignity, with fo great a Superiority of Forces, to forbear attacking an handful of Men already put to Flight and incumbered with their Baggage; refolved to pass the River, and engage the Romans, notwithstanding the Disadvantage of the Ground. Labienus, who had foreseen this; that he might draw them all over the River, continued the Feint of his March, and went on quietly. Then fending the Baggage a little before, and ordering it to be placed upon a rifing Ground: " Behold, Fellowfoldiers, fays he, the Opportunity you fo much " defired: you have the Enemy at a disadvantage, and in a Place where they cannot fustain the " Onset: shew only under my Command the Walour you have fo often manifested to our " General;

"General; think him present, and that he sees and BOOK " observes you." At the same time he ordered them to face about, and form in Line of Battle; and detaching a few Troops of Horse to guard the Baggage, drew up the rest on the two Wings. Our Men gave a fudden Shout, and threw their Iavelins. The Enemy, contrary to their Expectation, feeing those whom they imagined put to flight, marching against them with displayed Banners, could not fustain the very first Shock; but betaking themfelves immediately to flight, took Refuge in the nearest Woods. Labienus pursuing with his Cavalry, put many of the Enemy to the Sword, and took a great Number of Prisoners; infomuch that within a few Days the whole State was obliged to fubmit: for the Germans, who were coming to their Affistance, upon hearing of their Defeat, returned home. The Relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the Authors of the Revolt, chose likewise to retire with them, and abandon their Country. Cingetoria, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, was thereupon invested with the fupreme Authority.

IX. Cæsar, after his Arrival in Treves, from among the Menapians, refolved for two Reasons to pass the Rhine: one, because the Germans had affisted the Treviri against the Romans; the other, to deprive Ambiorix of a Retreat into those Parts In consequence of this Resolution, he set about making a Bridge on the River, but somewhat higher up than before. As the Form and Manner was known, the Soldiers, by their extraordinary Diligence, finished the Work in a sew Days. Leaving a strong Guard on the side of Treves, to prevent any sudden Insurrection in that Country, he carried over the rest of his Army. The Ubians, who had before submitted

VI. him to vindicate their Conduct, and affure him, that they had neither fent Troops to the Affistance of the Treviri, nor in any Instance departed from their Engagements. They urged and requested, that he would spare their Territories, and not, out of a general Hatred to the Germans, involve the Innocent in the Punishment of the Guilty. If he desired more Hostages, they told him they were ready to send them. Cæsar sinding upon Inquiry, that the Supplies had been sent by the Suevians, accepted the Submission of the Ubians: and preparing to march against the Suevians, informed himself of the Ways and Accesses to their Country.

X. A FEW Days after, he had Intelligence from the Ubians, that the Suevians were drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous, and had fent Orders to all the Nations under their Jurisdiction, to furnish their Contingents of Horse and Foot. Upon this having furnished himself with Provisions, and chosen a proper Place for his Camp, he ordered the Ubians to retire into their Towns with their Cattle and Effects; hoping that fo unskilful and barbarous an Enemy, might eafily be drawn by the Want of Provisions, to fight in a Place of Disadvantage, He further injoined the Ubians to fend Spies into all Parts, to learn the Defigns and Motions of the Suevians. They readily complied, and in a few Days brought him back word; "That the Suevians, upon certain Infor-" mation of the Arrival of the Roman Army, had " retired to the remotest Part of the Country, with " all their own Forces, and those of their Allies: that there they had refolved to wait the coming " up of the Romans, at the Entrance of a Forest 10 0

- " of immense Extent, called Bacenis, which reach-BOOK
- " ed a great way into the Country, and ferved as a VI.
- " Barrier between the Cherusci and Suevians, to pre-
- " vent their mutual Incursions."

XI. On this Occasion it may not be improper to fay somewhat of the Manners of the Gauls and Germans, and the difference of Customs between these two Nations. A spirit of Faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that not only in their feveral States, Districts, and Villages, but almost in every private Family. The Men of greatest Esteem and Confideration among them, are commonly at the head of these Factions, and give what turn they think proper to all publick Deliberations and Coun-This Cuftom is of long flanding, and feems defigned to fecure those of lower rank from the Oppression of the powerful: for the Leaders always take care to protect those of their Party, otherwise they would foon lofe all their Authority. This equally obtains thro' the whole Continent of Gaul, the Provinces being in general divided into two Factions.

XII. WHEN Cæsar arrived in the Country, the Eduans were at the head of one Faction, and the Sequani of the other. These last being the weaker, because the Æduans had long bore the greatest sway, and had a number of considerable States in their dependence; they united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom by great Presents and Promises they drew over the Rhine to their Assistance. This Alliance made them so powerful, that having worsted their Adversaries in several Battles, and killed almost all their Nobility; they forced the States dependent upon the Æduans to have recourse to them for protection; obliged the Æduans themselves

BOOKselves to give the Children of their principal Nobility as Hostages, swear publickly not to attempt any thing against the Sequeni, and resign up to their possession a part of their Territories; and by this means rendered themselves in a manner Sovereigns of all Gaul. Divitiacus, in this Necessity, applied to the Senate of Rome for Relief, but without effect. Casar's Arrival soon changed the face of Affairs. The Æduan Hostages were sent back, their former Clients restored, and new ones procured them by Cafar's Interest; it appearing, that such as were under their Protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder Lot: by all which their Fortune and Authority being confiderably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged to refign the Sovereignty. The Rhemi fucceeded in their place: and as they were known to be in the same degree of Favour with Cafar, fuch as could not get over their old Animofity to the Aduans, put themselves under their Protection. The Rhemi were extremely attentive to the Interests of their Clients, and thereby both preserved their old Authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such therefore was the then Situation of Gaul, that the Æduans possessing indisputably the first Rank, the Rhemi were next in Consideration and Dignity.

> XIII. Over all Gaul, there are only two Orders of Men, in any degree of Honour and Esteem: for the common People are little better than Slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, and have no share in the publick Deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with Debt, heavy Tributes, or the Exactions of their Superiors; they make themselves Vaffals to the Great, who exercise over them the fame Jurisdiction, as Masters do over Slaves. The two Orders of Men, with whom, as we have faid, all

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all Authority and Distinctions are lodged, are the BOOK Druids and Nobles. The Druids prefide in matters of Religion, have the care of publick and private Sacrifices, and interpret the Will of the Gods. They have the Direction and Education of the Youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all Controversies, whether publick or private, the Decision is left to them: and if any Crime is committed, any Murder perpetrated; if any Dispute arises touching an Inheritance, or the Limits of adjoining Estates; in all such Cases, they are the supreme Judges. They decree Rewards and Punishments; and if any one refuses to submit to their Sentence, whether Magistrate or private Man, they interdict him the Sacrifices. This is the greatest Punishment that can be inflicted among the Gauls; because such as are under this Prohibition, are considered as impious and wicked: all Men shun them, and decline their Conversation and Fellowship, lest they should suffer from the Contagion of their Misfortunes. They can neither have recourse to the Law for Justice, nor are capable of any publick Office. The Druids are all under one Chief, who possesses. the supreme Authority in that Body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the reft, he fucceeds: but if there are feveral Candidates of equal Merit, the Affair is determined by plurality of fuffrages. Sometimes they even have recourse to Arms before the Election can be brought to an Issue. Once a Year they assemble at a consecrated Place in the Territories of the Carnutes, whose Country is supposed to be the middle of Gaul. Hither fuch as have any Suits depending flock from all parts, and fubmit implicitly to their Decrees. Their Institution is supposed to come originally from Britain, whence it passed into Gaul; and even at this day, fuch as are defirous of being perfect

B O O Kperfect in it, travel thither for Instruction. The Druids never go to War, are exempted from Taxes and military Service, and enjoy all manner of Immunities. These mighty Encouragements induce multitudes of their own accord to follow that Profession; and many are sent by their Parents and Relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of Verses by heart, and often spend twenty Years upon this Institution: for it is deemed unlawful to commit their Statutes to Writing; tho' in other matters, whether publick or private, they make use of Greek Characters. They seem to me to follow this Method for two Reasons: to hide their Mysteries from the Knowledge of the Vulgar; and to exercise the Memory of their Scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, had they Letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal Maxims that the Soul never dies, but after Death passes from one Body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt Mens Courage, by difarming Death of its Terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the Stars and their Motions, the Magnitude of the World and our Earth, the Nature of Things, and the Power and Prerogatives of the immortal Gods.

XIV. The other Order of Men is the Nobles, whose whole Study and Occupation is War. Before Casar's Arrival in Gaul, they were almost every Year at War, either offensive or defensive; and they judge of the power and quality of their Nobles, by his Vassals, and the number of Men he keeps in his Pay: for these are the only marks of Grandeur they make any account of.

XV. THE whole Nation of the Gauls is extremely BOOK addicted to Superstition: whence in threatning Distempers, and the imminent Dangers of War, they make no scruple to facrifice Men, or engage themselves by Vow to such Sacrifices; in which they make use of the Ministry of the Druids: for it is a prevalent Opinion among them, that nothing but the life of Man can atone for the life of Man; infomuch that they have established even publick Sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge Coloffus's of Ofier Twigs, into which they put Men alive, and fetting fire to them, those within expire amidst the Flames. They prefer for Victims such as have been convicted of Theft, Robbery, or other Crimes; believing them the most acceptable to the Gods: but when real Criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to fuffer. Mercury is the chief Deity with them: of him they have many Images, account him the Inventor of all Arts, their Guide and Conductor in their Journeys, and the Patron of Merchandize and Gain. Next to him are Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva. Their Notions in regard to them are pretty much the same with those of other Nations. is their God of Physick; Minerva of Works and Manufactures; Yove holds the Empire of Heaven; and Mars presides in War. To this last, when they refolve upon a Battle, they commonly devote the Spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the Cattle taken, and fet apart the rest of the Plunder in a Place appointed for that purpose: and it is common in many Provinces, to fee these Monuments of Offerings piled up in confecrated Places. Nay it rarely happens, that any one flews fo great a Difregard of Religion, as either to conceal the Plunder,

BOOKPlunder, or pillage the publick Oblations; and VI. the feverest Punishments are inflicted upon such Offenders.

XVI. The Gauls fancy themselves to be descended from the God Pluto; which, it seems, is an established Tradition among the Druids. For this Reason they compute the Time by Nights, not by Days; and in the Observance of Birth-days, new Moons, and the beginning of the Year, always commence the Celebration from the preceding Night. In one Custom they differ from almost all other Nations; that they never suffer their Children to come openly into their presence, until they are of Age to bear Arms: for the Appearance of a Son in publick with his Father, before he has reached the Age of Manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

XVII. WHATEVER Fortune the Woman brings, the Husband is obliged to equal it out of his own Estate. This whole Sum, with its annual Product, is left untouched, and falls always to the share of the Survivor. The Men have Power of Life and Death over their Wives and Children: and when any Father of a Family of illustrious Rank dies, his Relations affemble, and upon the least ground of Suspicion put even his Wives to the Torture like Slaves. If they are found guilty, Iron and Fire are employed to torment and deftroy them. Their Funerals are magnificent and fumptuous, according to their Quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even Animals, are thrown into the Pile: and formerly fuch of their Slaves and Clients as they loved most, facrificed themselves at the Funeral of their Lord.

XVIII. In their best regulated States they have BOOK a Law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the Publick, whether by Rumor or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the Magistrate, without imparting it to any one else: for the nature of the People is such, that rash and unexperienced Men, alarmed by false Reports, are often hurried to the greatest Extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the highest Consequence. The Magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the Multitude what they think needful for the service of the Commonwealth: nor do the Laws permit to speak of State Affairs, except in publick Council.

XIX. THE Germans differ widely in their Manners from the Gauls. For neither have they Druids to prefide in religions Affairs; nor do they trouble themselves about Sacrifices. They acknowledge no Gods but those that are Objects of Sight, and by whose Power they are apparently benefited; the Sun, the Moon, Fire. Of others they know nothing; not even by Report. Their whole Life is addicted to Hunting and War; and from their Infancy they are inured to Fatigue and Hardships. They esteem those most, who continue longest Strangers to Women; as imagining nothing contributes fo much to Stature, Strength, and Vigour of Body: but to have any Commerce of this kind before the age of twenty, is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal any Irregularity this way; because they bathe promiscuoully in Rivers, and are clothed in Skins, or fhort Mantles of Fur, which leave the greatest part of their Bodies naked.

BOOK XX. AGRICULTURE is little regarded among them, as they live mostly on Milk, Cheese, and the Flesh of Animals. Nor has any Man Lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed Boundaries. The Magistrates, and those in Authority, portion out yearly to every Canton and Family, fuch a quantity of Land, and in what part of the Country they think proper; and the Year following remove them to some other Spot. Many Reasons are affigned for this Practice : left feduced by Habit and Continuance, they should learn to prefer Tillage to War: left a defire of enlarging their Poffessions should gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel the weaker: left they should become curious in their Buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of Heat and Cold: left Avarice should get footing amongst them, whence fpring Factions and Discords: in fine, to preserve Contentment and Equanimity among the People, when they find their Possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.

XXI. It is accounted honourable for States to have the Country all around them lie waste and depopulated: for they think it an argument of Valour to expel their Neighbours, and suffer none to settle near them; at the same time that they are themselves also the safer, as having nothing to apprehend from sudden Incursions. When a State is engaged in War, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of Magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with a Power of Life and Death. In time of Peace there are no publick Magistrates; but the Chiefs of the several Provinces and Clans administer Justice, and decide Differences within their respective Limits. Robbery has nothing

thing infamous in it, when committed without the BOOK Territories of the State to which they belong: they even pretend that it ferves to exercise their Youth, and prevent the growth of Sloth. When any of their Princes in this case offers himself publickly in Council as a Leader, fuch as approve of the Expedition rife up, profess themselves ready to follow him, and are applauded by the whole Multitude. They who go back from their Engagement are looked upon as Traytors and Deferters, and lofe all Esteem and Credit for the time to come. The Laws of Hofpitality are held inviolable among them. fly to them for Refuge, on whatever account, are fure of Protection and Defence; their Houses are open to receive them, and they plentifully supply their Wants.

XXII. FORMERLY the Gauls exceeded the Germans in Bravery, often made War upon them, and as they abounded in People beyond what the Country could maintain, fent feveral Colonies over the Accordingly the more fertile Places of Rhine. Germany, in the neighbourhood of the Hercynian Forest, (which I find mentioned by Exatostbenes and other Greek Writers under the name of Orcinia,) fell to the share of the Volce, who settled in those Parts, and have ever fince kept Possession. They are in the highest Reputation for Justice and Bravery, and no less remarkable than the Germans for Poverty, Abstinence, and Patience of Fatigue; conforming exactly to their Customs, both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the Roman Province, and an acquaintance with Traffick, has introduced Luxury and Abundance among the Gauls; whence becoming by little and little an unequal match for the Germans, and being worsted Vol. I.

BOOK worsted in many Battles, they no longer pretend VI. to compare with them in Valour.

XXIII. THE Hercynian Forest, of which we have been just speaking, is about nine Days Journey in breadth: for as the Germans are ignorant of the use of Measures, there is no other way of computing it. It begins from the Confines of the Helvetians, Nemetes, and Rauraci; and following directly the course of the Danube, extends to the Territories of the Anartes and Dacians. ing from the River to the left, it runs thro' a multitude of different Regions: and tho' there are many in the Country, who have advanced fix Days Journey into this Forest; yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or discovered how far it extends. Many different species of Animals, unknown in other Countries, harbour here; the most remarkable of which, and that best deferve to be mentioned, are thefe.

XXIV. THERE is a Bull that nearly refembles a Stag, with only one Horn rifing from the middle of his Forehead, taller and straighter than those of our Cattle, and which at top divides into many large Branches. The Males and Females are shaped alike, and have Horns the same in size.

XXV. HERE are likewise a kind of wild Asses, shaped and spotted like Goats, but of a larger size; without Horns, or Joints in their Legs; that never lie down to sleep; nor can raise themselves, if by any accident they are overthrown. They lean against Trees, which serve to support them when they sleep. Hence the Huntsmen, after having discovered their haunts, either loosen the Roots of the Trees, or saw them almost quite off; so that when

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

when the Animal, acording to Custom, reclines BOOK against them, they immediately give way, and both VI. fall down together.

XXVI. A third species of Animals are the Uri, nearly equalling the Elephant in bulk; but in colour, fhape, and kind, resembling a Bull. They are of uncommon strength and swiftness, and spare neither Man nor Beaft that comes in their way. They are taken and flain by means of Pits dug on purpose. This way of Hunting is frequent among the Youth, and ferves to inure them to Fatigue. They who kill the greatest number, and produce their Horns in publick as a proof, are in high Reputation with their Countrymen. It is found impossible to tame them, or conquer their fierceness, tho' taken never so young. Their Horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, differ much from those of our Bulls. The Natives preserve them with great care, tip their edges with Silver, and use them instead of Cups on their most solemn Festivals.

Scouts, that the Suevians were retired into their Woods; and fearing the want of Provisions, because, as we have already observed, the Germans are but little addicted to Agriculture; resolved not to advance any farther. But to keep the Enemy still under some awe of his Return, and prevent their sending Succours to Gaul; having repassed the Rhine, he only broke down about two hundred Feet of his Bridge, on the German side; and to secure the rest, built at the extremity a Tower of sour Stories, where he left a Garrison of twelve Cohorts, and strengthened the Place with all manner of Works. Young C. Volcatius Tallus had the charge of the Fort and Garrison. He himself, as

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BOOK foon as the Corn began to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix; taking his way thro' the Forest of Arden, which is much the largest in all Gaul, and reaches from the Banks of the Rhine, and the Confines of Treves, quite to the Nervians, thro' a Space of more than five hundred Miles. L. Minucius Basilus was fent before with all the Cavalry, in hopes that the quickness of his March, and the opportunity of fome lucky Conjuncture, might enable him to do fomething confiderable. He had orders to light no Fires in his Camp, the better to conceal his Approach from the Enemy; and Cafar affured him, he would follow with all expedition. Bafilus exactly followed his Instructions; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon the Gauls, furprifed great numbers of them in the Field, Being informed by them of the Place whither Ambiorix had retired with a few Cavalry, he marched directly against him.

> XXVIII. But as Fortune has a confiderable fhare in all human Concerns, fo particularly in those of War. For as it was a very extraordinary Chance, that he should thus come upon Ambiorix unprepared, and furprise him with his personal Arrival, before he had the least notice of it from Fame or Report: fo was it an equal effect of Fortune, that the Gaul himself, after having lost his Arms, Horses, and Chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the lituation of his House, which was surrounded with a Wood; it being customary among the Gauls, in order to avoid the Heats, to build in the neighbourhood of Woods and Rivers. By this means his Attendants and Friends, possessing themfelves of a Defile, fustained for a time the Attack of our Cavalry; during which, one of his Servants having provided him with a Horfe, be escaped

escaped into the Woods. Thus Fortune re-BOOK markably played her Part, both in bringing him VI. into the Danger, and delivering him out of it.

XXIX. Ambiorix, after his Escape, made no Attempt to draw his Forces together; nor is it known whether he acted in this manner out of Choice, as not thinking it fafe to hazard a Battle; or because he thought he should not have sufficient time, being surprised by the sudden Arrival of the Cavalry, and believing that all the rest of the Army followed. Dispatching therefore, Messengers privately thro' the Country, he counfelled every one to provide for his own Safety; upon which fome took refuge in the Forest of Arden, and some in the adjoining Morasses. Those who lived upon the Sea-coast, hid themselves in the Islands formed by the Tide at High Water: and many abandoning their Country altogether, trusted themselves and their all to the Faith of Foreigners. Cativulcus, who jointly with Ambiorix was King of the Eburones, and had affociated with him in all his Defigns, being of a very advanced Age, and unable to bear the Fatigues of War or Flight; after many Imprecations against Ambiorix, who had been the prime Contriver of the Revolt; poisoned himfelf with an extract of Yew, a Tree very common in Gaul and Germany. The Segni and Condrust, originally German Nations, whose Territories lay between those of Treves and the Eburones, fent Ambassadors to Casar to intreat: " That he would "not confider them as Enemies, nor look upon " all the Germans on this fide the Rhine as equally " obnoxious: That they had harboured no "Thoughts of War, nor been any ways aiding " to Ambiorix." Cafar finding it to be so by the Answers of the Prisoners, ordered them to deliver

BOOK up fuch of the Eburones as had fled to them for Re-VI. fuge; and promised, upon that Condition, not to molest their Territories.

> XXX. THEN dividing his Army into three Bodies, he fent all the Baggage to Atuatuca, a Caftle fituated almost in the heart of the Country of the Eburones, where Titurius and Arunculeius had been quartered during the Winter. This Place he chose, as for other Reasons, so likewise because the Fortifications raised the Year before were still entire. which would lessen the Labour of his Soldiers. He left the fourteenth Legion to guard the Baggage, being one of the three lately levied in Italy, and brought thence into Gaul. Q. Tullius Cicero had the Charge both of the Legion and Fort, which was further strengthened with an additional Guard of two hundred Horse. The Army being thus divided; he fent T. Labienus, with three Legions, towards the Sea-coast, and the Provinces that border upon the Menapians; C. Trebonius, with a like number of Legions, to lay wafte the Country adjoining to the Atuatici; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the Scheld, which flows into the Meuse, and to the Extremities of the Forest of Arden, whither he was informed Ambiorix had retired with a few Horse. mised, at his Departure, to return in seven Days; the Legion he had left in Garrison being provided with Corn only for that time: and exhorted Labiehus and Trebonius, if they found it confiftent with the publick Advantage, to return likewife with their Legions within the same Space; that joining counsel together, and taking their Measures from the Conduct of the Enemy, they might resolve where next to carry the War. XXXI.

XXXI. THERE was, as we have already ob-BOOK ferved, no formed Body of Troops, no Garrison, no fortified Town to defend by Arms; but a Multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever a Cave, or a Thicket, or a Morass offered them Shelter, thither they retired. These Places were well known to the Natives; and great Care and Caution was required on our part, not for the Security of the whole Army, (which had no danger to fear whilft in a Body, from Enemies dispersed and full of Terror;) but for the Preservation of each Individual. And yet even this regarded not a little the whole Army: for the Defire of Plunder drew many of the Men to a great distance; and the Woods full of Defiles and hidden Ways, hindered them from keeping together in a Body. If Cafar meant to terminate the War altogether, and extirpate this Race of perfidious Men; the Soldiers must be divided into small Parties, and detached on all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his Men together, as the Rules of War, and the Roman Discipline required; the Enemy were sheltered by their Situation, nor wanted Boldness to form Ambuscades, and cut off Stragglers. Amidst these Difficulties, all possible Precautions were taken; and although the Soldiers were eagerly bent upon Revenge, yet Cafar chose rather not to push the Enemy too far, than expose his Men to danger. He therefore sent Messengers to the neighbouring States, inviting them all by the hopes of Plunder, to join in the Destruction of the Eburones; choosing rather to expose the Lives of the Gauls in the Woods, than of the legionary Soldiers; and hoping by the Multitude employed against them, totally to extirpate the Name and Memory of a State, whose Revolt had rendered them fo obnoxious. Accord-04 ingly

BOOK ingly great Numbers flocked suddenly thither from VI. all Parts.

XXXII. Thus were the Eburones attacked on all fides, and the Havock continued till the feventh Day, which Cafar had appointed for returning to his Camp and Baggage. It then evidently appeared what Influence Fortune has over War, and how many Accidents spring from her Interposition. The Enemy being dispersed and full of Terror, as we have related above; there remained no Body of Troops in the Field, to give any the least ground of Fear. A Report spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine, that the Territories of the Eburones were given up to Plunder, and all without distinction invited to share in the Spoil. The Sicambri, who inhabit upon the Rhine, and had afforded a Retreat to the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, as mentioned above; affembled immediately a Body of two thousand Horse, passed the River in Barks about thirty Miles below Cafar's Bridge and Fort, and advanced directly towards the Territories of the Eburones. Many of those that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and down the Country, fell into their Hands; as likewife abundance of Cattle, of which the Barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by this Success they advanced farther. Neither Woods nor Morasses proved any Obstacles to Men, trained up from their Infancy to Wars and Incursions. Inquiring of the Prifoners concerning Cafar, they understood that he was a great way off, and had left the Country with his whole Army. One in particular addressing them.: " Why, fays he, do you lose time in pur-" fuit of fo flight and trifling a Booty, when For-" tune offers one of fo much greater Value. In " three Hours you may reach Atuatuca, where the 66 Romans

Romans have deposited all their Wealth. The BOOK Garrison is hardly sufficient to line the Rampart, VI. much less to fally out of their Intrenchments."

Urged by this hope, they left their present Booty in a Place of Sasety, and marched directly to Atuatuca, being conducted by the Captive who had given them the Information.

XXXIII. CICERO, who hitherto had kept his Soldiers strictly within the Camp, according to Cafar's Orders, nor fuffered fo much as a Servant to straggle beyond the Lines; seeing the seventh Day arrive, began to despair of Casar's Return, who, as he heard, was marched farther into the Country, and had fent him no notice of his Rout. Wherefore tired with the continual Murmurs of the Soldiers. who complained of his Patience, and told him they were kept like Men besieged; and not suspecting that any Accident could befal him, within the small Extent of three Miles; especially as the Enemy, opposed by nine Legions, and a very numerous Cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed and cut off; he fent out five Cohorts to forage in an adjoining Field, separated from the Camp only by a fingle Hill. A great many fick Men had been left behind by Cæsar, of whom about three hundred, that were now pretty well recovered, joined the Detachment. These were followed by almost all the Servants of the Camp, together with a vast Number of Carts and Carriage-horses.

XXXIV. In that very Instant, as Fortune would have it, the German Cavalry arrived; and without discontinuing their Course, endeavoured to force an immediate Entrance by the Decuman Gate. As their March had been covered by a Wood, they were not discovered till they were just upon

BOOK upon the Camp; infomuch that the Sutlers, who kept their Booths under the Rampart, had not time to retire within the Intrenchments. Our Men were fo furprised at this sudden and unexpected Attack, that the Cohort upon Guard could scarce fustain the first Onset. The Enemy spread themfelves on all fides to find a Place of Entrance. The Romans with difficulty defended the Gates; the Rampart fecuring them every where elfe. whole Camp was in an Uproar, every one inquiring of another the Cause of the Confusion; nor could they determine which way to advance the Standards, or where to post themselves. reported the Camp was already taken: others, that the Germans, having destroyed Cafar and his Army, were come victorious to storm their Trenches. The greater Number, full of imaginary Fears, when they confidered the Place in which they were encamped, called to mind the Fate of Cotta and Titurius, who perished in that very Fort. This univerfal Consternation being perceived by the Barbarians, confirmed them in the Belief of what the Prisoners had told them, that there was fcarce any Garrison within to defend the Camp. They renewed their Endeavours to force the Intrenchments, and mutually exhorted one another, not to let so fair a Prize escape out of their hands.

XXXV. Among the fick in Garrison was P. Sextins Baculus, a Centurion of the first Rank, of whom mention has been made in former Battles, and who had not tasted Food for five Days. This Officer, anxious for his own Safety, and that of the Legion, rushed unarmed out of his Tent. He saw the Enemy at hand, and the Danger extreme. Snatching the first Arms that offered, he posted thimself in the Gate of the Camp. The Centurions of

of the Cohort upon Guard followed the Example, BOOK and for a while fustained the Enemy's Charge. VI. Sextius expired under a multitude of Wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the Soldiers. This short Delay gave the rest time to resume their Courage; so tar at least, as to mount the Rampart, and make a shew of desending themselves.

NXXVI. MEAN-TIME our Foragers returning, heard the Noise at the Camp. The Cavalry advancing before, were soon apprized of the Danger. Here was no Fortification to shelter the frighted Troops. The new Levies, unexperienced in matters of War, fixed their Eyes upon the Tribunes and Centurions, waiting their Orders. Not a Man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed by so unexpected an Accident. The Germans perceiving our Ensigns at a distance, gave over the Attack of the Camp, imagining at first it was Cæsar and the Legions, which the Prisoners had informed them were marched farther into the Country. But soon observing how sew they were, they surrounded and fell upon them on all sides.

XXXVII. The Servants of the Camp fled to the nearest rising Ground; whence being immediatedly driven, they threw themselves amongst the Ranks of the Cohorts, and thereby increased their Terror. Some were for drawing up in form of a Wedge, and forcing their way thro' the Enemy: for as the Camp was so very near, they imagined, that if some fell, the rest at least must escape. Others were for retiring to an Eminence, and all sharing there the same Fate. The veteran Soldiers, who had marched out with the Detachment, could by no means relish this Proposal: wherefore mutually encouraging one another, and being led by

BOOK C. Trebonius a Roman Knight, under whose command they were, they broke thro' the midst of the Enemy, and all to a Man arrived fafe in the Camp. The Servants and Cavalry following them, and feconding their Retreat, were likewise by their Bravery preserved. But the Troops who had refired to the Hill, being unexperienced in military Affairs, could neither perfift in the Resolution they had taken of defending themselves from the higher Ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous Effort which they faw had been fo ferviceable to their Companions: but endeavouring to gain the Camp, quitted the advantage of their Situation. The Centurions, fome of whom had been felected from veteran Legions, and on account of their Bravery promoted to higher Stations among the new Levies; fought resolutely to maintain the Glory they had acquired, and endeavoured to fell their Lives as dear as they could. Their Valour obliging the Enemy to fall back a little, part of the Troops, contrary to Expectation, reached the Camp. The rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Barbarians.

XXXVIII. The Germans, despairing to carry the Camp, as they saw our Men now prepared to defend the Works, repassed the Rhine with the Booty they had deposited in the Woods. But so great was the Terror of the Romans even after their Retreat, that C. Volusenus arriving in the Camp the same Night with the Cavalry, could not persuade them that Coesar and the Army were safe. For Fear had taken so thorough a possession of their Minds, that as if berest of Understanding, they persisted in believing the Insantry was wholly destroyed, and that the Cavalry alone had escaped: it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the Germans

no Misfortune befallen the Roman Army. But VI. Cesar's Arrival soon put an end to their Fears.

XXXIX. Upon his Return, being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the fending out the Cohorts to forage; observing: "That in War nothing ought to be left to Fortune, "whose Power appeared evidently in the sudden "Arrival of the Enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very Gates of the "Camp." But nothing in this whole Affair appeared to him more wonderful, than that the Germans having crossed the Rhine with design to plunder the Territories of Ambiorix, should by falling upon the Roman Camp do him a most acceptable Service.

XL. CÆSAR marched a second time to harrass the Enemy, and having drawn a great number of Troops together from the neighbouring States, fent them into all Parts upon this Service. All the Houses and Villages were set on fire: the Plunder was universal: the vast number of Men and Horses not only destroyed great Quantities of Corn, but the Rains and advanced Season made Havock of all that was left; infomuch that if any of the Enemy escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, that after the Retreat of the Army, they must perith by Famine. As the Cavalry were divided into many Parties, they often came to Places, where the Prisoners not only informed them they had feen Ambiorix flying, but that he could even yet be scarce out of view. The Hope of coming up with him made them leave nothing unattempted, as imagining they would thereby gain the highest Favour with Casar, whose good Fortune wanted only this to render it compleat.

BOOK compleat. But all their Endeavours were fruitless:

VI. for he still found means to hide himself in the Woods and Morasses; whence removing privately in the Night, he escaped into other Regions, accompanied with only four Horsemen, in whom alone he durst conside.

XLI. CÆSAR having destroyed the whole Country, led back his Army into the Territories of the Rhemi, with the loss of only two Cohorts. There he summoned a general Assembly of Gaul, to examine into the Assair of the Senones and Carnutes: and having passed a severe Sentence against Acco, the Contriver of the Revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some fearing a like sate, sled: whom having banished by a Decree of the Diet, he quartered two Legions in Treves, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agendicum, in the Country of the Senones. And having provided the Army with Corn, he went, pursuant to his Design, into Italy, to hold the Assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul.

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